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ABSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to study the development of the Gaullist movement's views on the
situation in French North Africa - Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria - in the period between the
elections of June 1951 and Charles de Gaulle's return to power following the revolt ofMay
1958 in Algeria. It seeks to emphasise the activities of Gaullists in parliament and in
government, as well as those of regional Gaullist activists, rather than focusing closely on
the work of de Gaulle himself. It is based on Gaullist party archives, politicians' private
papers, and the extensive Gaullist press, as well as parliamentary papers and diplomatic
documents. It seeks to establish the range of Gaullist views on the North African problems
before their return to power, in the light of the fact that it was the crisis in North Africa that
brought about the Gaullists' return to government. In addition, the thesis demonstrates the
extent of divisions among Gaullists during the Fourth Republic, providing a close analysis of
Gaullist thought in this often-neglected period, with special reference to colonial and
international questions.
The first chapter, after providing an overview of the state of scholarship on Gaullism and
decolonisation in French North Africa, attempts to define and clarify notions of Gaullism,
and introduces the most important Gaullist figures whose views and behaviour will be
examined in the rest of the thesis. The second chapter discusses the most important themes
associated with Gaullism in the early years of the Fourth Republic, demonstrating the origins
ofmany of the ideas and principles that were to shape Gaullist thinking on North Africa in
the period 1951-58.
The third chapter deals with Gaullist responses to the unrest in Morocco and Tunisia in
1951-54, at a time when increasing nationalist activity forced the question of the
Protectorates' future onto the French political agenda. Chapters four and five set the issue in
wider context, concentrating on other important developments that influenced the Gaullists'
opinions on North Africa. The fourth chapter describes the Gaullists' opposition to the
European Defence Community plan in 1952-54, emphasising the role that prioritisation of
North Africa played in their opposition to European integration. The fifth chapter describes
Gaullists' reactions to the French defeat in Indochina in 1954, in terms of its effect on their
views of the importance ofNorth Africa for France's influence, prestige and security.
Chapters six and seven describe Gaullist responses to government attempts to introduce
reform in North Africa. The sixth chapter focuses on the Gaullists' opposition to government
proposals to devolve power to Morocco and Tunisia, with a view to their independence. The
seventh chapter examines the first fifteen months of the war in Algeria, from November
1954 to February 1956. It shows how Gaullists lost faith in successive governments' ability
to solve the Algerian problem, and it traces the emergence of the idea that this crisis was
seriously weakening France both domestically and internationally. In addition, it focuses on
the divisions that emerged within Gaullism in response to colonial problems. This chapter
also studies in detail one of the most important Gaullists in terms of the North African crisis,
Jacques Soustelle, analysing his role in the development of Gaullist views.
The eighth chapter deals with the Gaullists' responses to the deepening crisis in North
Africa, between Moroccan and Tunisian independence in March 1956 and the end of the
Fourth Republic in May 1958. It looks, in particular, at the international dimension of the
Algerian crisis as seen by Gaullists, and includes detailed study of another key Gaullist
thinker and activist, Michel Debre. Chapter nine attempts to identify the Gaullists'
involvement in the revolt ofMay 1958 in Algiers, by examining their contacts with the
leaders of the military revolt against the government and with settler politicians in Algiers. It
seeks to determine how the Gaullists succeeded in persuading traditionally antigaullist
groups that de Gaulle would be able to guarantee the maintenance of French Algeria, and
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CHAPTER 1
Review of literature and sources
The literature on the subject of Charles de Gaulle in general is vast.1 In addition to
historical studies, the General has been the subject of much attention from political
science, which has frequently sought to place his political principles within the
broader context of recurring themes in French political history. However, relatively
little attention has been paid to the period between de Gaulle's departure from office
in 1946 and his return in 1958, the so-called 'traversee du desert.' Indeed, the Gaullist
political movements of this period have been neglected in the general studies of
Gaullism, which have tended to concentrate on the Second World War and the
Liberation era, and on the Fifth Republic. The principal works on the Fourth
Republic period are those by Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'Opposition, and Purtschet, Le
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Rassemblement du Peuple Frangais. Both of these works deal extensively with the
organisation of the RPF and its activities within France; they have less to say,
however, about the evolution of Gaullist policy as opposed to the life of the
movement, and both are virtually silent on the question of Gaullism's attitudes to
colonial questions at the time of the RPF. In addition to the above-mentioned works
by Chariot and Purtschet, the only substantial work of note on the RPF is the
'
Among the most useful biographies of de Gaulle are: J. Lacouture, De Gaulle, vol. 2: le politique
1944-1959 (Paris: Seuil, 1985); C. Cogan, Charles de Gaulle: A briefbiography with documents
(Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1996); J. Jackson, Charles de Gaulle (London: Cardinal, 1990); C.
Williams, The Last Great Frenchman: A life ofCharles de Gaulle (London: Little, Brown, 1993); J.P.
Rioux, De Gaulle: La France a vif(Paris: Liana Levi, 2000); P.M. de la Gorce, De Gaulle entre deux
mondes (Paris: Fayard, 1964). The total number ofworks on Gaullism now numbers over 2000,
according to Institut Charles de Gaulle, Nouvelle bibliographic internationale sur Charles de Gaulle
(Paris: Plon, 1990).
2 See for example P. Cerny, The Politics ofGrandeur: Ideological aspects ofde Gaulle's foreign
policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); J. Chariot, Le Phenomene gaulliste (Paris:
Fayard, 1970); J-C. Petitfils, Le Gaullisme (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1981); J.
Touchard, Le Gaullisme, 1940-1969 (Paris: Seuil, 1978); N. Tenzer, La Face cachee du gaullisme
(Paris: Flachette, 1998); S. Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994).
3 J. Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition (Paris: Fayard, 1983); C. Purtschet, Le Rassemblement du
Peuple Frangais (Paris, Editions Cujas, 1965); A. Flartley, Gaullism: The Rise and Fall ofa Political
movement (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972). S. Berstein, Histoire du gaullisme (Paris: Perrin,
2001) devotes more space than many other histories of Gaullism to the Fourth Republic, but does not
specifically address colonial policy.
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collection of articles published in 1997 by the Fondation Charles de Gaulle, entitled
De Gaulle et le RPF 1947-1955 4 It, too, provides a detailed account of the internal
life of the movement but deals only briefly with colonial and foreign policy
questions.? The RPF is of course mentioned in general works on Gaullism and on
Fourth Republic politics, but such work has tended to focus on its presumed role as a
vehicle for the spread of de Gaulle's ideas, at the expense of analysis of the
movement as a political movement with its own internal trends of opinion and
policy-making processes. This somewhat cursory treatment of the RPF surely owes
much to de Gaulle's own attempts to minimise its importance to his career; the
Rassemblement famously only occupies one paragraph in his memoirs.6 The other
Gaullist movements of the Fourth Republic have received even less attention than the
RPF, frequently being overlooked by general histories of the period or of Gaullism.
The groups ofRPF deputies who formed, in 1952, the Action Republicaine et Sociale
(ARS) as a sub-group within the RPF and, in 1953, the Union Republicaine d'Action
Sociale (URAS) have not been treated as representative of a distinct tendency within
Gaullism, despite the fact that several of the most influential Gaullist thinkers can be
found within these short-lived groups. Likewise, the Centre National des
4Fondation Charles de Gaulle/Universite de Bordeaux III, De Gaulle et le Rassemblement du Peuple
Frangais (1947-1955) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1998).
5 The three chapters on colonial affairs that do appear in this collection deal only with Indochina (F.
Turpin, 'Le RPF et la guerre d'Indochine', pp. 530-40 and 'Le RPF en Indochine', pp. 280-9) and
Equatorial Africa (P. Bas, 'Le RPF en AEF (1949-1951)', pp. 289-94), while a general introduction to
the theme of the RPF and the Union Frangaise (G. Perville, 'Le RPF et l'Union Franchise: Rapport de
synthese', pp. 521-9) is limited to general remarks about the place of the colonies in de Gaulle's
worldview. The chapters on foreign and defence policy (J-P. Bled, 'Le General de Gaulle, le RPF et la
politique etrangere: rapport de synthese', pp. 563-69; C. d'Abzac-Epezy, 'Le RPF et les questions de
defense', pp. 569-84) too, do not refer to the role played by colonial questions in the development of
Gaullist thinking on international affairs.
6
Gaulle, Charles de, Memoires d'Espoir: le renouveau 1958-1962 (Paris: Plon, 1996), pp. 22-3
7 The ARS was formed in 1952 by twenty-seven Gaullists expelled from the parliamentary RPF for
voting the investiture as Prime Minister of Antoine Pinay, in contravention of the RPF's policy of not
according its support to any Fourth Republic government. Its leading figure was Henri Frederic-
Dupont. It consisted mainly of deputies who might be described as members of the traditional
conservative Right. The URAS was formed in 1953, after de Gaulle had brought the parliamentary
existence of the RPF to an end. Its members included most of the RPF deputies, led by a 'Comite
d'initiative et d'organisation' composed of Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Francis Le Basser and Georges
Oudard. Its members were mostly new to politics in 1945, and might be said to represent more of a
centrist tendency. The ARS provided five government ministers in 1952-53, while the URAS were
rarely absent from government after 1954. D. Macrae, Parliament, Parties andSociety in France,
2
Republicains Sociaux (generally shortened to Republicains Sociaux (RS)), created in
January 1954 and to all intents and purposes the successor to the RPF after the
Rassemblement was brought to an end in 1955,8 has only rarely been studied in
detail, with only two monographs devoted to it, the more recent in 1980.9 The neglect
of the RS is perhaps understandable given the movement's spectacular lack of
success in the 1956 elections, and the fact that it was never able to claim that it spoke
for the entire Gaullist movement, as some prominent Gaullists appeared to show only
a nominal commitment to the movement and, most importantly, it never received de
Gaulle's unequivocal public support. Yet, for the years between 1956 and 1958, the
RS is the closest approximation of a Gaullist movement that can be identified, and its
conferences and publications represent the clearest public expression of Gaullism
during the two years before de Gaulle's return to power in May 1958.
Although general works on Gaullism and de Gaulle abound, few deal with the Fourth
Republic in detail and even fewer address colonial and international questions in this
period. On the subject of the present study — Gaullism and North Africa — only one
detailed work based on archival sources is available, Fabrice Barthelemy's memoire
de maitrise of 1997 entitled Le Gaullisme et I'Algerie au temps du RPF, 1947-1955.10
This work, though based on RPF archives, is of necessity brief, and deals with the
question ofRPF organisation in Algeria rather than the movement's policy on the
future of the territory. Furthermore, Barthelemy does not consider the Algerian
1946-1958 (New York & London: St. Martin's Press/Macmillan, 1967), pp. 141-2; Purtschet, Le RPF,
pp. 359-69.
8 The RPF, although effectively ended by de Gaulle on June 30 1955, was never actually dissolved. Its
administrative structures remained in place under General Secretary Jacques Foccart and played a part
in maintaining a Gaullist party organisation at local level that could be reactivated in 1958 and in the
early years of the Fifth Republic. The RPF also continued to produce one publication after 1955, the
Lettre a I'Union Franqaise.
9
M-F. Chevrillon, 'Les Republicains Sociaux ou la traversee du desert', (unpublished memoire de
maitrise, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1965); H. J. Tummers, Das 'Centre National des
Republicains Sociaux': Eine Gaullistische Partei unter der IV. Republik, (unpublished doctoral thesis,
Universitat Augsburg, 1980)
10 F. Barthelemy, Le Gaullisme et I'Algerie au temps du RPF, 1947-1955, (unpublished memoire de
maitrise, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1997). Also of use is Institut Charles de Gaulle,
Brazzaville janvier-fevrier 1944: aux sources de la decolonisation (Paris: Plon, 1988)
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question in terms of its wider implications for or connections with Gaullist policy on
other matters, nor does he find space for consideration of the views of Gaullists as
expressed outside the formal structures ofRPF activities, such as press articles,
speeches in parliament or co-operation with other political or lobbying groups. The
chief usefulness ofBarthelemy's research, therefore, consists in its portrayal of
Gaullist activity in Algeria in the early Fourth Republic and of the slow evolution of
Gaullist policy as revealed by the 'official' sources such as RPF conference reports.
Other than this work on Algeria, the body of secondary work on Gaullism and North
Africa available to researchers consists of summaries in general works on Gaullism
or on decolonisation, which tend to place the emphasis on the declarations of de
Gaulle himself on the subject.1'
Histories of the crisis in French North Africa in the 1950s include some discussion of
the Gaullists' position where this is relevant to French government policy, such as
Christian Fouchet's spell as Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs (1954-55),
Gilbert Grandval's brief governorship in Morocco (July-August 1955), Jacques
Soustelle's period as governor-general in Algeria (1955-6) and General Georges
Catroux's nomination to and rapid resignation from the same post in February 1956.
Yet histories of the North African problems of this period cannot devote significant
attention to the policies of a political group that, through its reluctance to participate
in government, had little direct effect on the government policy that such works
examine. Similarly, general work on Fourth Republic foreign policy makes little
reference to the views of the Gaullists, whose role in the elaboration and discussion
of government policy was limited to that of a constant voice of opposition in
parliament, most importantly at the time of the European Defence Community
(EDC) affair of 1952-54. Furthermore, colonial and foreign policy questions have
generally been treated as separate during the Fourth Republic, with only one study,
Aimaq's For Europe or Empire, attempting to demonstrate the close link between
" See notes 1&2 above.
4
French colonial interests and the formulation of policy on other matters of
international concern.12 Aimaq's thesis - that the French government's opposition to
EDC and resistance to American influence in Europe were determined largely by
colonial preoccupations - provides a valuable interpretative framework in which to
examine the influence of the North African question on Gaullist international and
defence policy. It must be noted, however, that For Europe or Empire is a study of
French government attitudes and as such includes very few references to Gaullism.
Only one monograph on any aspect of Fourth Republic Gaullist foreign policy exists,
Manin's Le Rassemblement du Peuple Frangais et les problemes europeens,n and its
focus on Europe places it on the periphery of this study's field of interest. The theme
of general RPF attitudes to international affairs has been addressed by Jean-Paul
Brunet,14 who argues that the RPF's conception of how the principle ofgrandeur
could be applied relied heavily on the development ofAlgeria, which would in turn
allow France to maintain great power status and challenge American influence in
Europe. The importance for the Gaullists of achieving puissance and grandeur, as
highlighted by Brunet and by other, more general, studies of Gaullism's attitudes to
foreign affairs, will be examined in this thesis as an underlying principle that guided
Gaullist policy towards North Africa.13
If the Gaullists were little more than peripheral figures in the elaboration ofmost of
the Fourth Republic's policies, one area in which they might be said to have exerted
more direct influence is military affairs. Three Gaullists - Pierre Billotte, Pierre
Koenig and Jacques Chaban-Delmas - held the office ofMinister of Defence, while
others were instrumental in the beginnings of the French nuclear programme that was
12 J. Aimaq, For Europe or Empire: French Colonial Ambitions and the European Army Plan (Lund:
Lund University Press, 1996)
13
P. Manin, Le Rassemblement du Peuple Frangais et les problemes europeens (Paris: Presses
universitaires de France, 1966)
14 J-P. Brunet, 'Le RPF et l'idee de puissance nationale (1945-1948)', in La Puissance frangaise en
question (1945-1949), ed. by R. Girault & R. Frank (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1988), pp.
362-84
15 On the themes ofgrandeur and puissance see Cerny, Politics ofGrandeur and M. Vai'sse, La
Grandeur: politique etrangere du General de Gaulle 1958-1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998)
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to become a key aspect of de Gaulle's policy during the Fifth Republic.
Consequently, general secondary work on the military history of the Fourth Republic
tends to be more useful to the observer of Gaullism during that period than is the
case for histories of foreign policy. The recent collection of essays entitled Militaires
en Republique 1870-1962 contains valuable pieces on Pierre Koenig's defence
ministry, on the beginnings of the nuclear programme, and on the extent ofmilitary
support for the RPF.16 On the military question alone, general works dealing with the
genesis of the force de frappe during the Fourth Republic demonstrate the extent of
Gaullist involvement and reveal both the importance that certain Gaullists attached to
the military programme as part of their vision for France's future and the relatively
minor role that nuclear questions, so important in the Fifth Republic, played in
1 7
Fourth Republic Gaullism. The involvement of Gaullists in military policy under
the Fourth Republic has also been evoked in general studies of the armed forces
during this period, focussing especially on civil-military relations and the appeal of
Gaullism to disillusioned officers. While much of the work available on this subject
was completed before the opening ofmilitary archives, it nevertheless remains useful
as an indication of the contemporary perception of Gaullists and discontented
military figures as potential allies, an impression that played an important role in the
1 o
period leading up to the return of de Gaulle in 1958. Memoirs of former military
16 O. Forcade, E. Duhamel & P. Vial, (eds.) Militaires en Republique 1870-1962: les officiers, le
pouvoir et la vie publique, (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999) - especially D. Mongin, 'Le role
des militaires dans le choix de l'arme atomique avant 1958', pp. 89-97; P. Vial, 'Un ministre
paradoxal, le general Koenig (19 juin/14 aout 1954 - 23 fevrier/ 6 octobre 1955)', pp. 255-89; B.
Lachaise, 'Les Militaires et le gaullisme au temps du Rassemblement du Peuple Franfais', pp. 455-65.
17 W. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1971); W. Mendl, Deterrence and
Persuasion: French Nuclear Armament in the Context ofNational Policy, 1945-1969 (New York &
Washington: Praeger, 1970); W. Mendl, 'The Background of French Nuclear Policy', International
Affairs, 41 (1965), pp. 22-36; D. Mongin, La Bombe atomique frangaise 1945-1958 (Brussels:
Bruylant, 1997); Institut Charles de Gaulle/Universite de Franche-Comte, L'Aventure de la bombe:
De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucleaire (1958-1969) (Paris: Plon, 1985)
18 The most useful works on the French armed forces in the period covered by the present study are:
P.M. de la Gorce, La Republique et son armee (Paris: Fayard, 1963); R. Maran, Torture: The Role of
Ideology in the French-Algerian War (New York & London: Praeger, 1989); D. Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfarefrom Indochina to Algeria: The analysis ofa political and military doctrine
(London: Pall Mall Press, 1964); J.S. Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962 (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1966); G. Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis,
1947-1962 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965); O. Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic (Lincoln:
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figures, many ofwhom quickly distanced themselves from Gaullism once Algerian
independence began to seem inevitable,19 are in this respect valuable sources for a
study of the appeal of Fourth Republic Gaullism in the context of colonial questions,
and they demonstrate the importance, for a study of Gaullism and colonial questions,
of devoting sufficient attention to the military aspect of the subject.
The chronological and geographical focus of this study - North Africa during the
Fourth Republic - has, like Gaullism, received considerable general coverage. As is
the case for Fourth Republic politics, however, the Gaullists tend to occupy only a
small part of the available works. Histories ofpolitical life in the North African
colonies treat the settler communities in general, with the Gaullists tending to receive
only the brief mention that their limited electoral presence and popular support
merits.20 The most detailed treatment of Gaullism in practice in North Africa - other
than Danan's work on wartime Algiers - is Firestone's article dealing with the
doctrine of 'integration' among the settler population in Algeria. Integration,
however, as will be seen in Chapters 7-8, might be said to be as much the policy of
• •91
one individual Gaullist, Jacques Soustelle, as that of the entire Gaullist movement.
Among the many works on the Algerian War, the only mention of Gaullist activity
tends to be brief and related to the alleged conspiracies ofMay 1958 that led to de
Gaulle's return to power. Moreover, most general accounts of these events draw
University ofNebraska Press, 1967); R. Girardet, La Crise militaire franqaise (Paris: Armand Colin,
1964); J. Planchais, Une histoire politique de Parmee, vol. 2 (Paris: Seuil, 1967)
19
A. Argoud, La Decadence, I'imposture et la tragedie (Paris: Fayard, 1974); R. Salan, Memoires,
vols. 3 & 4 (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1972-74); J. Massu, La Vraie bataille d'Alger (Paris: Plon,
1971); J. Massu, Le Torrent et la digue (Paris: Plon, 1972); R. Trinquier, Le Temps perdu (Paris:
Albin Michel, 1978); E. Jouhaud, O mon pays perdu (Paris: Fayard, 1969); E. Jouhaud, Ce que je n'ai
pas dit (Paris: Fayard, 1977); A. Juin, Memoires, vol. 2 (Paris: Fayard, 1960); P. Ely, Memoires, vol.
2: Suez...le 13 Mai (Paris: Plon, 1969)
20 A. Nouschi, L'Algerie amere 1914-1994 (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Flomme,
1995); Y. Danan, La Vie politique a Alger de 1940 a 1944 (Paris: Librairie Generate de Droit et de
Jurisprudence, 1963); C.R. Ageron, Modern Algeria: A History from 1830 to the Present, trans. & ed.
M. Betts (London: Hurst & Co., 1991); D. Leconte, Les Pieds-noirs: histoire et portrait d'une
communaute, (Paris: Seuil, 1980); P. Nora, Les Franqais d'Algerie (Paris: Rene Julliard, 1961); P.
Laffont, Histoire de la France en Algerie (Paris: Plon, 1980); S.H. Van Dyke, French Settler Politics
during the Algerian War (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 1980)
21 On integration, see Y. Firestone, 'The Doctrine of Integration with France among the Europeans of
Algeria, 1955-1960', Comparative Political Studies, 4 (July 1971), pp. 177-203
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heavily on the work of contemporary observers such as Ferniot or the Brombergers,
whose accounts, published in the 1950s and 1960s, still constitute the principal
source of reference for the events that led to the return of de Gaulle.22 More detailed
analysis of the role of the Gaullists in the Algerian crisis and the end of the Fourth
Republic are provided by Andrews' French Politics andAlgeria, along with
Rudelle's Mai 1958: De Gaulle et la Republique, which presents the advantage of
being compiled with the aid of sources to which the author was granted exclusive
access by the Fondation Charles de Gaulle, although the final result at times bears
close resemblance to the various apologies for Gaullism published in participants'
memoirs.23 Further valuable material on the background to Gaullists' involvement in
the Algerian crisis is provided by Bourdrel's detailed La Derniere chance de I'Algerie
frangaise, which, though dealing primarily with the Mollet government of 1956-57,
nevertheless gives useful information on the increasing vehemence of the Gaullists'
opposition and the development of Gaullist thinking.24 While this study will not seek
to provide a definitive treatment of the events ofMay 1958, whose true nature may
never become clear in the apparent absence of reliable sources and the abundance of
conspiracy theories, it will seek to trace the development of the idea among Gaullists
that a crisis could arise, or be provoked, via the Algerian crisis, that would bring
22 M. & S. Bromberger, Les 13 complots du 13 mai (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1959); J. Femiot, De
Gaulle et le 13 mai (Paris: Plon, 1965). Articles by Touchard and Williams give a useful
bibiliographic overview of other work on the subject in the period immediately following May 1958,
most of which presents the same evidence as the Brombergers: J. Touchard, 'La Fin de la Quatrieme
Republique', Revue frangaise de science politique, 8 (Dec. 1958), pp. 917-28; P. Williams, 'The
Fourth Republic: Murder or Suicide?', in P. Williams, Wars, Plots and Scandals in Post-War France
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 129-66. The best overall treatments of the
Algerian War are H. Alleg et al., La Guerre d'Algerie (3 vols.), (Paris: Les Temps Actuels, 1981); Y.
Courriere, La Guerre d'Algerie (4 vols.), (Paris: Fayard, 1971); B. Droz & E. Lever, Histoire de la
guerre d'Algerie, 1954-1962 (Paris: Seuil, 1982); H. Elsenhans, La Guerre d'Algerie 1954-1962. La
Transition d'une France a une autre. Le Passage de la IVeme a la Verne Republique, trans, by V.
Goupy (Paris: Published, 1999). T. Oppermann, Le probleme algerien: donnees historiques,
jurdiques, politiques, trans, by J. Lecerf (Paris: Francis Maspero, 1961) is particularly useful for its
emphasis on international aspects of the conflict.
2j O. Rudelle, Mai 58: De Gaulle et la Republique (Paris: Plon, 1988); O. Rudelle, 'Gaullisme et crise
d'identite republicaine' in La Guerre d'Algerie et les Frangais, ed. by J.P. Rioux (Paris: Fayard, 1990),
pp. 180-201; W. G. Andrews, French Politics and Algeria: The process ofpolicyformation 1954-
1962 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1962); Fondation Charles de Gaulle, L'Avenement de la
Ve Republique: entre nouveaute et tradition (Paris: Armand Colin, 1999)
24 P. Bourdrel, La Derniere chance de I'Algerie frangaise: du gouvernement socialiste au retour de de
Gaulle, 1956-1958 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1996)
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about the return to power of de Gaulle. In this respect, in addition to the above
mentioned treatments of the end of the Fourth Republic (note 23), the recent,
controversial, study by Nick, Resurrection, provides useful information on the
9 S
underground activities of Gaullists between 1954 and 1958.
The Moroccan and Tunisian aspects of the subject have received considerably less
attention than the Algerian War. The most comprehensive works on the process of
Tunisian and Moroccan independence are those by Bernard, Julien and El-Machat,
none of which treats the Gaullists in detail. Julien briefly portrays the RPF in Tunisia
as the voice of reaction and colonial conservatism, while El-Machat concentrates
entirely on the Tunisian nationalists and the French government. These books,
therefore, contain information on the Gaullists who held official positions relating to
Morocco and Tunisia, but, with the exception of Bernard's reference to the
relationship between Gilbert Grandval and de Gaulle, their views are not treated as
26
an expression of Gaullism, but rather as an expression of French colonial policy.
Morocco and Tunisia have been discussed in the context of their international
significance under the Fourth Republic, by El-Machat and Lacroix-Riz, both of
whose work is useful in its demonstration of the increasing attention paid to the
North African region by those with an interest in international and strategic questions
throughout the 1950s. These books' particular focus on American interest in the
protectorates provides a basis upon which to assess the combination of Gaullists'
27
concerns for Franco-American relations and colonial questions. The repercussions
25 C. Nick, Resurrection. Naissance de la Verne Republique: un coup d'Etat democratique (Paris:
Fayard, 1998) Useful works on Fourth Republic politics in general, which devote some space to the
Gaullists, are G. Elgey, Histoire de la IVe Republique (4 vols.) (Paris: Fayard, 1965-97) and P.
Williams, Crisis and Compromise: Politics in the Fourth Republic (London: Longman, 1964)
26 S. El Machat, Tunisie: les chemins vers I'independance (1945-1956) (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992);
C.A. Julien, Et la Tunisie devint independante (1951-1957) (Paris: Jeune Afrique, 1985); S. Bernard,
Le Conflitfranco-marocain 1943-1956 (3 vols.) (Brussels: Editions de l'lnstitut de Sociologie de
l'Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1963). Bernard devotes a chapter to Grandval's spell in Morocco
(Vol. 1, pp. 273-315), which is useful for its comments on the contacts between Grandval and de
Gaulle, but not based on any primary source material.
27 S. El Machat, Les Etats-Unis et le Maroc: le choix strategique 1945-1959 (Paris: L'Harmattan,
1996); S. El Machat, Les Etats-Unis et la Tunisie: de Tambiguite a I'entente, 1945-1959 (Paris:
L'Harmattan, 1996); A. Lacroix-Riz, Les Protectorats d'Afrique du Nord entre la France et
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in France of the Moroccan and Tunisian questions under the Fourth Republic have,
like the protectorates themselves, been overlooked in favour of work on Algeria, but
98
a survey of the state of political debate in France has been attempted by Oved, in an
article that gives a brief outline of the positions of the main political forces, including
the RPF. The specific role of the Gaullists in Morocco and Tunisia, whether on the
level of local organisation or general policy, has not been the subject of any detailed
study; the promisingly-titled De Gaulle et le Maroc deals with only the Second
World War and the Fifth Republic.29
In addition to works on Gaullism or Fourth Republic politics, many leading Gaullist
figures have also been the subject of biographical treatment. While the published
biographies vary in depth and usefulness, largely due to differences in the availability
of archival sources, they nevertheless represent a significant contribution to the
literature available to scholars of Fourth Republic Gaullism, if only because they are
able to offer some information on a period in which many Gaullists did not hold any
public office of note, and therefore were not included in works on government
policy. Many biographies of de Gaulle make only passing reference to the Gaullist
movement. Lacouture's work, however, does provide useful information on the RPF,
detailing the General's relationship with the movement he created, and demonstrating
Washington, du debarquement a Tindependance: Maroc et Tunisie, 1942-1956 (Paris: L'Harmattan,
1988). El Machat's trilogy on the United States and North Africa is completed by Les Etats-Unis et
I'Algerie: de la meconnaissance a la reconnaissance 1945-1962 (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996). Gaullist
attitudes to the United States have received much coverage, though little of it has focused specifically
on the Fourth Republic, for example R.O. Paxton & N. Wahl (eds.), De Gaulle and the United States:
a centennial reappraisal, (Oxford: Berg, 1994). General works on Franco-American relations also
provide a useful synthesis of the potential for discord under the Fourth Republic, a potential that was
certainly recognised by Gaullists in both the Fourth and Fifth Republics. C. Cogan, Oldest Allies,
Guarded Friends (Westport & London: Praeger, 1994); F. Costigliola, France and the United States:
The Cold Alliance Since World War II (New York: Twayne, 1992); I. Wall, France, the United States
and the Algerian War (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 2001); I. Wall, The United
States and the Making ofPost-war France, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991); I. Wall, 'The United States, Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic', Diplomatic
History, 8 (1994), pp. 498-511
28 G. Oved, 'Le Debat politique sur le Maroc de 1945 a 1955', Relations Internationales, 37 (1984),
pp. 55-80
29 M. Sehimi (ed.), De Gaulle et le Maroc (Paris: Publisud, 1990)
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the frustration and differences of opinion that arose/0 As far as other prominent
Gaullists are concerned, the most revealing and well documented biographies deal
o 1
with Debre, Soustelle and Georges Catroux. In each of these works, the biographer
has benefited from some access to private papers, while they also have the merit of
according considerable importance to periods in which their subject was not active in
national politics. Other biographies of Gaullists - dealing with Chaban-Delmas,
32Michelet and Foccart - are less reliable in terms of sources and objectivity, the
biographer often having personal connections with the subject. In the case of Foccart
and Michelet, however, who have received very little scholarly attention at all, the
biographies do provide an indication of the subjects' chief areas of interest and of
their personal contacts within and beyond the Gaullist movement. Other leading
Gaullists - notably Fouchet, Terrenoire and Palewski - appear not to have attracted
the attention of biographers. This apparent omission, however, may be explained by
the lack of availability of documentary material.
Given the paucity of comprehensive treatment of Gaullists' views on North Africa in
secondary sources, the writings of Gaullists themselves on the subject provide a
valuable resource, which has not yet been fully exploited by scholars. Gaullist
writing on North Africa falls into two categories: articles published during the Fourth
Republic, and subsequent works of history or memoirs. Articles and speeches
produced by leading Gaullists will therefore constitute a valuable complement to
archival sources, illustrating the development of Gaullist thought as well as the
means that were used to appeal to different audiences. Several leading Gaullists were
very active in the production of articles for the national press and academic journals,
,0
Lacouture, De Gaulle, vol. 2: Le politique
jl P. Samuel, Michel Debre: I'architecte du General (Paris: Arnaud Franel, 1999); B. Ullmann,
Jacques Soustelle: le mal aime (Paris: Plon, 1995); H. Lerner, Catroux (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990)
32 P. Chastenet, Chaban (Paris: Seuil, 1991); J. Mousseau, Chaban-Delmas (Paris: Perrin, 2000): P.
Pean, L'Homme de Vombre: elements d'enquete autour de Jacques Foccart, I'homme le plus
mysterieux et le plus puissant de la Ve Republique (Paris: Fayard, 1990); J. Charbonnel, Edmond
Michelet (Paris: Beauchesne, 1987); C. Michelet, Mon pere Edmond Michelet (Paris: Robert Laffont,
1981)
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and were in great demand as speakers, particularly towards the end of the Fourth
Republic. The writings and speeches of Gaullists are worthy of examination as they
complement archival sources and can reveal important nuances in the development
ofGaullist policy. Gaullists, notably Soustelle, Debre and Palewski, published essays
in journals or in book form in popular series such as Plon's Tribune Libre. Soustelle,
Debre, Catroux and Palewski wrote for the Revue des Deux Mondes, Revue de Paris
and similar influential and widely-read publications. The national press, essentially
Le Monde and Le Figaro, also occasionally published work by prominent Gaullists,
while Debre and Soustelle went as far as the creation ofweekly newspapers to
33further the spread of their message. The military press is a further useful source,
given the military aspect of the subject, in that it shows the extent to which 'Gaullist'
ideas penetrated military and strategic thought. Debre and Soustelle were also
occasional contributors to publications such as the Revue de Defense Nationale.
While press articles must be treated with some caution by researchers, being written
in a specific context and for a specific audience, they allow, in the cases of Debre
and Soustelle in particular, some degree of detailed analysis of their authors' views.
The behaviour of Gaullists in parliament will also be used as a source to complement
the information available in official party or personal papers.34 Debre, in the Senate,
and Soustelle, in the National Assembly, were the acknowledged leaders of
parliamentary Gaullism,35 and indeed some of the most prolific of all politicians in
terms of their contributions to debate. They also contributed to the widely-held view
of Fourth Republic Gaullism as little more than a permanent opposition to the
33 The Courrier de la Colere, founded and edited by Michel Debre, appeared weekly from November
1957 until June 1958, after which it became Le Courrier de la Nation. Void Pourquoi, edited by
Claude Delmas but with Soustelle as its high-profile political editor, was published from December
1957 to May 1958. The Union Pour le Salut et le Renouveau de I'Algerie Franqaise (USRAF) - led
by Soustelle - published a newspaper entitled La verite sur I'Algerie from 1956; it later became
Verites sur I'Algerie et le Sahara.
34 The RPF had 118 elected members in 1951 in the National Assembly, this total declining to 72 by
1955 because of defections and splits. In the 1956 elections, the RS won only 20 National Assembly
seats. In the Senate, the RPF had 56 seats in 1952 and 37 by 1954, while the RS counted 36 senators
in 1955. The ARS/URAS had 30 deputies between 1953 and 1955.
35 Debre was leader of the RS in the Senate; Soustelle in the Assemblee Nationale
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regime, given the ferocity of their attacks on government. They were not alone in
their parliamentary combat, however. Less well-known Gaullists such as Raymond
Dronne, Henri Fouques-Duparc and Raymond Triboulet, who rarely if ever held high
office within either Gaullism or government, also made a significant contribution to
the articulation of Gaullist views in parliament. The clearest cases of the Gaullist
group in parliament achieving victory for its cause by concerted action and
persuasive argument are the defeat of the European Defence Community in 1954,
and the fall of the Bourges-Manoury government in 1957 over the Algerian problem.
The latter case is widely recognised as having been engineered largely by the
arguments of Jacques Soustelle alone. Parliamentary Gaullism, therefore, must be
seen as an important aspect of the movement's activities, notable as much for the
content of the speeches as for the tactics that allowed the Gaullists to exert an
influence disproportionate to their numbers through their ever-present threat of
bringing down a government.
A further source that is of use in establishing the behaviour of Gaullists, albeit one
that must be used with considerable care, is the memoirs of participants in the
Gaullist parties and Fourth Republic politics. Most of the leading Gaullists of the
period covered by this study have written memoirs, although in some cases these
mirror the standard histories ofGaullism by dealing only superficially with the
Fourth Republic. Among Gaullists who held official posts, the most revealing
memoirs are those of Pierre Billotte, Christian Fouchet, Gilbert Grandval, Gaston
Palewski and Jacques Soustelle. Chaban-Delmas' memoirs, however, provide little
information of relevance to the study of the Fourth Republic, notably on the events of
May 1958 in which their author played a crucial role. Other high-ranking Gaullists
have produced memoirs detailing Gaullism's parliamentary and extraparliamentary
36 P. Billotte, Le Passe au futur (Paris: Stock, 1979); C. Fouchet, Memoires d'hier et de demain (2
vols.) (Paris: Plon, 1971-73); G. Grandval, Ma Mission au Maroc (Paris: Plon, 1956); G. Palewski,
Memoires d'action 1924-1974 (Paris: Plon, 1988); J. Soustelle, Vingt-huit ans de gaullisme ( 2nd ed.)
(Paris: J'ai lu, 1971); J. Chaban-Delmas, Memoires de demain (Paris: Flammarion, 1997).
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activities, and, in the case of Foccart and Terrenoire, also shedding some light on the
private views of de Gaulle. These works are useful in that they allow for some
insight into the activities of those Gaullists who devoted themselves to opposition to
the Fourth Republic and the spread both of de Gaulle's ideas and of the General as a
recourse or potential saviour. A third category ofGaullist memoirs, perhaps of less
direct relevance to this study, consists of work that focuses principally on the RPF or
TO
.. .
on the author's relationship with de Gaulle. While not dealing directly with Gaullist
policy or colonial matters, these works do nevertheless contribute to an
understanding of the different trends within Gaullism, the means used to extend its
support and the progress among Gaullists of the idea that de Gaulle's return could be
engineered in response to a crisis. Yet, as with all memoirs, these works must be
used in conjunction with other, more objective, sources. Indeed, the majority of
Gaullists' memoirs do not contain any revelations or contradictions of what might be
assumed; rather, they facilitate understanding of the nuances of policy debates, the
details of internal party affairs or the pace of changes.
The primary sources used in this study are a combination of public and private,
published and unpublished documents. Among the published sources are the
proceedings of the Assemblee Nationale and the Conseil de la Republique (Senate),
39 •
along with relevant volumes of the Documents Diplomatiques Frangais. Also in the
category of published sources is the press of the Gaullist movement. For the RPF,
this consists of Le Rassemblement, L'Etincelle, Courrier d'Information Politique and
,7
M. Debre, Trois Republiquespour une France: memoires (vol. 2) (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1988); P. Gaillard, Foccart parte: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard (Paris:
Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995); L. Terrenoire, De Gaulle 1947-1954: pourquoi I'echec? (Paris: Plon,
1981).
38 A. Astoux, L'Oubli: de Gaulle 1946-1958 (Paris: J.C. Lattes, 1974); O. Guichard, Mon general
(Paris: Grasset, 1980); P. Lefranc, Avec qui vous savez (Paris: Plon, 1979); J. Vendroux, Cette chance
que j'ai eue (Paris: Plon, 1974).
Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Commission de Publication des Documents Frangais,
Documents Diplomatiques Franfais, 1951-58 (Paris: Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Commission
de publication des documents diplomatiques/ Imprimerie Nationale, 1959-) Journal OJficiel de la
Republique Franqaise: Debats de I'Assemblee Nationale (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1951-58);
Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise: Debats du Conseil de la Republique (Paris: Imprimerie
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La Lettre a I'Union Frangaise,40 The Republicains Sociaux published a newspaper
entitled Les Idees ... Les Faits,41 The press titles of prominent Gaullists may also be
considered in this category; they include Debre's Courrier de la Colere, Soustelle's
Void Pourquoi, Jacques Dauer's Le Telegramme de Paris and Paris-Jeunes.42
Among North African newspapers, the Echo d'Alger is of use because of its position
as the authoritative and influential voice of the settler community, but ofmore direct
relevance to a study of Gaullism is the smaller Journal d'Alger. The only pro-
Gaullist publication in French North Africa (outside the RPF's own publications), it
is a revealing guide to the features ofNorth African Gaullism that distinguished it
from its metropolitan counterpart. Perhaps the most useful of these titles is the Lettre
a I'Union Frangaise: it was the only RPF publication to remain active until 1958.
Edited by Jacques Foccart, who contributed a leader article for each issue, it was
conceived as the link between the metropolitan RPF and its supporters in the Empire.
Its focus is particularly appropriate for the present study, being chiefly concerned
with colonial and international questions, along with regular analysis of the failings
of the French government and institutions to deal satisfactorily with such issues.
Foccart's interest in colonial questions, and his close contact with de Gaulle, make
the Lettre a I'Union Frangaise a most useful source for the study of Gaullism and
colonial affairs, although one might justifiably ask whether it reveals more about
Gaullism in general or about Foccart's particular interpretation of it.
40 L'Etincelle was published in 1947-48, and was succeeded by Le Rassemblement. The Courrier
d'lnformation Politique was published between April 1952 and November 1955, with Foccart
replacing Terrenoire as editor in February 1955. It was intended to serve as a guide for party activists
to the main political problems of the time and the RPF's attitude to them, compared to Le
Rassemblement, which carried less detailed political discussion and more news of the activities of the
RPF or de Gaulle. The Lettre a I'Union Frangaise was published from 1949 until June 1958. It often
included material from the Courrier d'lnformation Politique on domestic politics, leaving Foccart to
concentrate on colonial and international affairs in his contributions. The Lettre a I'Union Frangaise
and Courrier d'lnformation Politique have been consulted virtually in their entirety for this study.
Regional editions ofL'Etincelle and Le Rassemblement were also produced; some of the North
African editions have been consulted, although many appear to be no longer available.
41 Les idees... Les faits, edited by Roger Frey, was published from April 1954 to May 1958.
42 For details of Le Courrier de la Colere and Voici Pourquoi, see note 33. Paris-Jeunes was
published by Dauer from February 1953 to May 1955, and was replaced by Le Telegramme de Paris
until 1958. All these titles have been extensively consulted.
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The archival sources for this study are, for the most part, those of the Gaullist
movement. The RPF archives, held by the Fondation Charles de Gaulle, are now
open to researchers, with the exception of financial documents and personal
information about members. The series used in the present study are those relating to
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, and the extensive collection of reports prepared for
the RPF's Assises (annual conferences) and biennial Conseils Nationaux. These
reports constitute the clearest indication of the evolution of policy and the extent of
debate within the RPF. The series relating to North Africa are extensive, and deal
with both party organisation and policy. In particular, they contain a large amount of
correspondence between ordinary militants and officials in Paris, generally Soustelle
or Foccart, which highlights the extent of divergence from official views among
party members. The RPF files relating to the Sahara and to party organisation and
parliamentary behaviour and cohesion have also been consulted. The archives of the
Republicains Sociaux are considerably less extensive than those of the RPF. Also
held by the Fondation Charles de Gaulle, they consist largely of reports for party
conferences and policy meetings, rather than correspondence between members and
the hierarchy. This is most likely a result of the somewhat disorganised nature of
contacts between leadership and members at the time of the RS. The reports prepared
for conferences, and texts of speeches and debates, however, are useful in
demonstrating the debates within the RS over the extent of participation in
government, and the limits that they were not prepared to cross in the name of
maintaining their stake in the 'system'. Republicains Sociaux documents reveal the
differing degrees of interest shown in the RS by prominent Gaullists; Soustelle, for
example, appears as a semi-detached member of the organisation, ofmore value for
the support his name could attract than for his own contribution. The events ofMay
1958 are not well-documented in archives, although those of the RS do show an
attempt to improve the movement's organisation in Algiers in the early months of
1958, in anticipation of its potential usefulness. Thus, despite their patchy nature, the
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RS archives do complement those of the RPF in demonstrating the changes in
Gaullism as it passed from the hands of one movement to another.
Private papers of politicians have also been used where available. It must be noted,
regrettably, that many collections that would cast more light on the subject remain
inaccessible. Chief among these are the papers of de Gaulle himself. The archives of
Soustelle, Chaban-Delmas, Fouchet, Palewski and Foccart are also all unavailable at
present, though the Gaullist archives contain many documents produced by Foccart.
Nevertheless, several interesting and extensive collections have been consulted.
While Soustelle's papers are not open to researchers, the RPF archives contain a
significant number of documents relating to his period as governor-general in Algeria
and his activities in the RPF and the Union Pour le Salut et le Renouveau de I'Algerie
Franqaise (USRAF). Michel Debre's archives relating to the Fourth Republic were
also consulted, although the Debre papers in general are not intended to be made
available for consultation until cataloguing has been completed. Among the
documents that were available, at the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques,
Debre's correspondence with collaborators and constituents was of considerable
value. In particular, Debre may be distinguished somewhat from many other
Gaullists in that his principal correspondents and collaborators were not all fellow
Gaullists. Thus, the Debre archives are valuable for the light they shed on the extent
of contacts and common ground between Gaullists and others, in addition to the
opportunity they afford to trace the evolution of Debre's thought, for example
through drafts ofCourrier de la Colere articles. Also at the Fondation Nationale des
Sciences Politiques, the papers of Jacques Dauer were consulted. Dauer, as one of
the leading 'activist' Gaullists, involved in youth and student movements in the
1950s, is a revealing source for the methods, extent and success ofGaullist
propaganda, and the role that colonial and foreign policy questions played in the
general appeal of Gaullism.
17
In the realm of non-'Gaullist' archives, some of the collections of the Service
Historique de I'Armee de Terre have been of use. Reports on the morale of troops
and populations in North Africa are a valuable source for the study of the means and
success of Gaullist penetration of these important groups. While many sensitive
military files relating to the Algerian War remain closed,43 the military archives do
reveal the evolution ofpolicy and perceptions ofpriorities in relation to North
Africa, and as such contribute to analysis of the convergence between Gaullists and
the military during the Fourth Republic.




Gaullism has been the subject of a number of attempts, by both historians and
political scientists, to define its essential tenets. The most problematic aspect of the
subject has been the extent to which Gaullism can be said to reach beyond the ideas
of de Gaulle himself. In addition, the apparent existence of different trends within the
Gaullist movement has raised the question of whether it would not be more accurate
to speak not of Gaullism but of Gaullisms. One of the most influential definitions of
Gaullism has been that offered by Rene Remond, who argues that Gaullism
represented essentially a modem form ofBonapartism, because of its emphasis on
international prestige and a strong centralised State.44 Remond's analysis, however,
suffers from its failure to acknowledge the diversity within Gaullism; the only
manifestation of different trends within the Gaullist movement identified by Remond
is the evolution ofGaullism after the end of de Gaulle's presidency in 1969.45 Further
general analyses of Gaullism have been attempted, by Jean Chariot and Jean
Touchard for instance, while the most extensive attempt in English to define the
ideology of de Gaulle is that ofAnthony Hartley.46 Hartley's analysis includes some
discussion of Fourth Republic Gaullism, yet his work is typical ofmost studies of
this subject, focusing on the idea of Gaullism being little more than a permanent
opposition movement, with little indication of the process of reflection on policy
taking place between 1946 and 1958. Indeed, having first defined Gaullism as a
doctrine emanating virtually entirely from de Gaulle, and operating on the level of
general principles rather than details of policy, Hartley argues that during the period
in which de Gaulle was not active in political life the activities of the Gaullist
movement amounted to little more than token opposition to the regime:
44 R. Remond, Les Droites en France (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1982), pp. 313-49
45
Remond, Les Droites en France, pp. 313-4
46 J. Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition and L'UNR: etude du pouvoir au sein d'unpartipolitique
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1967); J. Touchard, Le Gaullisme, 1940-1969; A. Hartley, Gaullism: The Rise
and Fall ofa Political Movement
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De Gaulle and his followers played a negative role, and Gaullism only altered
its position - in so far as it had one - to change from being an active threat to
the regime to being merely a symbolic condemnation of it.47
The idea, therefore, that the Gaullist movement, as opposed to the General alone,
actually played a role in developing policy during the Fourth Republic, has been
overlooked by most attempts to define Gaullism. This is a result of the focus that
studies of Gaullism have tended to place on the general principles of the doctrine
rather than specific policies, a tendency that has served to emphasise the importance
of the general terms such as grandeur often used by de Gaulle 48 Yet it would be
wrong to conclude that the frequent references in Gaullist discourse to grand
concepts of this kind preclude the study ofmore detailed and applied forms of
Gaullism. The Fourth Republic, in which the Gaullist movement was not in
government and was therefore freed somewhat from the obligations of always
presenting a united front on policy matters, provides a useful context in which to
attempt a more nuanced definition of Gaullism. Thus, it is hoped that the present
study, while focusing on the Gaullists' reaction to North African affairs, will
contribute to the elaboration of a fuller definition of Fourth Republic Gaullism than
has been attempted, and will in turn cast some light on the intellectual sources of
some aspects of Fifth Republic policy.
Any attempt to analyse Gaullist behaviour, however, must begin with an
acknowledgement of the importance of the general principles associated with
General de Gaulle.49 His relationship with the Gaullist movement is also of
importance to an understanding of Gaullism, and this will be discussed at a later
stage. It has been said that de Gaulle operated on the level of general principles and
47
Hartley, p. 97
48 The only real exception to this approach is that ofWatson, who argues for the importance of
members of the Gaullist movement rather than de Gaulle alone in the development of policy. His
work, however, is confined to the 5th Republic, although his approach appears well suited to the study
of Fourth Republic Gaullism. J. Watson, 'The Internal Dynamics of Gaullism, 1958-1969' in The Right
in France, 1789-1996, ed. by N. Atkin and F. Tallett (London: Taurus, 1997), pp. 245-59.
49 D. Johnson, 'The Political Principles of General de Gaulle', International Affairs, 41 (1965), pp.
650-62.
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declarations of intent, leaving others to concern themselves with their application in
practice.30 The relevance of de Gaulle's general principles to the subject of this study
derives from his frequent references to France's world role and to the need for a sense
of national unity, both ofwhich themes were to feature in Gaullist fears for the
potential consequences of the North African crises for France. France's role in the
world, as de Gaulle saw it, was to project its influence beyond the hexagon, to be
seen to be in control of international developments affecting the nation, and, through
the achievement of these aims, to unite the people of France and the Empire behind
the notion of a strong, independent state. The details of how such principles were to
be applied did not emerge until the post-war period, first through de Gaulle's spell as
Head of State between 1944 and 1946, and subsequently as the Gaullists developed
responses to the changing international situation, within the framework of the
principles arising from the wartime experience. In 1944-46, for example, it was
French preoccupations with the future ofGermany that led de Gaulle to the
conclusion, in line with what wartime precedents had led him to suspect, that
France's allies in Britain and America could not be relied upon to always defend and
share France's vital interests, and that France must therefore rely on its own
resources. Thus, in the immediate post-war period, de Gaulle's views of the need for
France to be able to act independently of alliances to secure its interests were
reinforced by the Allies' attempts to settle the pressing international questions. De
Gaulle's annoyance that France was overlooked at the Yalta conference31 was
compounded by the apparent failure ofBritain and the United States to provide
sufficient guarantees of French protection against Germany.52 The foundations of
subsequent Gaullist attacks on France's so-called allies were laid in this period. De
Gaulle was equally concerned in the post-war years about the threat posed to France
by the USSR, because of the strength ofFrench communism and his fears of a
50
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51 On the lasting effect of Gaullist perceptions of the Yalta conference during the Fourth Republic, F.
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Soviet-German alliance. In this area, too, Gaullism expressed a sense that France's
allies had failed to appreciate the greater immediacy of the dangers facing France
ST
than those potentially facing Britain and the United States.
As the Fourth Republic confronted new international problems, Gaullism showed
some evolution, adapting the views of the General to the changing international
situation. Indeed, as Hartley points out: 'It was ... in foreign policy and defence that
the movement was to make its most characteristic contribution to French political life
and itself undergo an evolution of some significance'.54 Foreign policy, therefore,
emerged during the Fourth Republic as a key area in which Gaullism, though acting
in accordance with the principles of its founder, redefined itself in response to events.
As will be seen in detail in chapter 4, the European Defence Community affair and
the apparent spread of communism in the Empire confirmed de Gaulle's suspicion of
the Atlantic system, which dated from 1944-46 or earlier, and in turn brought about a
shift in Gaullism's emphasis, from the projection of French influence within a
Western alliance to a greater sense of France's unique international role, a shift which
at times amounted to anti-Americanism.55
If the need to develop and adapt foreign policy was one of the means by which
Fourth Republic Gaullism evolved, then colonial questions also played a crucial role
in the evolution of Gaullist doctrine. The importance of the Algerian War for the
development and the policies of Fifth Republic Gaullism has been examined in terms
of the restraining effect that the Algerian problem had on domestic policy between
1958 and 1962, with some writers arguing that the four years spent seeking a solution
to the Algerian crisis effectively prevented Gaullist policies from being fully
implemented throughout the period of de Gaulle's presidency.56 The same could be









said for Fourth Republic Gaullism, in that towards the end of the Fourth Republic, it
became preoccupied with the crisis in North Africa to such an extent that other areas
of policy were either ignored or altered as the Gaullists argued that a satisfactory
solution to the North African problems was a prerequisite of France's very survival.
Gaullism's general stance on colonial matters, if not throughout the Fourth Republic
then certainly in its early stages, was deeply influenced by de Gaulle's wartime
colonial reforms and policies. Aware of the great importance of the Empire to the
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Free French, de Gaulle introduced important reforms, while at the same time
attempting to ensure that the link between France and the colonies, so important in
the establishment of Free France, would not be broken despite the global moves
towards decolonisation and in particular the American insistence on self-
determination for European colonies. In 1943, de Gaulle, drawing from the
Provisional Government's report on North Africa, prepared largely by General
Catroux, granted citizenship to 60,000 Algerians. These were mainly former officers,
civil servants, local or tribal leaders and those with a certain level of education. They
were placed in the first electoral college along with the European voters. De Gaulle
and Catroux also specifically stated at this time that no further political reforms were
to be expected in Algeria and that any reduction of French authority was
inconceivable. In 1944, de Gaulle turned his attention to sub-Saharan Africa, in his
speech at Brazzaville. This speech became the main point of reference for Gaullists
seeking to demonstrate their colonial policy throughout the Fourth Republic. The key
themes of the Brazzaville conference of 1944 were the introduction of assemblies
and voting to the colonies, celebrating the political 'maturity' that France's civilising
mission had brought about. However, the majority of those present at the conference
37 The Popular Front government of 1936-38 had begun a programme of colonial reform that had been
interrupted by war and in some cases reversed by Vichy. It is not clear to what extent de Gaulle was
inspired by these reforms, but it can certainly be argued that the earlier reforms had awakened a desire
for change in the colonies that de Gaulle knew would have to be satisfied at the end of the War. See T.
Chafer and A. Sackur (eds.), French Colonial Empire and the Popular Front; Hope and disillusion
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999) and M. Thomas, The French Empire at War, 1940-1945
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998).
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were colonial administrators, not local African leaders, and de Gaulle's speech
58
cannot be seen as an early indication of an intention to proceed with decolonisation.
De Gaulle's Bordeaux speech ofMay 15, 1947 further outlined the Gaullist vision of
the Union frangaise - as the Empire was now known - acknowledging the distinct
'character' of each territory and advocating an administrative and institutional
framework for each territory, to be adapted to the different levels of 'evolution' in the
different parts of the Empire. All this was to be complemented by federal institutions
common to all member territories, within the framework of a strong central French
state. In particular, de Gaulle stressed the absolute need for the colonies to remain
French. Along with the Brazzaville declaration, this speech defined Gaullist policy
on the colonies for the years to come; it was taken as the last word on the subject by
both conservative Gaullists and by those who simply showed little interest in the
colonies, believing the essential problems to have been solved at Brazzaville and a
plan for future action to have been set out at Bordeaux.59
The reforms proposed at Brazzaville and Bordeaux were not particularly radical or
wide-ranging, and were unlikely to satisfy nationalist aspirations. Yet, during the
Fourth Republic, the Gaullists generally failed to build on this legacy of limited
initial reforms and, while claiming that Brazzaville made Gaullism a doctrine of
colonial liberalism, many Gaullists continued to fiercely oppose any further change.
To fully understand the refusal of even liberal Gaullists to acknowledge nationalist
aspirations, it is essential to understand the link between the establishment of strong
government and the granting of autonomy. While it was possible, in theory, for a
Gaullist to accept the granting of autonomy to a territory by a strong France, the
possibility that an external body - such as the United Nations or the Arab League -
38
De Gaulle's speech at Brazzaville can be found in his Memoires de Guerre, vol. 2: L'Unite (Paris:
Plon, 1956), pp. 477-80.
59
For de Gaulle's Bordeaux speech, see his Discours et Messages, vol. 2: dans I'attente 1946-1958,
pp. 74-81. On the influence of the speech in the Fourth Republic, Guy Perville, 'Le RPF et l'Union
Fran^aise: Rapport de Synthese' in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et le RPF, pp. 521-29.
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could force a weak France to abandon North Africa was, for Gaullists, not only an
aberration but an increasingly real danger caused by the parliamentary regime. Thus,
the Gaullists' defence of the colonial status quo can be seen as a manifestation of
their fierce opposition to the regime. At stake was the status of the nation; a hasty
decolonisation on terms dictated by an authority other than the French government
would represent a heavy blow to France's prestige. As the Fourth Republic wore on,
the idea grew among Gaullists that this blow to national status might even be fatal to
the regime. It was not until the second half of the Fourth Republic, after the
announcement in 1954 of'internal autonomy' for Morocco and Tunisia, that Gaullists
began to adapt their colonial policy in a similar way to that in which the foreign
policy they had inherited from World War II had evolved in response to changing
situations. By 1958, considerable evolution in Gaullist colonial policy - not all of it
in a progressive direction - can be identified. The process of change, however, was a
slow and gradual one and may even have been held up by the certainties that the
legacy of Brazzaville and the Bordeaux speech seemed to confer. The silence of de
Gaulle himself on colonial matters during much of the Fourth Republic is surely
another important factor in the slow evolution and diverse results that characterised
Gaullist thinking on Empire.
Yet, while Gaullism displayed some evolution during the Fourth Republic in its
development of detailed applications for general principles of foreign and colonial
policy, it nevertheless continued to stress the theme of national unity that, along with
grandeur, is the key feature of de Gaulle's writings. Indeed, for de Gaulle, national
unity was bound up with grandeur, and could best be achieved through it: 'II faudrait
savoir, en effet, si quelque grand reve national n'est pas necesaire a un peuple pour
soutenir son activite et conserver sa cohesion'.60 In this context, the crime of the
Fourth Republic, according to Gaullism, was to undermine national unity by failing
to provide a national and international vision of sufficient scope and scale. The
60
De Gaulle, Vers I'Armee de Metier, p. 76, quoted in Hartley, p. 12
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divisions among the French population were certainly never far from the mind of
Gaullists, as can be seen in the RPF's frequent reference to the Communists whom it
identified as the principal enemies of national unity, and to political parties which by
their vary nature served to emphasis division over a sense of common purpose.
In terms of Gaullist political activity during the Fourth Republic, the most important
feature of Gaullism that, in theory at least, marked out the RPF, the ARS/URAS and
the RS as different from their political rivals was the claim that Gaullism, through its
foundation in the Second World War experience and its interest in uniting the nation
behind grand principles, was a more powerful force than mere political parties. The
clearest definition of this concept was provided by de Gaulle himself in 1952:
Ce grand mouvement depasse de loin les limites de ce qui est electoral. II
entre plus ou moins dans l'esprit de tout le monde, meme de ceux qui votent
contre lui. C'est ce qui se passait deja, pendant la guerre, pour ce qu'on
appelait le 'gaullisme'. Chaque Franfais fut, est ou sera 'gaulliste'... Ceci pour
vous dire a quel point le Rassemblement du Peuple Franfais s'etend dans la
nation plus loin et plus profondement que ne peuvent l'exprimer des chiffres
de suffrages electoraux.61
In these words of de Gaulle, lie some of the essential notions that are necessary for an
analysis of the political behaviour of Gaullists during the Fourth Republic. Chief
among these is the refusal to accept elections as the absolute indication of the
strength of political forces in the country. This aspect of Gaullism has a significant
effect on the methodology that can be employed in the study of Gaullism: more than
most parties, Gaullism did not see its activities as being focused on the parliamentary
and electoral arenas to the exclusion of other means of exerting influence.
Extraparliamentary and, to some extent, antiparliamentary means of organisation and
expression occupied a more central place in the Gaullist movement than in




'mainstream' parties. Thus, it is important to identify non-politically aligned groups
- such as war veterans - in which Gaullists sought to exert influence with the aim of
/TO
generating a national network of popular support for de Gaulle. As will be seen in
chapter 8, the tactic of cultivating popular support for Gaullism became closely
identified, towards the end of the Fourth Republic, with the concept of de Gaulle as
the legitimate leader or saviour of the nation who would assume its leadership at a
moment of crisis.64
A further important element of Gaullism that emerges from de Gaulle's vision of his
movement is the impression of a certain reluctance on the part of the General to
speak ofGaullism as a doctrine or coherent movement. While this has been taken as
a sign that Gaullism hardly existed at all in isolation from de Gaulle, it is equally
likely that in displaying caution in the use of the term, the General was showing an
awareness of the existence of different currents of opinion within Gaullism.
Although hardly surprising given the general nature of the central tenets of Gaullism,
this point has received relatively little attention. Indeed, the history of different
trends within Fourth Republic Gaullism has not received the same interest as have
the more commonly treated questions of the splits in Fifth Republic Gaullism over
62 In its extraparliamentary activities, the RPF closely mirrored the Communist Party, to the extent of
developing a mass movement, with a security force and propaganda machine, to rival the communists
in traditionally left-wing areas such as the Paris suburbs. The tours and public addresses undertaken
by de Gaulle throughout France, often taking the form of huge, highly stage-managed rallies, also
constituted a key part of the RJPF's activity and invited comparisons with both communism and
fascism.
63 The role of anciens combattants in French politics in general has been examined by several
historians, although none focuses directly on the Fourth Republic. The work on the subject does,
however, demonstrate the respect and importance accorded to war veterans and their potential to
influence policy or constitute a strong opposition movement. A. Prost, Les anciens combattants et la
societe frangaise 1914-1939 (Paris: Presses de le Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977);
J.P. Charnay, Societe militaire et suffrage politique en France depuis 1789 (Paris: Ecole Pratique des
Hautes Etudes, 1964); R. Remond, 'Les Anciens combattants et la politique', Revue frangaise de
science politique, 5 (1955), pp. 267-90; C. Nick, Resurrection; Purtschet, Le Rassemblement du
Peuple Frangais, pp. 141-74
64 B. Gai'ti, De Gaulle, prophete de la cinquieme Republique (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998)
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Algeria, or the emergence of contrasting doctrines and movements after de Gaulle's
death.6:1
The most satisfactory attempt to identify different tendencies within the Gaullist
movement is that of Jean Chariot in his study of the Union Pour la Nouvelle
Republique, the Gaullist party formed at the beginning of the Fifth Republic.66
Chariot identifies three broad groups within the Gaullism of 1958-59, each of which
had its origins in a different form of Fourth Republic Gaullism. Kahler has also
attempted to identify different branches of Gaullism, with specific reference to the
A7 .......
Algerian crisis. His division is limited to the years 1956-58, and splits Gaullists into
four groups: those advocating participation in government, those fiercely hostile to
the regime and in favour of direct action against it, those prioritising Algeria above
all else, and the liberals. Kahler identifies the leader of each trend as, respectively,
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Michel Debre, Jacques Soustelle and Edmond Michelet.68
Kahler's analysis is persuasive in its identification of four groups, although one must
exercise caution in speaking of Gaullist 'liberalism' on Algeria, as the so-called
liberal Gaullists were very few in number and their liberalism did not extend as far as
the renunciation of French Algeria. The other three groups of Gaullists, as Kahler
observes, all came to see Algerie franqaise as a central part of their priorities, even if
some believed in it more strongly than others. Kahler's work on Gaullism, however,
is situated within the context of a study of the consequences of decolonisation on
metropolitan politics, and therefore provides only a necessarily brief survey of
general tendencies within Gaullism. Likewise, his identification of de Gaulle as the
unsuspected ally of the liberal Gaullists perhaps amounts to an oversimplification of
65 On the question of 'Gaullism after de Gaulle', A. Knapp, Gaullism since de Gaulle, (Aldershot:
Dartmouth, 1994); Remond, Les Droites en France; Chariot, Le Phenomene gaulliste. On splits
within Gaullism in the 1958-62 period, P. Viansson-Ponte, Histoire de la Republique gaullienne: Mai
1958-Avril 1969 (Paris: Robert Laffont/Bouquins, 1984); Touchard, Le Gaullisme 1940-1969
66 Chariot, L'UNR
67 M. Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: the domestic consequences of international




the complex interplay of colonial, international and domestic factors in determining
the General's ultimate decision to grant Algerian independence in 1962.69
The terminology used by Chariot in his identification of different tendencies in
Fourth Republic Gaullism is borrowed from Jacques Soustelle, who identified:
'gaullistes de foi, gaullistes de combinaison et gaullistes de raison.'70 The 'gaullistes
de foi' were characterised by their loyalty to de Gaulle above all, and by their
conception of Gaullism as a kind of adventure or common enterprise. Prominent
71members of this group were Edmond Michelet and Andre Malraux. To these
definitions one might add the notions of left and right wing Gaullism, traditional and
modern forms of conservatism, nationalism and internationalism, in addition to the
divisions that can be identified between those with or without Resistance
backgrounds, those in favour of or hostile to reform in the Empire, and those in
favour of participation in government or devoted to destroying the 'system'. Chariot's
analysis, however, provides a useful starting point for the categorisation of different
variations ofGaullism. A very different approach to political involvement was
favoured by the 'gaullistes de combinaison', such as Jacques Chaban-Delmas. For
them, the chief attraction ofGaullism consisted in its potential achievements, and to
that end they preferred participation in the regular forums of political life to the
'purity' of the former category of Gaullists.72 The third group identified by Chariot
and Soustelle - that of the 'gaullistes de raison' - lends itselfmost easily to a more
detailed analysis of ideology, policy and political affiliations. Within this group,




Chariot, L'UNR, p. 276, quoting Soustelle
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de l'Etat', social democracy, and a 'Doctrine du bien commun'.73 These terms provide
a useful foundation for an examination of left-wing, centrist and right-wing elements
within Gaullism.
Gaullists
In analysing the different political trends represented within Gaullism, the political
background of the Gaullists themselves is an important field of study. The most
comprehensive work on this subject, by Gilles Le Beguec, attempts to categorise
Fourth Republic Gaullists according to their pre-war political affiliations.74 His study
of the 1951 RPF group in the Assemblee Nationale reveals that approximately one
third ofRPF deputies had been active in right-wing movements before 1940, many
of which had royalist connections, including at least thirteen former members of the
Croix de Feu and Parti Social Fran^ais (PSF).75 The high percentage ofRPF
members with links to movements such as the PSF, which might appear to be
incompatible with attachment to the leader of the wartime resistance, demonstrates
the danger in assuming that the RPF was, as some of its leaders claimed at its
foundation, the continuation of Free France and the Resistance. Le Beguec's study
unfortunately does not attempt to unravel the wartime activities ofRPF deputies; it
appears, nonetheless, that pre-war right-wing nationalism played as large a part in the
movement as the reforming spirit of the resistance and the liberation.
The centre and left of French politics were also represented in the RPF, lending some
weight to its claims to be a national rather than partisan movement. Between twenty
and thirty of the 1951 parliamentary RPF had been members of the Christian
Democrat Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP), the Radical Party or the Union
73
Chariot, L'UNR, pp. 281-87
74 G. Le Beguec, 'Les Antecedents Politiques des Deputes RPF', in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, De
Gaulle et le RPF, pp. 338-52
73 Le Beguec, p. 339
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Democratique et Social de la Resistance (UDSR).76 This group, significantly,
contained a relatively high proportion of figures who were to become central to the
Gaullist movement, such as Terrenoire and Michelet (both former MRP members),
the former Radical Chaban-Delmas, and the former socialist Soustelle, one of only
two RPF deputies to have passed through the socialist party. To these names must be
added that of another former Radical, Michel Debre, absent from Le Beguec's study
by virtue of his being elected to the Senate and not the National Assembly. In
contrast, the right of the RPF provided less of its leading figures, the most notable
exception being Gaston Palewski, who had served in Third Republic ministerial
77
cabinets under droite parlementaire governments. Palewski's attachment to the
parliamentary rather than the militant Right under the Third Republic is typical of the
behaviour ofRPF deputies in their former affiliations; mostly they belonged to the
moderate wings of their respective political groups. Le Beguec has justifiably
identified the droite moderee as the dominant trend in the RPF;78 this appears to be
reflected in the Gaullists' policies and electorate during the Fourth Republic.
In addition to the political 'families' mentioned above, many RPF deputies had no
previous political experience. The principal feature uniting these political novices
was their involvement in the Second World War. The vast majority of Gaullist
deputies were veterans of either Free France or the internal (non-communist)
79resistance movements. Indeed, it is something of a truism to state that in the early
years of the Fourth Republic the common bond uniting all Gaullists was a vague
desire to perpetuate the spirit of the wartime years, just as the Left was concerned
principally with the enactment of the reforms promised in the Resistance charter. The
RPF's short-lived predecessor, the Union Gaulliste pour la IVe Republique, founded
in 1946 by the left-leaning Gaullist Rene Capitant, stated that it intended to be: 'Un
76
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rassemblement, au-dessus des partis politiques et autour des combattants et
resistants, de tous les Fran9ais resolus a se devouer, dans l'esprit du 18 juin, a
80
l'edification de la IVe Republique'. While the Union Gaulliste failed to achieve
electoral success, due to the non-involvement of de Gaulle, its emphasis on the
Second World War was continued in the RPF. Indeed, the networks and means of
operation devised in response to the clandestine nature of resistance frequently had
echoes in the RPF, with many RPF leaders having either worked together in London
(Palewski, Fouchet, Soustelle), commanded the forces of the Free French (Catroux,
Grandval, Billotte, Koenig) or organised both resistance and reconstruction in France
in co-operation with de Gaulle (Chaban-Delmas, Debre). Jacques Foccart and
Jacques Soustelle were particularly active in the clandestine side ofGaullism, being
responsible for intelligence and surveillance work. The methods used during World
War 2 persisted to some extent under the Fourth Republic, manifested in some quasi-
military aspects ofRPF meetings and security, and a tendency to regard clandestine
or secretive action as a means of conducting political business. This aspect of
Gaullism has been criticised as unnecessary and unrealistic by observers such as
Pierre Viansson-Ponte:
Trop d'hommes honnetes et convaincus, deformes par l'epopee de la resistance
et encourages par le mepris de la politique eleve a l'etat de dogme, ont tendance
a considerer que les fonds secrets, les fiches, la pression morale et l'interet
materiel sont les meilleurs armes de gouvernement... C'est la pire, la plus
critiquable et la plus condamnable des derivations du gaullisme.81
Thus, while the RPF attracted members from various political backgrounds or none
at all, their differences should not be exaggerated, as the sense of common purpose
and camaraderie arising from their wartime activities often prevailed over ideological
differences. Soustelle, indeed, claims that the Fourth Republic Gaullist movement's
cohesion was only once threatened by an ideological debate, at the time of the Remy
80 Purtschet, pp. 45-6
81 P. Viansson-Ponte, Les Gaullistes: Rituel et Annuaire (Paris: Seuil, 1963), p. 118
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affair of 1950, which is discussed in chapter 2. That this disturbance should come
over the issue of the World War 2 legacy is no surprise; it was chiefly when
Gaullism attempted to reach out to those who did not share its heritage of resistance
that its ideological cracks began to show. The problem of attracting support among
the settler populations in North Africa provides the clearest example of this; other
manifestations of the problem can be found in Gaullists' relations with other parties
and to some extent in the difficulties that Gaullists had in adapting their specific
world-view to issues beyond France.
The third ofChariot and Soustelle's categories, the 'Gaullistes de raison', is worthy of
more detailed examination in terms of the way in which senior Gaullists during the
Fourth Republic were identified with different trends in relation to different issues.
The so-called 'Gaullisme de gauche' is perhaps the most easily defined sub-group
within the movement. This tendency never attained more than marginal status under
either the Fourth or the Fifth Republic. The centrist or Christian Democrat tendency
was more influential, probably because of the personal role played by its leaders,
Terrenoire and Michelet. In domestic politics, its importance to the RPF consisted
largely of its ability to attract centrist and Catholic votes that would otherwise go to
the MRP. RPF - MRP competition was a feature of Fourth Republic politics,
heightened by the fact that many of the government posts ofmost significance to the
Gaullists - especially foreign affairs - were frequently held by MRP ministers. The
leaders of this trend within the RPF were particularly active in the campaign against
the European Defence Community, Michelet and Terrenoire's experience of
deportation during the Second World War lending an aspect ofmoral authority to
their denunciation of German rearmament. In colonial affairs, however, the centrist
Gaullists were less strident. While both Terrenoire and Michelet believed in Algerie
frangaise, Michelet was one of the first politicians to publicly condemn torture, and
82 Soustelle, Vingt-huit ans de Gaullisme, cited in O. Wieviorka, 'Les dirigeants: Rapport de Synthese',
p. 92
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he argued strongly against the logic of pursuing a war that was likely to lead to
oo
greater divisions within France. This Christian Democrat trend within Gaullism
was thus of electoral value to the Gaullists, and, together with the limited left-wing
Gaullism, detracts somewhat from the conventional view of Gaullism as a traditional,
right-wing nationalist movement.
The so-called 'doctrine d'etat' undoubtedly represented the dominant strain within
Fourth Republic Gaullism. Its chief spokesman was Michel Debre, whose pre-war
experience in the Conseil d'Etat led him to devote much of his energy to the question
of the state.84 Debre's belief that a strong state was essential to the survival and
success of a nation often saw him adopt positions that have been associated with
authoritarianism, nationalism and conservatism. This aspect of Gaullism - which
Debre frequently translated into attacks on the regime for allowing France to become
internationally and institutionally weak - can be found in the speeches and writings
of the majority of Gaullist deputies. Debre's thinking on constitutional and
institutional affairs was undoubtedly more developed and complex than that ofmost
of his collaborators. In foreign affairs, he applied the same arguments used to
demonstrate the need for a strong state to questions of France's overseas status. In
this, too, he became the spokesman of the fervent cold warriors and colonialists
within Gaullism. Debre certainly typified the rest of this majority group of Gaullists
- among whom can also be found Jacques Soustelle - in that he believed strongly in
Algerie franqaise. However, his interpretation of the Algerian situation displayed
more subtlety than most, in that he recognised that the chief value of defending
French Algeria was that to concede defeat would consist of a terrible blow to the
state, from which it might not recover. Debre certainly condemned concessions to
international pressure, warned of the dangers of communism if Algeria were to be
lost, and refused to condemn torture - an example of his conception of reason of
8j E. Michelet, Contre la guerre civile (Paris: Plon, 1957)
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state as a key aspect of Gaullism - but it might be argued that he was alone in
faithfully representing the 'Doctrine de l'Etat'. Although the majority ofGaullists
appear, therefore, to conform to Chariot's third category, through their nationalism,
resistance to colonial reform and conservatism, it is necessary to see Debre's case as
a slightly separate and more complex manifestation of Gaullism.
The Gaullist movement's support in France has been analysed by Purtschet and by
8S
Franfois Goguel. " The RPF's membership, as identified by Purtschet, was
principally among the middle and working classes, with a lower than average
proportion of intellectuals. Its overall numbers were higher than mainstream political
movements and comparable to the Communist Party, a fact which, taken together
with the sociological spread of its members, suggests that its principal appealing
factors were its direct appeal to the people, the authority and prestige offered by de
86
Gaulle, and its ability to offer an alternative to the Fourth Republic system.
Goguel's analyses of the geographical spread ofRPF support have demonstrated that
it frequently achieved success in areas not connected with the traditional right, in
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spite of the political associations ofmany of its members. It appears, therefore, that
the RPF, like the Parti Communiste Franqais (PCF), appealed to sections of the
population seeking a form of change or progress; indeed, Goguel has referred to the
• 88
'modernity' of the RPF compared to the rest of the centre-right. While the RPF can
correctly be described as a party of the moderate right, it is less accurate to describe
it as a traditional or conservative movement simply on the basis of the affiliations of
its elected representatives. In the Union franqaise, however, the situation was
different: the RPF frequently came to be seen as the voice of conservatism. This
point will be examined in greater detail in chapters two and three, but in the context
of a general study of Gaullist support, the description of the movement's supporters









offered by one prominent figure in the Algerian RPF is revealing: 'd'anciens
resistants, mais pas les meilleurs, qui restent dans l'ombre, et les gaullistes de salon
on
qui n'ont rien a voir avec les gaullistes de guerre'. Other commentators have
claimed that, in fact, the RPF outside metropolitan France was entirely dominated by
conservatives. Charles-Andre Julien, for example, describes the 86, 000 membership
applications received from the Union frangaise in 1947 as a 'ralliement en masse' to
defend conservatism.90 A similar picture of the appeal of the RPF in the colonies
upon its creation, as the voice of the colonial status quo in opposition to left-wing
government, is provided in Bourgi's survey of Sub-Saharan Africa.91 Thus, it is
essential to differentiate between metropolitan France and the colonies in any
definition of Gaullism and its supporters.
In conjunction with the above overview of the political backgrounds of Gaullists, a
more detailed survey of some of the Gaullist movement's leading figures is useful to
a study ofGaullism as distinct from de Gaulle himself. The Gaullists who held
significant positions in the RPF or RS, or in Fourth Republic governments, and who
contributed to the development of Gaullist thinking, will therefore be examined
briefly, in order to establish what common points or areas of divergence can be
identified. The leading Gaullists during the Fourth Republic were undoubtedly
Michel Debre and Jacques Soustelle. Four others are worthy of special interest
because of their connections with colonial questions (in addition to Soustelle's
significant contribution to Gaullist thinking on Algeria): Gilbert Grandval, Christian
Fouchet, General Georges Catroux and Jacques Foccart. Furthermore, four Gaullist
leaders can be identified as having special interest in questions of defence and
foreign policy: Pierre Koenig, Pierre Billotte, Jacques Chaban-Delmas (all of whom
served as Minister of Defence), and Gaston Palewski. Finally, Louis Terrenoire and
89 Rene Vinciguerra, quoted in Purtschet, p. 123
90 Julien quoted in Purtschet, p. 123; the membership application figures are those claimed by the RPF
and recorded by Purtschet, pp. 122-3
91 R. Bourgi, Le General de Gaulle et iAfrique noire, 1940-1969 (Paris: Librairie generale de droit et
de jurisprudence, 1980), pp. 215-8
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Roger Frey are important figures because of their role in party organisation, internal
cohesion and electoral strategy. It must be noted that Foccart and Soustelle also
played a significant part in RPF organisation, while of those mentioned above,
Foccart, Terrenoire and Debre might reasonably be said to have been the closest to
de Gaulle.
Michel Debre has already been discussed in relation to his place within Gaullist
ideology. His role within the Gaullist movement is equally important. Described as
being at the heart of all the plots and subversion attempts under the Fourth
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Republic, he was certainly more involved than any other Gaullist, with the possible
exception of Soustelle, in the discrediting and destruction of the regime. His chief
contributions to this were in the form of his articles in Le Courrier de la Colere and
his parliamentary speeches, while his extensive network of contacts in the military
also contributed to his role as one of the leaders of the group of Gaullists with the
real potential to bring about the collapse of the Fourth Republic. Debre's chief
interest was in the constitution and institutions of France; he worked on drafts of
what was to become the constitution of the Fifth Republic throughout his spell in
opposition. His belief in national independence made him the leader in the Senate of
the Gaullists' attacks on the EDC, the EEC and EURATOM, the proposed European
atomic energy project. The same intransigence was later manifested in strong attacks
on the United States for interfering in North Africa and thus rendering the Atlantic
Alliance meaningless. Despite this, Debre's role in the Gaullist party organisation
was smaller than his contribution to policy. He never held high office in the RPF or
RS, and indeed was sceptical of what he saw as the RS' excessive willingness to
participate in government. He did, however, undertake national projects under the
Fourth Republic, notably the creation of the Ecole Nationale d'Administration and
92
Viansson-Ponte, Les Gaullistes, pp. 101-7
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the presidency of government committees dealing with the Saar and Germany, acting
as a senior civil servant as much as a Gaullist.93
The second key figure of Fourth Republic Gaullism is Jacques Soustelle. Like Debre,
his influence extended beyond the Gaullist movement. He is chiefly important for his
crucial role in the North African crisis from 1955 onwards, which is examined in
chapter 7. He served as Governor-General in Algeria in 1955-56, during which time
he developed and implemented the doctrine of integration - the complete
incorporation ofAlgeria into France. The significance of this cannot be
underestimated, as the May 1958 events in Algiers took place in the name of
integration. Soustelle, therefore, is central to any study ofGaullism in North Africa.
As one of the first Gaullists to develop a coherent doctrine relating to North Africa
after the start of the Algerian War, he was frequently referred to by colleagues, to
such an extent that his personal doctrine of integration was for a time barely
distinguishable from Gaullist policy in general. Soustelle was also a key figure in the
RPF; he was the movement's first Secretary General, and strongly advocated that the
movement should seek to establish itself in North Africa. He fell out of favour with
de Gaulle after agreeing to hold consultations with a view to forming a government
in 1952; from that date onwards he was never the central figure in the Gaullist
movement that he had been before. He was not very seriously involved in the RS,
having founded a cross-party organisation, the Union Pour le Salut et le Renouveau
de IAlgerie Franqaise (USRAF), to which he devoted more time, demonstrating that
his priorities, unlike those of Debre lay primarily with keeping Algeria French rather
than in ensuring the triumph of Gaullism and the return of de Gaulle.94
9-1 Debre's published essays during the Fourth Republic are: La mort de I'etat republicain (Paris:
Gallimard, 1947); La republique et son pouvoir (Paris: Nagel, 1950); La republique et ses problemes
(Paris: Nagel, 1952); Ces princes qui nous gouvernent (Paris: Plon, 1957).
94 Soustelle's published works during the Fourth Republic are: Aimee et souffrante Algerie (Paris:
Plon, 1956); Le drame algerien et la decadencefranqaise: reponse a RaymondAron (Paris: Plon,
1957). In addition to Ullmann's biography (note 31), P. Dabezies, 'Jacques Soustelle', in Fondation
Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et le RPF, pp. 95-8, highlights Soustelle's tolerance of reactionary
opinion in the RPF. Soustelle's later publications, L'Esperance trahie, 1958-1961, (Paris: Editions de
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The four Gaullists with most experience of colonial affairs, other than Soustelle,
were Gilbert Grandval, Christian Fouchet, Georges Catroux and Jacques Foccart.
Grandval was Resident-General in Morocco in 1955, Fouchet was Minister for
Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs in 1954-55, Catroux was briefly Governor-General in
Algeria in 1956, and Foccart was responsible for the Union frangaise within the RPF.
Grandval belonged to the 'gaullistes de gauche', and his appointment to Morocco was
unpopular even with fellow Gaullists, many of whom demanded his removal after
only two months in office. He was accused of excessive liberalism, and it is true that
the chief reason for his downfall was the number of enemies he made among the
colonial civil service and the army. He had previously been Governor, Commissioner
and Ambassador to the Saar, and was absent from the main activities of the RPF and
RS except during his crucial period in Morocco. Despite his failure there, he can
nevertheless be seen as the representative of a liberal trend within Gaullism.
Christian Fouchet, a professional diplomat, was appointed Minister for Moroccan
and Tunisian Affairs by Pierre Mendes-France in 1954, at the time when the Prime
Minister had decided to grant 'internal autonomy' to the Protectorates. Like Grandval,
Fouchet portrayed a liberal type of Gaullism, which was not universally accepted in
the Gaullist movement, in his dealings with North Africa. His importance in the
development of Gaullist policy on North Africa can be seen in the fact that, in 1962,
he was appointed by de Gaulle as the first French ambassador to Algeria, charged
with reconciliation. General Georges Catroux first came into contact with Gaullism
and North Africa in 1943, when, following his role in negotiations with Giraud, he
was appointed Minister for North Africa in the Provisional Government. He did not
believe as strongly as most Gaullists in Algerie frangaise, and in 1943 was influential
in the report that recommended the extension of citizenship in Algeria. He was the
most liberal member of the RPF Conseil de Direction, on which he was often
l'Alma, 1962) and La page n'estpas tournee (Paris: La table ronde, 1965) are also useful in
understanding Soustelle's attachment to Algeriefranqaise, along with his memoirs (note 36)
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isolated and from which he finally resigned in 1952 over the RPFs policies on
Morocco and Tunisia. His liberalism on North African affairs persisted throughout
the Fourth Republic, leading to his being declared 'undesirable' in 1953 by General
Guillaume, Resident General in Morocco, and in 1955 negotiating the return to
Morocco of the deposed, pro-nationalist Sultan. In this context, his appointment to
replace Soustelle as Governor-General in Algeria in 1956 caused violent protests
among the settlers and he resigned within days. His reputation as one of the most
consistently liberal Gaullists on colonial affairs is deserved, and it is interesting that
he remained close to de Gaulle throughout the Fourth Republic. Unlike Grandval,
Fouchet and Catroux, Jacques Foccart never held ministerial office, but was
acknowledged as the RPF's expert on colonial affairs, although his expertise related
more to Black Africa than the Maghreb. He edited the Lettre a I'Union Franqaise and
accompanied de Gaulle on his tours of the colonies in 1953-1957. He presided the
RPF's Commission de I'Union Franqaise, as well as serving as its Secretary General
from 1954 to 1958. His links with the police and security services, dating back to his
role in the Second World War, meant that he played a somewhat mysterious role in
the events of 1958, and in the Fifth Republic's African policies.
Gaullist foreign and defence policy was best illustrated during the Fourth Republic
by the three Gaullist Ministers of Defence, Generals Pierre Koenig (1954 and 1955),
Pierre Billotte (1955), and Jacques Chaban-Delmas (1958). Koenig was opposed by
some fellow Gaullists for according too much importance to European and Atlantic
issues, and by others for being too easily influenced by military pressure.95 Billotte
had a special interest in strategic questions and was instrumental in the formulation
ofRPF policy in this area. He was in favour of the Atlantic Alliance, and never a
fervent partisan ofAlgerie franqaise-, he publicly condemned torture in 1957.96
Chaban-Delmas played an important role in May 1958, as it was the antenne of the
95 The only work on Koenig is the essay by P. Vial in Militaires en Republique, (note 16)
96
In addition to Le Passe an futur (note 36), Billotte also published Le Temps du Choix (Paris: R.
Laffont, 1950)
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Ministry of Defence that he had established in Algiers that succeeded in turning
events there to the Gaullists' advantage. As mayor ofBordeaux and President of the
RS from 1954 to 1957, he was the strongest advocate of Gaullist participation in
government and co-operation with other parties, although he did incur the wrath of
fellow Gaullists for this reason in 1957-58. Opinion is divided on his motives for
entering the Gaillard government of 1958, with some claiming that his aim was to
undermine the Fourth Republic from within, while others accuse him of betraying
Q7
Gaulhst principles. In addition, Gaston Palewski can be included in this group
because of his interest in and knowledge of foreign and strategic issues; he frequently
presented reports on foreign policy at RPF conferences. His experience as a close
collaborator ofMarshal Lyautey, the chief exponent of the colonial doctrine of the
'civilising mission' in Morocco in the 1920s, also lent him some authority within the
Gaullist movement to speak on North African affairs. His chief sphere of official
activity during the Fourth Republic was his role in developing the French military
nuclear programme, while Ministre Delegue a la Presidence du Conseil in 1955. He
also influenced Gaullist thinking on the increasingly important question of the Sahara
in 1956-58.
Louis Terrenoire and Roger Frey are important due to the roles they played in the
organisation of the Gaullist movement. Terrenoire, split with the MRP in 1947 and
became RPF Secretary General between 1951 and 1954, and was instrumental during
this period in maintaining a reasonably coherent Gaullist group in parliament. His
further contribution to the survival and evolution of Gaullism after 1953 was the
leading role he played in the defeat ofEDC. Although he did not greatly influence
Gaulhst thinking on North Africa, he appears to have been more aware than most of
de Gaulle's changing views on the situation, and in the later years of the Fourth
Republic he acted as a mediator and link between different Gaullist groups, while
97 Chaban-Delmas' memoirs (note 36) are complemented by L'Ardeur (Paris: Stock, 1975), which is
equally reticent on the subjects of the Fourth Republic and Algeria.
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working for the return of the General. Roger Frey's contribution to Fourth Republic
Gaullism is a smaller one, but no less significant. As General Secretary of the RS
from 1955, he was at the centre ofmost of the plots, conspiracies and activism of the
end of the Fourth Republic, working closely with Debre, Soustelle and Foccart in this
period. In particular, he was in Algiers in May 1958, overseeing and directing the
course of events. His views on Algeria present little of note, but he is of interest for
the way in which he demonstrates the vital role that activism and contacts played in
Gaullist Algerian policy.
The relationship between de Gaulle himself and the Gaullist movement remains to be
examined. Olivier Wieviorka has suggested that de Gaulle's role in the RPF
amounted to one of overall direction rather than involvement in the details of policy
or party activities." Along with Soustelle's account of the absence of 'ideological'
conflict within the RPF, this account of de Gaulle's leadership appears to confirm
that individual Gaullist responsables were accorded a considerable amount of
freedom in respect of policy and tactics. De Gaulle, however, did attempt to maintain
order within the Rassemblement, and was concerned that his appointed collaborators
should not overstep the limits of their responsibilities, or reinterpret his opinions.100
Thus, Soustelle's acceptance of the offer from President Vincent Auriol to form a
government in January 1952, although ostensibly done in the name of promoting
98 In addition to his memoirs of his Gaullist activity (note 37), Terrenoire also published the useful De
Gaulle et I'Algerie: temoignagepour I'histoire (Paris: Fayard, 1964), which has been influential in the
development of the idea that de Gaulle recognised the inevitability ofAlgerian independence before
1958.
99 O. Wieviorka, 'Les dirigeants, Rapport de Synthese', pp. 90-2
100
Wieviorka, 'Les dirigeants', p. 91; Examples of de Gaulle notifying colleagues that they had gone
beyond the limits ofwhat he considered appropriate behaviour can be found in two rebukes to
Soustelle, the first for attending a UDSR meeting, which de Gaulle feared would be interpreted as a
sign of Gaullist approval for co-operation with the socialist movement. The second example amounts
to a clear statement of how de Gaulle saw his place within the RPF leadership: 'Je repete, une fois de
plus, que personne ne peut ni ne doit faire de declaration a quiconque quant a ce qui me conceme
personnellement. Ce que je pense, ce que je fais, ce que je projette, c'est mon affaire. II n'appartient
qu'a moi de le dire ou de le taire. Priere d'en tenir compte absolument et de faire le necessaire aupres
de tous les membres de mes services pour qu'ils se conferment, eux aussi, a cette regie indispensable
de convenance et de tactique.' De Gaulle, Lettres, Notes et Carnets: complements 1924-1970 (Paris:
Plon, 1997, pp. 76 & 78) (De Gaulle to Soustelle, 30.5.1947 & 10.11.1947)
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Gaullism, met with the General's disapproval because it represented a significant
overstretching, on Soustelle's part, of the responsibilities given to him by de Gaulle
as a leader of the Gaullist movement.101
In determining the importance of de Gaulle's public pronouncements on North
Africa, it must be remembered that after his withdrawal from the RPF in 1953, the
General made only infrequent public appearances, and indeed did not speak publicly
at all on colonial affairs between June 30, 1955 and May 19, 1958. It has generally
been assumed, nevertheless, as previously mentioned, that Gaullist policy and ideas
emanated exclusively from de Gaulle. Their diffusion and reception, however, raise
questions about the extent of authority that de Gaulle exercised over different parts of
the Gaullist movement in the realm of doctrine. For those Gaullists chiefly motivated
by personal loyalty to and admiration for de Gaulle - Chariot and Soustelle's
'Gaullistes de foi' - the writings and speeches of de Gaulle constitute the essence of
their political views. This is the case especially for the mass of Gaullist militants -
party members and local officials. Thus, any statement of policy or ideology from a
relatively minor figure in the RPF or RS party hierarchy invariably referred directly
102
to the oeuvre of de Gaulle. The existence of a considerable body ofwork
presenting the General's views on virtually every subject certainly facilitated the
emergence of a school of thought known as 'Gaullism'. The RPF, indeed, sought to
strengthen this ideological cohesion by producing, in 1951, a compilation of de
Gaulle's writings and speeches entitled La France sera la France: ce que veut
1 OT
Charles de Gaulle. Intended to become a kind ofGaullist 'bible', twenty thousand
copies of this volume were sent to RPF members. It was organised thematically, with
101 For details of the dispute between Soustelle and de Gaulle over this issue, Ullmann, Jacques
Soustelle, pp. 168-71; Soustelle, Vingt-huit ans de gaullisme, 76-8, Chariot, Le 'gaullisme cl'opposition,
pp. 257-59.
102 De Gaulle's published work before 1958 consists of: La discorde chez Vennemi (Paris: Berger-
Levrault, 1924); Le Fil de I'epee (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1932); Vers I'armee de metier (Paris: Berger-
Levrault, 1934); La France et son armee (Paris: Plon, 1938); Trois Etudes (Paris: Berger-Levrault,
1945); Memoires de Guerre, vol. 1: L'Appel (Paris: Plon, 1954) & vol. 2: L'Unite (Paris: Plon, 1956).
103 Rassemblement du Peuple Franfais, La France sera la France: ce que veut Charles de Gaulle
(Paris: Rassemblement du Peuple Fran9ais, 1951).
43
each chapter consisting of extracts from de Gaulle's writings that were thought to
present the essence of the General's thought on the subject.
The publication of the first two volumes of de Gaulle's war memoirs in 1954-56104
added to the body ofwritten work that the General's supporters could scrutinise in
search of intellectual guidance. It could be argued that the content of the war
memoirs helped focus attention on the international aspects of Gaullism. The second
volume, L'Unite, especially, dealing with de Gaulle's period in Algiers and the
international diplomacy surrounding the North African landings and Allied attitudes
to Free France, reinforced the link between North Africa and France's wartime
recovery. Published in 1956, it kept de Gaulle in the public sphere and maintained
the association ofGaullism and Algeria that had existed within the Gaullist
movement since 1943. The effect of the memoirs as a whole, through their immense
popular success, was to further develop the image of de Gaulle as saviour in a time of
crisis, the same idea that the Gaullists were in the process of developing as part of
their strategy for a solution in Algeria and Gaullism's return to power.
104 The third volume, Le Salut, was not published until 1959.
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CHAPTER 2
GAULLISM AND THE UNION FRANQAISE TO THE 1951 ELECTIONS:
POLICIES, PRIORITIES AND CONTACTS
The Gaullists' reflection on colonial affairs in the early years of the Fourth Republic
laid the foundations upon which their reactions to problems in North Africa in the
1950s were based. This chapter will introduce the key themes in Gaullist thinking on
colonial questions in the period leading up to the 1951 elections. These are the
Gaullists' attitude to the French colonial presence and the question of reform in
North Africa, the link between French North Africa and the emerging Cold War
geopolitical situation, and North Africa's place in the Gaullists' strategy for electoral
victory and de Gaulle's return to power. Reflection on all these subjects took place
within the framework of general policy outlined by de Gaulle at Brazzaville and
Bordeaux and described in Chapter 1: gradual evolution towards a degree of self-
government in the colonies as part of a greater French state along federal lines, with
no question of independence for the colonies. The protectorates in Morocco and
Tunisia might be expected to be seen as exceptions to this rule - the overall aim of
protectorate being to prepare the territories for independence - but in practice
Gaullists made little distinction between the protectorates and the colonies, and came
to see independence as an unrealistic aim for North Africa, believing that the French
influence would simply be replaced by a different type of foreign domination.
Likewise Algeria, officially a part ofmetropolitan France rather than a colony, rarely
featured in debates on domestic policy.'
1 Morocco and Tunisia tended to be treated by Gaullists as if they were part of the Union frangaise.
Algeria was technically part of the French element of the Union frangaise, rather than a member in its
own right, but was generally treated in the same way as the other overseas territories and colonies.
The RPF's conferences tended to deal with North Africa as part of the Union frangaise section,
distinct from domestic affairs. The Lettre a I'Union Frangaise clearly saw Algeria and the
protectorates as part of its sphere of interest, while the metropolitan Gaullist publications such as Le
Rassemblement and L 'Etincelle did not systematically treat Algeria as part of their area of
competence, publishing separate Algerian editions. The aim of an inclusive community embracing
France and its overseas territories on an equal basis thus seems to have existed more in theory than in
practice in the RPF's activities. The RPF therefore displayed the same confusion, and reluctance to see
the metropole and the colonies as parts of the same Union, that they condemned in their opponents.
Even the new term Union frangaise did not signify a significant new departure in colonial thinking, as
it failed to replace the idea ofEmpire in general perceptions. Lacouture describes it thus: 'Ce que
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Means of strengthening links between France and the Union frangaise
While colonial problems were not the Gaullists' highest priority in the period
between 1946 and the 1951 elections, the question of relations between metropolitan
France and the colonies was of considerable importance in debate over the new
institutions of the Fourth Republic. The issue of links between France and the Union
frangaise played an important part in Gaullist opposition to the proposed constitution
of the Fourth Republic. Throughout the 1950s, Gaullists claimed that the Union
frangaise was flawed because it failed to provide for colonial representation at levels
below the Assemblee Nationale. This analysis had its origins mainly in Debre's
critiques of the 1946 constitutional proposals. Debre's thought on colonial issues in
the early years of the Fourth Republic displayed a clear emphasis on developing the
idea of community already expressed by de Gaulle, through an emphasis on inclusion
of the colonies in the Nation as a whole, and local representation for colonial
populations.2 This community in turn required leadership to be provided by
metropolitan France.
The Gaullists envisaged popular representation at a local level in the colonies. In
addressing the question of representation - the key to achieving a truly inclusive
Union frangaise - the RPF stressed that fair representation for colonial populations
did not necessarily mean universal suffrage. Announcing that the RPF proposed the
creation of representative assemblies in each territory of the Union frangaise, Debre
cautioned that the distribution of seats and means of election would depend on the
'characteristics of the local population', adding that 'Nous ne pensons pas que le
suffrage universel soit la panacee a appliquer des maintenant, automatiquement et
uniformement, a tous les pays d'Outre-Mer. Proclamons-en le principe, mais
chacun appelle alors l'Union franqaise sans cesser de penser en termes d'Empire.' J. Lacouture, De
Gaulle, vol. 2: le politique, 1944-1959 (Paris: Seuil, 1985), pp. 343-4
2 Michel Debre archives (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), 1DE21, Rapport sur
1'Organisation Constitutionelle et Administrative de I'Union frangaise, 10.4.1948
J Debre archives, 1DE21, Rapport sur I 'Organisation... 10.8.1948
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appliquons-le avec discernement'.4 For the RPF, change in the colonies was
inevitable after the War and Brazzaville, but the essential principle owed much to the
traditional French mission to protect and civilise: 'assurer ... les progres des
populations autochtones, les traiter avec justice ...' .5 The most pressing issue in the
early Fourth Republic was to establish the means of ensuring representation for both
native and settler communities, since the franchise had been widened by de Gaulle.
In this respect, some willingness to change the existing strict separation of French
and native populations can be seen: Debre stated a preference not for the 'double
college' system, but rather for what he called a 'pluralite des colleges', allowing for
the creation of several different electoral colleges in areas where several distinct
ethnic or social communities could be identified.6 The creation of unitary assemblies
in the colonies was to be avoided, as these would risk giving the colonies a state
apparatus that could be used by nationalists to challenge the authority of Paris, a
preoccupation that featured strongly in the Gaullists' opposition to the loi-cadre
proposals for Algeria in 1956-8.
Debre's constitutional ideas inspired Gaullist debate on the problem ofmodifying the
structures ofmetropolitan institutions to allow the idea of the Union franqaise to be
fully realised. Thus, another familiar Gaullist theme associated with the end of the
Fourth Republic emerged: the need to secure a system of government in Paris that
allowed governments the authority to control the pace of reform in the colonies. A
central federal structure for the Union franqaise, with a Haut Conseil de I 'Union
franqaise made up of representatives of the Union franqaise states as well as the
government, along with a federal Conseil des Ministres, was generally welcomed,
4 ibid
5 ibid
6 ibid. Areas of the Union franqaise that were considered particularly suited to this varied system of
involvement in political life were those seen as politically more mature or complex, such as Reunion,
the Etablissements Franqais des Indes, and Senegal. The general idea of separation of communities in
North Africa persisted until the end of the Fourth Republic in Gaullist thinking, as seen in plans to
create different institutions for different groups in Algeria in 1956-8. See for example Palewski's
similar plan for Algeria in G. Palewski, 'Une politique pour l'Afrique du Nord', Revue politique et
parlementaire, 660 (July 1956), pp. 7-17
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but many Gaullists were reticent on the question of creating parallel representative
institutions and decision-making mechanisms at a local level in the colonies
themselves. Even federalism was not universally popular. Raymond Dronne, later a
strong supporter ofAlgerie franqaise, claimed to speak for many RPF members in
opposing the introduction of federal ministries with responsibility for both the
metropole and the Union franqaise, as well as representation in the Senate for the
members of the Union franqaise. Devolution of local powers and creation of local
representation, too, were not universally welcomed. The model of the Union
franqaise that emerged from the RPF's discussions therefore retained a strong central
power in Paris, albeit one with the potential to evolve into a federal one. In the Union
franqaise, however, the local representation on a small scale envisaged by de Gaulle
and Debre received only lukewarm and conditional support. Power was to remain
firmly in Paris, and it is indeed questionable whether the majority of Gaullists were
ever committed to a federal Union franqaise to the same extent as the RPF leaders.
Gaullism and conservatism in North Africa
Gaullist plans for stronger constitutional links between France and the Union
franqaise were an important aspect of long-term planning for reform in the event of
an RPF victory in the 1951 elections. In the short term, however, they had to attract
support in North Africa in order to establish a Gaullist presence beyond metropolitan
France and demonstrate their commitment to the region. The Gaullists' attachment to
North Africa as a result of their wartime experience owed as much to the Muslim
populations as to the settlers. Indeed, many of the settlers had supported the Vichy
regime, particularly in Algeria where its anti-Semitism had been popular, and had
little time for de Gaulle. While some Muslims had welcomed the French defeat in
1940, Gaullists focused on the fact that many more had fought in the Free French
7 Debre archives, 1DE21, RPF Comite d'Etudes, 1.9.1948. Dronne never held a senior position within
the Gaullist movement, despite being one of the RPF and RS' most prolific orators in parliament. His
views might be assumed to be closer to those of the mainstream Gaullist supporters than those of the
acknowledged policy-makers like Debre and Soustelle, or those of the Gaullists regularly who
participated in Fourth Republic government, such as Chaban-Delmas.
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armies, and it was this recognition, along with international pressure to implement
reform in the colonies, that had led to the limited extension of citizenship and the
franchise in Algeria in 1943. The Gaullists, therefore, sought to maximise the
benefits of de Gaulle's image as reformer among the North Africans, in order to steer
them away from the emerging nationalist parties. Electoral concerns, however, and
the need to protect French authority in North Africa against any nationalist or
communist advances, also led them to seek support among the settlers. Indeed, the
dual college electoral system that made settlers' votes more important than Muslim
ones meant the Gaullists were obliged to seek settler support. Thus a difficult
compromise was sought, between preserving the important legacy of wartime
reforms and reassuring the settlers that a Gaullist government in France would
protect their privileges.
The RPF was keen to develop a strong organisation in North Africa, particularly in
Algiers.8 The main obstacle it faced among the settlers was the fact that the Second
World War legacy of Gaullist legitimacy could not be relied upon in North Africa as
in metropolitan France. The RPF's electoral behaviour in North Africa reveals its
ambivalent attitude to the entrenched conservatism and enduring Petainism of the
European population, while highlighting the problems faced by Gaullism in
attempting to live up to the legacy of Brazzaville and continue to represent the
aspirations of the colonial populations. The RPF in fact made very little progress
among Muslims; the number ofMuslim members was regularly exaggerated by the
delegues departementaux in the reports they sent to headquarters in Paris.9
8 Soustelle, aware of the movement's limited resources, insisted that for the 1947 elections the two
most important cities for Gaullism to win were Paris and Algiers. Fabrice Barthelemy, Le Gaullisme
et I'Algerie au temps du RPF (1947-1955), (unpublished memoire de maitrise, Insitut d'Etudes
Politiques, Paris, 1997), p. 15
9
Barthelemy, Le Gaullisme et I'Algerie, p. 33. The name of de Gaulle certainly retained much
prestige among the Muslims, but the General remained relatively distant from North African
Gaullism, perhaps in recognition of the fact that the RPF in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia contained
as many former antigaullists as anciens resistants.
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Given the value of Gaullism's reforming reputation, some Gaullist leaders in France
were uncomfortable with the tendency of some of the most conservative and
reactionary elements of colonial society to join the RPF,10 attracted by its
anticommunism and emphasis on strong central government. However, their
reluctance to co-operate with more moderate forces in electoral alliances prevented
the RPF from widening its support in North Africa. In contrast to an alliance of
parties, the RPF claimed to offer 'une veritable union... des Frantpais et des
musulmans',11 echoing its emphasis, in metropolitan France, on national unity rather
than the short-lived and unstable political alliances that the Fourth Republic's
electoral laws had produced. In one exception to this policy, Gaullists in Algiers
proposed that the RPF should produce a 'common manifesto' for the 1951 campaign,
with the collaboration ofMuslim figures known for their authority and their pro-
French sentiment. Yet this plan was designed not to appeal to the Muslims but to
12calm the settlers' fears concerning de Gaulle's popularity among the Muslims, and
therefore to allow the Gaullists to win pied-noir support. In practice, the 1951
campaign saw the Gaullists' ideas concerning Franco-Muslim unity somewhat
sidelined by the disputes among the Europeans about the legitimacy of Gaullism.
The RPF in Morocco, like in Algeria, had trouble establishing itself on the basis of
the Gaullist war legacy, and was generally identified as the voice of conservative
opinion. Moreover, internal disputes among the Europeans who made up the bulk of
the North African RPF undermined the movement's cohesion. As early as 1948,
Fran?ois Marrier, an RPF organiser in Fes, highlighted the key fault-line that was
emerging in the movement:
J'ai oeuvre aux cotes des promoteurs du mouvement a Fes avant que ne
viennent s'y joindre ceux qui furent des antigaullists a 1'epoque de Vichy
10 The RPF membership in Algeria has been described as 'recrutes parmi les elements les plus
retrogrades de la population europeenne.' H. Lerner, Catroux (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990), p. 298
11 RPF archives (Paris: Fondation Charles de Gaulle), Dossier Algerie, BR.42, Yaffi to Soustelle,
16.10.1950
12 RPF archives, Dossier Algerie, BR.42, Yaffi to Soustelle, 16.10.1950
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... J'ai toujours ete un des admirateurs du General de Gaulle et j'accepte
difficilement une gestion du mouvement par ceux qui dirigent actuellement
au Maroc.13
The majority of active RPF members in Morocco, however, were to be found on the
conservative side of the divide, with attempts to impose unity behind a 'Paris' line
sidelined in favour of consolidating the movement's membership and electoral
strength. One of the most important groups targeted by the Gaullists in North Africa
was militaires and anciens combattants. This strategy was not merely a local
initiative in Algiers, but was sanctioned by party leaders in Paris, despite the
Petainism ofmost North African soldiers and veterans. At the 1950 Assises, the RPF
called for anciens combattants overseas to be granted the same state benefits as those
in metropolitan France, and for improved conditions of service for military personal
overseas.14 RPF Secretary-General Louis Terrenoire was particularly active in the
defence and promotion of anciens' combattants rights, and maintained regular contact
with the Federation des Anciens Combattants et Victimes de Guerre du Maroc,13
The 1951 elections were the first test of the RPF's success in appealing to generally
antigaullist voters. The Gaullists had already begun to address the legacy of the
Second World War in a largely Petainist community, after the Remy affair of 1950.
Colonel Remy, the chief secret agent of Free France and a close friend of de Gaulle,
published an article in the Gaullist-supporting newspaper Carrefour, in which he
claimed that in 1940 France had needed both Petain and de Gaulle - the Marshal as
the shield and the General as the sword.16 Furthermore, he insisted that he was
expressing the views of de Gaulle himself. Despite the latter's firm denial and Remy's
resignation from the Conseil National of the RPF, the link between Petainism and
Gaullism had been clearly stated and a sensitive subject opened to public debate. The
13 RPF archives, Dossier Maroc, 51/4, Marrierto Soustelle, 17.12.1948
14 RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, Union frangaise section, November 1950
13 RPF archives, Maroc, 51/4.2, dossier 'Anciens Combattants' , Terrenoire to Jacquinot, 27.4.1950.
16
Remy in Carrefour, 11.4.1950
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Gaullists recognised the electoral value of attempting to 'assimilate' Petain to the
prestige of de Gaulle and Free France.17 For settlers - pieds-noirs - resentful about
the Fourth Republic's appropriation of the metropolitan war record, the Remy affair
was seen as a vindication. According to the influential settler newspaper L 'Echo
d'Alger, Remy had made possible national unity, by recognising that Petainists and
Resistants were both motivated by the restoration of French grandeur.18
The 1951 elections also coincided with the final months of Petain's life, as calls for
grace became increasingly frequent in the conservative press, especially in Algeria.
RPF publications abandoned earlier articles in praise of the spirit of resistance as
incarnated by the Free French, and shifted their emphasis to the theme of national
unity.19 Louis Terrenoire tabled a motion in parliament calling for the release of
Petain from his detention on the lie d'Yeu, Petain's lawyer, Jacques Isomi, stood for
election on the RPF list in Paris, and de Gaulle himself criticised the government's
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treatment of Petain. In France, the RPF's attempt to create national unity in the face
of a presumed communist threat lay behind these tactics; in North Africa, however,
the RPF was also attempting to appeal to the settlers whose votes were so important
to Gaullism's implantation in the region.
The 1951 elections failed to deliver a Gaullist government. The RPF won the largest
number of seats but, with only 21.7% of the vote and a commitment to avoid
alliances with other parties, was resigned to a further parliamentary term out of
office. The Gaullists concluded from the election results that they would never be
17
Remy's crime, in this context, was not to raise a delicate subject, but rather, to claim to speak for de
Gaulle without the General's prior permission.
18 L'Echo d'Alger, 13.4.1950. The newspaper's editor, Alain de Serigny, played a crucial role in
ensuring the return of de Gaulle in May 1958, dramatically rallying to Gaullism and delivering pied-
noir support to the Gaullists.
19 Parallels can be seen with the Gaullists scaling down their attacks on Giraud and Vichy in 1943
when the immediate imperative in Algiers was unity behind the joint heads of the provisional
government.
20 See for example C. de Gaulle, Discotirs et Messages, vol. 2: dans I'attente 1946-1958 (Paris: Plon,
1970) pp. 280-81 (Press Conference, 29.3.1949)
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able to hold office under the Fourth Republic's system of proportional representation
and coalition government. After the elections, Gaullists in North Africa made less
effort to court pied-noir opinion, until 1958, but they continued to support
conservative policies, defending the French position and the settlers' privileges and
attacking nationalism. One of the casualties of the 1951 election campaign in North
Africa was, therefore, Gaullism's short-lived popularity among the Muslims as a
reforming movement in the spirit of the resistance and the provisional government.21
Gaullism in North Africa had failed to develop into the kind of popular movement
that was growing in metropolitan France; chief among the reasons for this was surely
that its frequent association with the defenders of the colonial status quo, business
leaders, the military and former Petainists prevented it from establishing a foothold
in a Muslim community already susceptible to nationalist propaganda.
North Africa and France's international Position: Defence, Security and
Sovereignty
The wartime reforms that the Gaullists hoped would win Muslim support had been
enacted partly in response to international events. American pressure on European
colonial powers to move towards decolonisation, at the end of the Second World
War, had been followed by Soviet encouragement of anticolonial movements as the
Cold War began. The Gaullists' concerns thus shifted from allowing some reforms,
in order to avoid criticism from France's allies, to preventing any nationalist gains
that could be put to the service of communism. The RPF's fierce anticommunism in
domestic politics was mirrored by its opposition to nationalism in North Africa; both
communism and anticolonialism were thought to have an international dimension,
21 De Gaulle retained personal prestige among colonial populations - as the reception he generally
received on his tours of the colonies in the mid-1950s demonstrated - but the Gaullist movement in
general never succeeded in presenting itself as a voice of reform after 1951. The well-documented
rallying of the Algerian Muslims to de Gaulle in 1958 can be attributed to the General's personal
popularity, and even to his relative distance from the conservatism ofmuch Fourth Republic
Gaullism.
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operating for the benefit of a foreign power.22 In the case of French communism, the
real threat was clearly the Soviet Union, whereas in North Africa, Gaullists were for
a time unsure as to whether the nationalist movements were being directed by
communists in Moscow or Arab nationalists in Egypt. In this climate, even allied
calls for further reforms became unwelcome, as the Gaullists increasingly saw the
United States and Britain as interfering in French North Africa, not in the interests of
the Muslim populations but for their own economic or strategic purposes. Despite the
supposed common cause ofWestern nations in the Cold War, British and American
interests did not necessarily match those of France, given the Gaullists' belief, based
on their wartime experience, that French control ofNorth Africa was the only means
to ensure national security and to give France hope for survival in the case of attack
in Europe.23
The Second World War had convinced Gaullists ofNorth Africa's importance for
French and European security. From the government's attempt to retreat to Algeria in
1940, through the Allied landings of 1942 to the establishment of de Gaulle's
provisional government in Algiers in 1943, the Second World War offered evidence
that North Africa could play a vital role in the event of further threats to metropolitan
France. In addition, the importance that Gaullists attached to sub-Saharan Africa as
the first part of the Empire to rally to Gaullism strengthened their argument for North
Africa's importance: without firm control in North Africa, France's strategic,
22 The RTF was for a time associated with violent anticommunism. In the early years of the Fourth
Republic, RPF or PCF rallies frequently witnessed violence between supporters of the two parties,
particularly in the so-called 'Red Belt' in the Paris suburbs, which was targeted by the RPF. De
Gaulle's tours in the provinces often attracted extreme-right sympathisers. In Grenoble in 1948, a
young communist was killed in fighting at an RPF rally. Throughout the 1950s, the RPF youth
movements continued to recruit members on the basis of a strong appeal to direct action against
communism. Anticommunism was the common theme in the rapprochement of RPF and extreme-
right students, which sometimes resulted in Gaullists appearing on joint electoral lists with royalists at
a local level, and it remained an appealing characteristic of Gaullism for those attracted by its
potential for direct action, described by one historian as 'Gaullistes de choc'. See O. Dard, 'Jalons pour
une histoire des etudiants nationalistes sous la IVeme Republique', Historiens et Geographes, 358,
(July-August 1997), pp. 249-62
23 Since the late 1940s, the onset of the Cold War had led de Gaulle, in particular, to fear an imminent
third world war.
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political and economic links with the rest of the continent would be weakened. The
rational argument for North Africa's vital contribution to French security, therefore,
acquired added weight for Gaullists through its association with their more mystical
attachment to the idea of national regeneration based on the Free French wartime
experience. Consequently, any threat to French North Africa that could be identified
with third-party interference - such as that of the Arab League, the USSR or the
United States - became an object ofGaullist concern, combining North African
nationalism with the fear of escalating Cold War conflicts.
Gaullist fears that North Africa had become the target for outside influences had
been growing since 1950. In March of that year, the Moroccan RPF became aware of
contacts in Cairo between Moroccan nationalist leaders and Abd-el-Krim, head of
the Comite de Liberation de I 'Afrique du nord24 in which the Arab League had
promised to devote its attention to Morocco once Libyan independence had been
9 S
achieved. Gaullist fears of internationalisation ofNorth African nationalist
activities were confirmed by a further report that Abd-El-Krim had sent an envoy
from the Comite de Liberation to discuss with the newly independent Indonesian
9 f\
government. The international dimension of anticolonial movements was thus
demonstrated to Gaullists for the first time, and was to prove one of their chief
preoccupations in the crisis in North Africa throughout the Fourth Republic. By April
1950, the RPF in Morocco had acquired evidence which it saw as proof that the three
countries in French North Africa were now under orders from the Arab League to
combat the Union franqaise 21 Unrest was spreading from one area to another, such
24 RPF archives, Dossier Maroc, 51/1, 'Note de renseignements. Influence de la Ligue Arabe au
Maroc. Activite du Comite de Liberation du Caire'. s.d. (March-April 1950)
25 ibid
26 ibid. The Indonesian connection was particularly worrying for Gaullists because of the way in
which the Indonesian nationalists had won independence by successfully attracting the attention of the
international community to their dispute with the Netherlands, culminating in the United Nations'
resolution calling for Dutch withdrawal. Throughout the Fourth Republic, the Indonesian precedent
was evoked by Gaullists concerned about internationalisation of the situation in North Africa, usually
in an attempt to persuade French governments to resist international pressure.
11
RPF archives, Dossier Maroc, 51/1, Note de renseignements, 28.4.1950, 'Evenements exterieurs et
leurs influences sur le Maroc'
55
as a student strike in Tunisia that had inspired similar protests in Morocco, and the
nationalists were growing in confidence. The acceleration ofNorth African
nationalist activity, especially its international dimension, combined with the
presence in Paris of governments either unable to prevent this or simply focused on
other problems, seemed to represent a real threat to the integrity of the Union
frangaise.28
North Africa, however, had not yet attained the absolute priority status in Gaullist
foreign policy that it reached during the Algerian War. Senior Gaullists were
principally concerned, in the early years of the 4th Republic, with European security,
which was accorded higher priority than the colonies.29 RPF defence policy, for
30
example, in contrast to future Gaullist views on European security stressed the
importance of developing an effective European defence organisation within the
Atlantic alliance. The role ofNorth Africa in Gaullist defence policy was to ensure
that any system of alliance put in place was as effective in the Mediterranean as in
continental Europe. The Atlantic Pact, Gaullists insisted, would need to extend
beyond Europe, whereas the existing treaties neglected Africa, thereby giving an
advantage to the USSR.31 The solution to this problem was to be French leadership in
the organisation of European defence, in order to guarantee adequate protection of
the Mediterranean theatre.32 The idea of a Soviet threat to Western Europe coming
through the Union frangaise, particularly North Africa — a key part of Gaullist North
28 The process by which the metropolitan Gaullist movement became aware of these problems in
Morocco also reveals the extent to which they had allowed the RPF in Morocco to become the voice
of settler resistance to any nationalist activity.
29
Debre, for example, having been instrumental in the creation of an RPF Commission Administrative
d'Etude pour I'Organisation Politique et Economique de I'Unionfrangaise in 1947, found himself
apologising by late 1948 for having become so preoccupied with the Saar and Germany that he had
been able to take part only occasionally in the Commission's business. The Commission itself also
rapidly sidelined North Africa in order to concentrate on Indochina. Debre archives, 1DE21.
j0 For a discussion of the role of problems in North Africa in altering Gaullist defence policy, see Ch 4
below.
31 RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, 'Rapport General sur la Defense Nationale', November
1950. The Soviet threat in Africa was not necessarily thought to be a direct military one; the Gaullists
were more concerned about Soviet aid to anticolonial movements.
32 RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, November 1950
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African policy in 1954-58 - was therefore already a matter of concern for the RPF,
but the solution, in 1950, lay in the strengthening and extension of alliances made
with Europe in mind, rather than in prioritisation ofNorth Africa over the Western
Alliance. The threat to the Union frangaise was seen as symptomatic ofWest
European vulnerability rather than as a problem principally concerning France and to
be dealt with as a matter of national importance. The shift in perceptions towards the
latter analysis did not occur until after 1953, when the immediacy of the Cold War
threat had faded.
The Gaullists' focus on Europe ahead ofNorth Africa owed much to their belief that
nationalism was only a minority movement, generated by foreign interference in
French affairs. Nationalist activity could, therefore, be treated as a matter for foreign
policy, while France developed the Union frangaise as a symbol of commitment to
its colonial mission. To give in to nationalism would be to betray loyal populations,
as the Moroccan Gaullists argued: 'La masse de la population qui verrait avec terreur
notre depart, ne comprend pas notre faiblesse et en cherche en vain la cause ... nous
sommes en train de perdre le Maroc parce que, a Paris, personne ne connait le
Maroc'. Given that nationalists in North Africa were therefore not to be seen in any
way as representative ofmajority opinion, the Gaullists insisted that, rather than
considering negotiating with nationalist leaders, France should deal only with the
sovereigns ofMorocco and Tunisia. This argument, however, demonstrated their
limited awareness of the strength of nationalism, as Mohammed V was already
sympathetic to the Moroccan nationalist Istiqlal party. In Algeria, the Gaullists
would not admit even the possibility of dealing with any local representatives about
the future of the territory; de Gaulle's reforms of 7 March 1944 had fixed Algeria's
status once and for all. Indeed, after the 1951 elections, Algeria barely featured in
Gaullist activities or statements until the outbreak of the rebellion in 1954. Political
33 RPF archives, Maroc, 51/1, Suffren to Soustelle, 15.8.1951
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'evolution' was not ruled out, but it was to focus on the development of institutions
that would accelerate the Muslims' integration into France.34
34 RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, Motion surl'Afrique du Nord, November 1950
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CHAPTER 3
GAULLISM AND THE MOROCCAN AND TUNISIAN PROBLEMS, 1951-54
After the 1951 elections, with Algeria thought to be free of nationalist unrest, the
Gaullists' attention in North Africa was focused on the growing challenge to French
authority in Morocco and Tunisia. Though frequently divided on the question of
participation in government after the defeat of 1951, the Gaullist movement managed
to maintain a greater degree of unity where foreign and colonial policies were
concerned. From 1951 to 1954, the Gaullists trod a careful path between advocating
reform and authoritarianism in the protectorates, while consistently stressing the need
for any solution to the problems posed by nationalism to be a purely French one.
Indeed, it might be said that more attention was paid to the international dimensions
of the North African problem - the roles of the Arab League, the United States, and
the United Nations - than to specific plans for the future of the protectorates. This
chapter will examine the Gaullists' views on the international dimensions ofNorth
African nationalism, the extent ofGaullist organisation among the settler
communities in Morocco and Tunisia, and their attempts to propose solutions to the
problems in the protectorates. In particular, the state of Gaullism in Morocco and
Tunisia provides a valuable opportunity to address the question ofGaullism's
strength and attitudes in North Africa, and North African Gaullism's ability to
influence overall Gaullist policy, in a period when a relatively well-organised
Gaullist movement still existed. In Algeria, in contrast, such a study of overseas
Gaullism is less feasible for the period after 1951, as the electoral defeat saw the end
ofGaullist attempts to cultivate support among traditionally antigaullist pieds-noirs
through developing often-fragile alliances.
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Gaullist fears aroused: the Protectorates and the international
community, 1951-54
In December 1951, RPF deputy Raymond Dronne expressed concern about the
consequences of Libyan independence for French North Africa.1 January 1952 saw
the beginning of Tunisian nationalist attempts to involve the United Nations in the
• 2settlement of the Tunisian question. The Gaullists saw this as principally the fault of
the French government, whose announcement, in December 1950, that its long-term
aim was Tunisian independence was seen as the cause of the Moroccan and Tunisian
nationalists' interest in taking their case to the UN. Gaullists consistently harassed
the government whenever a debate on North Africa at the UN was approaching: in
October 1952, Foccart demanded to know what the government intended to do 'pour
eviter une evocation de l'affaire tunisienne qui serait un precedent mortellement
dangereux pour notre presence en Afrique du Nord comme pour l'Afrique du Nord
elle-meme.' One of their most frequently used tactics, intended to demonstrate the
invalidity of the UN's case, was to attack the states who raised the Tunisian question
in New York. Thus in June 1952, the Pakistani championing of the Tunisian cause
provoked a detailed report in the Lettre a I'Union Frangaise of the extent of
repression in Pakistan, contrasted with the benefit for Tunisia of French protectorate
status, while the Courrier conformation politique argued that Tunisia's other allies,
such as Egypt, India and Iraq, could hardly be seen as model states.4 Similar tactics
were used to discredit American anticolonialism, highlighting the American
1
Dronne, Assemblee Nationale (henceforth AN), 29.12.1951, Journal Ojficiel de la Republique
Frangaise (henceforth JORF). Dronne returned to this theme the following year, insisting that the new
Libyan state was a threat to the French presence (JORF, 5.6.1952), while the Gaullist deputy for Oran,
Quilici, saw a dangerous precedent for French North Africa in the departure of Italians from
independent Libya. (JORF, 5.6.1952). In addition, the province of Fezzan was attached to the new
Libyan state when, at the end of the Second World War, de Gaulle's government had hoped for the
incorporation of Fezzan into Algeria and protested that a non-French presence in the area could be
prejudicial to security on the Algerian border.
2 In contrast to the Gaullists' repeated assertions that a coalition of Arab states was systematically
raising the North African question at the UN, the devolved Tunisian government itself actually made
the approach to the UN in January 1952, while the first resolution passed on Morocco, in December
1952, was in fact proposed by Brazil. The protectorates were, however, always supported by those
Arab states that were already independent. M.C. Smouts, La France al'ONU: premiers roles et
second rang (Paris : Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1979), pp. 230-9
3 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 153 (2.10.1952)
4 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 137 (5.6.1952); Courrier d'lnformationpolitique, 8 (October 1952)
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treatment of blacks and natives, and American policy in South America, in contrast
with the traditional French mission of inclusiveness.5 Thus, according to Fouchet,
T'inscription de l'affaire tunisienne a l'ordre du jour de l'ONU est une atteinte a notre
dignite de puissance protectrice... C'est aussi une atteinte a la presence fran9aise
dans toute lAfrique comme c'est une atteinte a l'Afrique elle-meme'.6
Along with Fouchef s strong rebuttal of the competence of the Arab League or the
UN to speak for the Moroccans and Tunisians went a further attack on American and
British strategic interests in Morocco,7 condemning 'faction menee contre la France
en Afrique du Nord avec le concours de certains gouvernements et, parfois, la
complaisance de certains allies'. Although the RPF had not yet definitively adopted
an anti-Atlanticist stance in defence policy, Fouchet nevertheless refused to accept
the Allies' argument that the strategic interest ofMorocco for the West as a whole
should take priority over French interests, emphatically stating that Te Maroc n'est
pas destine a etre le Gibraltar americain'.9 Anti-American or anti-Atlanticist attitudes
to foreign and defence policy were beginning to interact with the RPF's policies on
the future ofNorth Africa. Indeed, as early as April 1951, Foccart wrote that only the
presence in Morocco of General Juin — apied-noir and conservative - as Resident-
General was preventing the strategic importance of the territory from becoming a
pretext for the opening up ofMoroccan affairs to international consideration. The
United States, United Nations and the Arab League were all identified as having
much to gain from the removal of Juin from Morocco and the damage to French
authority that it was assumed his departure would cause.10 Therefore, Juin's
appointment as Commander in Chief ofNATO forces in Central Europe was viewed
5 Courrier d'lnformation politique, 8 (October 1952)
6 RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, C. Fouchet, 'Afrique du Nord et Tunisie: la politique
Franco-Tunisienne', 9-11.11.1951
7
RPF archives, Assises Nationales, 1951, C. Fouchet, 'Afrique du Nord et Monde Arabe', 9-
11.11.1951
8
RPF archives, Assises Nationales, 1951, Motion on North Africa, 9-11.11.1951
9 RPF archives, Assises Nationales, 1951, Fouchet speech, 9-11.11.1951
10 The Moroccan question was first raised at the UN in November 1951, though the first resolution on
Morocco was not passed until December 1952.
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by Gaullists not as a welcome hand on the controls of the Western Alliance, but
rather as a potential threat to the French presence in North Africa.
The Gaullists' concerns about American influence in the protectorate - Mohammed
V was known to have received encouragement from President Roosevelt during the
Second World War for an independent Morocco - influenced their attacks on the
government's perceived weakness. An American threat to French sovereignty was
seen in demands for air bases and guaranteed rights for American citizens.11 In
September 1951, Gaston Palewski challenged foreign minister Schuman on the
i
subject of American bases in the protectorate, refuting the government's argument
that the bases were merely an operational detail of the Atlantic Pact, and forcing the
government to make a statement to the effect that the bases in question were in fact
responsible directly to Washington rather than to NATO, despite remaining
11
nominally under French control. This admission on the part of the government was
seen by the RPF as a vindication of its policy of constant harassment of the
authorities over the issue of whether Western security interests alone justified the
American presence in Morocco. Furthermore, in line with Gaullist views on
interdependence between France and the overseas territories, the concept of
" The dispute with the United States over Morocco arose from the rights accorded to Americans by
the 1856 Treaty of Meknes, including exemption from fiscal, military and judicial obligations. In
1947, the Resident-General ended Americans' tax-free status on imports, on the pretext that the
Istiqlal independence movement had promised to extend Americans' economic privileges in return for
aid from the United States in the independence campaign. Thus the removal of Americans' economic
privileges on these grounds was presented by the Resident General as an action taken in the name of
the defence of French sovereignty. One of the most fervent advocates of the need to reduce American
privilieges in order to safeguard its sovereignty was the Gaullist senator, Gabriel Puaux. In October
1950, France brought the dispute to the International Court of Justice, which concluded in August
1952 that the United States retained the freedom to develop economic interests in Morocco, although
France was entitled to claim authority concerning import laws. The court's decision was welcomed by
Moroccan nationalists, who saw in it a rejection of French claims to exclusive authority over all
economic activity in Morocco. For the United States, the most significant factor in the whole dispute
was the concern with securing strategic bases in Morocco, which were considered crucial to Western
security. A Franco-American bilateral agreement on this issue alone was signed in December 1950,
although the French government insisted that this in no way amounted to its consent to American
interests in Morocco. Samya El Machat, Les Etats-Unis et le Maroc: le choix strategique 1945-1959
(Paris: L'Harmattan, 1996), pp. 16-22
12 In July 1951, it had been agreed that the United States should have seven air bases in Morocco.
13 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 98 (6.9.51)
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independence was portrayed as a rather meaningless one for Morocco and Tunisia;
only larger nations like France could achieve true independence, while the emerging
African nations should be encouraged to aspire to interdependence as part of a
greater community. Gaullists went as far as to dismiss the very concept of
independence for colonies as 'Anglo-Saxon' - devised by America and Britain and
therefore of little relevance to the unique French sense of a colonial mission.
Morocco: Gaullist responses to nationalism, 1951-54
The Gaullists felt that, in the absence of a mass nationalist movement, the essential
problems in Morocco were the international dimension of debate over the
protectorate's future, and the apparent loss of French authority that could be seen in
any concessions to international or nationalist opinion.14 In addition, it was felt that
Morocco's existing relations with France provided ample opportunity to minimise
the appeal of nationalism without any need for far-reaching changes. The history of
the French protectorate was interpreted as offering a framework for change; the
Lettre a I 'Union Frangaise, for example, devoted considerable space to articles in
praise of Marshal Lyautey, founder of the Protectorate in 1912.15 Lyautey was a
figure of great symbolic importance for Gaullists. They particularly admired his
emphasis on the dominant role of the State in directing national projects, such as his
attempt to create a new style of colonial regime in Morocco.16 Lyautey's aims of
governing Morocco with respect for the Moroccan population and curbing the
excesses of settler colonialism also appealed to the Gaullists, who attached great
importance to notions of interdependence, association, and gradual evolution of
14 The Gaullists underestimated the strength ofMoroccan nationalism. Nationalist societies had
existed since the 1930s, the Istiqlal (independence) party had been formed in 1944 and had been
steadily gathering support since 1947.
15 Lettre a I'Union Franqaise, 169 (22.1.1953) & 172(12.2.1953)
16 On Lyautey's policies in Morocco, see A. Le Reverend, Lyautey (Paris: Fayard, 1983); A. Scham,
Lyautey in Morocco: Protectorate Administration 1912-1925 (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia
Press, 1970).
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colonial populations within a protective French framework. Their admiration for
Lyautey also reveals the lasting appeal of the civilising mission in the post-war era.17
The commemoration of the Second World War victory, in May 1953, provided a
further opportunity to evoke Morocco's glorious past in partnership with France, as
Foccart praised the contribution ofMoroccans, and particularly Berbers, to the
18
French expeditionary corps in Italy. The question of the Berbers, central to much
French colonial discourse that sought to demonstrate the non-existence ofMoroccan
or Algerian nations, was gaining importance as a weapon with which to combat
Moroccan nationalism.19 The idea that the Berbers were more reliable, or pro-French,
than the Arabs in Morocco dated back to the beginnings of the Protectorate. Indeed,
French attempts to regulate Berber law and distance the Berbers from Islam in 1930,
in order to strengthen their attachment to France, had provoked nationalist feelings,
united Arabs and Berbers in condemnation of the proposal and led the Sultan also to
20condemn the French attempt to exploit Morocco's supposed racial division. In the
1950s, with nationalist activity increasing, the Gaullists acknowledged that the South
of the protectorate, along with the desert areas ofmost ofNorth Africa, effectively
lay outside the direct control of the administration, and that order and loyalty in those
areas were consequently only maintained through the co-operation of the Berber
chiefs to whom the people felt allegiance. The loyal Berber was thus frequently
contrasted with the troublesome Arab in French perceptions of the Moroccan people.
In parliament, the Gaullist senator for Algiers, Leon Muscatelli, developed this
theme of distinguishing between Arabs and Berbers, by claiming that the Berbers
were more closely linked to the West than the Arabs, that France's Arab policy
17
Lyautey's aims of peaceful coexistence of the Moroccan and French communities were in fact
seldom achieved, as the investment needed to modernise Morocco led to colonial exploitation and
large-scale French immigration as seen in Algeria.
18 Lettre a I'Union Franqaise, 185 (13.5.1953)
19 Lettre a I'Union Franqaise, 185 (13.5.1953)
20 On the question of French attempts to oppose nationalism by pointing out supposed differences
between Arabs and Berbers, throughout the colonial period in North Africa, see P. Lorcin, Imperial
Identities : stereotyping, prejudice and race in colonial Algeria (London: Taurus, 1995).
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therefore had little relevance to its North African policies, and that the populations of
91
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia therefore had a 'Western vocation'. Thus, the
international dimensions of the Moroccan problem - reduced by Gaullists, when
convenient, to Arabic interference - could be put to the service of attempts to
minimise the extent of the threat posed by nationalism in Morocco.
In August 1953, the French authorities in Morocco deposed the Sultan, Sidi
Mohammed, who was openly supporting the nationalists. This was supposedly done
in response to calls from the opposition led by the Pacha of Marrakech, Si T'hami El
99
Glaoui, demonstrating the French reliance on the alleged Arab-Berber divide in
Morocco. El Glaoui's campaign against the Sultan, which served the interests of the
French administration very well, began with a petition in favour of the Sultan's
replacement. Despite their support for conservative policies in Morocco, the Gaullist
reaction to this policy was somewhat unexpected. Foccart immediately reminded the
French government of its obligation - under the protectorate treaty signed by
Lyautey - to protect the Sultan and therefore ignore the petition, while Catroux
99
declared that the case against the Sultan was entirely invalid. The question of the
validity of the Sultan's removal and the wisdom of encouraging the indigenous tribal
opposition divided French politics, many Gaullists apparently siding with the
Sultan's supporters. Lyautey's legacy, in this case, proved more valuable to Gaullists
than their more recent association with colonial conservatism and their identification
21
Muscatelli, Conseil de la Republique (henceforth CR), 20.12.1951, JORF. Muscatelli also felt that
the Berbers had never achieved the same degree of civilisation as the Arabs, presumably a justification
for the continuation of the French protectorate.
22 General Guilhaume was Resident-General at this stage, though Juin is widely acknowledged to have
been responsible for engineering the situation whereby the petition against the Sultan appeared to
come from El Glaoui. The Pacha of Marrakech was the supreme tribal chief of the Moroccan South,
whose support the French valued greatly. He was also very conservative in political and social
matters, and therefore encouraged the French to proceed with the removal of the liberal, pro-
nationalist Sultan. Personal ambition also played a part in El Glaoui's behaviour, but his opposition to
nationalism, and the desire to keep peace in the South, led the French to accept him as a valuable ally
in their attempt to maintain authority. On the relationship between the French authorities in Morocco
and El Glaoui, see G. Maxwell, Lords of the Atlas: The Rise and Fall ofthe House ofGlaoua 1893-
1956 (London: Century, 1983), pp. 153-265
23 Lettre a 1'Union Franqaise, 189 (11.6.1953)
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with attempts to support Berber attempts to undermine Arab rule. Thus, the Gaullists'
dilemma ofwishing to appear at once firm on the question of authority in the
colonies and flexible on questions of policy arose once again. The risks incurred in
deposing the Sultan were considered greater than those entailed in trying to limit the
extent of reform while maintaining the possibility of dealing with a recognised
authority in Morocco. The replacement of the Sultan was seen as too big a risk; the
Gaullists were aware of the likely consequences on both Moroccan nationalism and
international opinion of such obvious interference in the spirit of the protectorate.
Within a few weeks of the installation of the new, puppet Sultan, ben Arafa, the
Gaullist press insisted that he did not represent the future ofMorocco, and that
moderate reforms must continue. The government's chief concern should be to win
over the Moroccan youth and intellectuals, a task made all the more difficult by the
French support for the voice of tradition and conservatism in the shape of El
Glaoui.24 The Gaullists realised that the nationalist movement had arisen out of a
desire for modernity, as well as frustration with French rule, and it was hoped that a
French emphasis on modernisation and renewal would effectively counteract the
nationalists. While the Gaullists undoubtedly underestimated the simple appeal and
importance of national feeling in Morocco, they nevertheless showed awareness of
the danger posed by a policy of steadfast refusal to change.
As has been seen, the RPF's views on Morocco were not entirely hostile to all
reform, although it is true that in the period between June 1951 and summer 1954,
calls for reform were less frequent and less vocal than Gaullist demands that the
status quo be maintained, other than on the issue of the Sultan. One of those
apparently advocating some degree of reform in Morocco was in fact one of the
movement's more senior figures, Michel Debre. Debre believed that France's
24 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 199 (3.9.1953). Further evidence of Gaullist division over the dynastic
question is provided by Catroux's leading role in facilitating the return of the deposed Sultan in 1955,
as will be seen in chapter 6 (pp. 143-4).
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problems in Morocco stemmed from the fact that the necessary reforms had not been
introduced, thereby creating more serious troubles for the future, arguing that: 'il
faudra accepter des reformes qui seront plus difficiles car on les aura differes'.23 Yet
despite Debre's apparent interest in reform for the sake of ensuring peace in
Morocco, no concrete plans appear to have been advanced - Debre was at this time
preoccupied with questions ofGermany, the Saar and Europe - and there was
certainly no united attempt in the name of the RPF to impose a policy of reform in
Morocco.
The support that the idea of reform enjoyed in Paris tended to be undermined by the
conservatism of the RPF in Morocco and by the relatively low priority accorded to
Morocco in overall Gaullist policy. In late 1951 and early 1952, Jacques Baumel, one
of the founding members of the RPF and generally seen as being on the left of the
Gaullist movement, undertook a detailed survey of the state of the RPF in Morocco.
His report does not present the Moroccan federations as a powerful voice in favour
of reform. The delegue federal, Valabregue, was seen as not in control of the
membership, and having succeeded in attracting support only among former
r 26Petainists. The local federations in Casablanca and Rabat were composed largely of
conservatives, civil servants, active Catholics and militaires, while in Meknes the
military element of the RPF was so substantial that most of the members attended
meetings in uniform. Anciens Combattants also occupied a prominent place, such as
in Casablanca where the President of the local veterans' association, Pinel, was the
dominant personality on the RPF electoral list. Baumel saw the dominance of
conservatives and militaires as a damaging factor for Moroccan Gaullism - though
there is no indication as to whether his views were shared by leaders in Paris - while
lamenting the fact that Valabregue had not been able to extend the RPF's appeal to a
wider section of the population. In particular, there is no evidence in Baumel's
25 M. Debre, 'Incoherence africaine', in La Republique et ses problemes (Paris: Nagel, 1952), pp. 118-
20
26 RPF archives, Maroc, Dossier 51.1, J. Baumel, Situation du RPF au Maroc, 1951-2
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detailed report of any Muslim involvement in Gaullist activities. Even though
Baumel concluded that Valabregue was to be replaced because of the federation's
failure to spread Gaullism more widely, his list of eight possible replacements was
drawn entirely from the French business community, with no Muslims or working-
77
class settlers.
Despite the lack of encouraging signs from Morocco, Foccart, in Paris, sought to
promote the idea that overseas support for Gaullism could inspire a similar
phenomenon in France. In November 1953 Foccart proposed a certain M. Torre - the
RPF's representative in Morocco - as candidate for a vacant seat in the Assemblee de
I'Union Franqaise, a post often seen as a sinecure offered to loyal metropolitan
politicians (indeed, Foccart had already benefited from such an arrangement
7R • •
himself). Foccart was initially determined that Torre should be elected, as a symbol
of the importance ofMorocco within both Gaullism and the Union franqaise, and of
Gaullist commitment to including the settler population in the political life of France:
'il y aurait un interet evident a ce que le Maroc soit represents a l'Union franqiaise par
7Q
un vieux Fran$ais du Maroc'. However, by the time of selection in March 1954,
internal RPF affairs had reasserted themselves and Foccart's initiative was sidelined.
Olivier Guichard, de Gaulle's chefde cabinet, required paid employment in order to
remain in the General's service. Instead of Torre, Guichard was to be the RPF's
choice for the vacant seat, and the chance to make a gesture that would demonstrate
the Gaullists' commitment to allowing their members in the colonies to participate in
policy debates was lost. The whole episode was indicative of the way in which North
Africa mattered to the Gaullists as an aspect of international and defence policy, and
as an electoral and parliamentary weapon against other parties or the government, but
ultimately remained the subject ofpolicy determined in Paris rather than an area in
27 ibid
28 Foccart was elected to the Assemblee de I'Union Franqaise in March with the aid of de Gaulle. P.
Gaillard, Foccartparle: entretiens ctvec Philippe Gaillard (Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), p. 88
29 RPF archives, Maroc, Dossier 51.4, Foccart to Torre, 19.11.1953
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which the leadership deferred to the views of its local activists. Torre's response to
the RPF leadership's decision revealed much about the relationship between Paris
and the Gaullist organisation in the areas that appeared to hold a special place in RPF
priorities:
II y a un enorme travail a faire de liaison et d'information entre la France et le
Maroc ... j'aspirais a jouer un role suivant les directives que nous aurions
arretees a Paris; les contacts accidentels ou sporadiques ne sont pas suffisants
maintenant, il faut une action ordonnee et suivie par un meme individu pour
suivre tres attentivement le probleme franco-marocain ... Dans ce pays les
grands problemes qui font l'objet de l'activite du RPF en France, echappent
un peu a nos compagnons du Maroc et la seule chose qui les interesse pour
l'instant c'est leur avenir dans ce pays ... Concernant le RPF au Maroc, je
dois preciser que les Fran9ais ici s'interessent au Rassemblement a cause de
leur devouement au General, et ensuite dans un but electoral. Le General a
degu en remettant a differentes reprises sa visite au Maroc; il est difficile
d'expliquer a des gens simples les raisons importantes de ces decisions,
puisqu'ici, un seul probleme existe, celui des interets des Fran9ais au
Maroc.30
The importance ofNorth Africa to overall Gaullist policy clearly outweighed the
RPF's practical commitment to its organisation in the protectorates, and the danger of
the Gaullists losing the support of or influence over the settlers in Morocco was
increasing by 1954 as the RPF in France began to disintegrate.
Gaullist policy on the future ofMorocco, too, was frequently subject to
considerations of domestic politics and electoral advantage, and affected by the
RPF's divisions. In general, details of policy initiatives seem to have been of
secondary importance behind the issue of establishing a strong Gaullist presence in
the region. The case of Georges Catroux demonstrates how the RPF made little
30 ibid, Torre to Foccart, 14.3.1954
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attempt to instigate debate about the movement's position on reform in Morocco,
leaving individual members to make their own statements of policy. Catroux's call
for a revision of the Treaty ofProtectorate to correspond more closely to the
changing situation, in November 1950, for example, did not receive the widespread
publicity in the Gaullist press that one might expect of a seemingly radical new
departure in policy. In 1952 Catroux again diverged from what might be expected of
the RPF, going against the dominant trend of support for the colonial administration
by denouncing the way in which French policy in Morocco in the 1930s had failed to
remain true to the ideals ofMarshal Lyautey. Once again, Catroux's views were
largely unreported in Gaullist circles.31 Through his involvement in the liberal
Comite France Maghreb, Catroux found himself on the opposing side to that
favoured by most Gaullists. This committee of intellectuals and politicians was
founded in 1953, chaired by Frangois Mauriac, and included such illustrious figures
of the anticolonial and left-wing movement as the historian Charles-Andre Julien,
Albert Camus, and future President of Senegal, Leopold Sedar Senghor. While not an
overtly pro-independence organisation — it called for respect for human rights, an end
to violence and repression, and 'une cohabitation confiante entre tous les habitants de
l'Afrique du Nord' - it is nonetheless somewhat surprising to find a prominent
Gaullist in such company at a period when the RPF was committed to the defence of
French interests in Morocco. Catroux also chaired a parallel group, the Comite
d'etude des problemes d'Outre-Mer, in which he was joined by his fellow Gaullist
Diomede Catroux, as well as former Tunisian Residents-General Perillier and
Rous.32 This organisation cannot be said to be anticolonialist, but it did nevertheless
display a willingness to debate original solutions to the Moroccan crisis that was not
found in mainstream Gaullist circles. These distinctive positions adopted by Georges
Catroux, however, appear very much as the exception to a general rule of consensus
Jl G. Oved, 'Le debat politique sur le Maroc de 1945 a 1955', Relations Internationales, 37 (1984), p.
77
32 Herve Bleuchot, Les liberaioc frangais au Maroc (1947-1955) (Gap: Editions de l'Universite de
Provence, 1972), p. 238
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among leading Gaullists. In 1954, certainly, debate did finally arise within the
Gaullist movement over Fouchet's appointment to the Ministry ofMoroccan and
Tunisian Affairs, although it could be argued that even this debate had more to do
with the Gaullist principle of non-participation in Fourth Republic governments than
with the Moroccan and Tunisian questions themselves.
Gaullism and Tunisia, 1951-54
As in Morocco, the Gaullists' concerns about Tunisia were related to international
interests and the growth of nationalism, both ofwhich were seen in the context of
French government weakness. Unlike in Morocco, however, the Gaullists could call
upon a well organised and effective Tunisian RPF movement, which increased their
ability to influence government policy on the future of the protectorate. Since the
creation in 1945 of the Rassemblement Frangais Democratique et Social (RFDS) to
represent the settlers, who elected a senator but no National Assembly deputies, there
had been pressure for a close association between the RFDS and the RPF. Upon the
creation of the RPF, Yvan Colonna, a Gaullist and one of the French community in
Tunisia's most vocal spokesmen, had pressed for the RFDS to effectively become the
Tunisian RPF, much to the discontent of Gaullist leaders in Paris, who were keen to
preserve the movement's independence and concerned that such an overt association
with the settlers would damage the RPF's chances of attracting MRP and Socialist
voters.34 The nomination of the mayor of Tunis, Perussel, rather than Colonna, as
RPF delegue general in Tunisia, and the RPF's ability to attract more members than
the RFDS in the immediate post-war years, led to a split between the two
movements. The competition between them, however, meant that they needed to
33
Although Catroux was excluded from the inner circle of RPF leadership, his status as one of the
movement's elder statesmen did not suffer greatly from his dissidence over North African questions.
His close personal association with de Gaulle was surely an important reason for this.
34 C. Paillat, Vingt ans qui dechirerent la France, vol. 1: le guepier (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1969), pp.
512-15. It is revealing that the RPF were more concerned about the effect of a strong settler vote on
their appeal to the left and centre in France, than with its effect on their chances of attracting support
among the Tunisians. The North African Muslim populations, despite the legacy of de Gaulle's
wartime reforms, were rarely seen as a credible source ofGaullist support in the early years of the
Fourth Republic.
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attract support among the same relatively small settler population, with the Muslims
who could vote remaining steadfastly indifferent to the RPF. Thus, by the early
1950s, the success of the RPF in Tunisia depended on its ability to appeal to a
fundamentally conservative population. Its chief asset was Gabriel Puaux, Senator
representing the Franqais de Tunisie, who became one of the most vocal
• • • 35
campaigners against reform. His views were influential on RPF policy on Tunisia.
Puaux came to dominate the RPF in Tunisia, until he was to all intents and purposes
the movement's only public face in the protectorate. Indeed, his influence extended
beyond that normally enjoyed by the RPF in that, as a representative of the settler
population and in conjunction with the conservative civil service, he actually
succeeded in influencing government policy in Tunisia, thereby giving the RPF a
voice that they would have struggled to achieve through conventional metropolitan
politics. Puaux put pressure on the government to uphold what he referred to as the
• 36
'rights of France' in Tunisia, and those of the Franqais de Tunisie, resulting in the
government's famous letter of 15 December 1951, in which, largely in response to
pressure from the settler community, Foreign Minister Schuman reversed the
37
government's commitment to independence announced at Thionville in 1950.
According to the anticolonialist historian Charles-Andre Julien, the priority thus
given to defence of French interests - the 'politique de la note du 15 decembre' — was
at the origin of the Franco-Tunisian dispute from that date until Mendes-France
no
announced internal autonomy in July 1954. Indeed, the nationalist leader,
Bourguiba, saw the French government's willingness to respond to this pressure from
j5 Puaux had been appointed Resident-General in Morocco by de Gaulle in 1943, and had served until
1946.
36 C.A. Julien, Et la Tunisie devint independante (1951-1957) (Paris: Jeune Afrique, 1985), p. 30
37 The change in government policy and apparent concession to the settlers was a decisive moment in
the campaign for Tunisian independence. In the short term, it removed any doubts the nationalists had
about appealing to the UN, while in the longer term it can be seen as a crucial stage in the
develpoment of a more militant stance on the part of the Neo-Destour (Tunisian independence party)
and a blow to nationalist hopes of continued cooperation with the French government. S. El Machat,




the settlers as a sign that France was not prepared to seriously address the question of
independence.39
Puaux's influence extended beyond his role as a constant voice of opposition; he also
managed to secure the appointment of the conservative Gaullist Jean de Hautecloque
(cousin ofMarshal Leclerc and consequently a figure of some status in the Gaullist
pantheon) as Resident-General, a move that aggravated Franco-Tunisian tensions.
Puaux was able to exert such influence through his son's position in the Foreign
Ministry's Sous-direction des Protectorats. Puaux junior had pressured Foreign
Minister Schuman into appointing Hautecloque, and President Vincent Auriol
despaired of the latter's conservatism and apparent desire to prolong and aggravate
the Franco-Tunisian tensions.40 Furthermore, Hautecloque was seen as incompetent,
imprisoning the Tunisian Prime Minister, Chenik, without government approval in
1951, maintaining overt contact with the ultras among the settler population and
refusing to protect Tunisian targets against French violence. Hautecloque's
reactionary behaviour in Tunisia was condemned not only by Auriol, but also by
moderate Gaullists such as General Catroux, but it appears, nevertheless, that the
majority of the RPF was content to have secured the appointment of one of its
members to a key position. The metropolitan RPF publication, Terrenoire's Courrier
d'Information Politique, echoed this initial approval ofHautecloque, hoping that he
would overcome government immobilisme and be able to win over the Muslims.41
Such indulgence towards the new Resident-General, however, was short-lived, due to
the fact that most Gaullist attacks on official policy towards Tunisia made no
distinction between Gaullists serving the regime and others. As repression and
tension worsened in Tunisia in 1952, the Gaullists' confidence in Hautecloque
39 Julien comments on the policy thus forced upon the government by the voice of the Tunisian
Gaullists: 'On trouverait difficilement dans l'histoire coloniale une si lourde faute et une telle
persistance dans l'erreur.' Julien, p. 31
40 Auriol suspected that the RPF's support in 1952 for the investiture of the Pinay government owed
much to the appointment of Hautecloque in Tunisia.V. Auriol, Journal du Septennat, vol. 6 (Paris:
Armand Colin, 1970-78), pp. 243-4,256
41 Courrier d'Information politique, 1 (April 1952)
73
diminished. The Gaullists, therefore, firmly established themselves, in 1951 and
1952, as the voice of the settlers in Tunisia. They demonstrated their ability to use
the French government's fear of causing offence to the settlers as a means of exerting
influence in governmental circles, even, as Auriol indicates, beginning to develop a
strategy ofmaking North African policy a condition of their support for
governments. This tactic was displayed on several occasions before 1958, notably in
the cases of the Mollet and Bourges-Manoury administrations of 1956-7. While the
very idea ofRPF support for government went against Gaullist orthodoxy, it
nevertheless demonstrates the evolution both of the metropolitan RPF and of the
prominence enjoyed by North Africa in Gaullist thinking.
As in the case ofMorocco, the actual policy of the metropolitan RPF towards Tunisia
was expressed infrequently and with only a limited degree of coherence. In 1950,
Debre had published an article in which he claimed that the settlers were not being
excessive in their demands for stability, and the situation was one which could easily
be solved because of the general popularity of the French oeuvre in the protectorate;
all that had to be done was to demonstrate more clearly to the population the benefits
that French rule had brought.42 By early 1951, however, Debre had concluded that,
contrary to the French reluctance to make small concessions in Morocco, in Tunisia,
'On cede tout a nos ennemis.. .il faudra apres d'inutiles abandons, reprendre
l'autorite'.43
Debre frequently criticised the French administration in Tunisia, considering it
overbearing and lacking in the qualities shown by earlier examples of colonial rule:
'la fermete, la dignite et...l'honnetete...Ces erreurs ont facilite et justifie la
transformation du nationalisme en un mouvement revolutionnaire'.44 While one may
assume that Debre's assertion that the nationalists had a legitimate cause for
42
Debre, 'Tunisie 1950', in La Republique et sesproblemes, pp. 113-4
43
Debre, 'Incoherence africaine', pp. 118-9.
44
Debre, 'La France Musulmane', in La Republique et ses problemes, pp. 123-4
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complaint was a mere rhetorical device, it is nevertheless significant that the
Gaullists' assault on the regime was clearly accorded such importance that the
nationalists, too, were not to be condemned entirely for simply taking advantage of
the government's weakness. Jacques Soustelle added that the government's weakness
in allowing Bourguiba to return to Tunisia from his detention in France was directly
responsible for the troubles, and insisted that the government should give assurances
that its policy was to remain in line with that ofDecember 1951,45 The implication -
which was to become a key point of RPF colonial policy in the Fourth Republic -
was that a restoration of purpose, dignity and authority to French government would
eradicate the nationalist challenge.
In this context, the RPF's support for the settlers might be interpreted as much as an
advocacy of organisation and direct action in the face of an incompetent
administration, as the adoption of a definite policy of hostility to the nationalists;
concessions might be possible, as in Morocco, provided that they could be granted
from a position of strength and stability. The Gaullists felt that the Muslims could
still be won over to the benefits of continued association with France, stressing that
France's role in Tunisia should extend beyond a mere defence of its own interests to
encompass the true development of the French colonial mission.46 In contrast to the
benefits of French influence, Fouchet described the nationalist Neo-Destour party as
'un mouvement caique sur les mouvements fasciste et hitlerien'.47 Both these ideas -
that the Muslims could be rallied to the French cause if the colonial mission were
finally properly implemented on a sufficiently large scale, and that North African
nationalists were the heirs of the European dictators of the 1930s and 40s — featured
prominently in Gaullist discourse on Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria later in the
45
Soustelle, AN, 22.1.1952, JORF
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Fourth Republic. They can be seen as a result of the Gaullists' discovery of the
polarisation of the two communities in Tunisia in the early 1950s.
While the Gaullists were principally concerned with the re-establishment of order in
Tunisia and Morocco, they also became aware of the effect of the problems in the
protectorates both in Algeria and among North African immigrants in France. The
phrase 'La situation en Afrique du Nord' was used for the first time by the Lettre a
I'Union Franqai.se in March 1952, where previous reports had always spoken
48
exclusively of problems in Morocco, Tunisia or Algeria alone. The potential links
between nationalism in the protectorates and in Algeria were highlighted in April of
the same year, with speculation that the veteran Algerian nationalist leader Messali
Hadj was in contact with the Tunisian Neo-Destour party.49 Once Algerian
nationalism was identified as a potential consequence of the problems in the
protectorates, the Gaullists began to see a threat to stability in Algeria in a number of
forms. One of these was the problem of Algerian immigration to France, a
phenomenon that had not captured Gaullist attention before the escalation of
problems in Morocco and Tunisia. In 1952, following violence between police and
Algerian immigrants in Northern France, it was reported that Algerian workers had
now become targets for the forces of subversion - hardly an original observation
given the history of Algerian nationalist recruitment in the impoverished 18th and
19th arrondissements of Paris in the 1920s - and that those demonstrating against
poor conditions now also carried anticolonialist and pro-nationalist banners.'0
Foccart called for urgent measures, including a reassessment of immigration policy,
to halt the spread of Algerian nationalism: 'La libre circulation entre lAlgerie et la
France doit d'urgence etre suspendue. Des operations d'envergure doivent etre
48 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 125 (13.3.1952)
49 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 132 (30.4.1952). This example of Gaullist perceptions ofNorth African
nationalism also reveals the extent to which the RPF was relatively uninformed of the scale of the
problem, as contacts between the various nationalist movements had been going on since the Second
World War.
50 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 133 (8.5.1952)
76
entreprises dans toutes les regions ou vit une population nord-africaine
agglomeree'.51 In parliament, Raymond Dronne pointed out Tampleur et l'urgence
du probleme social et politique constitue par la presence de tres nombreux Nord-
CO
Africains en France'. For Fouchet, however, this problem, like the unrest in the
protectorates and Algeria, was of French making: France had failed to provide a
sufficiently welcoming environment for North African students and workers, with
the result that: 'nous en faisons souvent des faux intellectuels et des proletaries, c'est-
a-dire tout ce qu'il faut pour les donner corps et ame aux doctrines totalitaires et au
communisme'.53
By 1954, most of the factors that were to dominate Gaullist policy on North Africa
until 1958 were in place: resistance to internationalisation, refusal to acknowledge
the legitimacy of the principle of self-determination, attacks on government for both
immobilisme and inconsistency, warnings of the international and domestic
consequences of losing North Africa, and reminders of the continuing importance of
the French civilising mission. In 1954, the loss of Indochina, the definitive adoption
of a liberal official position on the protectorates, and the outbreak ofwar in Algeria
provided an environment in which the Gaullists' evolving ideas were applied to the
escalating problems in North Africa.
51 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 136 (29.5.1952)
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CHAPTER 4
THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY AND FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
Europe, Africa and Western Security: Changing Gaullist Priorities
Between 1952 and 1954, the debate over the proposed common European defence
force, the European Defence Community (EDC), dominated and polarised French
political life. Conceived as a means of allowing the West German rearmament that
seemed essential in the context of the Cold War balance of forces in Europe, while
preventing the rebirth of a powerful German army, it nevertheless attracted strong
criticism from both Gaullists and Communists. The RPF claimed that parliament's
acceptance of the EDC would amount to the loss of France's independent military
capacity, and consequently of national independence. The campaign against the EDC
also held great significance in the internal life of the RPF, as it provided the focus
that maintained Gaullist cohesion in the year following de Gaulle's withdrawal from
active politics in May 1953. It allowed the Gaullists to develop contacts with
members of other parties and with military and non-political figures,1 in a prelude to
the cross-party campaigns of the later years of the Fourth Republic in favour of
Algerie frangaise. The anti-EDC campaign is, therefore, a crucial area in the study of
Fourth Republic Gaullism in that it shaped both policy and tactics for the years to
come.
The National Assembly's rejection of the EDC treaty in 1954 - due partly if not
entirely to the fierce attacks led by Gaullists - demonstrated that there was indeed a
'Gaullist alternative' in parliament; in the words of one Gaullist, the rejection of the
treaty showed that 'nous ne sommes done pas morts, puisque nous pouvons encore
1
Jean Chariot has demonstrated the importance of the EDC campaign in determining the pattern of
Gaullist relations with the Fourth Republic 'system'. Notable examples of the way in which Gaullist
behaviour was influenced by the EDC debate are the RPF's promise of support for the investiture of
Georges Bidault (MRP) or Rene Mayer (Radical) as Prime Minister if either would pledge to oppose
EDC. Furthermore, Rene Capitant, the RPF's strongest voice of opposition to the Fourth Republic
regime, considered, during the EDC campaign, the possibility that rather than continuing its policy of
uncompromising opposition, the RPF might enter into the 'system' with the intention of taking
advantage of a divisive issue to undermine it from within. This alternative conception of Gaullist
opposition to the Fourth Republic, devised in response to EDC, remained influential in Gaullist
debates until 1958. J. Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 282-4.
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detruire'.2 The success that Gaullist leaders saw in the defeat of the EDC encouraged
them to adopt an increasingly hostile position towards the Fourth Republic, which
they now believed could be defeated just as one of its central policies had been. The
EDC campaign gave the Gaullists an opportunity to state clearly that North Africa,
and the Union franqaise in general, were too important to sacrifice to European
integration. Seeking support for this view, and often finding it in military circles, the
Gaullists came to commit themselves to a worldview that called for the retention of
an unbreakable link between metropolitan France and its most valued overseas
territories. Consequently, the EDC affair shaped Gaullist policy for the years to come,
in that it led to the development of the idea that the most pressing threat to French
security was not Soviet military aggression, but anticolonialism. From the EDC
campaign until 1958, the Gaullists argued that the way to save France from insecurity
and weakness was not through the new concept of European integration, but rather
through stronger bonds between the metropole and North Africa, thus guaranteeing
both security from military attack and a restored sense of purpose and status.
While seemingly not directly related to colonial questions, the EDC debate played a
role in developing Gaullist views on the Union franqaise, and North Africa in
particular. It represented, for the Gaullists, a clear symbol of the choice that the
nation faced, between a limited European role, which would in time be eclipsed by
Germany, and a more ambitious, rewarding and constructive world role based on
concentrating energy and resources on the Empire. Consequently, the EDC debate
deserves to be examined in terms of its importance in focusing Gaullist policy on the
emerging questions of the Union franqaise.
2
Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition, p. 296. This often-quoted remark was made by the RPF deputy,
Andre Diethelm, on the occasion of the defeat of the Mayer government at the heart of the EDC affair,
on May 21, 1953, by the combined votes of Gaullists, Communists and Socialists. The implication was
that it was the Gaullists' decision to vote with their political opponents on a matter they considered to
be of sufficient importance that had produced the decisive result. Coming at a time of Gaullist
division, five days before de Gaulle brought the parliamentary RPF to an end, this vote held great
significance for Gaullists as it offered hope that they could continue to exert influence on questions of
national importance.
J In addition to the present focus on the colonial aspect of the Gaullists' reactions to the EDC, the
affair's significance for Gaullism has been analysed from a number of different perspectives. Chariot
concentrates on the internal life of the RPF and its relations with the 'system'; Odile Rudelle
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Most studies of the EDC's failure have concentrated on France's political instability,
fear ofGerman rearmament and relations with the United States over questions of
Western security.4 While the principal reasons for the treaty's rejection were indeed
closely related to the evolving Franco-American relationship and the government's
failure to allay fears about German rearmament, extra-European affairs did play a
part in the development of opposition to the EDC proposal. As Aimaq has shown,5
the subject benefits from being seen in the context of the growing importance of
colonial problems in French decision making. Aimaq focuses, therefore, on the
influence of events in Indochina on French government policy, demonstrating that
Franco-American differences over the Asian colonies gave rise to an increased
perception of American threat to French interests.6 A similar approach, explaining
opposition to EDC at least partly by colonial questions, might be considered relevant
to a study of the Gaullist opposition to the treaty. This chapter will therefore take as
its starting point the Gaullists' growing interest in North Africa and their conviction
that the problems in the Protectorates and Algeria were of importance to the Western
world as a whole. This approach led the Gaullists to address questions ofwhether the
focus on Europe that the EDC proposal demanded would offer sufficient benefits to
justify a corresponding reduction of interest in and military commitment to North
Africa. As the proposed EDC treaty would not extend to European countries' overseas
territories - just as the NATO treaty covered Algeria but not Morocco or Tunisia - it
emphasises the role that the EDC campaign played in establishing Michel Debre as the intellectual
leader of the Gaullists and a spokesman for the concept of the Nation above all else; Debre devoted a
substantial proportion of his memoirs to the importance of the EDC episode in laying foundations for
the future course of Fourth Republic Gaullism, by establishing networks that were useful in 1958 and
committing Gaullists to international and nuclear roles for France. Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition,
O. Rudelle, 'Michel Debre et la CED', in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et le RPF (1947-
1955) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1998), pp. 556-62; M. Debre, Trois Republiques pour une France:
memoires, vol.2: Agir, 1946-1958 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), pp. 161-256.
4 For the history and significance of the EDC episode, see E. Fursdon, The European Defence
Community, a History (London: Macmillan, 1980); Jacques Fauvet et al., La querelle de la C.E.D. :
essais d'analyse sociologique (Paris: A. Colin, 1956)
5 J. Aimaq, For Europe or Empire: French colonial ambitions and the European army plan (Lund:
Lund University Press, 1996)
5 France saw the apparent American lack of commitment to its effort in Indochina as a symbol of the
United States' equivocal attitude to the role of the Union franqaise as part of a western security system.
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raised the issue of a choice that would have to be made between Europe and the
Union frangaise.
Before dealing with the Gaullists' arguments regarding the EDC and the colonies, it is
important to place the question of European defence and co-operation in the broader
context of French foreign and defence policy. Since the early years of the Fourth
Republic, the idea had been gaining ground, in particular in military circles, that
France's interests might lie not in a total commitment to Europe, but rather in some
sort of role as a link between Europe and Africa. The idea ofpuissance or grandeur
as an essential element of the French state, as outlined in chapter 1, was not, in the
early Fourth Republic, exclusively the preserve of the Gaullists, despite its close
association with de Gaulle, which is surely a legacy of the General's Fifth Republic
policies.7 The alternative to a close association with Europe, in the early years of the
Fourth Republic, was generally referred to as Eurafrica, a term that had originally
been used in the 1930s. The concept of Eurafrica implied a Franco-African
community as a world power, in which the development of an African hinterland
would ensure that France would never be restricted by lack of space, population or
resources, and would consequently be able to stand comparison with the other major
players in international politics. By the post-war period, this had taken on the implied
meaning ofmatching the domestic stabililty, prosperity and confident outlook of the
superpowers. Gaullists were quick to adopt the model of Eurafrica and apply it to
their views of an evolving relationship between the metropole and the Empire,
particularly with reference to closer integration with Algeria. The first to use the term
in this sense after the Second World War, however, were the military planners at the
r O
Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale (IHEDN). This is an early
7
On the themes ofpuissance and grandeur in both Gaullist and official policy at the beginning of the
Fourth Republic, see J-P. Brunet, 'Le RPF et l'idee de puissance nationale (1945-1948)', in La
Puissance franqaise en question (1945-1949), ed. by R. Girault & R. Frank (Paris, Publications de la
Sorbonne, 1988), pp. 362-84; M. Vai'sse, La grandeur: politique etrangere du General de Gaulle
1958-1969 (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 22-52
8C. d'Abzac-Epezy & P. Vial, 'In Search of a European Consciousness: French Military Elites and the
Idea of Europe, 1947-1954', in, Building Postwar Europe: National Decision-Makers and European
Institutions, 1948-1963, ed. by A. Deighton (Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 12
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example of the transfer of ideas from the military to the Gaullist movement, a process
considerably facilitated by the close contacts between militaires and Gaullism from
the time of the RPF until 1958, and one which can be seen in several cases of Gaullist
foreign and colonial policy development during the Fourth Republic.
Eurafrica came to be opposed to the EDC proposal, with its supporters in the military
claiming that it offered a larger geographical field in which France could operate in
defence of national security.9 For advocates of Eurafrica, the permanence of the
Union franqaise was not in question. Based on the assumption that the threat of actual
dissolution of the Empire in Africa was small, the Eurafrica lobby focused on the
EDC proposal as the chief threat to their vision of a new global role for France, and it
was their attachment to an African vocation in foreign and defence policy that lay
behind much of their strategic opposition to EDC. This view of the EDC affair does
not seek to demonstrate that fear of German revival was not of great importance to
the treaty's enemies, but it can be argued that the opposition based on consideration of
strategic questions differed from the anti-German element of the anti-EDC campaign,
which tended to focus on the more emotive issue of French leadership in Europe.
Such claims to European leadership, however, fulfilled a function of national prestige
and inspiration as much as they responded to the pressing strategic questions of the
time.
The military objection to EDC, which closely mirrored the Gaullists' views, was that
the only possible way in which to conceive of European organisation was in the form
of a united Eurafrica under French leadership. The union that would be achieved
through EDC was dismissed as nothing more than a 'small Europe' that would lack
the resources and status to assume a world role to rival the superpowers.10 Gaullist
9 That this geographical field consisted of the African colonies does not appear to have made Eurafrica
the exclusive domain of the strongest opponents of colonial reforms. Colonialism was not a prominent
aspect of the discourse surrounding the idea of the Empire in Africa as a necessary hinterland for the
metropole; the debate about the strategic value of Eurafrica always remained separate from any
discussion about the need or otherwise for reform in the Union franqaise.
10 C. d'Abzac-Epezy & P. Vial, 'In Search of a European Consciousness', p. 12
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concerns with finding a path between Washington and Moscow clearly persisted into
the early 1950s, a legacy of de Gaulle's attempt to maintain dialogue with the Soviet
Union as Head of the Provisional Government. Thus the concern for French prestige
evident in military and Gaullist thinking combined with the Gaullists' interest in an
equivocal attitude to the superpowers, resulting in an opposition to EDC which
emphasised the idea that European union would lessen France's ability to retain
sufficient influence and authority in both European and world affairs.11
The threat to French influence in North Africa seemed more serious to the Gaullists
once the prospect of a German renaissance was evoked in the early 1950s. Whereas
in the immediate post-war period, French participation in a form of European union
was not viewed wholly negatively, because of the assumption that any such body
would not include Germany, by 1951 it had become clear that any future European
organisation would inevitably include West Germany, and indeed be designed to
ensure its successful reconstruction. Debre, who had devoted much energy to various
proposals for European co-operation in the late 1940s, lost enthusiasm for Europe at
around the same time that the Gaullists began to identify a threat to French North
Africa. That the escalation of problems in the Protectorates and Algeria coincided
with the realisation that German revival was to be encouraged by France's Western
Alliance partners served to highlight the links between French aspirations to
leadership in Europe and the nation's parallel role in the Union frangaise. The catalyst
for a change in Gaullist attitudes to Europe was the creation of the European Coal and
Steel Community in 1950, which was clearly a response to American pressure and
intended to allow German industrial recovery. From this point on, the idea of the
" While the most pressing international affair for France in 1951-54 might be said to have been the
war in Indochina, the Gaullists did not see Indochina as creating a worrying precedent for the rest of
the Empire until the fall ofDien Bien Phu in May 1954. French losses in the years before that point
tended to be explained by Gaullists as the result of government incompetence, lack of support for the
armed forces, and American refusals to provide more aid, rather than being seen as part of a global
movement that seriously threatened France's world role. Franco-American differences over Indochina
did, however, make a significant contribution to French perceptions of American security policy as a
potential threat. The Gaullist reactions to the war in Indochina will be dealt with in the following
chapter; on Gaullist interpretations of the conflict before 1954, see F. Turpin, 'Le RPF et la Guerre
d'Indochine (1947-1954)', in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et le RPF, pp. 530-40
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Union frangaise as a necessary counterweight to a German-dominated Europe
gathered support among Gaullists.
In December 1951 Debre outlined the problem posed by the new situation in Europe:
La construction que nous envisageons, nous ne sommes plus les maitres de
l'edifier. Desormais, sur le continent, nous sommes deux de jeu, et si les
institutions dites specialisees voient le jour - autorite du charbon et de l'acier,
etat-major europeen - nous nous apercevrons... que nous sommes tres loin de
la liberie d'action que nous avions void seulement deux ans. Deja les desseins
de la nouvelle Allemagne sont claires: elle n'accepte l'idee d'Europe que dans
la mesure ou cette Europe lui permettra un jour de reconquerir son unite et sa
puissance.. .C'est a dire que la France doit refaire sa force et sa volonte.
Probleme interieur, sans doute... Mais aussi probleme plus vaste, celui de
l'Union franijaise. Plus que jamais nous nous rendons compte que la France
continentale n'est pas grand chose a elle seule. Quelle gratitude ne devons-
nous pas a ces batisseurs d'empire, notamment a nos grands Africains qui, par
leur oeuvre continue depuis cent vingt ans, donnent a la France epuisee du
12
XXe siecle des chances nouvelles.
With the evolution of the post-war plans for European co-operation into a narrower -
specifically economic and military - form ofWestern European integration, the
appeal of Europe had faded for the Gaullists. Europe no longer held sufficient appeal
or hope for the revival of a France exhausted by war and division and in need of a
new role. This new role, according to Debre and most of his fellow Gaullists, was to
be found in Africa.
The Gaullists' first steps towards opposing a Eurafrican vision to a purely European
one did not represent merely a retreat into the certainties of colonialism. They
represented the beginnings of an attempt to define a new role for France in the world,
one that would build on a position of strength and leadership not in Europe but in the
Empire. Coupled with the Gaullists' short-term concerns about re-establishing
authority in North Africa, from 1951-2 one can identify a new sense of purpose in the
Gaullist attachment to the region, which grew in intensity as the two-year debate over
12
Debre, 'France, Europe et Union Frangaise' (14.12.1951), in M. Debre, La Repablique et ses
problemes, (Paris: Nagel, 1952), pp. 125-6
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the EDC reinforced the need to develop an alternative policy to the pro-European
orthodoxy of the majority of the governing coalition. Opposition to EDC thus
provided the Gaullists with an opportunity to propose an alternative vision of France's
future grandeur, based on Africa rather than Europe, a valuable chance to reintegrate
national political debate after the 1951 elections, and an unmissable opportunity to
demonstrate Gaullism's enduring relevance and popularity by associating themselves
with a cause that seemed popular - opposition to German rearmament. The demise of
the parliamentary RPF during the anti-EDC campaign provided an additional impetus
to the Gaullist campaign, as the Gaullists' very existence as a coherent movement in
1953-4 might be said to have depended upon their success in the EDC debate alone.
EDC and the Gaullist Alternative
The chief tenet of the Gaullists' arguments against EDC was that France would
become too small a nation if restricted to a purely European role, losing the prestige
and world status that its imperial mission had given it. In addition to the geopolitical
lessons of the Second World War experience, Michel Debre stressed that France's
role must continue to extend beyond Europe into North Africa for the simple reason
IT. •
that 'la France est une puissance musulmane'. The idea that France must remain a
power in the Muslim world as well as in Europe, while apparently inspired by the
colonial mission civilisatrice, might also be seen as a consequence of pressure being
exerted on metropolitan politics by those with an interest in protecting Algeria.
Marcel-Edmond Naegelen, for example, while Governor-General in Algeria between
1948 and 1951, developed the argument that Algeria was essential to France in order
to obtain greater financial commitment from the metropole through fear of what the
consequences would be for France in the event of the loss ofNorth Africa.14 Indeed,
Charles-Robert Ageron has demonstrated that such warnings of the unthinkable
consequences of the end of France's role in North Africa predate the unrest in the
13
Debre, CR, 20.12.1951 ,JORF. This argument was also used to emphasise the extent to which
France was different from the United States in its world role, and consequently as a justification for
rejection of American plans that would alter French foreign policy objectives.
14 C-R Ageron, "'L'Algerie derniere chance de la puissance franpaise": Etude d'un mythe politique
(1954-1962)', Relations Internationales, 57 (1989), pp. 113-39
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Protectorates and Algeria by several years, dating back to 1946-7.ls In the immediate
post-war years, the effect of such arguments was most noticeable on the Left, with
even those in favour of recognising the fait national algerien nevertheless stressing
the absolute need for France to retain a presence beyond Europe.16 The most
commonly proposed solution to this dilemma was some kind of federation, an idea
that was to be further discussed by the Gaullists in later years (see pp. 168, 208-9).
In 1951, Michel Debre defined France's dual and closely linked areas of concern as
Western Europe and the Mediterranean:
La France... a deux zones majeures d'interets: d'une part, l'Europe
continentale; d'autre part, la Mediterrannee et l'Afrique du Nord. Elle y a son
interet propre, car ce sont ses deux frontieres, deux bastions de sa securite,
mais elle a aussi la defense d'un interet commun a l'ensemble de l'Occident.
En Europe, elle est la liberie, face aux incertitudes et aux tendances
tyranniques; en Mediterrannee et en Afrique du Nord, elle est, par experience,
par tradition, l'autorite et la paix vis-a-vis des ferments d'anarchie ou de
division.17
For Debre, France's interest in the Mediterranean derived from the same concern for
security and stability that was at stake in Europe. In this context, the Gaullists could
not accept a plan designed to secure European defence that did not acknowledge
either the importance ofNorth Africa to that defence or the unique commitment of
France to the communal security effort through its presence in the Mediterranean
region. At present, Debre claimed, France was already prevented from exercising full
control in the Mediterranean region, as none of the relevant Allied commands was
1 8
held by a French military figure. Further military integration with the rest of





17 Debre, CR, 20.12.1951, JORF
18
In 1951, the Allied Supreme Command in the Mediterranean was American, the Naval Command
British, and the Land Command for North Africa Italian.
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At the time of the EDC debate, however, the Gaullists' immediate priority was not to
develop a new relationship between France and North Africa, but instead to combat
any attempt to prioritise Europe over other areas of national interest. The 1952 RPF
Assises saw the RPF strongly affirm its belief that France should not be reduced to a
uniquely European role. The most strident advocate of this view was, unsurprisingly,
Michel Debre, who asserted that:
La France n'est pas seulement europeenne. La puissance fram^aise tient a
l'Afrique et a l'ensemble des peuples des territoires d'Outre-Mer... Ce n'est
pas seulement une question de puissance, c'est une question de securite et
meme d'existence. II n'est pas d'avenir garanti pour les Fran9ais s'ils n'exercent
pas un role determinant en Mediterranee et dans l'Atlantique.19
While Debre failed to explain in what way the very existence of France would be in
doubt if it were to be deprived of its non-European role - presumably a reference to
the threat of communist take-over and civil war in the event of the loss of the Union
frangaise - he emphasised strongly that the nation's priority should be not Europe,
but France's overseas interests.
Debre's remarks were echoed by the RPF deputy for Guyana, Edouard Gaumont.
Speaking as a citizen of the Outre-Mer, Gaumont attacked the 'eurocentrism' of
government policy. Gaumont emphasised the importance of the Union frangaise to
metropolitan France in terms of its potential contribution to national defence and
economic growth - both ofwhich were subjects that now demanded consideration on
a global scale - and he rejected any separation of'European' and 'colonial' affairs. For
Gaumont and other Gaullists d'Outre-Mer, the lesson of these observations was that:
'Les traites, pactes ou accords ne doivent en aucun cas etre conclus autrement qu'au
nom de l'Union franfaise tout entiere, et en fonction de ses interets et de sa defense,
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qui sont et demeurent indivisibles'. Both Debre and Gaumont relied heavily on
traditional notions of Jacobin republicanism - a theme found throughout the
19 Debre, 'L'Europe', RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, 9-11.1.1952
20 E. Gaumont, 'L'Union franqaise et la politique exterieure de la France', RPF archives, Assises
Nationales de Paris, 9-11.11.1952
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries - with emphasis on the absolute indivisibility of
the Republic. In later years, Soustelle also drew upon this enduring aspect of political
and constitutional thought in defence ofAlgerie frunguise. Any engagements France
was to enter into beyond the metropole, it was clear, must not be allowed to
compromise the integrity of the Republic or the authority held by its government. The
metropolitan Gaullists could thus take encouragement from the fact that their
colleagues in the Union frangaise supported their views on the need to maintain
France's world role as a priority over its European one. Allegations of colonialism -
which the RPF policy of prioritising the colonies over the construction of new
European institutions might legitimately have attracted - were absent from the debate
within the movement itself, even though RPF policy seemed to be moving away from
what was essentially the basis of Gaullism's appeal in the colonies: the 'liberating'
reputation of de Gaulle.
The Gaullist attack on EDC was always aimed both at the American support for the
scheme - and by implication at American interference in French affairs - and at the
French government that had envisaged such a degree of union. Gaullist criticism of
the French government for failing to convince its Allies of the particular urgency of
France's situation in defending both Europe and North Africa predated the official
announcement of the EDC scheme. Debre, for example, complained that the
government had, by remaining silent on questions affecting the Arab World and the
Middle East, given the impression that France did not consider itself to have any
special interest in North Africa other than the defence of its own citizens. For Debre,
the government, not the Allies, was responsible for the apparent erosion of French
influence on decisions affecting the security of North Africa: 'Notre presence en
Afrique du Nord nous parait une routine; nous ne croyons notre presence necessaire
que pour la seule protection des Franfais qui y vivent ou des interets fran^ais qui y
sont implantes'.21 Jacques Soustelle, meanwhile, preferred to focus on the American
dimension of the problem, issuing a strong warning to the United States of the
21
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dangers of restricting European defence matters to the continent alone, in the
22influential American journal Foreign Affairs. Soustelle argued that the rebirth of
Germany within a pan-European organisation rather than in the narrow context of
Franco-German agreement played into the hands of the Soviet Union:
The West resorted to such fictions as the Council of Europe, and dangerous
efforts were made to 'pool' coal, steel and armed forces. Now Russia has
decided to exploit her chosen weapon - the appeal ofGerman unity. In the
field ofpolitics it is comparable to the atomic bomb.23
According to Soustelle, the problems posed by German revival and the prospect of
unity were not insurmountable, provided that they were addressed by a specific,
bilateral Franco-German agreement, which would provide a solid basis for the
construction of Europe.24 One of the fundamental points of any such agreement was
that:
It should be negotiated and signed by France in her full status as the French
Union - that is, France as an African power as well as a European power -
with all the consequences which that implies, economic and political.2:1
Thus Soustelle's argument against EDC or other proposals for Western alliance to
solve the German problem was that France should be allowed to sign bilateral
agreements that would allow for the introduction of a non-European dimension to any
European partnership.
The inclusion of the Union frangaise in any form of European organisation was not
negotiable for the Gaullists, and Soustelle's interest in making this point clear to
American opinion demonstrates the extent to which a perceived American ignorance
of, or hostility to, the French colonial presence was felt to underpin moves towards
European union. The Gaullists, in 1952, were moving towards a situation in which a





choice would have to be made between commitment to Europe or to the Union
franqaise, although Soustelle's attempt to put his case to the United States does
indicate some willingness to find common ground on the importance of France's non-
European role, rather than a firm desire to seek confrontation with Washington over
the issue as subsequent Gaullist policy on the question of European security might
suggest.
The balance between concerns for international security and French colonial interests
in the Gaullists' championing of the Protectorates' inclusion in an alliance is hard to
evaluate precisely; it might be said, however, that a continued French presence in the
Protectorates was always seen by Gaullists as a means to ensure national security, in
addition to any benefits that French rule might bring to settlers or native populations.
At the beginning of the EDC debate in 1952, the Gaullists were already moving away
from a conception of security based on the defence ofWestern Europe as a priority,
towards the idea that French and European interests were actually under greater threat
from nationalist activity in North Africa. After 1953, following the death of Stalin
and the end of the Korean War, other western powers gradually began to accept the
view that the most pressing Cold War threat was not necessarily in central Europe. It
appears, however, that the Gaullists had already come to this conclusion, not in
response to the apparent possibilities for East-West detente but as an indication that
they were moving towards prioritising North Africa over Western Europe as early as
1952. This point - the Gaullists' shift in strategic thought predating that of the West
in general - explains much of subsequent Gaullist policy on both North Africa and
Western security.
As the EDC debate continued into 1953, the RPF became more uncompromising on
the need to prioritise the Empire over European integration. During the longest
parliamentary debate on the question of links between the proposed European
organisation and the Union franqaise, Michel Debre further developed the idea of
France's necessary prioritisation of non-European interests, to such an extent that he
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called into question the very compatibility of the Union franqaise with any project for
European unity. For Debre, this problem could only be resolved through the creation
of TEurope compatible avec l'Union fran9aise'.26 Any European project, therefore,
was to be judged according to whether its realisation would have harmful effects on
France's non-European territories; the parallel British argument that the
Commonwealth precluded too strong a commitment to Europe was suggested as a
useful example to follow. Too narrow a focus on Europe presented a real danger, for
a simple reason:
Elle [la France] est la seule puissance continentale qui ait encore des elements
de puissance mondiale. Elle est la seule puissance continental qui puisse encore
etre une puissance africaine. Que l'Union frangaise revive ainsi un germe de
mort par une mauvaise organisation europeenne, nous perdons tout.27
The risks inherent in European construction seemed, for many Gaullists, to outweigh
the advantages that such a project might bring in terms of security. Indeed, as will be
seen below, the question of security meant little to Gaullists unless its focus was
principally on North Africa, the part of France considered to be potentially under
threat and insufficiently defended.
Such views on France's vocation being essentially a non-European one were not
confined to the RPF's elected representatives and acknowledged intellectual leaders,
like Debre and Soustelle, who were engaged in parliamentary debate over EDC. The
Gaullist press also contributed to the development of this renewed hope in the
Empire, although it must be noted that the press interest in the subject came at a
considerably later stage in the EDC debate, being expressed particularly towards the
end of 1953 and in 1954, when the ratification of the treaty was already in some
doubt. In the Courrier d'Information Politique, Louis Terrenoire highlighted the
warm welcome received by de Gaulle in Africa. This was interpreted as proof that the
RPF's insistence that the Union franqaise was a more receptive and profitable field
26
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for French ambitions than Europe did indeed have some grounding in popular support
and offer hope for the future. The Outre-Mer once again provided the impetus and
inspiration for the regeneration and encouragement ofmetropolitan Gaullism. The
same message was repeated to Terrenoire's readers later in 1953, on this occasion in
connection with de Gaulle's visit to the Indian Ocean territories, described as a source
of comfort and hope.
The increased interest in the Union frangaise on the part of ordinary Gaullists, as the
EDC affair continued, is evidenced by the subject's treatment in the militant
newspaper Paris-Jeunes, edited by the young Gaullist Jacques Dauer and normally
29concerned exclusively with domestic politics, notably virulent anticommunism.
Paris-Jeunes developed at considerable length the theme of the Empire representing
France's future, in articles written to appeal to the journal's young readers. Castigating
the government for failing to fully develop the Union frangaise's potential, it argued
that a proper exploitation of its resources could satisfy young peoples' demands for
employment, purpose and national pride, and could thus prove to be the salvation of
the nation.30 This glorious vision of France's future in the colonies was, of course, in
stark contrast to the alternative vision, that of a European organisation doomed to
failure and offering little hope: 'Creer une puissance mondiale n'est-ce pas plus
exaltant que de tenter l'impossible fusion des peuples europeens vieillis, et separes
par des siecles de lutte'.31 For young Gaullists, the Union frangaise was therefore
28 Terrenoire in Courrier d'Information Politique, 18 (November 1953)
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Jacques Dauer - although later seen as on the left of the Gaullist movement in the Fifth Republic -
was one of the so-called 'Gaullistes de choc', and was associated with the antiparliamentary, even
violent, strain of Gaullism in the early Fourth Republic, attracting support among students and young
workers on a platform of direct action against communism. Paris-Jeunes first appeared in February
1953 and survived in various guises until 1958, becoming increasingly strident in its attacks on the
regime. Its focus was very much on the decay of domestic politics, with foreign affairs generally
serving as a means of attacking the government's weakness.
30 As in the case of Debre's pronouncements in parliament, the question of from what the nation was to
be saved was never clarified, though one can presume the enemy to be a combination of communism
and decadence.
31 M. Bonot, 'Pour une politique de l'Union Fran9aise', Paris-Jeunes, 24 (15.3.1954)
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presented as the force that would make France a true world power, compared to the
32futile enterprise of uniting Europe, from which little benefit would accrue to France.
Once the Gaullists had established that a France restricted to Europe represented too
limited a vision, the next stage of their offensive in favour of the Union franqaise
over the EDC was to argue that the alliance proposed in the treaty was itself too small
in comparison with the presumed Soviet threat. As Soustelle argued:
The fundamental defect of the Atlantic alliance ... is that it is merely - Atlantic.
Actually, it is restricted to the North Atlantic. It would have value as a regional
section of a larger grouping, but in itself it is as inadequate as a breastplate
covering half the chest or a helmet protecting the forehead but not the back of
the neck. The danger facing the free nations is global. To parry it they must
have a global strategy.33
In this area, the Gaullists were able to develop their evolving ideas about a Soviet
threat to France, and to Western Europe as a whole, coming via North Africa. The
key fault of both the existing NATO treaty and the proposed EDC was their failure to
include the whole of the Mediterranean in their sphere of influence. For the head of
the RPF Comite de Defense Nationale and deputy, General de Monsabert, the only
meaningful form of European security organisation was one designed according to
the idea ofEurafrica, in which: 'Le theatre Sud-Europe n'aurait du etre... qu'un sous-
theatre de l'Eurafrique, dont les bases communes sont en Afrique du Nord. La
campagne de liberation a travers l'ltalie en a illustre la demonstration'.34 The
precedent of France's wartime experience played a major role in the Gaullist
campaign against EDC, as will be seen below with reference to the relations between
j2 In contrast to the image of a stagnating Europe, the Union frangaise was presented as offering
employment and wealth. An ongoing theme ofGaullist policy towards the Empire in the final years of
the Fourth Republic can be seen here, and will be developed further in subsequent chapters relating to
the Gaullists' interest in the mise en valeur ofAlgeria and the Sahara as part of a movement of national
regeneration.
33 Soustelle, 'France and Europe', p. 550
34 Gen. de Monsabert, AN, 24.1.1952, JORF. Monsabert was on this occasion speaking not for the RPF
alone but as rapporteur pour avis of the Assembly's Commission de la Defense Nationale. This might
therefore be seen as a case of Gaullist policy finding an expression in a non-partisan context. It is
significant that this tended to occur principally on military and security questions during the Fourth
Republic.
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Gaullists and the military; its importance, clearly, was not limited to the obvious
parallels suggested by the prospect of German rearmament, as the non-European
aspects of the war effort also influenced Gaullist policy.
The non-European aspect of the Gaullists' opposition to EDC was equally evident in
their concern that the very idea of Europe, detached from its colonies, as a third force
able to rival the two superpowers, was unrealistic. The Gaullists' attack on this so-
called 'third force' idea took two forms: firstly, insistence that Africa must be
included in such a force, and secondly, dismissal of the idea that Europe alone could
ever assert its independence of the superpowers. Developing the latter point at the
1952 Assises, Debre attacked those who claimed to see a world role for continental
Europe: 'L'idee d'une Europe qui serait une troisieme force, egale a celles des deux
autres puissances, n'est pas une idee serieuse du point de vue des realites politiques'.33
The alternative to the flawed concept of a 'small Europe' was to be found in the
inclusion of France's African territories in a greater Europe, which would be capable
of attaining world power status. Terrenoire argued that the rapid growth under way in
Africa actually called for the creation of some kind of European body as an
international force, but this Europe would only attain its international standing in
conjunction with Africa. The long-term future of the Union franqaise was therefore
to be tied in to French leadership of a greater Europe. The EDC, however, was clearly
not to be seen in any way as the first step towards this goal: 'L'avenir de l'Europe,
impossible sans l'Union franfaise, se trouve a l'oppose des conceptions et des
T7
dispositions du traite sur l'armee europeenne'. The Gaullists' aim was to combat the
creation of a narrow, continental Europe that would soon prove unable to keep pace
with the rapid developments expected in the French colonies, and condemn France to
a future in which she would be unable to take advantage of the Empire's potential
while failing to find sufficient prestige and security in Europe alone.
35
Debre, 'L'Europe', RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, 9-11.11.1952
36 Courrier d'Information Politique, 15 (April 1953)
37 ibid
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While the Gaullists' opposition to the EDC, as has been seen, centred on the general
need for France to retain an African presence, their campaign did focus more
precisely on North Africa than on the sub-Saharan colonies. The catalyst for Gaullist
reflection on North Africa's contribution to national and Western security was the
decision, in 1952, to expand NATO to include Greece and Turkey. While welcoming
this contribution to security in the Mediterranean, the RPF was disappointed that
France's allies had not seen fit to expand NATO to embrace the entire Mediterranean
-> o
theatre, with particular reference to Morocco and Tunisia. For General Pierre
Billotte, the admission of Greece and Turkey called into question the very nature of
the so-called Atlantic Alliance:
J'aurais de loin prefere l'organisation d'un pacte regional mediterranneen,
convenable, articule avec le pacte de l'Atlantique et dans lequel seraient entres
tout naturellement, avec les puissances mediterraneennes, les Etats-Unis et la
Grande-Bretagne dont les interets sont pleinement reconnus dans cette
- • 39
region.
The geographical unity of the North Atlantic Alliance having been somewhat
disrupted by its enlargement to include Greece and Turkey, Billotte's remarks about
the possibility of a Mediterranean pact emerging to occupy a parallel place to the
Atlantic pact in Western security were not entirely unreasonable. They represent the
beginning of a Gaullist attempt to find a system of collective security that would both
include France's North African interests and reduce the nation's dependence on the
Western European and Atlantic alliances. With West German rearmament within
NATO likely by 1952, and the principal threat to France seeming now to come from
Arab nationalism rather than Soviet communism, Billotte's response to the apparent
prioritisation ofGreece and Turkey over Morocco and Tunisia is an indication of
Gaullist doubts about the value of greater concentration on Western Europe at the
'8
Algeria, due to its official status as an integral part of France, was already included in the NATO
treaty.
39
Billotte, AN, 24.1.1952, JORF. Billotte made clear at the beginning of his speech that he was
speaking on behalf of the RPF as a whole.
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expense ofNorth Africa.40 Indeed, Gaston Palewski attempted to introduce an
amendment to the protocol before parliament, to the effect that the articles of the
North Atlantic Treaty relating to Greece and Turkey would be valid only once
Morocco and Tunisia had also been included. His logic for this was concerned as
much with French power within the Alliance as with security in the Mediterranean:
Apres la conference de Lisbonne, il est bien evident que la question du
commandement de la Mediterranee sera tranchee. Avec quel poids
supplementaire ne se presenterait pas alors la France si l'ensemble de la region
strategique de FAfrique du Nord etait inclus dans le pacte!41
Palewski's amendment, however, was defeated and the Gaullists' contribution to the
parliamentary debate was limited to Billotte and Monsabert's insistence that steps be
taken to incorporate the Protectorates into the Western Alliance.
Gaullist-Military relations over EDC
The Gaullists' opposition to EDC on grounds of strategic concerns and national
security was not only significant in terms of its effect on the clarification of several
key areas of policy; it also provided a forum for rapprochement between Gaullists
and the military. Despite the somewhat strained relations between de Gaulle and
much of the army during the war and the post-war epuration, the RPF nevertheless
attracted a considerable amount ofmilitary support throughout the Fourth Republic.42
The main reason for militaires joining the RPF was a concern for France's national
and international situation, including a perceived threat to the army from the
Communists or, in some cases, from Europe, rather than any attachment to de Gaulle
40
Although Greece and Turkey were certainly part of the Mediterranean theatre, they were clearly
included in NATO in response to growing fears about Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, and
because their geographical position made them ideal bases for a strike against the south of the Soviet
Union. Thus their inclusion in NATO did not necessarily amount to a greater Western commitment to
the Mediterranean.
41 G. Palewski, AN, 7.2.1952, JORF. Palewski was particularly concerned that the link between
metropolitan France and French North Africa might no longer be under French command.
42
Militaires made up at least 5% of its membership, including twenty generals, twelve commanders
and eighteen colonels, and a significant percentage of its national or regional leadership; eight generals
served on its Conseil National. B. Lachaise, 'Les militaires et le Gaullisme au temps du RPF (1947-
1955)', in Militaires en Republique 1870-1962: les officiers, lepouvoir et la viepublique, ed. by O.
Forcade, E. Duhamel & P. Vial (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), pp. 455-65.
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himself 43 The RPF was happy to use the prestige of its well-known military figures
to attract support where it could benefit from playing the nationalist card, notably by
using General Koenig in Alsace.44 Military support for Gaullism - often in the form
of contacts between individual Gaullists and influential generals - was to be a crucial
factor in the demise of the Fourth Republic, and indeed in opposition to the regime
from the defeat in Indochina onwards. Flowever, it was during the campaign against
EDC that Gaullists and militaires first began to find common ground on issues of
national importance.
The French military elites, after 1945, despite uninterrupted action in the colonies, at
first saw considerable prospects in the idea of Europe.43 Around the time of the EDC
proposal, however, emphasis shifted towards a perception of the Cold War being
fought away from the Elbe.46 The influence available in continental Europe alone, it
was thought, was not sufficient to compensate for the implied loss of France's world
role.47 As the 1950s progressed, the idea of Europe was studied in military circles,
notably at the influential Institut des Hautes Etudes de la Defense Nationale, but
emphasis was increasingly on Europe's relations with the overseas territories. The
idea of Eurafrica was seen by many officers as a potential bastion against
communism in Europe, because of the value of Africa for its resources and as a
territory from which the defence ofWestern Europe could be continued as it had been
during the Second World War.48
43
Lachaise, 'Les militaires et le Gaullisme', p. 460
44
ibid, pp. 461-2
45 C. d'Abzac-Epezy & P. Vial, 'In Search of a European Consciousness: French Military Elites and the
Idea of Europe, 1947-1954', pp. 1-20
46 The defeat in Indochina in 1954 confirmed this shift in military attention, from Europe to the Union
frangaise.
47 C. d'Abzac-Epezy & P. Vial, 'In Search of a European consciousness...', p. 12
48
Military planners openly acknowledged the precedent of the Second World War. See C. d'Abzac-
Epezy & P. Vial, 'In Search of a European consciousness...', p. 5; Archives de l'Armee de Terre
(Vincennes: Service Historique de I'Armee de Terre) (henceforth SHAT), 1H 1130/1 'Imperatifs
strategiques de l'A.F.N.', 1952. It must be noted that Eurafrica never attained the status ofofficial
doctrine, perhaps because there remained a body of officers who preferred to concentrate uniquely on
defending continental Europe, while others, with experience of fighting in Indochina, remained
convinced that the decisive battle would take place far from Europe.
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The Second World War had given rise to a dominant opinion within the armed forces,
that Africa was essential to the defence of France, and that consequently any future
defence pact that France might enter into with its Western allies must allow for the
continued prominence ofAfrica in French strategic thinking. Thus, many officers
were reluctant to contemplate the possibility of any European alliance that would take
priority over France's African commitments 49 Military planners even wondered if the
African and European missions of France could be reconciled without damaging the
unity of the army itself, such was its attachment to the view that France's strongest
support could be found not in Europe but in the African colonies.50
The common ground shared by the Gaullists and the military over North Africa and
Western security also owed much to both sides' attachment to the historical
importance of Africa. Dating back to the early colonial conquests, with a high point
between the World Wars, the army's association with Africa was a source of
considerable pride among officers, and a symbol of past grandeur. Even the division
of the wartime period had not completely eroded the army's faith in Africa. Despite
North Africa's new significance, acquired since 1943, as a Free French lieu de
memoire, the liberation campaigns in Italy and the South of France had nevertheless
been conducted by a reconstituted Armee d'Afrique, with a force made up chiefly of
non-Gaullists - fighting a parallel campaign to those of the Gaullists and Allies in
Normandy - and of the internal resistance. Thus, the spirit of the Armee d'Afrique had
managed to survive the apparent Gaullist take-over of the liberation era, largely
because many of the colonial army's aims seemed close to those of the Fourth
Republic Gaullists. The themes of the permanence of French presence in Africa,
French grandeur on a world scale being achieved through this overseas role, and a
degree of caution regarding European or American-led alliances - perhaps, for non-
Gaullist militaires, a legacy of the prioritisation of the Normandy campaigns over
49 The most comprehensive account of the views of the military regarding the relationship between
European co-operation and the African colonies is C. d'Abzac-Epezy & P. Vial, 'In Search of a
European Consciousness...'
50 C. d'Abzac-Epezy & P. Vial, 'In search of a European Consciousness', p. 5
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those of Italy during the liberation and in commemoration of the war effort - were
shared by Gaullists and militaires. The EDC campaign highlighted the closeness of
Gaullist and military views and prepared the ground for future co-operation between
the two groups.
Given the relatively high proportion ofmilitary figures within Gaullism, it is not
surprising that when the Gaullists adopted a policy of highlighting the shortcomings
of France's security arrangements, they should seek to attract military support by
clearly stating their faith in the capacities of a properly constituted and managed
military force. At the 1951 RPF Assises, General Koenig outlined plans for increased
troop numbers and simplified command structures, which were designed to
reconstitute effective and coherent national armed forces. Koenig stated clearly that
what was needed was not a closer focus on European defence alliances, but rather the
reconstruction of an 'Armee d'Afrique', which would include a unified command for
the North African area as a whole.51 On North Africa, Koenig claimed, considerable
common ground already existed between the views of the army - notably Marshals
Juin and Leclerc, who had tried to convince governments of the need for greater
focus on military organisation in Africa - and those of the Gaullists, with both groups
believing that the North African territories were 'simplement le prolongement autour
du lac mediterraneen'.
Gaullist agreement with the military, particularly on the question of the need for
increased troop numbers to meet France's international role, continued throughout the
EDC debate. The 1952 RPF Assises, for example, witnessed calls for the armed
forces to be properly equipped, and for a vigorous recruitment campaign to be
launched to tackle the lack of suitable personnel. While acknowledging that the
government's military policy had allowed the army to meet its NATO commitments
51




by the end of 1952,53 the defence spokesman, General Gilliot,54 continued to stress
the need for further recruitment, suggesting that the NATO forces were envisaged as
only meeting part of France's military obligations. With North Africa only partly
covered by NATO, and the war in Indochina showing no sign of abating, the RPF
was therefore calling for a substantial show of government commitment to a military
effort beyond France's NATO role. Gilliot underlined, in particular, the fact that
while French forces outside Europe were nominally not concerned by the EDC
proposal, they could nevertheless only be reinforced with the approval of the Atlantic
command, suggesting that France should be looking to take greater responsibility for
the security of its overseas interests than the present form of alliance seemed to allow.
Echoing the calls that had been made in parliament at the beginning of the year for
inclusion ofMorocco and Tunisia in NATO, the Assises passed a motion on Atlantic
policy that called for the immediate enlargement of the Atlantic Pact to take into
account the Soviet strategy of'dissociation interne et externe'" - attacking the West
through support for anticolonial movements, as the Gaullists had for some time been
concerned about in the Protectorates and Indochina. Faced with this strategy, the RPF
now saw the proposed European military alliance as a completely inadequate
response to the Soviet threat to both Europe and French North Africa. The Gaullists
were not yet advocating complete prioritisation of colonial affairs over the Western
Alliance - that would not occur until the outbreak of rebellion in Algeria and moves
towards detente - but it was already clear that any European or Atlantic Alliance was
not seen as adequately responding to France's need for a role on the international
stage. Gaullists increasingly envisaged national defence as being centred on North
Africa; the further deterioration of the situation in that region during 1954 confirmed
their assessment of the dangers of a Eurocentric policy.
53 Twelve French divisions had been guaranteed to NATO by the end of 1952, in line with France's
commitments to its partners at the 1952 Lisbon Conference.
54 Gilliot was RPF deputy for the Marne departement.
55 RPF archives, Assises Nationales de Paris, 9-11.11.1952, 'Motion sur la politique Atlantique'
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Conclusion
By May 1954 and the fall of Dien Bien Phu - signifying humiliating defeat in
Indochina - the Gaullists had cultivated important alliances in military circles.36 The
end of the debate over EDC coincided with the eruption of urgent colonial questions,
beginning with the loss of Indochina, into national political debate. From this point
until the fall of the republic in 1958, Gaullists believed that any official commitment
to Europe - whether political, economic or military - was inevitably made at the
expense of the Union frangaise, and they increasingly found support for this view in
military circles. Furthermore, with Indochina lost, the focus of attention was now
clearly North Africa, considered to be under greater threat than before because of the
demonstration of France's weakness in South East Asia. The first test of the Gaullists'
newfound resolve to prioritise colonial - and, specifically, North African - affairs
after Dien Bien Phu and the defeat of EDC came in the form of the government's plan
to grant 'internal autonomy' to Morocco and Tunisia in July 1954. For the military,
the focus of the revolutionary, ideological warfare they had suffered in Indochina
now shifted to North Africa, as the temptation to see Arab nationalism as a Trojan
horse for Soviet communism became stronger. By the end of 1954, with rebellion
under way in Algeria and unrest continuing in the Protectorates, the Gaullists'
decision to prioritise the retention ofNorth Africa over a retreat to Europe at the time
of the EDC debate meant they were committed to spend the final four years of the
Fourth Republic arguing that France's very survival, and the welfare of the Western
world, depended upon there being no further distractions from the effort to restore
France's world role through prioritising its campaign in North Africa.
56 The Gaullists' stance over the EDC and the Union frangaise also proved popular with anciens
combattants associations, as will be seen in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
THE DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CHANGE IN
NORTH AFRICA AND EVOLUTION OF GAULLIST STRATEGY
The fall ofDien Bien Phu in May 1954 is widely acknowledged as a turning point in
the history of the Fourth Republic's colonial policy. Defeat in Indochina raised
colonial problems to a new level of urgency and prominence in metropolitan political
debate, and was particularly influential in that it focused public opinion on the threat
to the Empire for the first time. The themes raised by the defeat - the spread of
communism along with nationalism; the unreliability of France's Western Allies in
colonial affairs; the lack of support provided by government to the army in the
colonies; the signals that the fall of Dien Bien Phu sent out about France's
international status - were to dominate the remaining years of the Fourth Republic.
For Gaullists, the loss of Indochina was viewed with a curious combination of horror
and masked optimism. In the summer of 1954, with the defeat of the EDC and the
belated awakening of general interest in the themes of threat to the Union frangaise
and lack of government commitment to France's overseas role, some Gaullists felt
that the decisive moment of national redressement that had been awaited since 1947
had finally arrived. The dramatic defeat was even viewed by some in a similar way
to that of 1940, such a great shock to French grandeur that it would, in time, prove to
be the catalyst for national renewal and a return to greatness. While such hopes
proved to be optimistic, the legacy of Dien Bien Phu was present throughout the final
years of the Fourth Republic, with a growing sense that the regime's final crisis was
now likely to arise from colonial problems. North Africa assumed a new importance
as the symbol of France's last chance to retain international prestige, and of
governments' commitment to the nation.
The importance of the loss of Indochina to the Gaullists was not, however, purely
indicative of a general atmosphere of crisis and urgency.1 Concrete lessons were
1 Frederic Turpin has argued that Indochina, like the Saar and Morocco in previous years, was used by
Gaullists as a means to attack the regime, rather than as an issue about which they were genuinely
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drawn from the events in South East Asia, which were to inform Gaullist attitudes to
the problems in Algeria and the Protectorates between 1954 and 1958. In domestic
politics, too, Dien Bien Phu marked a turning point in Gaullist strategy for a return to
power; the blow to the nation's confidence in its rulers led Gaullists to believe more
strongly that a mass rallying round de Gaulle as saviour was possible and could be
organised in response to a colonial emergency. To this end, the Gaullists stepped up
their efforts to attract support and form alliances outside conventional parliamentary
circles. The malaise in the army after Dien Bien Phu, the anger felt by anciens
combattants, the fear among settler populations, and the heightened sense of urgency
and crisis on the nationalist, anticommunist right all provided opportunities for the
Gaullists to exploit the loss of Indochina.
In 1954, the most pressing problem, after Indochina, was the question ofMorocco
and Tunisia. The fall of Dien Bien Phu must, therefore, be looked at principally in
terms of its effect on Gaullist views of the problems in the protectorates. The chief
developments brought about by events in Indochina were a strengthened conviction
that France's allies - in particular the United States - were more likely to constitute a
threat than a source of support for France's overseas aims, and a more sophisticated
view of colonial nationalism, its links with communism, and even the necessity of
negotiating with the nationalists in certain circumstances. The Gaullists did not by
any means become anticolonialists after Dien Bien Phu, but they did begin to realise
that dialogue with carefully chosen representatives in Morocco and Tunisia might
concerned. F. Turpin, 'Le RPF et la Guerre d'Indochine' in Fondation Charles de Gaulle, in Fondation
Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et le RPF (1947-1955) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1998), pp. 530-40, 539
2 There is, indeed, evidence that Gaullists were not particularly concerned with Indochina, other than
in terms of its value as a means of asserting their patriotic credentials and opposition to both the
government and the Communists. Jacques Foccart, for example, states that de Gaulle felt somewhat
distanced from the war in Indochina. See P. Gaillard, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard
(Paris: Fayard/Jeune Affique, 1995), p. 91. In the light of the Gaullists' emphasis on the imperatives
of the Cold War, as outlined in previous chapters, the Gaullists' concerns about the future of the
Union frangaise in the early 1950s were focused more closely on the more strategically important
North and West African territories.
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prove more constructive than the centralised and authoritarian practices of the recent
Residents-General.
This did not mean, however, that the Gaullists unconditionally welcomed the
opening of negotiations with the Viet Minh in 1954. While De Gaulle had
announced in April 1954 that the priority in Indochina must be finding an end to the
conflict, and had welcomed the Geneva peace conference for this reason, the
General, as ever, left scope for different interpretations of his words by alluding to
the inevitable internationalisation of the problem that would arise from the
conference.4 If negotiation was to be welcomed, international 'interference' clearly
was not, and the need to negotiate should not prevent the government from insisting
upon a solution that preserved France's interests. Given this lead by de Gaulle, the
Gaullists' reactions to the situation in Indochina ranged from Chaban-Delmas'
defence of Mendes-France against accusations of abandoning Indochina,3 to Debre's
attack on the Prime Minister for exaggerating the need for withdrawal.6
Demonstrating the Gaullists' growing awareness of the potential effect of colonial
conflicts on international relations, the Gaullist deputy Frederic-Dupont insisted
somewhat dramatically that not only French interests were at stake in Indochina, but
also the future of the free world: 'II y a en Indochine les interets franfais a
sauvegarder ... il y a aussi la liberie du monde'.7 While negotiation was generally
accepted as the best policy for France in Indochina, there was considerable
3
Turpin has demonstrated that the Gaullists were moving towards support for negotiation, even
without an outright military victory, in order to save face, in the second half of 1953. F. Turpin, 'Le
RPF et la Guerre d'lndochine', 538
4 Gaullist doubts about the benefits of pursuing the war in Indochina at all costs had, indeed, been
expressed as early as October 1953 by Christian Fouchet, who had spoken in parliament of the need to
avoid a disaster even at the expense of acknowledging defeat. His comments, however, failed to have
the effect on the Gaullists in general that de Gaulle's public pronouncements inevitably did. De
Gaulle, Press Conference, 7.4.1954, in C. de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 2: Dans I'attente,
1948-1958 (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 613-4; Fouchet, AN, 20.10.1953, quoted in F. Turpin, 'Le RPF et la
Guerre d'lndochine', 537
5 J. Chaban-Delmas, Memoirespour demain (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), pp. 241-2
6 M. Debre, Trois Republiques pour une France: memoires, vol. 2 1946-1958: agir (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1988), p. 265
7
Frederic-Dupont, AN, 5.3.1954, JORF
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resentment that the Western Allies had failed to provide sufficient and unequivocal
support. This theme ofGaullist discourse was to become a familiar feature of
responses to the war in Algeria.
Few Gaullists held official positions relating to Indochina, perhaps due as much to
the relatively low priority that Gaullists afforded the region, as to the effect of
o
Gaullist refusal to compromise with the 'system'. Indeed, General Koenig was
offered command of the forces in Indochina in 1954 but refused. Koenig's reluctance
to accept such a high position owed much to his feeling that Indochina was already a
lost cause by 1954; only massive reinforcements in the form of conscripts could turn
the situation to France's advantage, and even then, the only benefit that could be
expected would be a stronger bargaining position at the peace conference.9
Furthermore, Koenig is reported as having persuaded colleagues, notably Soustelle,
that Indochina was already lost to France.10 The loss of Indochina was nevertheless
difficult for Gaullists to accept, believing as they did that a stronger government
could have made a difference at an earlier stage of the war. Frederic-Dupont, in
particular, was a strong critic of the armistice, accusing the government of betraying
loyal populations and abandoning South-East Asia to communism.11 It could be
argued that Gaullist determination to avoid a similar loss of control over events in
North Africa was therefore strengthened. For Soustelle, indeed, the need to
concentrate on maintaining peace in Africa was itself a reason to disengage as
1 9
quickly and efficiently as possible from Indochina.
8 While Gaullists had been participating in the 'system' since 1952, it could be argued that the final
stages of the EDC affair in early 1954 temporarily reinforced their opposition to the regime, thus
preventing them from taking a more active part in Indochinese affairs.
9
L. Terrenoire, De Gaulle 1947-1954: pourquoi I'echec? Du RPF a la traversee du desert (Paris:
Plon, 1981), pp. 272-7
10 B. Ullmann, Jacques Soustelle: le mal aime (Paris: Plon, 1995), pp. 181-2
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Frederic-Dupont, AN, 22.7.1954, JORF. Another Gaullist deputy, Pierre de Benouville, took this
argument further, accusing the government of abandoning the Christians of Asia, in a foretaste of
some of the Gaullists' attempts to interpret subsequent problems in North Africa as part of an
aggressive onslaught of Islam against Christianity.
12
Soustelle, AN, 9.6.1954, JORF
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If Indochina provided clear lessons for the French authorities on the need to act
decisively in North Africa, Gaullists feared that it also served as an inspiration to the
nationalists in Morocco and Tunisia. Christian Fouchet warned in parliament in May
1954 that French residents in Morocco were already receiving threats of a 'Moroccan
Dien Bien Phu',13 while General de Monsabert stressed in parliament the need to
avoid following 'une route qui nous conduirait fatalement de Vietminh en Istiqlal'.14
Along with nationalist activity, a second potential threat to the French presence in
North Africa arising from Dien Bien Phu was the question of intemationalisation.
The French acceptance of an international conference on Indochina carried the
danger of legitimising any other attempts to resolve problems in the Union franqaise
by international diplomatic means. Indeed, the new prominence of
intemationalisation as a way of dealing with colonial problems was, after Dien Bien
Phu, one of the most important issues the Gaullists had to address in their attitude to
North Africa.15 The Gaullists - already warning of the nationalists' links with Egypt
and Libya16 — now had to develop a response to the reality of the superpowers'
interest in the French Empire as demonstrated in Indochina, and to the involvement
of the international community as a whole as demonstrated at Geneva. The United
States, Soviet Union and United Nations, hitherto seen as potential sources of
interference in the case of French weakness, were from 1954 reluctantly
acknowledged as a major influence on events in North Africa. It is possible to trace
the Gaullists' close focus on the international elements of the Algerian War - the
roles of the UN, US, other NATO Allies, and the USSR - to the lessons they learned
from the way in which the war in Indochina ended. Indeed, Pierre Messmer, Minister
for the Army in de Gaulle's Fifth Republic government and a senior colonial civil
13
Fouchet, AN, 11.5.1954, quoted in J-R Tournoux, Secrets d'Etat (Paris: Plon, 1960), p. 71
14 de Monsabert, AN, 2.6.1954, JORF. General Boyer de Latour, Resident General in Tunisia,
confirms that the fall of Dien Bien Phu did indeed strengthen resistance to France in the protectorates.
P. Boyer de Latour, Verites sur I'Afrique du Nord(Paris: Plon, 1956), p. 54
15 A. Hartley, Gaullism: The Rise and Fall ofa Political Movement (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1972), p. 127
16 See for example the Lettre a I'Union Franqaise, 215 & 226 (7.1.1954 & 3.6.1954), which stressed
the need to be aware of the specific links between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco rather than
vague links between nationalism and communism.
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servant during the 1950s, confirms this development by acknowledging that the
Gaullists, in the aftermath of Dien Bien Phu, were guilty of over-emphasising the
international aspects of the North African situation, as a result of the accepted idea
that it was the proximity of China that had made it possible for the Viet Minh to
1 7
defeat the French forces in Indochina.
Military affairs played a major part in the adaptation of Gaullist strategy towards
North Africa after the loss of Indochina. The campaign had taught the French
military much about the use of guerrilla tactics and psychological warfare, lessons
10
that the Gaullists claimed the government had failed to learn. Furthermore, the
Gaullists insisted that the new methods of warfare learned in Indochina must be
applied to the problems in North Africa. In this respect, the influence of Indochina on
Gaullist policy dealing with North Africa for the remaining years of the Fourth
Republic was considerable, as it was frequently on issues relating to the military
response to nationalist activity that the Gaullists found most popular support and
were able to put most pressure on government. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, a future
Defence Minister during the Algerian War, was convinced, in 1954, that the reason
for the defeat in Indochina had been a failure to appreciate the nature of the conflict
and adopt the correct strategy.19 The officers returning from Indochina drew the same
conclusions about reasons for the defeat: the enemy had been under-estimated, and
the determination and sense of purpose that combat in the name of a well-defined
ideology conferred upon the Viet Minh had not been appreciated until too late in the
conflict. The effect of Dien Bien Phu on the officer class was so profound that the
Gaullists' role as spokesmen for a completely new approach to colonial campaigns
left them well placed in 1954 to benefit from military discontent with governments
demonstrating a lack of commitment to military effort. The need for an ideologie
nationale to oppose the ideologically-driven anti-colonialist guerrillas was expressed
17 P. Messmer, Apres tant de batailles (Paris: Albin Michel, 1992), p. 270
18 R. Dronne, AN, 1.6.1954, JORF
19 J. Chaban-Delmas, Memoires pour demain, pp. 238-9
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simultaneously, in 1954, by Indochina veterans and Gaullist politicians, whose
existing conviction that wars of decolonisation were becoming a conflict between
'Western' or 'civilised' values and totalitarian ideology found considerable support
among those with first-hand experience ofViet-Minh tactics of indoctrination. Yet,
in terms of policy, little changed in 1954. The Gaullists in parliament defended the
military's effort in Indochina and stressed that overwhelming numerical superiority
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and more appropriate tactics might have made a difference, but with neither
officers nor Gaullists in a position to influence government policy, their shared
assessment of the defeat in Indochina counted for little in practical terms. Where a
more significant coming-together of Gaullists and militaires did occur in 1954 was in
the field of opposition to the regime in general, as will be discussed in more detail
below.
In more concrete terms, a Gaullist influence on military policy in the immediate
aftermath of Dien Bien Phu can be seen in General Koenig's spell as Minister of
22Defence between June and August 1954. As soon as the war ended in Indochina,
Koenig promised two further divisions for North Africa, demonstrating a
commitment to avoid the same mistakes of insufficient numbers of troops that had
9^
undermined the French effort in Indochina. Yet Koenig's spell as Minister of
Defence was too brief to implement any of the strategic lessons of Indochina.24
Furthermore, in the absence of a declared rebellion, his task in respect ofNorth
Africa was simply to maintain order,2:1 and approval for a more vigorous military
20 On the effect of the war in Indochina on the army, see G. Kelly. 'The French Army Re-enters
Polities', Political Science Quarterly, 76 (1961), pp. 367-92
21 General de Monsabert, in particular, considered that the defeat in Indochina had been caused partly
by insufficient and poorly-prepared troops, and warned that such errors must not be repeated in North
Africa. AN, 2.6.1954, JORF
22
Koenig's acceptance of this post, whereas two months earlier he had declined the command in
Indochina, demonstrates the hope that the Gaullist invested in Mendes-France's ability to achieve
results.
23
Boyer de Latour, Verites sur I'Afrique du Nord, p. 55
24 On Koenig's spell as Minister of Defence in 1954, see P. Vial, 'Un ministre paradoxal, le General
Koenig', in Militaires en Republique 1870-1962: les officiers, lepouvoir et la vie publique, ed. by O.
Forcade, E. Duhamel & P. Vial (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1999), pp. 255-89, 264-9
25 C.A. Julien, Et la Tunisie devint independante (1951-1957) (Paris: Jeune Afrique, 1985), pp. 157-8
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campaign in the protectorates would surely not have been forthcoming from Mendes-
France, who was concerned with finding a political solution to the problems in the
region and still preoccupied with the EDC.
Breakthrough in Morocco and Tunisia: Government attempts to learn
from Indochina
The link between defeat in Indochina and the problems in North Africa was as clear
to Mendes-France as it was to the Gaullists. During the summer of 1954, therefore,
the Prime Minister sought to take advantage of the short-lived period of political
goodwill he was enjoying, to attempt to move away from the impasse that years of
mistrust and insufficient reform had created in the protectorates. Gaullist reactions to
Mendes-France's policies on Morocco and Tunisia reveal the extent to which their
attitudes to the problems of the Union franqaise had altered in the light of events in
the Far East. Mendes-France's policies on Morocco and Tunisia are especially
interesting to the study of Gaullist attitudes because of Christian Fouchet's crucial
role in the reforms, in his capacity as Minister for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs.
Fouchet's participation in both government and colonial reform did not elicit the
criticism that might be expected ofGaullists, though it was by no means
unanimously approved. Gaullist indulgence towards Mendes-France can be
explained to some extent by the parallels that Gaullists saw between him and de
Gaulle; Mendes-France has, indeed, retained a place in Gaullist mythology that sees
him as the closest to a Gaullist-style Prime Minister that the Fourth Republic was
capable of producing. That many Gaullists have expressed admiration for Mendes-
France despite the latter's fierce opposition to de Gaulle's return to power in 1958
and refusal to accept the post ofMinister of the Interior in de Gaulle's first
government indicates the esteem in which he was held by Gaullists. Yet, in 1954,
their admiration for Mendes-France owed as much to his policies as his style of
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leadership.26 He mirrored Gaullist attitudes to Indochina, estimating that the best
solution to the crisis was a withdrawal without further unnecessary losses of troops
and with as little loss of prestige as possible. On North Africa, therefore, Mendes-
France already benefited from a reserve of approval among Gaullists when he
announced, on July 31, 1954, his plan to grant Tunisia and Morocco 'internal
autonomy', amounting to a significant devolution ofpower with the exception of
foreign and defence policy.27
The reputation that Mendes-France enjoyed as a result of the resolution of the
Indochina problem meant that Gaullists initially set aside their reservations about the
liberal policy he intended to pursue in North Africa. Chaban-Delmas felt that, as the
government's Tunisian policy was inspired by its success in Indochina, it too was
likely to prove correct,28 while Foccart reports that, with Indochina in the past, de
9Q
Gaulle approved Mendes-France's Carthage speech announcing internal autonomy.
Even General de Monsabert, a conservative Gaullist and one of the fiercest critics of
the regime's policies in North Africa in subsequent years, felt, in June 1954, that
internal autonomy was worth trying, providing that the limits were strictly and
TO
clearly defined. The Gaullist press, too, broadly welcomed Mendes-France's
policy, with the Lettre a I'Union Frangaise expressing hope that the events in
Indochina would lead to reflection on the rest of the Empire, particularly North
26 Gaston Palewski sums up the admiration that many Gaullists had for 'un Pierre Mendes-France dont
le style nous plaisait et qui nous semblait, a juste titre, doue de cette qualite essentielle de 1'homme
d'Etat qui consistait a aller droit aux difficultes au lieu d'essayer de les contourner ou de les ignorer'.
G. Palewski, Memoires d'action (1924-1974) (Paris: Plon, 1988), p. 261. Philippe Vial, however,
argues that the Gaullists' support for Mendes-France in 1954 owed more to the atmosphere of crisis
and salut public of the time than to any real faith in the Prime Minister. P. Vial, 'Un ministre
paradoxal...', p. 265
27 In July 1954, for example, the Republicans Sociaux newspaper, Les Idees... Les Faits stated that
Mendes-France had produced the best solution to the Indochina problem. R. Frey, 'L'heure de verite',
in Les Idees.. Les Faits, 3 (July 1954)
28
Chaban-Delmas, Memoires pour demain, p. 242
29
P. Gaillard, Foccart parte, p. 115
30 De Monsabert in Paris-Jeunes, 29 (1.6.1954). De Monsabert stated more clearly than most Gaullists
what he considered the limits of internal autonomy to be: defence, foreign relations, security and the
economy were to remain entirely in French control.
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Africa, and then, a few weeks later, proclaiming itself satisfied with the progress so
TO
far on Morocco and Tunisia. Indeed, the Lettre's only complaint about the reforms
announced by Mendes-France at Carthage was that they contained little that was
new, a comment echoed by General Catroux's biographer, who claims that the
essence of the announcement of July 1954 had already been proposed by Catroux in
1953 and outlined in 1952 in his book on Lyautey, to no avail.33 In 1952-3, however,
Catroux's liberalism on North Africa had been rejected not only by the government
to which it was proposed, but also by the RPF. By 1954, partly owing to the shock of
Dien Bien Phu, Mendes-France succeeded where liberal Gaullists had failed, in
winning over the majority of the Gaullists in parliament to a plan of reform for the
protectorates.
It would, however, be wrong to state that Mendes-France's 'internal autonomy' plan
met absolutely no resistance among Gaullists. Indeed, one might argue that, without
the extraordinary circumstances created by Dien Bien Phu, and the Republicains
Sociaux' uncharacteristic desire to avoid another governmental collapse, the new
Moroccan and Tunisian policy might have fallen victim to the same Gaullist
obstruction that had defeated other Fourth Republic initiatives. The proposed reforms
were not well received by the Gaullists in Morocco, who saw the new government as
being determined to 'liquidate' the Union frangaise:
En somme, la devise du gouvernement, en ce qui concerne la France d'Outre-
Mer c'est 'On liquide et l'on s'en va'...Jamais notre position, a nous Franqais
du Maroc, n'a ete aussi menacee... Et que notre compagnon Christian
Fouchet soit ministre de la Tunisie et du Maroc ne change rien a l'affaire.34
31 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 243 (22.7.54)
32 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 248 (9.9.54)
3j H. Lerner, Catronx (Paris: Albin Michel, 1990), pp. 313-6. See also G. Catroux, Lyautey le
Marocain (Paris: Hachette, 1952 )
34 RPF archives, Maroc, 51/1, Groupe RPF de Casablanca, 'Bulletin No 12', October 1954
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Fouchet's role as a key figure in the implementation of the reforms made no
difference in this case, as Mendes-France's style of leadership could be interpreted as
demonstrating that individual ministers had little influence on policy. However, as
has been seen in chapter 3 (pp. 67-9), the RPF federations in Morocco were already
known within the Gaullist leadership as the repository of some of the most extreme
conservative views, and in this respect their opposition to the new policy is hardly
surprising and perhaps had less effect in Paris than had been hoped. Indeed, a report
of July 1954, on the RPF in Morocco concluded that the local membership had
unrealistic expectations, a polarised view of the North African problem, and had
completely failed to take account of the changing international situation, Indochina,
the Geneva peace conference, or the growing international interest in France's
behaviour in its colonies.
A more immediate threat to the evolution of a liberal Gaullist attitude towards the
status ofMorocco and Tunisia was the existence of dissent within the parliamentary
group, in respect of Fouchet's ministerial activities.36 Many of the Gaullists'
concerns focused on the fact that the concept of the Union franqaise - a Gaullist
creation — did not seem to be important to Mendes-France; Raymond Dronne
complained, for example, that the Geneva peace treaty did not mention the Union
franqaise as it ought to have done.37 Koenig, too, although not opposed to reform in
Morocco and Tunisia, expressed fears that Mendes-France's policies might mean the
TO
end of the Union franqaise as the Gaullists had envisaged it. Mendes-France was
acceptable to Gaullists as a man of action, but his apparent disregard for the
constitutional framework devised by the Gaullists for the Empire reminded them that
35
RPF archives, Maroc, 51/1, anonymous, 'Note sur la situation au Maroc', July 1954
36 The Gaullists' views on Morocco and Tunisia, as opposed to their immediate responses to Fouchet
and Mendes-France's policies, will be examined in more detail in chapter 6.
37
Dronne, AN, 23.7.1954, JORF
38
Koenig, AN, 9.6.1954, JORF. Much of the Gaullists' criticism of Mendes-France reflected their
existing concern for the security implications of any weakening of the Union franqaise: de Monsabert
insisted that national defence was only possible within the framework of a French North Africa: 'La
defense nationale est une du Rhin au Sahara'. De Monsabert in Paris-Jeunes, 29 (1.6.1954)
112
he was not entirely to be trusted in his reforms. As for the manner in which reform
was being implemented, Michel Debre was concerned that not only was the
government proceeding too quickly, but it was also neglecting to treat the whole of
North Africa together, which the Gaullists had been advocating during the previous
OQ
years. Another Gaullist on the 'activist', uncompromising wing of the movement,
Pierre Lefranc, expressed concern that excessively hasty action in Tunisia might
have unwelcome consequences in Morocco and Algeria.40 The Republicains Sociaux
as a whole argued that the crises in Morocco and Tunisia had little in common except
the nationalism that had caused them.41 In the light of events in Indochina, where the
French had seen their credibility undermined by their attempt to deal only with a so-
called interlocuteur qualifie - the unpopular Emperor Bao Dai - the Gaullists
remained concerned about the existence of suitably qualified and authoritative
negotiating partners in Morocco and Tunisia. In Morocco, the deposition of the
Sultan meant that there was considerably less chance of finding a reliable partner and
great risk of repeating the errors of Indochina,42 whereas in Tunisia, the question of
dealing with an unpopular and contested sovereign did not arise.43 The Gaullist
deputy Bouvier O'Cottereau, president of the Groupe Parlementaire d'Amitie
Franco-Marocaine, insisted that while change was welcome in Morocco, the
deposed Sultan could not be considered an interlocuteur valable and the
identification of a negotiating partner was necessary before any serious reform could
be attempted in Morocco.44 Thus, the Republicains Sociaux considered the
government correct to have limited its dealings in the first instance to negotiations
39 It must be noted, however, that Debre's criticism of Mendes-France on these grounds is more
forcefully expressed in his memoirs than it was at the time. Debre, Trois republiques pour une
France: memoires, vol. 2, pp. 265-6
40
P. Lefranc, Avec qui vous savez (Paris: Plon, 1979)
41 'Dossier Marocain et Dossier Tunisien', in Les Idees... Les Faits, 4 (September 1954)
42 Gaullists were divided as to whether the deposition of the Sultan and the instalment of a puppet,
pro-French replacement were beneficial or harmful to the prospects for a peaceful and satisfactory
solution to the Moroccan problem. The situation in Tunisia, however, was universally acknowledged
to be more straightforward.
43
Significantly, Fouchet himself defended the government's policy of negotiating with Tunisia on the
basis that it had been possible to identify and support a clear leader. AN, 10.8.1954, JORF
44 Bouvier O'Cottereau in Paris-Jeunes, 29 (1.6.1954)
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with Tunisia,43 despite the apparent contradiction that this raised with the Gaullists'
stated aim of treating the whole ofNorth Africa together.
Christian Fouchet himself embodied the Gaullists' situation at the time of the
Mendes-France government, faced with the dilemma of supporting the only
politician seemingly capable of sustaining reform - at the expense of the 'purity' of
Gaullism - or retreating into the uncompromising non-participation policy of the
early Fourth Republic. Accounts of the degree ofFouchet's commitment to Mendes-
France's North African policy vary. Chaban-Delmas, for example, a supporter of
participation in government and of the 'internal autonomy' plan, claims that Fouchet
considered resigning over the proposal, and that Chaban and Koenig persuaded him
to remain in office.46 Boyer de Latour, however, who remained opposed to
concessions in North Africa until the end of the Fourth Republic, presents Koenig as
reluctant to implement Mendes-France's plan.47 Soustelle, moreover, claims to have
been offered the Moroccan and Tunisian ministry before Fouchet, and to have
declined not because of doubts about Mendes-France - Soustelle considered the
Prime Minister to have achieved a positive outcome in Indochina - but rather
because de Gaulle refused to approve Soustelle's appointment.
The apparent confusion among Gaullists over Fouchet's appointment and his degree
of responsibility for Mendes-France's actions reveals doubts about whether the
policy pursued in the summer of 1954 in North Africa, in response to Dien Bien Phu,
was a 'Gaullist' one. Fouchet received an ambiguous response from de Gaulle when
asking the General's advice before entering into government, the latter not
forbidding his participation in government, as he had done in the case of Soustelle,49
but refusing to grant Fouchet an interview on the grounds that he was entering into
45 'Dossier Marocain et Dossier Tunisien', in Les Idees... Les Faits, 4 (September 1954)
46
Chaban-Delmas, Memoires pour demain, p. 243
47
Boyer de Latour, Verites sur I'Afrique du Nord, p. 56
48 B. Ullmann, Jacques Soustelle: le mal aime (Paris: Plon, 1995), pp. 182-3
49Ullmann, pp. 182-3
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the regime.50 According to Jacques Foccart, however, de Gaulle approved of the
policy announced by Mendes-France at Carthage in the company of Fouchet and
continued to demonstrate a liberal approach to Moroccan and Tunisian affairs.51
Fouchet's own opinion was that the progress proposed by Mendes-France was faster
than he had envisaged, and that most Gaullists, even after Dien Bien Phu, saw only
slow evolution in North Africa as possible and were reluctant to support a non-
Gaullist plan.52 Most historians have interpreted these Gaullist doubts about the pace
of change as evidence that Fouchet was little more than a token conservative in the
Mendes-France government, fulfilling the same function as Marshal Juin, who also
accompanied the Prime Minister to Tunisia on July 31: to appease the settlers and the
army.53 While Fouchet did entertain some doubts about Mendes-France's policy, and
faced opposition from within the Gaullist movement, it can be argued that his spell as
Minister for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs amounted to more than a token Gaullist
presence in a sensitive position. The shock of Dien Bien Phu had convinced many
Gaullists that the time was right for decisive action to prevent similar disastrous
losses elsewhere. Such a shift in attitudes - admittedly only from outright hostility to
change to limited acceptance of carefully managed reform - represented an evolution
50 J. Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 309-10
51 P. Gaillard, Foccart parle, p. 115
52 C. Fouchet, Memoires d'hier et de demain: au service du general de Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1971), pp.
118-9
33 See for example J. Valette, La France et I'Afrique: L 'Afriquefranqaise du nord 1914-1962 (Paris:
SEDES, 1993), pp. 175-6; S. Berstein & P. Milza, Histoire de la France auXXe siecle, vol. 3, 1945-
1958 (Brussels: Complexe, 1991), pp. 252-4; M. Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: The
Domestic Consequences ofInternational Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p.
88. Valette is the most dismissive of Fouchet's contribution to reform, claiming that he was not
informed of Mendes-France's trip to Tunisia until the last minute, was only included in the
government to secure Gaullist support for Mendes-France's investiture, was restricted to jobs without
political responsibility (notably covering for the 'excesses' of Boyer de Latour), and knew nothing of
Tunisian affairs. Berstein and Milza claim that Fouchet's role in government was simply to provide
reassurance to conservatives. Kahler is perhaps the most accurate, although he too fails to consider the
possibility that Fouchet's participation in government was evidence of changing Gaullist attitudes; he
states that the Gaullists in the Mendes-France government 'used their power to slow the pace of
change in North Africa', while acknowledging that the Gaullists as a whole differed among themselves
in the extent of their support for the government. Kahler is also the only historian to refer to the
possibility that Fouchet may have offered to resign in response to the pace of reform proposed by
Mendes-France; another account of this unclear episode states that Fouchet was able to secure
Mendes-France's acceptance of a less radical, more 'Gaullist' plan for Morocco and Tunisia.
Fouchet's memoirs are inconclusive on the subject.
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in Gaullist thinking on the Union frangaise and demonstrated the effect of events in
Indochina. The fact that plans proposed by Catroux one year earlier and rejected as
excessively liberal were implemented by a government supported by the majority of
Gaullists in 1954 is evidence of this evolution.
Dien Bien Phu, North Africa and new hope for a Gaullist revival
The fall ofDien Bien Phu represented a turning point in the history of Fourth
Republic Gaullism not only through its role in focusing attention on North Africa,
but also because it gave rise to hopes that the final crisis of the discredited regime
might be approaching. Indeed, throughout the period from May 1954 to May 1958,
the name ofDien Bien Phu was frequently used by Gaullists to signify a humiliating
defeat in the face ofworld opinion or a moment of crisis for the government in
France.34 The various plots and schemes proposed to bring about de Gaulle's return
to power can be traced to Gaullist reactions to Dien Bien Phu. While the present
study is concerned with Gaullist views on North Africa, the idea that a crisis to bring
down the regime would arise from North Africa became so important to Gaullist
thinking on Algerian affairs towards the end of the Fourth Republic, that an analysis
of the Gaullists' tactics in engineering such a crisis demands at least a brief treatment
of the hopes for change awakened by defeat in Indochina in 1954.
The fact that the defeat in Indochina was able to have a significant effect on Gaullist
strategy owed much to the demise of the RPF in 1953. Although the Gaullists in
parliament had passed smoothly into new formations - the Union des Republicains
d Action Sociale (URAS) then the Republicains Sociaux (RS) - the RS did not attract
all former RPF members in the country as a whole. Therefore, many Gaullist
supporters preferred to remain within the RPF, despite the latter's strictly non-
54 This was especially true in 1957-58, when fears of internationalisation of the Algerian War
prompted Gaullists to rally round the cry of'no diplomatic Dien Bien Phu'.
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parliamentary character as laid down by de Gaulle.^ The new RS failed to attract the
support of every former RPF federation, and those Gaullists who did not join the new
movement tended to be those with a strong personal attachment to de Gaulle and a
strong hostility to the 'system'.^ The tendency towards direct, non-parliamentary
action, which had always been an important element in Gaullism, gathered strength
after the end of the parliamentary RPF, with the RS seen as too willing to participate
in the system and the remaining RPF organisation therefore providing a focus for
those opposed to this strategy. The divorce between the parliamentary Gaullists in
the RS and the general body of RPF sympathisers was further emphasised by de
Gaulle's lack of interest in the parliamentary or ministerial activities of RS deputies,
as has already been seen in the case of Fouchet's appointment as Minister.7*7 It must
be noted, however, that the common impression of the parliamentary Gaullists as in
some way deviating from the ideals of the General and of the RPF is not entirely
accurate; since 1952, the idea that Gaullists could enter the regime in order to
undermine it had been gathering support. This 'Trojan horse' theory was first
outlined by Rene Capitant at the November 1952 RPF Assises?* and envisaged an
overthrow of the regime by the Gaullists in government, in conjunction with 'la
grande poussee democratique que nous aurons pour mission essentielle de provoquer
de l'exterieur'.59 While there is no evidence that the Gaullists who entered Mendes-
55 In his press conference of April 7, 1954, de Gaulle stressed that the RPF was now no more than an
organisation composed of his supporters, undertaking no political action in the name of the
Rassemblement. De Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 2, p. 617
56 On the RS' failure to attract RPF members, see H.J. Tiimmers, Das 'Centre National des
Republicains Sociaivc', Eine Gaullistische Partei unter der IV. Republik, (unpublished doctoral thesis,
Universitat Augsburg, 1980), p. 106; J. Dauer & M. Rodet, Le 13 mai sans complots (Paris: La Pensee
Moderne, 1959), pp. 19-21
57 De Gaulle made clear his indifference to the activities of Gaullists in parliaments in his declaration
reacting to the investiture of Mendes-France with Gaullist support: 'Quelles que puissent etre les
intentions des hommes, l'actuel regime ne saurait produire qu'illusions et velleites. Je demande aux
Fran9ais de croire que, ni directement, ni par personnes interposees, je ne prends aucune part a aucune
de ses combinaisons'. De Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 2, p. 619 (Declaration, 22.6.1954) De
Gaulle's reaction to Koenig's request for approval of his ministerial appointment displays similar
indifference to Gaullist participation in government: 'Je ne vous demande pas de ne pas etre ministre,
mais je ne vous demande pas de l'etre'. Quoted in Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition, p. 309
58 M-F Chevrillon, Les Republicains Sociaux ou la traversee du desert: 1953-1958, (unpublished
memoire de maitrise, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1965), p. 7
39
Combat, 11.10.1952, quoted in Chevrillon, Les Republicains Sociaux, p. 7
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France's government in 1954 did so with this in mind, one can identify, in both the
parliamentary and non-parliamentary fields, a growing militancy among Gaullists.
From 1954 until 1958, the question ofGaullists undermining the regime from within
was always an important focus for debate within the movement. The spirit of salut
public prevailing after the fall of Dien Bien Phu encouraged those Gaullists who
were inclined to participate in government that their presence in positions of
influence might be of use in generating a national redressement in the case of a
further crisis - which was likely to arise over North Africa.60
The defeat in Indochina occurred in a climate of increasing Gaullist activism in
opposition to the regime. Much of this was orchestrated by Jacques Dauer's young
Gaullist organisations, who were already beginning to see a link between colonial
crises and the downfall of the regime itself. The opportunity to create a new, Gaullist
system based on a colonial emergency was certainly in the minds of Gaullists before
May 1954. Writing in Paris-Jeunes, Pierre Lefranc developed the theme of a
combination of the army and a mass movement of young people proving to be at
once the saviour of the Union frangaise and of France itself.61 By April 1954, after
weeks ofwarnings about France's decline, Dauer's La Voix de la France seized upon
de Gaulle's press conference ofApril 7 to state for the first time the link between
62disaster in Indochina, de Gaulle's return and the overthrow of the regime. Indeed,
de Gaulle's press conference was widely seen as a rallying call to Gaullists and
others opposed to the regime, with his public support for Marshal Juin, recently
disciplined for criticising the EDC treaty, and his call for a mass show of support at
the Arc de Triomphe in Paris for the commemoration of the victory of 1945:
Je demande au peuple d'etre la pour marquer qu'il se souvient de ce qui fut
fait pour sauver l'independance de la France et qu'il entend la garder. Je
60
An example of the atmosphere of crisis created by Gaullists in May and June 1954 can be seen in
Diomede Catroux's statement that: 'Nous jouons notre sort en Asie, en Afrique, en Europe. Nous
connaissons l'enjeu: il s'appelle la France'. AN, 12.6.1954, JORF
61 P. Lefranc in Paris Jeunes, 22 (15.2.1954)
62 La Voix de la France, 3 (March-April 1954)
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demande aux anciens combattants des deux guerres et d'Indochine
d'entourer le monument. La garnison de Paris fera le necessaire pour les
honneurs et les sonneries. La glorieuse police de Paris assurera le service
d'ordre, les acces, la circulation. Tous, tant que nous sommes, qui nous
trouverons presents, ne dirons pas un seul mot, ne pousserons pas un seul
cri. Au-dessus du recueillement de cet immense silence planera Tame de la
patrie.63
By the time of the ceremony on May 9, the fall of Dien Bien Phu had added extra
urgency and significance to de Gaulle's appeal, with the link between humiliation in
the colonies and a decisive rallying around de Gaulle now clearly being made by
Gaullist activists.
The demonstration ofMay 1954 has been interpreted, since May 1958, as a
forerunner of the return of de Gaulle and the end of the Fourth Republic. Its
importance to the Gaullists was twofold: it demonstrated both that a mass rally
around de Gaulle could capture the imagination of activists and, crucially, military
figures, and that the defeat in Indochina did not constitute a sufficiently serious
crisis, in the eyes of the general population, to warrant direct action to overthrow the
regime.64 As is the case for May 1958, many of the available accounts ofMay 1954
are unreliable and tend to focus on the existence of various conspiracies. The most
recent work on the subject has emphasised the role of prominent Gaullists such as
Pierre Lefranc and Gaston Palewski in planning to descend on the Champs Elysees
with de Gaulle's car, accompanied by the crowd of supporters, and force the
government to resign.65 While Palewski and Lefranc quickly realised that public
support was insufficient,66 the episode nevertheless represents a key moment in
63 De Gaulle, Discours et messages, vol. 2, pp. 617-8
64 C.R. Ageron has demonstrated that public opinion did not see the war in Indochina as a particularly
high priority and that a majority supported negotiation or withdrawal even before Dien Bien Phu. See
C.R. Ageron, 'L'Opinion publique face aux problemes de 1'Union franfaise', in Institut d'Histoire du
Temps Present, Les chemins de la decolonisation de I'empirefrangais 1936-1956 (Paris: CNRS,
1986), pp. 33-48; C.R. Ageron & C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Histoire de la France coloniale, vol. 3: Le
declin (Paris: Armand Colin, 1991), pp. 237-44.
65 C. Nick, Resurrection: Naissance de la IVe Republique, un coup d'etat democratique (Paris:
Fayard, 1998), pp. 9-38
66 The reasons for the failure of the demonstration ofMay 1954 are chiefly a lack of public interest in
Indochina and insufficient commitment on the part of activists and military supporters. Juin, for
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Fourth Republic Gaullism, as the first time that a seizure of power based on colonial
problems rather than domestic disturbances such as strikes, or international factors
such as the danger ofwar, was seriously contemplated. Despite the failure of this
demonstration, Soustelle remained convinced that the regime's final crisis was
approaching, making allusion to similar cataclysmic events in France's past:
Nous sommes amenes a nous dire que lorsqu'un regime a connu sa guerre
du Mexique, il n'est peut-etre pas loin de Sedan, et nous en sommes a nous
demander combien de temps il nous reste avant le Sedan que semblent
preparer les evenements d'Extreme-Orient.67
The second important lesson ofMay 1954 concerned the potential for co-operation
between the Gaullists and the military. The existing links between Gaullists and
anciens combattants were reinforced by the involvement of both groups in the
preparation of the demonstration ofMay 1954. In parliament, the Gaullist deputy
Edmond Michelet took up the cause of the disillusioned Indochina veterans,
challenging Koenig, as Minister of Defence, over the government's delay in
according them official war veterans' status. Koenig's response to this criticism
was markedly quicker and more compliant than most ministries' response to
criticism in parliament.69 In a significant development of his defence of anciens
d'Indochine, Michelet went on to warn of the consequences of disillusionment
example, was approached by representatives of the anciens d'Indochine to act as a figurehead of the
revolt that would bring de Gaulle to power, but considered the risks too great and the enterprise too
likely to fail. See Nick, Resurrection, pp. 21-6; J.R. Tournoux, L'Histoire secrete: La Cagoule; Le
Front Populaire; Vichy; Londres; Deuxieme Bureau; L 'Algerie franqaise; OAS (Paris: Plon, 1962),
pp. 252-6. It might also be noted that, whereas the RPF had always attracted some popular support
among those, somewhat disenfranchised in the immediate post-war period, who would normally be
considered as on the extreme right, by 1953-4 the far right was better organised and had reclaimed
some of the Gaullists' militant nationalist support, particularly among young people. The number of
true 'Gaullists', by 1954, prepared to overthrow the Republic in the name of national redressement
may, therefore, have been considerably lower than activists imagined. See O. Dard, 'Jalons pour une
histoire des etudiants nationalistes sous la IVe Republique', Historiens et Geographes, 358 (1997),
pp. 249-62.
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among veterans: 'Vous savez, par experience historique, jusqu'oit peut mener le
mecontentement legitime de ceux qu'on a appeles dans le passe les 'demi-
solde'.. ,'.70 In North Africa too, Gaullists attempted to maintain relations with both
veterans' groups and metropolitan Gaullism. In Morocco, the Federation Nationale
des Anciens Combattants - a key participant in the protests in Paris - displayed its
interest in continuing to support Gaullism by threatening to break links with the RPF
unless the Gaullists disowned a former leader now active in the counter-terrorist
group Presence Frangaise,71 This apparent departure from Moroccan veterans'
attacks on the Gaullists for being too liberal and too conciliatory towards the regime
might be seen as an indication that the new vigour associated with Gaullism after
Dien Bien Phu was proving popular in certain potentially useful circles. Veterans'
support for Gaullism, however, could be said to have more to do with opposition to
the regime than shared opinions; the Lettre a FUnion Frangaise noted with concern
that the veterans of the Italian campaign of 1943-4 were now distributing tracts
condemning the government's liberal policy in Morocco, even though the Gaullists
had expressed support for such a policy.72
That the events ofMay 1954 did not lead to a more sustained Gaullist assault on the
regime might be explained by the Gaullists' willingness to entertain hopes of
Mendes-France himselfbringing about the desired change. In this respect, the
disappointment felt, in February 1955, once Mendes-France suffered the same fate as
other Fourth Republic Prime Ministers contributed to the Gaullists' conviction that
nothing but a colonial crisis would be capable of providing the decisive moment of
salutpublic or redressement. Mendes-France's success in addressing the key issues
preoccupying the Gaullists - Indochina, the EDC, Morocco and Tunisia, the usual
government immobilisme - meant that in the summer of 1954 Michel Debre felt the
70
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chances of de Gaulle's return were now smaller. De Gaulle himself appears to have
entertained little hope of a return at this time, concentrating on writing his war
memoirs.74 According to Louis Terrenoire, Gaullist hopes of a decisive change in the
immediate future were so slight that de Gaulle envisaged a joint Gaullist-Mendes-
nc
France government after the 1956 elections. Gaullist optimism that Mendes-France
would permit recovery allowed de Gaulle to write, in October 1954, that: 'II me
semble, cependant, qu'un souffle de redressement, quoique extremement timide et
leger, commence a rider parfois l'eau dormante qu'est notre pays'. During the
Mendes-France government, therefore, the Gaullists attempted a period of
participation in government, admired the government's dynamism and willingness to
address the problems ofNorth Africa, and saw hope that the errors of Indochina
would not be repeated. However, once the governments that succeeded Mendes-
France encountered problems in Morocco and Tunisia, and the war in Algeria posed
questions that demonstrated the weakness of the regime, the Gaullists were able to
apply both their conclusions on colonial affairs learnt from Indochina, and their
views on the link between colonial crisis and change of regime.
7>
Debre, Trois Republiques pour une France, vol. 2, p. 264
74 The Memoires de Guerre were, of course, a means of keeping hopes of an eventual Gaullist triumph
alive.
75 L. Terrenoire, De Gaulle 1947-1954, p. 303
76 De Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, vol. 1: 1951-58 (Paris: Plon, 1984-85), 12.10.1954: De Gaulle
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CHAPTER 6
TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE FOR MOROCCO AND TUNISIA:
AUGUST 1954 - FEBRUARY 1956
Less than two years after Fouchet and Mendes-France's announcement of autonomic
interne, Morocco and Tunisia gained full independence, in March 1956. This period
also saw the beginning ofwar in Algeria, which made the situation in the
protectorates appear more urgent, international involvement in the crisis in French
North Africa, and discord within Gaullism as the Gaullists struggled to keep pace
with developments in the region. This chapter will look first at Gaullist reactions to
the rapid evolution ofMorocco and Tunisia towards independence, with particular
emphasis on the dynastic question in Morocco. In this respect, the views ofGaullists
in official positions, in parliament, and in settler and military organisations will be
examined in an attempt to identify whether it is possible to speak of a coherent
Gaullist response to the problems in the Protectorates. Secondly, the Gaullists'
growing interest in the international context of the Moroccan and Tunisian problems
will be traced, demonstrating that from 1955, both the internationalisation of the
nationalist campaigns and the relationship between French North Africa and the
international community came to occupy a prominent place in Gaullist thoughts. By
1956, the Gaullists had realised that France's international prestige was now at stake,
and that any solution to the problems in North Africa would have to be developed
with one eye on the international consequences of and reaction to French attempts to
restore order or initiate reform. Although this chapter will deal with both Morocco
and Tunisia, the situation in Morocco will be examined in greater detail, as this was
the area in which Gaullists were more closely involved, and which revealed more
clearly the emerging splits in the Gaullist movements.
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The Fouchet period: Gauilism in government?
As was suggested in the previous chapter, the Gaullists were far from united in their
responses to the Mendes-France experiment in North Africa, though the sense of
urgency created by Dien Bien Phu, and their admiration for Mendes-France,
frequently led to an attitude of indulgence towards the government. By February
1955, however, once the Mendes-France government had fallen, France no longer
appeared in control of the process of change in the protectorates, the nationalists had
not all been appeased and calmed as had been hoped, and many Gaullists became
more critical of the liberal policies being pursued in North Africa. Dissent with
Mendes-France and Fouchet's policy towards the protectorates had begun as early as
August 1954, as terrorist violence in Morocco and Tunisia, and continued demands
on the part of the Istiqlal and Neo-Destour independence parties demonstrated that
the promise of internal autonomy alone had not appeased the nationalists. On August
26 and 27, 1954, the problems in the protectorates were the subject of a prolonged
and very detailed debate in the National Assembly, with Mendes-France and Fouchet
called to account for the government's new liberalism in North Africa. The
contributions of Gaullists to this debate provide one of the clearest examples in the
whole of Fourth Republic Gauilism of both the range of different aspects of the
Gaullist worldview that were challenged by events in North Africa, and the
divergence of views between individual Gaullists.
The debate on Tunisia and Morocco is all the more interesting for the study of
Gauilism in that it presented, for the first time, the spectacle of a Gaullist minister
facing criticism of his policies from within his own party. Much of this criticism
focused on the question of whether Morocco and Tunisia could be considered ready
for the steps towards nationhood that Fouchet and Mendes-France had proposed.
This raised familiar themes of French colonial discourse such as the alleged Arab-
Berber divide, the role of the sovereign in each of the protectorates, and the political
'maturity' of the Moroccan and Tunisian people. The principal issue of contention
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for the Gaullists was, in the case of Tunisia, the proposed Franco-Tunisian
conventions that laid the basis of Tunisian self-government and, for Morocco, the
problem posed by the dynastic question. Both of these issues will be the subject of
closer examination in this chapter.
For Fouchet, the chief benefit of the government's policy was that it had finally
acknowledged and responded to the peoples' aspirations to some form of self-
government. 1 Many other Gaullists, whose chief concern was that the government
had not fully considered the consequences of its policies, did not share this view.
General de Monsabert accused Fouchet of forgetting his own earlier assessment of
• • r 2
the danger that the Tunisian Neo-Destour posed. In 1952 Fouchet had compared the
Tunisian nationalist movement to the totalitarian regimes of 1930s and 40s Europe,
as seen in chapter 3, and de Monsabert insisted that little had changed in this respect
by 1954:
Si nous n'y prenons garde, si notre prestige ne reste pas assure, si nos
precautions de presence ont quelques lacunes, si nous ne gardons pas
etroitement le maintien de l'ordre, le Destour, parti totalitaire a la mode
fasciste et hitlerienne - je cite toujours notre ministre des affaires marocaines
et tunisiennes - fera, soyez-en surs, les elections sous la menace des
mitraillettes et etablira sa dictature.
De Monsabert's comments demonstrated that the Gaullists would not spare the
government criticism on the grounds of Fouchet's participation in it, and that
Fouchet was considered to have compromised his earlier opposition to dealings with
the Neo-Destour. While Gaullist thinking on the need for reform and dialogue in
North Africa had certainly undergone some evolution, as has been seen, it is clear
from the warm support that de Monsabert's remarks found among the RS group in
parliament that the pace of change in Fouchet's own views was too fast for many
1
Fouchet, AN, 10.8.1954, JORF
2 Fouchet had, like other Gaullists, strongly condemned the Neo-Destour and rejected any possibility
that a French government might negotiate with it at the RPF Assises in 1952.
3 de Monsabert, AN, 26.8.1947, JORF
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Gaullists, regardless of his expertise in the Tunisian question. Gaullist thinking on
the protectorates, at this stage, remained concerned with general principles rather
than the elaboration of a detailed plan of action for managing reform.
When the Gaullists did attempt to address the problems in Morocco and Tunisia in
some detail, they had difficulty in moving beyond the received ideas and
misconceptions that had characterised much of French rule. Lyautey's ideal of
protectorate was still revered as an example to follow: 'Le marechal Lyautey est
encore une des chances de la France au Maroc'.4 That the Gaullists, in 1954, still
drew inspiration from the policies of 1912-25 revealed much about their assessment
of the situation in Morocco. Racial interpretations of the problems in Morocco,
which also dated to the time of the French conquest, were frequently evoked by
Gaullists in an attempt to claim that the protectorate had not yet sufficiently matured
to a stage where independence could be envisaged. Several contributors to
parliamentary debate attempted to explain the unrest in Morocco as simply another
manifestation of the conflict between the rural Berbers and the town-dwelling Arabs.
General de Monsabert spoke of the situation as no more than Teternel drame des
deux Marocs, celui du bled et celui des villes, [qui] s'est reveille des que sont
apparus les signes de notre faiblesse',5 in an attempt to demonstrate that the
nationalists actually posed a threat to the integrity ofMorocco by wishing to separate
the two communities and that they were in fact only interested in creating an Arab
state. Once the nationalists had been identified as Arabs acting against the wishes of
the loyal Berbers, according to this argument, they could then be denounced as
sectarian and racist.6 The conservative Gaullists, therefore, quickly reacted to the
continuation of nationalist activity following the announcement of the government's
reforms by denouncing nationalists as racist or dictatorial, thereby interpreting the
Moroccan and Tunisian problems as part of a wider assault on French and Western
4
Debre, CR, 14.12.1954,JORF
5 de Monsabert, AN, 26.8.1954, JORF
6 Godin, AN, 2.2.1955, JORF
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values. The effects of such a position can be seen in elements ofGaullist behaviour
until 1958, in particular with reference to the question of torture in Algeria.
The Gaullists' responses to the Moroccan and Tunisian problems during the Mendes-
France and Fouchet era and beyond were not, however, entirely negative. In August
1954, one RS deputy, Pierre Clostermann, used his group's entire allotted time for
participation in parliamentary debate on North Africa to express opinions that were
contrary to those held by most Gaullists. That this was possible reveals much about
the state of RS party discipline and unity. Though criticised by his own colleagues,
Clostermann's views may be seen as representative of an alternative strain of
Gaullism, in that he, unlike most other parliamentarians, was speaking from a
position of considerable first-hand experience ofMorocco.7 Clostermann refuted the
racialist arguments advanced by his colleagues, insisting that the Arab-Berber or
town-country divide in Morocco had never been as wide as French opinion had
constantly depicted it since 1912:
On cherche a recreer artificiellement l'antagonisme de la ville et de la
montagne. C'est la un de ces mythes qui finissent par se creer on ne sait
comment, mais qui deviennent verites absolues d'evangile a force d'etre
repetes, sans que les faits qui les ont fait naitre aient jamais ete controles. On
parle du probleme berbere, du probleme des villes. Oublie-t-on que
Casablanca est la plus importante des villes berberes? Dans cette ville, sur
huit cent mille Marocains, quatre cent mille a cinq cent mille sont berberes...
n'oublions pas que la raison meme du protectorat, c'etait cette lutte entre la
ville et la montagne. C'est a l'origine du traite de Fez. Le soin a ete confie a
la France de remettre de l'ordre au Maroc. Apres y avoir reussi, grace a
Lyautey, aujourd'hui on va tenter de recreer artificiellement une scission
entre les Berberes, gens des montagnes, et les gens des villes.
Clostermann's liberal position incorporated many of the key points of 'pure' Gaullist
doctrine: France's mission to bring unity and harmony to the colonies; admiration for
the achievements of Lyautey; rejection of those, whether political parties or colonial
7 Clostermann had been sent to Morocco by the government in 1953 to report on the state of opinion
in the protectorate and the dynastic question.
8 P. Clostermann, AN, 26.8.1954, JORF
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administrators, seeking to create division rather than unity. Yet Clostermann was so
untypical of the RS deputies that he was obliged to begin his speech by stating that
his views were not those ofmost of his group, to the grateful acknowledgement of
other RS members present.9 The crisis in Morocco and Tunisia split the Gaullists in a
number ofways. While a show of unity remained possible on certain issues -
notably, the international aspects of the North African question - the debates in
parliament and the press between Gaullists frequently revealed a divide between
those, like Fouchet, exercising official functions and others, like Dronne, claiming to
represent a 'purer' form ofGaullism. This division was perhaps accentuated, in the
case ofMorocco and Tunisia, by the relatively low profile kept by the movement's
acknowledged leaders. Debre, Soustelle, Chaban-Delmas and de Gaulle himself took
little part in the Gaullists' debate on the protectorates. Debre and Soustelle were at
the time preoccupied with European affairs and Algeria respectively. As a result, the
Gaullists did not have the possibility of falling into line behind one of the
movement's acknowledged intellectual leaders, as they had done over EDC, for
example. The divisions that thus surfaced continued throughout the early stages of
the Algerian war, once the crisis in the protectorates had illustrated the diversity of
colonial opinion within Gaullism.
Examples of the emerging split between Gaullists in government and ordinary
members can be found throughout 1954-55. As early as August 1954, Raymond
Dronne proposed an amendment to a parliamentary motion supporting Fouchet's
Morocco and Tunisia policy. Dronne's amendment, voicing the concerns of those
Gaullists not totally supportive of Fouchet, was based on three points: concern that
the work of constructing a true Union frangaise must not be forgotten; the need to
create a true Franco-Muslim community rather than treating the French population in
9 Notable for their criticism of Clostermann were the RS deputies Joseph Halleguen - who expressed
relief that Clostermann's views were not those of all Gaullists - and Pierre de Benouville, who
accused Clostermann of being mistaken and 'putting France on trial'. Halleguen, AN, 26.8.1954,
JORF
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the protectorates as a foreign community; and the government's policy of negotiating
with nationalists rather than directly addressing the supposedly pro-French
populations.10 All of these points reflect orthodox Gaullist colonial thinking, showing
very little change from the general principles enshrined in the limited reforms of the
post-war period. If Fouchet represented a strain ofGaullism that was evolving in
response to events in the colonies, Dronne marked himself out as the voice of those
who continued to believe that de Gaulle's reforms and the concept of the Union
frangaise would be sufficient to end the unrest in North Africa. Voting on the
government's policy effectively split Gaullists into conservative and liberal groups:
prominent among those supporting the government were Chaban-Delmas, Catroux,
Clostermann and Soustelle, while Dronne, de Benouville and Billotte opposed
Fouchet's policy.11
In 1954-5, the divergence of views among Gaullists over the internal autonomy
proposals for the protectorates was further complicated by the dynastic question in
Morocco. The chief obstacle to resolution of the crisis in Morocco was the question
of the Sultan. Since Mohammed V had been deposed by the French authorities in
1953, supposedly in response to pressure from the Pacha ofMarrakech, El Glaoui,
his successor, ben Arafa, had failed to win the allegiance of the Moroccan people.
Although not mentioned as a priority in Mendes-France and Fouchet's declarations
of July 1954, the dynastic problem quickly came to dominate and obstruct any
attempts at dialogue between the French authorities and the nationalists. By 1955, it
had become clear that ben Arafa would also have to be replaced, in order to re-open
dialogue with the moderate nationalists and prevent further polarisation. This raised
the question ofwhether France should simply restore Mohammed V, now exiled to
Madagascar, or devise an alternative solution to the problem of ensuring a reasonably
compliant and co-operative figurehead for the Moroccan people. Gaullists played a
10
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significant role in the debate over the Sultan, chiefly through Gilbert Grandval's brief
spell as Resident-General, Georges Catroux's appointment as government
representative in negotiations with the former Sultan, and Pierre July's role as
• •19
Minister for Tunisian and Moroccan affairs during 1955.
The first Gaullist to have to deal with the consequences ofMohammed V's exile was
Christian Fouchet, in 1954. Since the Sultan's removal in 1953 - which had not been
unreservedly welcomed by Gaullists - most Gaullists had nonetheless opposed his
return, fearing that it would give excessive encouragement to the nationalists
following the internal autonomy plan. Indeed, only Pierre Clostermann had actually
shown support publicly for Mohammed V, having intervened unsuccessfully to
IT
prevent his removal in 1953. Fouchet, however, soon realised that the existence of
a Sultan-in-exile was one of the major obstacles to the Moroccan nationalists'
acceptance of French good intentions and negotiations. As early as July 1954, he had
reached the conclusion that the most effective way ofmaking progress in Morocco
would be to end the ex-Sultan's exile, on condition that he renounce political
activity; his transfer from Madagascar to France was seriously envisaged.14 In
response, however, the Resident-General, Fran?ois Lacoste, displayed the same
attitudes that had led to Mohammed V's exile, ordering that all campaigning against
Ben Arafa be stopped.15 Fouchet thus entered into conflict, from the early stages of
his ministry, with the coalition of colonial administrators, settlers and tribal chiefs
12
July, although a member of the ARS group in the AN and therefore technically a Gaullist, was not
involved in any of the non-parliamentary Gaullist movements or activities, and appears to have had no
particular contact with de Gaulle or any of the Gaullist notables outside his parliamentary activities.
He therefore represents the so-called Gaullistes de combinaison, participating in parliamentary life as
a member of a Gaullist party but, unusually, otherwise displaying little interest in the idea ofGaullism
as a force greater than and existing independently of normal political activity.
13 S. Bernard, Le Con/lit franco-marocain 1943-1956 (3 vols.) (Brussels: Editions de l'lnstitut de
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14 Documents Diplomatiques Franqais (Paris: Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Commission de
publication des documents diplomatiques/ Imprimerie Nationale, 1959-) (henceforth DDF), Note du
Ministere des Affaires Marocaines et Tunisiennes, 22.7.1954
15
DDF, Lacoste to Fouchet, 29.7.1954
130
that had generally enjoyed close links with and the support of the Gaullists both in
Morocco and metropolitan France.
The prevailing view among the administration in Morocco remained that Morocco
was not united - due to the supposed racial division - and that the support of the
tribal chiefs in the South was so important to France that the return of Mohammed V
could not be envisaged without the loss of French authority. The southern chiefs'
fear of vengeance if the Sultan whose deposal they had orchestrated were to return
was viewed with some trepidation. As Lacoste explained to Fouchet:
Ces chefs traditionnels, dont il nous est impossible de sous-estimer le pouvoir,
car c 'est leur force, et non la notre, qui tient le bled, sont en effet obsedes par
la crainte d'etre 'abandonnes' ou encore de se laisser depasser par une
evolution politique...16
Lacoste's opposition to reform in the name of the defence of his loyal Moroccan
collaborators might be seen as a significant prelude to the debate over the treatment
of loyal Algerians in the early Fifth Republic; Fouchet's response was as
unsympathetic to the chiefs' predicament as de Gaulle's was to be of the harkis. Like
de Gaulle, Fouchet won few friends among Gaullist supporters for his insistence on
pursuing the dynastic issue in the face of opposition. Fouchet's determination to
adopt a liberal policy in the face of the administration's conservatism persisted
throughout the summer of 1954, inspired to some extent by his awareness of the need
to offer some hope of progress on the dynastic question in order to avoid the danger
of the anniversary ofMohammed V's deposal, on August 20, becoming a symbolic
date in the nationalist cause.
The Moroccan administration and the settlers saw things differently. Lacoste
reported that Fouchet's policy of reform in Tunisia risked having negative
16
DDF, Lacoste to Fouchet, 8.8.1954
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consequences in Morocco by creating unrealistically high expectations among the
nationalists, who were all too aware that no French government could survive the
removal of Ben Arafa and Mohammed V's return to the throne. Fouchet displayed
increasing frustration with such attitudes.17 His reform plan of September 20, 1954,
agreed with Mendes-France and involving social and economic reform, widening of
access to public office, conditional release of nationalist prisoners, establishment of
joint Franco-Moroccan government departments, and the creation of a council,
18
including nationalists, to study any kind of reform except the dynastic question,
was received relatively quietly by the Gaullists and by metropolitan politicians in
general. In Morocco, too, it failed to excite nationalists, although Lacoste and the
settlers protested nevertheless. The muted reactions, however, demonstrated that both
sides had realised that the kind of progress being made in Tunisia could not be seen
in Morocco until the problem of the Sultan had been resolved. Once the Istiqlal
refused to enter into negotiations without the dynastic question also being
considered, the idea of a Council of the Throne, first mooted under General
Guillaume's Residency (Sep. 1953 - May 1954) resurfaced as a means of breaking
the constitutional deadlock. Under this scheme, representatives of both Sultans
would rule, along with a third, independent, member, thus allowing Mohammed V to
return from exile without humiliating the tribal chiefs, encouraging the nationalists
and antagonising the settlers. However, the question ofMohammed V's abdication -
always demanded by the French as a condition of his return from exile - continued to
prevent a solution throughout 1954. Fouchet's role in the dynastic debate does not
appear to have been determinedly that of a Gaullist in government, attempting only
to ensure the implementation of the most conservative measure possible. Indeed, as
his frequent exchanges with Lacoste show, Fouchet clearly had little sympathy with
the conservative settler and administration viewpoints. Although the dynastic
problem had not been solved by the time Mendes-France's government fell in
17
DDF, Lacoste to Fouchet, 11.11.1954. Fouchet's annotation to this document - 'Ceci est du roman' -
illustrates the differences between his view of events and the Resident-General's.
18 For details of this plan, see Bernard, vol. 1, pp. 241-2
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February 1955, Fouchet did not show any signs of supporting Gaullist attacks on
Mohammed V. When, in August 1954, the Gaullist deputy Pierre de Benouville
launched an attack on Mohammed V for his alleged collaboration with Germany
during the Second World War, Fouchet strongly rejected this assertion and rebuked
his colleague for having considered it appropriate to the debate.19
Tunisia presented Fouchet with considerably fewer problems than Morocco, and
inspired less division and argument among Gaullists. The process of disengagement
from Tunisia was far less troublesome than in Morocco, chiefly because the situation
was not complicated by confusion over which potential negotiating partners
accurately represented the Tunisians. With nationalist leader Bourguiba still
imprisoned in France at the time of Fouchet and Mendes-France's new course in July
1954, negotiations proceeded between the French authorities and the ministers of the
Tunisian government formed in 1950, along with Ben Youssef, leader of the Neo-
Destour in Bourguiba's absence. Fouchet's first priority was to put an end to the
nationalist violence, in order that the principle of not negotiating with a movement
considered as terrorist by many in France could be upheld. Fouchet's expectations of
what France could hope to achieve in negotiations were lower in Tunisia than
Morocco. Soon after taking up his ministerial post, he observed that France was
somewhat restricted by its treaty obligation to support the Tunisian sovereign, as
Moncef Bey, who had come to power in 1942, was sympathetic to nationalism. In a
marked contrast to the attitude ofmost Gaullists concerning a very similar situation
in Morocco, however, Fouchet concluded that there could be no question of altering
this arrangement in any way.20 Rather than removing or undermining a local leader
who seemed hostile to France, therefore, Fouchet concentrated on ensuring that
France retained as much influence as possible on the evolution of the Protectorate,
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the Tunisian government was always that of finance.21 Displaying characteristic
Gaullist concern for the economic interests of the French settlers, Fouchet attempted
to ensure that the French population would have some degree of representation in
this field. He sought, however, to avoid this statement of concern for French
investments being interpreted as a more general defence of the settlers' rights against
those of the Tunisians. When Bourguiba complained, for example, that the settlers
had been politicised excessively by extremists, Fouchet reassured him that his
ministry's interest did not extend beyond economic matters to unconditional support
99
for all settler activities.
The problem of settler extremism was generally acknowledged as the first obstacle to
achieving a negotiated settlement in Tunisia, with the nationalist fellaghas refusing
to disarm without some guarantee of an end to settler counter-terrorism. Despite the
support the Gaullists had enjoyed among the Tunisian settlers - through Gabriel
90
Puaux, for example, as seen in chapter 3 (pp. 71-4) — Fouchet sought to avoid any
displays of favouritism towards the settlers. In this aim, he encountered the resistance
of the Resident-General, Boyer de Latour. Fouchet, however, in contrast to the later
collusion of Koenig, Boyer and the settlers in Morocco, appeared uninterested in
further cementing the evolving Gaullist-military-settler links in North Africa. Boyer
received unequivocal instructions that his role was to promote detente in Tunisia, and
to oversee an amnesty, in November and December 1954, during which nationalist
terrorists could surrender their arms with impunity. In Tunisian political affairs, too,
Fouchet kept his distance from settler politics, drafting his own policy documents,
for example, rather than simply relying on the proposals prepared for him by the




23 The state of Puaux's thinking on nationalism in Tunisia by 1955 is revealed by his description of
Bourguiba's influential book, La Tunisie et la France, as the nationalist leader's Me in Kampf. D. Ling,
Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), p. 173.
Similar views had been expressed by the Resident-General in Tunisia, General Boyer de Latour, in
August 1954, demonstrating the closeness of some Gaullist and military views.
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the administration's preferred option of the 'integration' of the French into any new
Tunisian institutions; Fouchet instead proposed a 'tunisification' of the existing
French administrative structures.24 Fouchet was certainly aware, throughout his
period of reform in Tunisia, of the need to avoid giving excessive cause for concern
to his more conservative Gaullist colleagues or to the settlers - Mendes-France
complained that the pace of change was too slow in the second half of 1954 - but he
did succeed in bringing about calm in Tunisia and opening negotiations with the
nationalists on the basis that France's essential interests in Tunisia would not be
entirely neglected.2? That the conservative Gaullists were not more hostile to Fouchet
surely owes much to this careful approach, as well as the fact that Fouchet's progress
in Tunisia meant that a Gaullist was associated with a successful and popular
government policy.
Once Fouchet had secured peace in Tunisia and established a common base for
negotiation with the nationalists, the settler community and conservatives in France
did begin to express their displeasure at the extent of concessions that France was
prepared to make. Boyer de Latour warned that France was in danger of legitimising,
through the government's determination to negotiate, a terrorist movement that was
increasingly international in character. In view of the resources and support being
made available to the nationalists, the risk of changing the remainingfellaghas from
a terrorist organisation to a legitimate liberation army through acknowledging their
right to engage in talks was a very real one, in the view of the Tunisian
administration.26 This argument was taken up in subsequent years by many Gaullists
in relation to the activities of guerrillas in Algeria, in another example of the transfer
of ideas from the military to Gaullists in North African affairs. Indeed, while the
24 J. Valette, La France et I'Afrique: L 'Afriquefrangaise du nord, 1914-1962 (Paris: SEDES, 1993),
pp. 179-80
25
By November 1954, Fouchet appears to have come to the conclusion that France's truly essential
interests in Tunisia - to be included in any treaty as a point of principle - were defence and security.
DDF, Fouchet to Boyer, 20.11.1954
26
DDF, Boyer to Fouchet, 14.9.1954
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final stages of Fouchet's spell in charge of Tunisian affairs, once the amnesty was in
place, were relatively calm, the criticisms that continued to emanate from Tunis read
like a prelude to the tone ofGaullist and military attacks on government North
African policy for the period between 1954 and the end of the Fourth Republic. Signs
that the government would be willing to deal with Bourguiba drew the rapid response
that the nationalist leader had renounced his aim of a French-style secular state and
was turning towards the East, representing both anti-Western Islam and
communism.27
The Faure Government: Gaullist Opposition and Division
Gaullist discontent with events in Tunisia increased after Fouchet's departure from
office with the fall of the Mendes-France government in February 1955. The cause of
their unhappiness, the signature of the Franco-Tunisian conventions that laid the
basis for the establishment of a Tunisian state, would surely, however, have led to
protests even ifFouchet had still been the minister responsible. Debre, hitherto rather
reticent on North African affairs, led the Gaullist attack on these agreements, by
which France recognised and proclaimed Tunisian self-government in all matters
98
except those specified in the conventions. As soon as the details of the proposed
conventions were known, in January 1955, Debre protested that the independent
Tunisian state that would be created would lead to misery, anarchy and dictatorship,
all of which France had a duty to prevent. There could, he argued, be no benefit to
the cause of freedom or the interests of the West arising from Tunisian
independence. France, therefore, had a duty, in the name of the West and of French
21
DDF, Boyerto Fouchet, 17.11.1954
28 These were: protection of the personal status of French nationals in Tunisia, including the provision
for dual nationality; technical co-operation between the French and Tunisian governments; the
retention of French schools alongside the Tunisian government's education system; measures to
promote Franco-Tunisian trade, keep Tunisia within the franc zone and safeguard French private
investments. France also retained influence in defence and security affairs. The conventions were
signed on June 3, 1955, and were accompanied by Bourguiba's return to Tunisia from exile in France.
Ling, pp. 174-176; S. El Machat, Tunisie: les chemins vers I'independance (1945-1956) (Paris:
L'Harmattan, 1992), pp. 225-8
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civilisation, to prevent independence at all costs. Tunisia's secession, Debre
argued, would ruin France's position in Morocco, Algeria and the sub-Saharan
colonies. He saw the best hope of avoiding this disastrous outcome in ensuring that
Tunisia be brought into the Union franqaise; thus, the Gaullists' fears about Mendes-
France's apparent lack of interest in this constitutional framework at the time of his
Carthage speech in July 1954 continued to govern their response to government
policy in Tunisia. Somewhat paradoxically, however, Debre also argued that to allow
a full French-style democracy in Tunisia was not necessarily the solution to the
problem: the danger of false elections was a serious one, and France ought to explain
to the Tunisian nationalists that an alternative form of government to an attempt to
replicate western systems might be better suited to their needs. Debre, unfortunately,
stopped short of outlining such an alternative in detail; one may assume that
Tunisia's limited representation and partial autonomy within the Union franqaise
was considered to be the limit of any moves towards sovereignty.
Like the Franco-Tunisian conventions, the resolution of the dynastic problem in
Morocco, and the resulting opening of meaningful negotiations, did not finally occur
until after Fouchet had left office. Gaullists played a prominent part in this prelude to
Moroccan independence, under new Prime Minister Edgar Faure's government,
although Gaullist unity was once again a casualty of the association ofRS members
with a progressive colonial policy. In keeping with the absence of recognised
Gaullist leaders from the debate on Morocco and Tunisia — Soustelle was now
Governor General in Algeria, and the Algerian problem was becoming increasingly
acute - another relatively little-known Gaullist, Gilbert Grandval, was appointed
Resident-General in Morocco in June 1955. Grandval was known as a liberal
Gaullist, and had never been part of the Gaullist hierarchy. Prior to his appointment
to Morocco, he had been the French government's High Commissioner in the Saar, a
29
Debre, 'Les Conventions Franco-Tunisiennes et l'Union Fran9aise' in Les Idees... Les Faits, 8 (Jan.
1955)
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region in which Michel Debre had shown considerable interest early in the Fourth
Republic. Although it was generally assumed in Paris that Grandval was a strong
TO
character likely to satisfy conservatives, his appointment was not greeted with any
great enthusiasm by the Gaullists, suggesting that they were, by June 1955, more
concerned with the nature of the policies being pursued in Morocco than with the
••31
symbolic importance of the nomination of a Gaullist to an important position.
Opposition to Grandval in Morocco was led by the settler population, many of whom
maintained contacts with the metropolitan Gaullist movement despite their
continuing attachment to the old RPF organisation rather than the RS' more
parliamentary and conventional approach. Grandval, however, had been appointed to
replace Lacoste principally because the latter had failed to control the growth of
counter-terrorism among the settlers. This had reached a high point in June 1955
with the murder of the prominent liberal businessman Jacques Lemaigre-Dubreuil, an
incident that shocked French opinion and made Faure determined to seek a rapid
solution to the dynastic problem through the nomination of a Resident-General likely
to win the support of the Moroccans.32 The Gaullists' links with settler counter-
terrorism were already somewhat ambiguous, even before the deputy Raymond
Triboulet openly sided with the settlers against Grandval. One of the Gaullist leaders
in Morocco, Reimbold, had been in correspondence with Paris since 1953 to protest
that the French community was left with no alternative to counter-terrorism in the
face of apparently unpunished nationalist violence.33 Reimbold was eventually
expelled from the RPF in January 1956 by Jacques Foccart, to the anger of some
Moroccan Gaullists and the relief of others, in a clear demonstration of the divisive
30
Bernard, vol. 1, p. 273
31 The Lettre a L 'Union Frangaise, for example, did not claim that Grandval's appointment
represented a success for Gaullism, and instead continued to call for a coherent government policy.
Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 289 (23.6.1955)
32 On the settlers' violence of the summer of 1955, which led to Faure's loss of patience with Lacoste,
see A. Werth, The Strange History ofPierre Mendes-France and the Great Conflict over French
North Africa (London: Barrie, 1957), pp. 211-4
3j RPF archives, Maroc, 51.1/2, correspondence, Reimbold to RPF headquarters, 1954-55
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fallout from the dynastic question.34 Foccart, indeed, was one of the few Paris-based
Gaullists to tackle the question of counter-terrorism at all, writing in February that
elements among the French population in Tunisia 'paraissent perdre leur sang-froid',
and later criticising the excessively violent tone of the Presence Frangaise
movement.35 Any signs of metropolitan Gaullist sympathy with Moroccan liberals
drew a rapid response from the Moroccan Gaullists. In June 1955, for example, the
Moroccan RPF held a special meeting in Casablanca, after which the group wrote to
Olivier Guichard, de Gaulle's chefde cabinet and one of the most influential
members of the Gaullist hierarchy, to protest at favourable treatment of the liberal
Conscience Frangaise movement in the Gaullist press and request permission to
make statements on Moroccan policy without waiting to hear the views of the
metropolitan party.36
Faced with the prospect of losing influence among the European population of
Morocco, Gaullists found more reason to avoid supporting further concessions. In
Tunisia, the senator Antoine Colonna, a close associate of Puaux and a former RPF
activist, invited a group of politicians including the Gaullists Debre and Jean
Legendre to Tunisia in April 1955, with the intention of enlisting them as the
metropolitan and parliamentary spokesmen of his Rassemblement Frangais settlers'
T7 • •
movement, which was associated with counter-terrorism. Around the same time, in
"4 RPF archives, Maroc, 51.6./3, correspondence, Foccart to M. Robert, 4.1.1956
35 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 269 (3.2.1955); 284 (18.5.1955). The Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, alone
among Gaullist publications, was consistent in its criticism of counter-terrorism throughout 1955. This
is all the more significant given its editor Jacques Foccart's role as co-ordinator of Gaullist activities
in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the RPF was frequently and accurately accused of being the mouthpiece
of the most conservative elements of the French population.
36 RPF archives, Maroc, 51.1/3, Richard (Groupe RPF, Casablanca) to Guichard, 19.6.1955. An
indication of the division within Gaullism in Morocco at this point is that Pierre Clostermann was the
victim of a counter-terrorist attack for being a member of the Conscience Frangaise that the Moroccan
RPF were so hostile to. DDF, 1.5.1955, Note du Secretaire General Politique de la Residence
Generale de France a Tunis.
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DDF, 1.5.1955, Note du Secretaire General Politique de la Residence Generale de France a Tunis.
This was a direct reaction to the signature of the Franco-Tunisian protocole d'accord, a prelude to the
Franco-Tunisian conventions. Puaux, also involved in this episode, compared the Conventions to
France's loss of Canada in 1759, an analogy that was to be repeated several times by Gaullists,
especially Debre, during the Algerie frangaise campaign (see pp. 253-4).
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France, Gaullist deputies such as Triboulet took up the settlers' cause, criticising
Grandval for failing to show sufficient sympathy for their problems. In June 1955,
Triboulet emerged as the leader of a tendency within the RS that put defence of
French interests in Morocco before support for the policies of the Gaullist Resident-
General.
Triboulet's public dispute with Grandval, illustrating the extent of the split in
Gaullist ranks, owed much to the fact that he was Minister for Anciens Combattants
in Faure's government. In this capacity, he sought to ensure favourable treatment for
TO
veterans among the settler communities in North Africa, thereby identifying
himself with some of the most conservative elements of the French population - a
high percentage ofNorth African Gaullists were former soldiers - at the same time
TO
as Grandval was earning a reputation as 'Resident-General of the Moroccans' and
suffering fierce attacks from the Europeans on the basis of his resistance background
and Jewish-German origins.40 In July 1955, Triboulet wrote to Grandval, telling him
that 'II est absolument impensable qu'un representant de la France en Afrique du
Nord puisse mener une politique quelconque contre la volonte des Franpais installes
la-bas'.41 Triboulet went on to attack Grandval in the press,42 accusing him of acting
rashly and failing to realise the importance ofmaintaining links between the French
and Muslim communities - links that Triboulet envisaged being kept alive by
veterans' associations, which were surely by this stage seen as the voice of the
conservative settlers. Indeed, September 1955 witnessed the first metropolitan
demonstration against the government's North African policy, organised in the name
of the RPF and intended specifically for anciens combattants. The participants were
38 Triboulet's policy in this area satisfied the demands of the more vocal Gaullist settlers, as
represented by Reimbold, who had been calling for government to give 'loyal' Moroccans and settlers
roles in Moroccan administration, with a prominent place being reserved for war veterans. RPF
archives, Maroc, 51.1/3, February 1954, Groupe RPF de Casablanca, Bulletin marocain de liaison,
No. 8
39 Werth, p. 217
40
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41 R. Triboulet, Un Gaulliste de la IVe (Paris: Plon, 1985), p. 234
42
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mostly Indochina veterans, as in May 1954, and their calls for Faure's resignation
were accompanied by others of 'De Gaulle au pouvoir'. While little was achieved, the
episode showed the place occupied by veterans in Gaullist activism, and can be seen
as a precursor of the Algerie frangaise demonstrations of the later Fourth Republic.44
When the conservative General Boyer de Latour replaced Grandval, Triboulet
reassured the Moroccan veterans' associations that their situation would now
improve. Thus, one Gaullist's metropolitan ministerial activities rapidly came into
conflict with another's attempt to pursue reform in North Africa.
Grandval's actual policies in Morocco gave the metropolitan Gaullists much to
disagree with, particularly concerning the dynastic question. Although he was
determined, upon appointment, to avoid the return of Mohammed V, his first report
from Morocco to the government in Paris stressed the absolute need to achieve some
change in the way in which the protectorate was ruled, suggesting that a return to the
true spirit of protectorate was necessary.44 Grandval thus immediately identified with
the liberal argument of colleagues such as Catroux, looking to Lyautey as his
inspiration. Further parallels with Lyautey can be seen in his determination to
challenge the excesses and privileges of the French population: 'II existe ... a
Casablanca une majorite fran9aise fermement opposee a toute politique evolutive et
n'admettant qu'une politique de force. II faudra, le moment venu, faire en sorte que
cette population ne contrecarre pas la politique gouvernementale'.45 Grandval clearly
saw himself as the representative of liberalism in Morocco, even when many of his
Gaullist colleagues were denouncing the liberal position in parliament; indeed, there
is general agreement that Grandval's ultimate failure to bring about effective reform
in Morocco was due to the number of enemies he made during his short period in
office.46 In this respect, his behaviour displayed, in many ways, the opposite ofwhat
43 D. Tartakowsky, Les manifestations de rue en France 1918-1968 (Paris: Publications de la
Sorbonne, 1997), p. 638
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one might expect of a Gaullist Resident-General; he rebuked the military
Commander in Morocco, General Duval, for having told Defence Minister Koenig
that the nationalists were fanatics who needed to be defeated completely by military
action.47
The notion of tribal and racial divisions that had been evoked by Gaullists in
parliament, and which had allowed El Glaoui to collaborate with the French to
undermine Mohammed V and the nationalists, also fell victim to Grandval's
reforming drive, as he found the Pacha of Marrakech not a useful ally but, instead,
stubborn and an obstacle to progress.48 Grandval rejected the conventional view that
the South of the country was securely held by loyal local chiefs. He criticised the
officials for their complacency in failing to appreciate that the supposedly loyal
Berbers were now also supportive of Mohammed V, taking this as conclusive
evidence that calm would not be restored to Morocco until the government allowed
the deposed Sultan to return. Such a determination to overturn the received ideas that
had lasted throughout the period of protectorate lost Grandval the support ofmost of
the Gaullists, although July remained generally supportive, and Catroux was a
valuable ally to Grandval through his acceptance of the task of negotiating the
Sultan's return. It has also been suggested that Grandval enjoyed the support of de
Gaulle, though de Gaulle's only direct advice to Grandval appears to have been that
the situation in Morocco could only be resolved by Mohammed V's return, which the
present government would not be able to enforce.49 Bernard, indeed, argues that
47
DDF, Duval to Koenig, 22.7.1955; Grandval to July, 24.7.1955
48
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Bernard, vol. 1, pp. 313-4. Further evidence for the supposed close relationship between Grandval
and de Gaulle is hard to find; de Gaulle's published correspondence does not include any prolonged or
detailed exchange with Grandval, while Grandval does not appear to have been in regular contact with
the General during his period in Morocco. De Gaulle's only public statement on Morocco in this
period predates Grandval's appointment by only a week, and might therefore be assumed to have been
influential, though it adds little to his previous statements on North Africa, speaking of federal
association between France, Morocco and Tunisia within the Union franqaise concept as outlined at
Brazzaville. De Gaulle, Discours et Messages, vol. 2: dans I'attente 1946-1958 (Paris: Plon, 1970),
pp. 637-9 (Press Conference, 30.6.1955). Foccart adds that de Gaulle told him in August 1955 that
the return of Mohammed V was inevitable and it would therefore be in France's interest to propose it
rather than witness the inevitable happen in the face of its protests. There is no evidence, however,
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Grandval's close connections to the General mattered more to Edgar Faure than the
fact that he was a member of the supposedly conservative parliamentary RS group.50
His role in government, therefore, would appear not to be merely to appease
conservatives, as had been suggested in relation to Fouchet in the Mendes-Franee
government, but rather to proceed with reform from a position of authority and
determination.
Grandval's chief achievement before his resignation in frustration at the failure of
Paris to share his urgency and defend him when he antagonised virtually all the
settlers, military and administration in Morocco, was to devise a plan for Mohammed
V's return from exile. The government's acceptance of this plan and its implications
caused a further display of division among the Gaullists. Georges Catroux was sent
to Madagascar to secure Mohammed V's acceptance of a Conseil du trone, which
would appoint a Moroccan government, thus avoiding the direct restoration of the
former Sultan and a humiliating defeat for the government. After negotiations,
Catroux eventually proposed a more liberal regime than even that which had been
proposed under successive governments' autonomie interne plans, the final formula
proposing merely a Moroccan government 'uni a la France par des liens permanents
d'une interdependance librement consentie'.51 Catroux had therefore considerably
surpassed the liberalism initially envisaged by both the government and the Gaullists,
although he did display some characteristically Gaullist reservations as to the effect
that this solution would have on the concept of the Union frangaise. With
Mohammed V reluctant to agree to the formula of 'association des etats par des
institutions communes de type federal', because it seemed too close to the Union
frangaise, ofwhich Morocco was not part, Catroux defended the use of such terms in
that de Gaulle or Foccart shared this opinion with any other Gaullists, and de Gaulle certainly never
expressed it publicly. P. Gaillard, Foccart parte: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard (Paris:
Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), pp. 116-17
50
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d'Outre-mer) - reporting on the Catroux-Mohammed V negotiations, 8.9.1955
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the final government declaration, arguing that to present the settlement as part of a
federal structure would avoid French opinion concluding that outright independence
was imminent, and would not in any case discourage the Moroccan nationalists.52 As
was the case with Fouchet's declarations of 1954, the concept of Union franqaise as
defined in 1944-46 remained important for Gaullists, even when implementing
liberal colonial policy.
While Gaullists such as Grandval, July and Catroux were willing to compromise
their purely 'Gaullisf view of colonial reform, to some extent, in the name of finding
a solution to the problems in Morocco, most Republicans Sociaux proved more
dogmatic. As early as July 1955, the parliamentary RS group resolved not to accept
ri
the return ofMohammed V; with five ministers in government, they might well
have expected this to become an issue on which they could force concessions
through the threat of bringing down Faure's administration. Koenig made the most
concerted attempt to water down Grandval's liberal policy, urging him to appoint the
ineffective General Leblanc as his director of Interior Affairs in Morocco.54 Koenig's
Chief of Staffwas Colonel Lecomte, who had previously been involved in the
implementation of legislation designed to create separate status for Berbers and
Arabs; through him, Koenig undermined Grandval's policies in Morocco.55 At the
same time, in Paris, Koenig led the opposition within the government to Grandval's
plan for a solution to the dynastic problem.56 Frustration grew between Grandval and
Koenig, especially when Koenig told Grandval, supposedly on behalf of the
government, that the deadline ofAugust 20 for acceptance of the Resident-General's
52
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53 These were Koenig (Defense nationale), G. Palewski (Ministre delegue a la presidence du conseil),
Bayrou (Secretaire d'Etat au Ministere de la France d'outre-mer), Corniglion-Molinier (Travaux
publics, transport et tourisme), and Triboulet (Anciens Combattants).
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plan could not be met.37 When this deadline did arrive without a solution in place,
serious violence broke out in the town ofOued Zem, with forty-nine Europeans
killed. Although the reasons for this incident remain unclear, it has been suggested,
by Grandval and his officials, that Koenig and Duval had sanctioned some from of
provocation, hoping that an outbreak ofMoroccan violence would undermine
CO
Grandval's liberal policy and allow for a policy of repression in its place.
After Grandval's resignation, Koenig associated more openly with the interests of the
settlers and the military in Morocco, attracting criticism for his excessive concern
with the effect of government decisions on the army's morale.39 He supported
Grandval's successor, the conservative Boyer de Latour, in his attempt to obstruct
government policy, and revived contacts between the military and the militant
settlers' association Presence Frangaise, which had largely been stopped by Fouchet
and Grandval. Indeed, on September 15, Koenig and Boyer de Latour's support
allowed Presence Frangaise to hold a demonstration against the departure from
Morocco of General Roger Miquel.60 In May 1958, Miquel's support, as Commander
of the Toulouse military region, was crucial to the Gaullist and military plans for
operation 'Resurrection' in metropolitan France designed to bring about the return of
de Gaulle. Contacts made during the Moroccan crisis clearly persisted through the
following two years of Gaullist isolation from official positions.
37 There is some uncertainty as to Faure's true intentions with regard to the Sultan's return. After
resigning, Grandval was apparently told by Faure that his policy had always been to restore
Mohammed V to the throne, making Grandval's resignation over this point appear to be a somewhat
futile gesture and the result more of his having lost the support of the administration and military in
Morocco than an expression of profound differences with the government.
58 The fullest account of this episode is in Bernard, vol. 1, p 305. While the allegations against Koenig
remain unproven, it is true that Grandval's resignation was ultimately brought about by a mass
rebellion against him on the part of the military in Morocco, and July was sufficiently concerned to
order Koenig to refrain from any further interference in Moroccan affairs after August 20, 1955.
Furthermore, Koenig's collaborator, Duval, had been in charge of French forces at the Setifmassacre
in Algeria in 1945 and was a well-known advocate of military repression as the solution to the
problems in North Africa. It was no coincidence that August 20 also saw the most violent episode to
date in the Algerian war - the Philippeville massacre of Europeans, which abruptly changed
Soustelle's policy from one of liberalism to repression.
59 P. Vial, 'Un ministre paradoxal...', p. 268
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IfKoenig was the chief voice of opposition to Grandval's liberalism, his point of
view was more popular among influential Gaullists than that of Grandval. Palewski,
appointed to Faure's Comite de Coordination des Affaires Nord-Africaines, sided
with Koenig rather than supporting Grandval. By October 1955, with Catroux and
the government having agreed on the return of the deposed Sultan, the Gaullist
ministers were faced with the prospect of the policies they had opposed throughout
the Faure ministry - largely those of fellow Gaullists Grandval, July and Catroux -
being approved by parliament and implemented. The threat of bringing down the
government by resignation - which had emerged as a cherished Gaullist tactic during
the EDC debate and was central to Capitant's 'Trojan horse' theory of bringing about
Gaullist change from within the 'system' - proved, at this point, to be redundant. The
RS ministers had found themselves isolated on the Right, once fellow right-wing
leaders Pinay and Duchet had reached agreement with Faure on the necessity of
negotiations to bring back Mohammed V. Consequently, RS resignations from
government were no longer feared by the Prime Minister.61 Having publicly
reiterated their opposition to the Sultan's return as late as September 9, while
Catroux was still engaged in negotiations with Mohammed V in Madagascar,62 the
RS, by the time Faure's policy was due to be approved by parliament on October 6,
risked both humiliating defeat and public exposure of Gaullist divisions. The RS
ministers' resignation from government before this National Assembly debate began
was therefore inevitable, and represented the defeat of their attempt to slow the pace
of change in North Africa from within government. The lessons of this experience
61 For details of the intrigues on the Right as Faure sought to build consensus in the summer of 1955,
see Bernard, vol. 1, pp. 298-311
62
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63 There is some doubt as to whether the RS ministers managed to offer their resignations before they
were sacked by Faure. Triboulet presents the incident as one of Gaullist defiance, calling for a
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can be seen in the Gaullists' reluctance, over the following two years, to become as
closely involved with governments' North African policies as they had with Faure
over Morocco.
The resignations did not put an end to Gaullist disunity. Pierre Billotte accepted
Faure's offer to succeed Koenig as Minister of Defence, and later accused his
predecessor of being too concerned with the army's state ofmind to implement
necessary government policy.64 Billotte was subsequently asked to resign from the
ARS parliamentary group, in whose name the RS deputies continued to officially
operate until the January 1956 elections. Though Billotte did not in fact resign, and
instead went to Morocco to be greeted with hostility by the settlers, the split in
parliamentary Gaullist ranks was obvious. This became clearer on October 7, 1955,
when Pierre July was expelled from the ARS group, as punishment for having firstly
ordered the removal of the puppet sultan Ben Arafa, secondly sided with Faure and
Pinay against the Gaullist ministers, and thirdly engaged in negotiations with the
Istiqlal.6i The most liberal of all Gaullists on Moroccan affairs, Clostermann, had
already resigned from the parliamentary group, in August 1955.66
ministers' action was completely in line with de Gaulle's own views; the evidence of de Gaulle's
comments on Morocco appears to contradict this, although the General would certainly have approved
of any Gaullist's resignation from a Fourth Republic government. One RS member of government -
Corniglion-Molinier - did not actually resign. This fact alone highlights divisions among the
Gaullists, demonstrates the government's success in exposing these divisions, and points to the value
to Gaullism of gestures such as resignation by high-profile figures like Palewski and Koenig, with
lesser-known Gaullists somewhat detached from these tactics.
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The International Context
Gaullist divisions on the precise nature of the policies to be applied in Morocco and
Tunisia were tempered by some degree of unity on the international implications of
events in the protectorates. Increasingly, through 1954-6, the situation was seen in
terms of its importance for France's international standing and foreign policy, as
much as a problem to be solved by a close focus on conditions in the protectorates
themselves. The Gaullists were concerned, in 1954, with their familiar themes of
safeguarding French puissance and ensuring that their allies in the Western alliance
supported their actions in North Africa. By the time Moroccan and Tunisian
independence seemed inevitable, however, new themes in international affairs were
beginning to occupy the Gaullists. These were chiefly the emergence of a bloc of
third world and post-colonial nations as a player on the world stage, and the
conviction that the Union franqaise was a vital bastion against the twin anti-Western
forces of communism and Arab unity.
Throughout 1954, the Gaullists saw the reassertion of authority over the process of
change in North Africa as a means of reclaiming some of the prestige that had
seemed to be threatened by defeat in Indochina. To this end, Foccart outlined what
was at stake in seeking peace in Tunisia, in November 1954: 'De la partie qui se joue
en Tunisie depend l'avenir de l'Afrique du Nord, du maintien de la France en
Afrique du Nord depend son avenir comme grande puissance'.67 The situation in
North Africa, however, was not seen as being as serious as that which had faced the
French at Dien Bien Phu earlier in the year; rather, the prospect of securing great
power status was held up as the reward for successful policies in North Africa.
French redressement was certainly seen as possible, provided that the Western allies
display their support for France's efforts. The forum through which such support
could be expressed was now the United Nations.68 The Gaullists' contributions to the
67 Lettre a 1'Union Franqaise, 258 (18.11.1954)
68 The Tunisian and Moroccan questions were frequently debated at the UN between March 1952 and
October 1955.
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parliamentary debate on the protectorates in August 1954, therefore, included a
strong appeal to the government not to tolerate the acquiescence of other Western
nations in complaints brought by the Arab states against France:
L'agitation en Afrique du Nord ... n'est pas spontanee ... Nous craignons
que, derriere toute cette agitiation, l'utilisant quand elle existe, la creant
quand elle n'existe pas, la nourrissant et l'attisant, il y ait surtout cette
conjuration etrangere dont a parle le marechal Juin et qui se manifeste en
Afrique duNord depuis 1945 ... Au Caire, a Tetouan, a Tanger, a
Washington, a l'ONU, nos ennemis trouvent refuge et bon acceuil ... La
question est de savoir si les nations qui se disent nos allies et nos amis vont
continuer, non seulement a nous laisser outrager, mais a laisser ouvertement
preparer l'emeute dans les territoires africains.69
Unfortunately for the Gaullists, the United States in particular showed little evidence
of supporting the French position that the problems in the protectorates were under
control and not, in any case, a matter for international consideration. The United
States, with its important economic and strategic interest in Morocco, had already
made clear its position on the dynastic question, strongly opposing Mohammed V's
removal in 1953. It was to continue in this policy, ignoring French protests, applying
pressure to ensure the Sultan's return in 1955, and clearly expressing its support for
Grandval.70 Gaullist suspicions about the American threat to French overseas
presence, first raised during the Second World War and heightened in Indochina,
therefore seemed to be confirmed by October 1955. As for the UN, it has been
suggested that the lessons of British colonial problems in the late 1940s showed that
it tended to take an interest in colonial problems whenever there was a risk of
...71
violence and instability. The Gaullists' calls for a vigorous military campaign
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before any negotiations, especially in Tunisia, therefore played into the hands of the
international organisation whose comments they deemed unwelcome.
Along with the need for moral and political support from other Western powers, the
Gaullists sought to convince their allies that French influence in North Africa was a
vital strategic asset for the West. General Koenig, in particular, attempted to impress
upon France's NATO partners the importance of North Africa, during his spell as
Minister ofDefence in 1955. Koenig argued that France should be permitted to
withdraw some of its troops assigned to NATO forces in Europe, and re-deploy them
in North Africa, claiming that this would still allow France to fulfil its NATO
commitments as this operation would be carried out in the name ofWestern
security.72 Echoes can be seen, in this argument, of the Gaullists' earlier protests
about NATO's refusal to consider including Morocco and Tunisia in the alliance.
The debate on the Franco-Tunisian conventions was punctuated by protests from
Gaullists that the important naval bases in Tunisia were not sufficiently protected; in
the light of their potential importance for the Algerian War, Dronne was still
criticising the government for this in 1956, pointing out, at the final granting of
Tunisian independence, that the naval base at Bizerte was not guaranteed to remain
in Western control.
The Gaullists' increasing interest in North Africa's importance to the Western World
as a whole was not only a reaction against international communism, as seen in
Indochina, but also against a new Arab and third world political consciousness. By
1954, after the revolution in Egypt and troubles in Iran, the very notion of an Arab
state was seen by many Gaullists as a direct threat to France and to the West. Thus,
by excluding the Berber population ofMorocco from criticism for nationalism and
terrorism, they could combine colonial conservatism and defence of the Western
72




world via the French presence in North Africa. In international affairs, their concern
was for the decline of France's historic role in the Arab world, a role that Foccart
saw as having generally been that of protector. The erosion of France's 'vocation
islamique' was to be lamented, as it would lead to a loss of control over the evolution
of much of the Empire, particularly the Muslim parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.74 If this
was worrying in terms of France's gradual decline, however, there was another much
more immediate threat, for the Gaullists: the conference of independent African and
Asian nations held at Bandung in Indonesia in April 1955, to which delegates from
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria were invited.
Gaullists were, unsurprisingly, divided as to the exact significance of the Bandung
conference. Flowever, they agreed that the formation of a new international bloc
consisting of former colonies, many of which had links to communism, represented a
potential threat. Debre took the most strident view, producing a resounding
condemnation of the conference's aims in May 1955. Emphasising that the
emergence of the non-European nations represented a threat to Western civilisation,
Debre ominously compared French resistance to Bandung to the defeat of the Moors
at Poitiers in the eighth century or the Turks' failure to capture Vienna in 1529. This
anti-Western movement was all the more dangerous for the opportunity it offered the
USSR to undermine the West. Neutralism, the official policy ofmost of the post-
colonial nations, was now to be seen as a manifestation of third world nationalism,
and therefore a threat. In response to this somewhat apocalyptic vision, Debre
insisted that Western division and 'decadence' were to blame, and that the only way
to oppose the new movement was through complete Western unity against any
manifestations of non-European advances. France was therefore placed in the front
line of this new crusade, with its Western allies now obliged to display complete
7S
support. ~ This demand of unconditional support for France's campaigns in North
74 Lettre a L'Union Frangaise, 275 (17.3.1955)
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Africa, in the name ofWestern civilisation, was an ever-present theme of Debre's
analyses of the Algerian conflict until 1958 and equally, to a lesser extent, in the
Fifth Republic.
Debre's view did not go unchallenged by other Gaullists. Foccart, for example, saw
the Bandung conference's importance as largely symbolic. Indeed, before the
conference took place, he urged the government to find a solution to the Tunisian
76
problem before the nationalists derived further encouragement from Bandung.
After the conference, however, he considered that the countries taking part were too
diverse to amount to the kind of coherent movement that Debre perceived, though he
did claim that the conference furthered the cause of both Soviet and American
anticolonialism.77 Edmond Michelet, meanwhile, went as far as to say that the
Bandung conference was evidence that the problems of the third world had been
understood by communist and other movements but not by the West, and the
conference, therefore, represented a challenge to the West, though not in the way that
no
Debre envisaged. Foccart's opinion that Bandung's importance was chiefly
symbolic, however, was due to his belief that France had already arrived at the best
way of leading nations to independence, through the process of gradual evolution
within a wider community as enshrined in the Brazzaville declaration.79 The
difference between Foccart and Debre's interpretations of the consequences of
Bandung can surely be explained by the fact that Foccart envisaged independence,
within a process defined and controlled by France, as a possible course for colonial
peoples, whereas Debre appeared to see any further moves towards independence as
little more than a threat to Western civilisation. Furthermore, Foccart argued, France
should not be overly worried about the conference's condemnation of French
76 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 278 (7.4.1955). That the nationalists did derive encouragement from
Bandung is confirmed by an Algerian historian of the diplomatic efforts at the UN. K. Mameri, Les
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colonialism as it came from countries which were poor (such as India), repressive,
(such as the Gulf states), or in the grip ofAmerican neo-colonialism, (such as the
80 ... .
Philippines). Likewise, American support for the conference was dismissed as
another manifestation of the United States' simplistic belief that all colonialism
played into the hands of communism, and further proof that America was not a
useful ally in North Africa. France, on the other hand, had 'lie [son] destin a celui des
81
peuples d'outre-mer', and thus had nothing to fear from condemnations of
colonialism. Despite the different interpretations that could be offered as to the
significance of this new third world political bloc, the Gaullists recognised that it had
changed the parameters of their international role in relation to North African
problems. By the time of the RS congress in November 1955, their view of the world
was one of three blocs: Soviet, American and the Bandung states, all ofwhich were
presumed to have their own interest in internationalising the conflict in North
Africa.82
The Gaullists' new awareness of the changes in the international system created by
the Bandung conference and the growth of the Arab League soon combined with
their existing views of the North African conflict as a cold war crisis. Jacques
Chaban-Delmas told the RS in July 1955 that the new situation meant that the period
of detente between the USA and the USSR must not be taken as a sign that
international tension and the communist threat had diminished. Constant vigilance to
the danger of communism spreading via North African nationalism was the new
Gaullist watchword.83 In this context, the Gaullists came to see the Union frangaise -
representing the association of France and the Empire - as a cold war weapon, and
80 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 282 (5.5.1955)
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embarked on a course similar to the United States' attempts to forestall communism
in Asia by a combination ofmilitary action and the creation of close economic links
intended to create pro-Western sentiment. This strategy will be examined in greater
detail in relation to the Gaullists' close interest in the mise en valeur ofAlgeria
between 1956 and 1958.
By November 1955, the tone of Gaullist views on France's international status had
become considerably less hopeful, with Terrenoire now comparing the situation in
North Africa with the crisis faced by Spain in Latin America in the early nineteenth
century. The picture painted by Terrenoire was one of irreversible decline following
the loss of the Empire, the only consolation for France being that, unlike the Spanish
in 1810, the small resistance to the loss of the Empire at least had an effective leader
in de Gaulle, even though the General was largely absent from the debate on North
Africa.84 The optimism of the Fouchet and Mendes-France era had clearly given way
to a sense of impending crisis represented by a serious threat to France's hopes of
playing a role on the world stage. This theme of impending crisis - like the Gaullists'
views on North Africa's international significance, France's need to safeguard its
prestige, and the mise en valeur of Algeria - dominated the final years of the Fourth
Republic. The other main result of Gaullist attempts to come to terms with change in
Morocco and Tunisia - disunity in Gaullist ranks - also persisted through the early
stages of the Algerian crisis, until early 1958, accompanied by a sense of urgency
that the independence of the protectorates had, by early 1956, conferred on Gaullist
North African policy.
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WAR IN ALGERIA: NOVEMBER 1954 - FEBRUARY 1956
While attention in metropolitan France was still focused on Morocco, Tunisia and
European defence, the Algerian War began on November 1, 1954. Although the
Gaullists were no more or less immediately aware than any other political groups of
the importance of the events ofNovember 1, they quickly adopted the crisis in
Algeria as their central area of concern. Algeria became an issue to which all else
was secondary, with the possible exception of constitutional reform, which was seen
as the only solution to France's apparent decline. This chapter will deal with the
early stages of the war in Algeria, by focusing on Gaullist policies and assessments
of the situation's international implications, and the war's effect on Gaullist unity. In
addition, reflecting the crucial importance the Gaullists attached to Algeria, it will
deal with the question of a necessary change of regime as a possible outcome of or
solution to the new colonial crisis. It also offers an opportunity to analyse in some
detail the behaviour of a leading Gaullist in a position of direct responsibility for a
colonial crisis. Jacques Soustelle, as Governor-General of Algeria between February
1955 and February 1956, exerted considerably more influence than Christian Fouchet
or Pierre July were able to wield as Ministers for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs.
Soustelle's influence, moreover, was not limited to the implementation of official
policy; his unofficial actions in Algeria had great influence on the way in which
Gaullism, during the final years of the Fourth Republic, sought to exploit events in
Algeria to its advantage. At the same time as attempting to further what he saw as the
Gaullist cause in Algeria, Soustelle also raised questions of party unity, further
contributing to the complex picture ofGaullist priorities and policies in response to
crisis in North Africa. In contrast, Catroux's disastrous experience, when he was
nominated as Soustelle's replacement in January 1956, but had to resign his post
almost immediately in the face ofpied-noir protests, clearly displayed the limits that
governed the acceptability of Gaullists and Gaullism among the Europeans of
Algeria.
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The first fifteen months of the war in Algeria were crucial with regard to the
development of Gaullist policy and strategy for the final years of the Fourth
Republic. It is generally acknowledged that following the election defeat of January
1956, the Gaullists sought to maximise the perception of Algeria as a decisive crisis
for the Nation, while simultaneously developing new ideas that were to become
important elements ofFifth Republic Gaullism.1 While this is true to some extent, it
is clear that many of the Gaullists' apparently new ideas and depictions of crisis in
Algeria were already in place by January 1956, having evolved between November
1954 and the elections. Their views on new approaches to colonial, constitutional
and international questions may well have been designed, through 1955, with the
elections in mind, although the more unconventional aspect of Gaullist activities -
direct contacts with groups such as the military and North African settlers - also
continued throughout the same period. The themes that the Gaullists focused on after
the elections - condemnation of the regime, the need for both reform and restoration
of order in Algeria, and emphasis on the international dimensions of decolonisation -
were all prominent in Gaullist discourse between November 1954 and January 1956.
That the Gaullists devoted much energy and debate to these subjects from 1956 to
1958 is undeniable; the depth and breadth of thinking and organisation that they were
able to undertake in those years was possible because of the first steps taken in the
preceding fifteen months
First Reactions: Responsibility, Reforms and New Possibilities
The Gaullists' first reaction to the outbreak of violence in Algeria was to see the
situation as a domestic policy crisis, and they initially concentrated on blaming the
government and the administration in Algeria for failing to control the situation. In
the first parliamentary debates on Algeria after November 1, Gaullists criticised the
1 M. Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: the Domestic Consequences ofInternational
Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 91-101; B. Gai'ti, De Gaulleprophete de
la cinquieme Republique, (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1998), pp. 221-62
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authorities for failing to prevent the new outbreak of violence. Leon Haumesser,
deputy for Constantine, complained that he had warned, in 1952, of the dangers of
government liberalism in North Africa, that terrorist groups had in fact been
operating unchecked for a month before November 1, and that as a result of ignoring
the warnings, the government was now faced with a repeat of the problems in
Indochina and Tunisia. Leon Muscatelli, senator for Algiers, argued, however, that it
was incorrect to blame Mendes-France and Fouchet's policies in Tunisia for the
violence in Algeria, though this did not prevent him from seeing the causes of the
rebellion in government weakness.2 Muscatelli argued, like many Gaullists, that
Algerian separatism was essentially 'imported' from the Middle East, and spread by
religious leaders. The local administration was to be blamed for allowing this to
happen, especially through its policy of encouraging the nationalist Mouvementpour
le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques (MTLD) to operate freely in an attempt to
undermine the Parti Populaire Algerien (PPA), which was linked to communism and
therefore considered a greater threat. This error of judgement, according to
Muscatelli, was compounded by under-administration, which made it difficult for the
authorities to keep track of nationalist activity/ Nationalism, rather than
communism, therefore seemed to be the principal threat perceived by Gaullists in
Algeria, in contrast to earlier attempts to claim that the two were indistinguishable.
The theme of laying at least some of the blame for the rebellion at the door of the
local administration was quickly seized upon by the Gaullists, with Foccart attacking
the local officials for failing to fully implement the Statute of 1947 and therefore
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attempts to undermine the application of the Statute's limited reforms in Algeria,
while officially supporting it in France. This fact was now forgotten by metropolitan
politicians, displaying the divide that had existed between metropolitan and North
African Gaullism in the early Fourth Republic.
Jacques Soustelle's period as Governor-General did not put an end to Gaullist
criticism of the administration in Algeria for failing to prevent the violence, although
criticisms of Soustelle personally were rare. The Gaullists, in keeping with their
opposition to the political establishment in metropolitan politics, saw the colonial
civil service in Algeria as complacent and out of touch with Algeria's needs.
Likewise, just as the movement for economic 'participation' was a key Gaullist
policy in metropolitan France, Gaullists involved in this area of policy attempted to
blame the rebellion in Algeria on poorly-managed and irresponsible capitalism.
Jacques Dauer's Paris-Jeunes argued that 'Nous devons dire ... que nous ne
defendons pas a Alger les interets exploiteurs capitalistes qui ne sont en rien les
interets de la France'.3 It was argued that an excessive concern for economic profit
alone had led to the loss of Indochina, because of a reluctance to commit to a costly
and long-term project, and that the same mistake could be made in Algeria. Thus,
one particular strand ofGaullism was vigorously rejecting the so-called Cartieriste
argument - that the cost of keeping Algeria French was too high to justify - even
before the campaign in favour of withdrawal for economic reasons had begun to
gather strength.6 For most Gaullists, however, the key to re-establishing control in
Algeria, other than military force, was essentially a question of political will.
5
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If the Gaullists agreed on the causes of the rebellion - foreign-led terrorism
encouraged by French neglect - they also displayed a surprising amount of unity on
the need for reforms. Gaullists generally agreed on the need for social reforms, their
differences only becoming more obvious when political reform was in question.
Reforms of three kinds were required: immediate moves to improve living
conditions, an effort to ensure equal opportunities for French and Algerian
communities, especially for young Algerians, and the progressive economic
transformation - or mise en valeur - ofAlgeria. Muscatelli argued that the most
pressing need was for education, which, it was hoped, would give young Algerians a
n
reason to feel loyalty to France. More generally, Gaullists expressed hope that the
Statute of 1947 might now be properly implemented, though their willingness to pin
their hopes on legislation proposed seven years previously did reveal the lack of
innovation behind many Gaullist calls for reform, however well-intentioned.
The general calls for reform, referring to past attempts rather than proposing concrete
plans for the future, might be explained by the relatively disorganised nature of the
Gaullist movement in late 1954 and early 1955,9 which made it difficult for
discussion and elaboration of a specific agenda to take place. The first real coming-
together of Gaullists in 1955 did not occur until the RS Journee d'Etudes des Cadres,
held on June 5 with a view to preparing a platform for the general election of 1956.
The motion that emerged from this meeting of RS leaders10 called for: 'une politique
hardie et loyale de reformes economiques, sociales et politiques de maniere a elever
7
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le niveau de vie des populations, a associer etroitement les musulmans fran<,:ais
d'Algerie a l'administration et a la vie politique sans discrimination'. This motion
was as clear in its broad principles as it was vague in its detailed proposals,
demonstrating that the Gaullists, like most metropolitan politicians, had few specific
ideas for meaningful reform in Algeria, and that the RS' thoughts were turning to the
coming elections in which statements of principle and intent over Algeria would play
a large part. Indeed, the RS senator, Bouquerel, went on to argue that just
implementing reform was as important as the specific content of any measures, as its
principal value would be to demonstrate the extent of France's commitment to
Algeria." Foccart, normally keen to put flesh on the bones of any vague statements
of principle, also limited himself to declarations of intent, writing that the RS' policy
was in favour of evolution and reform, though he did add that this principle applied
to the question of relations between France and its overseas territories, as well as to
12the internal affairs of those territories. The RS congress ofNovember 1955
mirrored Foccart's comments, the question of reform being examined in the context
of an improvement in living standards, to be implemented equally across the whole
1 T
of the Union frangaise. While this might be seen as an attempt to avoid
commitment to a specific policy for Algeria so close to the elections, Chaban-Delmas
did emphasise that the RS remained completely committed to reform, insisting,
indeed, that the need for military action against the nationalists must not be used as a
pretext for delaying reform.
The Gaullists, whether through a lack of expertise or reluctance to commit to a
specific programme, remained somewhat vague on the nature of social reform. They
were more forthright, however, on the issue of reaching out to the disillusioned
young Algerians. Michel Debre pointed out that France had a number of civil
obligations in Algeria, among which were education, facilitating participation in
11
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government, and instructing the Algerians in notions of human rights and liberties.14
While this appears to be a faithful representation of the traditional mission
civilisatrice, and does not necessarily amount to a liberal reform programme, Debre
was characteristic of the Gaullists in that he quickly appreciated the need for France
to make a more intensive effort in Algeria. He argued that implementation of the
measures he proposed would reassert the link between Algeria and France, therefore
removing any grounds for secession among the majority of the Algerians. In
particular, the emerging young Muslim elite - essentially a French creation - was to
be given a prominent role in Algerian civic society.15 This theme found support
among the Gaullist youth movement. Dauer argued that, given the large young
population of Algeria and the Union frangaise as a whole, an effort to give these
young people a meaningful role in society would ensure the continued link between
France and its overseas territories, and would also allow France to harness the
potential of the Union frangaise and therefore look forward to a future as a world
power.16
If the civic society ofAlgeria was to be developed as a symbol of French
commitment and an example for the rest of the Union frangaise, the same might be
said of the Gaullists' interest in the mise en valeur ofAlgeria. This campaign for
intense economic development, going far beyond the simple question ofmeeting the
population's needs and actually creating a new area of economic activity, reached its
14
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peak after the discovery of significant oil and gas reserves in the Sahara,17 but some
Gaullists showed an interest in it during 1955. Raymond Dronne, one of the most
conservative Gaullists, argued that the improvement of living conditions in Algeria
would depend on persuading French business interests to make a large-scale
. 'is*commitment to Algeria. Thus, in an apparent contradiction with Dauer's suspicion
of French industry's interest in overseas territories, the extension of the French
economic progress of the 1950s to Algeria was envisaged as a means to strengthen
the link between Algeria and France. That substantial economic investment in
Algeria was envisaged only as a means of ensuring that France retained control was
emphasised by another conservative Gaullist deputy, Jean Godin, who completely
ruled out independence by asserting that Algeria could never survive economically
outside a greater French community. His support for investment was therefore based
on the fact that, since France and Algeria were inextricably linked, it was only
logical that French industry should extend its operations to Algeria.19 The connection
between this intensive economic development and the demographic issues raised by
Debre and Dauer was clear; Paris-Jeunes soon became the first Gaullist publication
to speak of developing the Sahara as a concrete step towards what it described as the
need to 'sauver la France par l'Union franfaise'.20 The creation of economic activity
was seen as a means of channelling the great energy and aspirations of the young
population of France's African territories, to the extent that even foreign investment
might be encouraged in an attempt to devote as much capital as possible to France's
91
new 'vocation saharienne'.
In subsequent years, such ideas were to become closely linked to the Sahara's
usefulness as a source of resources and testing facilities for France's nuclear energy
17 On the search for and discovery of oil and gas reserves in the Sahara, and its importance for France,
see Elsenhans, pp. 267-9, 320-1. Gaullist views on the Sahara will be examined in more detail in
chapter 8.
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programme. While the role of Gaullists in relation to the French nuclear programme
is often seen in terms ofmilitary policy, their initial interest in the subject was in the
civilian applications of atomic energy. The problems in North Africa provided a
valuable opportunity, and a new sense of urgency, for the Gaullists with an interest in
the nuclear question. In 1955, Gaston Palewski had ministerial responsibility for the
development of the French atomic energy programme,22 and he and Soustelle began
to investigate the possibility that one of the biggest obstacles to North Africa's
economic development - the lack of energy sources - could be solved by the
development of nuclear power in Algeria. Indeed, Palewski envisaged the
development of the whole of the Union frangaise into a viable economic unit through
nuclear energy.24
Palewski's spell as minister responsible for the French nuclear programme, which
included the government's secret commitment to pursue a military application of
22 Gaullist interest in France's being able to develop a nuclear energy capacity had begun early in the
Fourth Republic with de Gaulle's establishment of the Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique (CEA) in
January, 1946. The nuclear question had contributed to the Gaullist and military opposition to the
EDC. Debre warned in 1954 that the military co-operation envisaged by the treaty risked not only
undermining the French nuclear programme, but also obliging France to share nuclear technology
with West Germany, creating a rearmed Germany with nuclear capacity and removing any advantage
France might have gained from its continental nuclear monopoly. The defeat of the EDC was
therefore viewed as a great encouragement by the advocates of a military nuclear capacity. This would
also fulfil Gaullist foreign policy aims in allowing France to become an independent third force
between the superpowers. By the end of the Fourth Republic, with colonial problems creating Gaullist
suspicion and antagonism towards the USA and the USSR, such a position still retained all its appeal
of 1954. After the defeat of EDC, the Gaullists defended the independent nuclear programme against
the proposed joint European atomic energy project, EURATOM. This campaign, led by Michel
Debre, resembled the anti-EDC campaign in many ways, though colonial problems and the less
emotive nature of the subject prevented it from achieving the same prominence. The nuclear question
was increasingly used by Gaullists as a means to demonstrate their commitment to national
sovereignty, by resisting both American and Soviet attempts to impose a test-ban treaty. Debre's
campaign increasingly used the problems in the Unionfranqaise as an argument for retaining France's
freedom of action in this domain. This was necessary, he argued, both to ensure the defence of French
interests outside the existing alliances and, from 1955-6, to retain the possibility of investing hopes for
the development of Algeria and the Union franqaise along with France in nuclear energy. For the
Gaullists' involvement in the Fourth Republic's nuclear programme, see W. Mendl, 'The Background
of French Nuclear Policy', International Affairs, 41 (1965), pp. 22-36. On the Gaullist linkage of EDC
and nuclear energy, see D. Mongin, La Bombe atomiquefranqaise 1945-1958 (Brussels: Bruylant,
1997), pp. 295-9; on the anti-EURATOM campaign, M. Debre, Trois Republiques pour une France:
memoires, vol. 2: agir 1946-1958 (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), pp. 233-48; P. Samuel, Michel Debre:
I'architecte du general (Paris: Arnaud Franel, 1999), pp. 122-25
23 Le Monde, 5.7.1955
24 G. Palewski, 'Presentation', in La Nef numero special: L 'atome, notre destin, (September 1955), pp.
5-9
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atomic energy, witnessed a crucial rapprochement between the scientists and the
fonctionnaires of the CEA and the military. Not all militaires were yet convinced of
the merits of a nuclear force, but with Koenig as Minister of Defence, the military
programme advanced in the face of these reservations, largely through the efforts of
9S
the two Gaullist ministers. Indeed, given Chaban-Delmas' presence in the same
government, this might be seen as one area in which Gaullists exerted considerable
96 •
influence on policy. The direct link between the nuclear programme and Algeria -
which would be seen in the usefulness of the Sahara as a test site in 1960 - was not
yet clear in the Fourth Republic, other than in general considerations of defence and
foreign policy. Palewski, however, was also responsible for the Sahara in the Faure
government, and he appointed de Gaulle's close collaborator, Olivier Guichard, to an
important post in the CEA. Guichard was later to become an influential figure both in
the intrigues ofMay 1958, and in Fifth Republic Algerian policy, through his post as
head of the Organisation Commune des Regions Sahariennes (OCRS), with
97
responsibility for continuing the mise en valeur of the Sahara. Thus, the seemingly
technical and relatively minor question of the role of the Sahara desert in the
development of nuclear energy came to assume considerable symbolic and actual
importance for the Gaullists, as an example of the kind of vigorous modernisation
and development effort that might be possible.
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The Limits of Reform
As has been seen, most Gaullists' first reactions to the beginning of the rebellion
involved some kind of reform. It would be wrong, however, to conclude that this
extended as far as unconditional support for any reform plan, opposition to the use of
military force to restore order, or wide-ranging changes in the constitutional links
between Algeria and France. Leon Muscatelli, while pointing out that French
negligence had created the situation, cautioned against too broad a reform
programme, arguing that Algeria was too 'delicate' to support radical change,28 while
Haumesser went as far as to say that there was nothing to be gained by the immediate
implementation of reform aimed at widening participation in civic society, as the
Muslims would simply not know how to use their newly-acquired political rights.29
General de Monsabert was equally sceptical about the possibility of achieving
political change, claiming that there could be no realistic hope of finding
interlocuteurs valables in Algeria, just as the search for negotiating partners in
Morocco and Tunisia had frequently proved difficult.30
The limits of the Gaullists' liberalism were demonstrated more clearly by their strong
support for intensive military action in Algeria. Debre's immediate reaction to the
outbreak of the rebellion was that restoration of order must precede any discussions
"3 1
about change in Algeria, while Haumesser insisted that the situation in Algeria
owed much to the inadequacy of the police and military presence there, as well as the
legal requirement to open judicial inquiries into the death of nationalist forces at the
hands of French troops, thereby preventing the required vigorous military response.
This argument was supported by de Monsabert, who complained that the French
military and civilian authorities showed excessive leniency towards terrorists, and
28 Muscatelli, CR, 24.11.1945, JORF
29
Haumesser, AN, 12.11.1954, JORF
30 De Monsabert, AN, 28.7.1955, JORF
31 Debre in Les Idees ... Les Faits, 6 (November 1954); Haumesser, AN, 10.12.1954, JORF
j2 The Gaullists always referred to the nationalist guerrilla forces as terrorists or rebels, thereby
denying them the legitimacy that would have been implied in a description of them as a nationalist
army.
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called for complete control and surveillance of the whole of Algeria.33 This latter
measure amounted to support for the government's decision to introduce a state of
emergency throughout Algeria, allowing for comprehensive surveillance, detention
of suspected nationalist terrorists, and extension of police powers.34 Their belief that
such measures were necessary was surely strengthened by Soustelle's frequent
assertions that the existing military effort in Algeria was insufficient to deal with the
rebellion, and they therefore willingly supported the government on the state of
emergency legislation. Although few Gaullists - other than Soustelle - were in a
position to affect government policy on Algeria, Pierre Billotte, as Minister of
Defence from October 1955, did show support for the view held by the Governor-
General and some in the military, that it would be desirable to augment forces in
Algeria by the use of conscripts, an issue that was to become more divisive
throughout 1956-58.33 Gaullist criticism of the military effort was rarely heard, and
tended to be limited to specific points, such as Muscatelli's warning that the policy of
regroupement - forcibly moving the Algerian population into 'safe areas',
supposedly allowing easier identification and pursuit of FLN (Front de Liberation
Nationale) forces - risked being counter-productive. Fouchet, though generally
preoccupied with Morocco and Tunisia, also sounded a note of caution, arguing that
37
apolitique de force could not be expected to succeed in the long term. Much later,
the first reports of torture were reported with some sympathy by the Lettre a I 'Union
T Q
Franqaise, though most Gaullists considered the debate over the moral aspects of
torture a potential threat to the army's morale.
33 De Monsabert, AN, 2.2.1955 & 31.3.1955, JORF
,4 The state of emergency legislation raised important questions of torture; these will be examined in
more detail in relation to the Battle of Algiers in 1957, from which most of the allegations of torture
arose.
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The Gaullists' vigorous defence of military action in Algeria reflected their
assessment of the nature of the nationalist movement. Their general view was that
the nationalists were divisive and extremist, attempting to create hatred between the
French and Algerian communities. Evidence for this was seen in the FLN's attempt
to ban Muslims from engaging in the same activities as the French, which was
viewed as proof that they intended to accentuate the differences between the French
TQ
and the Algerians, in contrast to the Gaullist vision of a broader community. The
massacre of Europeans at Philippeville on August 20, 1955, was seen as further proof
that the nationalists intended to create a deep and bitter division between the two
communities; Foccart compared it to the beginning of a civil war, aware that it would
probably have the intended effect of increasing violence and extremism on the pied-
noir side too.40 Along with denunciation of the nationalists' methods, the Gaullists
insisted that they were pursuing an unrealistic ideal in hoping for an independent
Algeria, repeating the mantra that Algeria could not survive without France.41 In
their views of nationalism in Algeria as alien and divisive, the Gaullists echoed the
sentiments of Jacques Soustelle, who insisted that it was only the nationalists, and
not the Algerian people as a whole, who were anti-French. Such statements were
happily reproduced by Gaullists in France, who frequently expressed complete
confidence in Soustelle's ability to win over the majority ofAlgerian people to this
argument.42 While these expressions of support rarely amounted to statements of
policy in their own right - though Foccart did call for the government to support
Soustelle against those claiming that no change was necessary in Algeria43 - it is
perhaps significant that most Gaullist statements of confidence in Soustelle came
before August 20, when the Philippeville massacre made the Governor-General more
j9 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 289 (23.6.1955). The Gaullists' dominant view of the nationalists was
that they were inspired by foreign forces; this will be analysed in a later section.
40 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 297 (1.9.55)
41
Haumesser, for example, claimed that France's withdrawal would 'faire revenir l'Algerie mille ans
en arriere'./FV, 12.10.1955, JORF
42
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sympathetic to strong military action and to the pied-noir cause. Some priority of
reform over repression can, therefore, be seen in the first half of 1955, in spite of the
Gaullists' deep suspicions of the nationalists' methods and intentions. Calls for
repression, however, were always present in Gaullist reactions to the situation in
Algeria, and they became more prominent as the FLN campaign became more
violent.
The Gaullists' unity on the need for both reform and military pursuit of nationalist
forces was not matched in their opinions on the need for change in the relationship
between Algeria and France. Although the Gaullists had devoted much time to
reflection on the constitution, and had indeed based their opposition to the Fourth
Republic largely on their dissatisfaction with it, they were not able to agree on the
exact nature of desirable relations between the metropole and Algeria. Association
within a federal context, assimilation and integration were all proposed by Gaullists
during 1955. Of these, a federal constitution with provision for close association
between metropolitan France and its overseas territories was the most prominent,
perhaps because of its role in attempts to find a new relationship between France and
the North African protectorates. This was the policy outlined by Chaban-Delmas in
October 1955, with the principle being 'association librement consentie', a phrase
that closely mirrored the arrangement being made for Morocco and Tunisia at the
time, following the negotiations between Catroux and Mohammed V.44 It represented
a surprisingly liberal attitude, in that it proposed the same status for Algeria -
officially not a colony or protectorate, but an integral part ofmetropolitan France -
as for the rest of the Union franc;ai.se. A month later, the national RS congress
approved a similar proposal for 'interdependence' between France and its overseas
territories.45 It must be noted, however, that this apparent liberalism may have been
expressed, in the autumn of 1955, with the immediate crisis in Morocco and Tunisia
44 Chaban-Delmas at RS Congres Regional du Snd-Est, Marseille, quoted in Lettre a I'Union
Frangaise, 304 (20.10.1955)
45
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in mind more than the still vague notion that relations between Algeria and France
might also have to be renegotiated. One must also bear in mind that the RS
congresses, at which such policies were made, tended to be ignored by figures such
as Soustelle and Debre, who were both more conservative on the constitutional
question, and arguably closer to the mainstream ofGaullist thought on many matters.
By the time of the January 1956 elections, some RS candidates were still expressing
their support for federalism in general throughout France's overseas territories. The
official policy of the Gaullist party, however, was by now integration. Integration
was the dominant idea among the military and the pieds-noirs, and Soustelle's role in
creating it is examined in further detail below. It proposed, in opposition to a loose
federation, complete equality between France and Algeria with no distinctions along
lines of geography, citizenship or race. It had already attracted the support of
Gaullists in parliament, with the deputy Marcel Ribiere advocating complete
integration, in October 1955, as the only solution to Algeria's problems.46 By
January 1956, integration had become the RS' official policy for the elections.47 This
fact alone demonstrated the influence that Soustelle had had on Gaullist policy, as
well as the growing awareness that Algeria demanded a different response from
Morocco and Tunisia. It is significant that the traditional French colonial doctrine of
assimilation, which differed from integration in that it made no provision for
acceptance of the differences of religion and language that existed between France
4R
and Algeria, received very little public support from Gaullists. Indeed, General
46
Ribiere, AN, 13.10.1955, JORF. Chaban-Delmas also spoke in favour of'integration progressive et
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Catroux had already insisted in parliament that the mistake of assuming that the
Algerian Muslims were or could become French must be avoided.49
The constitutional debate focused attention on the condition and prospects of the
Algerian Muslim population. Careful study of this subject was considered essential if
the Algerians were to be successfully integrated into the French population.
However, in line with the RPF's earlier attempts to penetrate the European
community, the Gaullists also devoted some attention to the problems facing the
pieds-noirs. Soustelle's departure from Algeria as their hero in February 1956, and
Catroux's appointment and subsequent resignation as his replacement, provide an
opportunity to assess the Gaullists' views of the European community in Algeria. An
ambiguous position can be identified in the Gaullist press, with the extremism of the
pied-noir opposition to Catroux strongly condemned, while the Gaullists derived
some satisfaction from the fact that Soustelle had proved such a success among the
Europeans.?0 The subject of Gaullist links with the pied-noir community, and with
the military, during Soustelle's period in Algeria, is certainly worthy ofmore
detailed analysis in the light of the extensive contacts between these groups in 1958.
The chief conduit for Gaullist-jvied-noir contacts was the veterans' associations,
which occupied a particularly prominent position in Algerian civic society. Relations
between the two, however, were not as close as might be expected, perhaps because
of the latent suspicion of de Gaulle that still existed in Algeria. Indeed, the normally
conservative General de Monsabert, who had, alongside Juin, commanded the largely
pied-noir forces in the Italian campaign, was keen to champion the cause of the
Muslim veterans. He argued that by showing them the same respect that was enjoyed
by European veterans, given the importance of the veteran in the pied-noir society
around them, these influential Muslims might be persuaded to remain loyal to
49
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50 Lettre a I'Union Franfaise, 320 (9.2.1956) & 321 (16.2.1956)
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France.31 In contrast, adopting a position more in line with what might be expected
ofGaulhst-veterans-/hec/-ttoz> links, the deputy Olivier de Sesmaisons attempted, in
March 1955, to introduce legislation granting French anciens combattants in Algeria
the right to bear arms for self-defence. In addition to nurturing support among
veterans in Algeria, the Gaullists continued to express solidarity with the
metropolitan activities of the anciens d'Indochine, though a repeat of the
o
demonstrations ofApril and May 1954 was not yet envisaged in 1955.
Along with support for veterans, the Gaullists enthusiastically took up the cause of
the troops fighting in Algeria, arguing in particular for their right to play a more
political role. General de Monsabert was especially active in this respect, calling for
the army to be given real decision-making authority and for its social role among the
Algerian people to be extended.34 These measures were gradually implemented by
the government, though their consequences in the form of torture and excessive
politicisation of the officer corps, from 1956 onwards, were not always positive. In
the meantime, the RS congress ofNovember 1955 heard an appeal to the government
to put the interests of defense nationale, in relation to events in Algeria, above all
other matters, reaffirming the absolute priority that the Gaullists accorded to support
for the armed forces.53 On the same subject, Dronne defended militaires'' right to
express their views on political subjects and the conduct of the war in Algeria.56 He
argued that this was a logical development of the political and social tasks the army
was being asked to perform, though, once again, the consequences in the form of
indiscipline in subsequent years might be said to have been of questionable benefit.
31 de Monsabert, AN, 2.2.1955, JORF. It must be noted, however, in the face of this apparent
liberalism, that de Monsabert went on to say that respect for anciens combattants was in fact a more
important reform for Algeria than social and political measures such as the 'imposition' of the
suffrage on Muslim women.
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In the light of the support the Gaullists received in 1958 from a politicised, confident
and relatively undisciplined officer corps, however, de Monsabert and Dronne might
be seen as the precursors of a more general Gaullist offensive aimed at enlisting the
army in Algeria to their cause.
Civilian activities among the pied-noir community received similar encouragement
from the Gaullists. The creation of self-defence groups, for example, was looked
upon favourably, while the Federation des maires - one of the most influential
pied-noir political groupings in a society where politics was often conducted outside
parliament - received the backing of defence minister Pierre Billotte, who praised
their courage in the face of terrorist activity and called for greater support in France
CO
for the pieds-noirs. Meanwhile, Foccart attempted to explain why the pieds-noirs
were dissatisfied with the evolution of the Muslim population since 1944. The
problem, he claimed, was that the Statute of 1947 would have been adequate, and the
pieds-noirs always knew they would be able to undermine it, but since then the
immobilisme of the domestic regime had prevented even moderate reform from being
properly implemented.?9 That this should be used as a defence of the pieds-noirs
frustration revealed the possibilities that Foccart saw in identifying the Gaullists'
dissatisfaction with the regime and the problems in Algeria. His apparent sympathy
with the Europeans' habit of assuming that any reform could be easily undermined
does, however, seem to cast doubt on his earlier liberalism over the issue of reform in
general. The question of Gaullist participation in pied-noir political groups was not
raised during Soustelle's time in Algeria as it would be from 1956-58, but it is
significant that one of Soustelle's main contacts in 1955 was the pied-noir radical
deputy Rene Mayer. That Soustelle frequently sought Mayer's advice on issues
affecting the European community, and distanced himself somewhat from
57 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 281 (28.4.1955). It is interesting that similar developments in Tunisia
tended to elicit criticism from this publication.
58
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mainstream metropolitan Gaullist activities, suggested that the development and
maintenance of contacts in the pied-noir world, both political and military, was
already emerging as a valued Gaullist strategy through which to turn the situation in
Algeria to their advantage.
Gaullism in Domestic Politics: New Strategies, Priorities and Divisions
The strategy of prioritising Algeria, as practised by Soustelle, was mirrored to some
extent by the Gaullists' activities in domestic politics during 1955. They seized
opportunities to use the crisis in Algeria as an explanation for the problems that they
had already identified in France, and began to make use of a discourse of coming
crisis and Gaullist solution in their parliamentary behaviour. The first metropolitan
impact of the conflict in Algeria to attract the Gaullists' attention was that of the
Algerian population in France. Opinion was divided as to whether this represented a
problem or an opportunity for France. For Dronne, the best way to address the
situation in Algeria was via metropolitan France, most of the nationalists having been
recruited and trained among the Algerian community in France.60 Foccart, too, saw a
potentially serious problem in Algerian circles in the metropole, reporting that the
MTLD was exerting considerable financial pressure on Algerians in France and
extracting contributions from Algerian businesses through threats of violence.61
Welcoming the government's decision, in June 1955, to create a Comite d Action -
which included generals Juin and Guillaume and former Governor-General
Naegelen, to deal with the Algerian problem - Foccart stressed that the committee
must be able to address problems not only in Algeria, but also in France, where
f\~)
unrest among North Africans was a growing problem. The fact that support for the
Algerian rebellion clearly existed among Algerians in France did not, however, lead
to calls for repression in France too. On the contrary, argued Foccart, it was a sign
that France had failed to fulfil its mission of development in Algeria. The problems
60
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posed by mass immigration would therefore only be solved by the admission, on the
part of the French authorities, that Algeria was under-developed and unable to
support its population, and by a serious commitment to rectifying the situation. The
problem of nationalism among Algerians in France was therefore blamed upon the
failings of the authorities, allowing the Gaullists to denounce nationalist activity in
France while attaching some of the blame to the government. The Gaullists' search
for any way of attacking the government did not, however, prevent Foccart from
welcoming the announcement of considerable expenditure on accommodation for
Algerian workers in France to distance them from the bidonvilles that bred
discontent.64
The Gaullists took advantage of any symbols in the metropole of the consequences of
the government's failure to define a clear Algerian policy. Thus, even though they
supported the increase in troop numbers, they sympathised with the protests among
rappeles and conscripts called up to serve in Algeria. These protests, it was claimed,
were an example of the government's inability to communicate to the population the
absolute importance of defeating the rebellion.65 Likewise, and more importantly for
most Gaullists, the crisis in Algeria provided an ideal opportunity to resurrect the
issue of constitutional reform. The RS made it clear that their support for Soustelle
should not be taken to imply that they had dropped their opposition to any Fourth
Republic government that refused to consider reform of the constitution. The 1956
election campaign saw the RS once again reaffirm that constitutional reform was an
absolute necessity, without which meaningful, long-term, change in Algeria could
not be envisaged.66 The calls for change in the constitution were accompanied, as
before, by warnings of impending crisis; the events in Algeria reawakened this
recurring theme ofGaullist discourse. The activities of Soustelle in Algeria were
63 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 273 (3.3.1955)
64 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 296 (4.8.1955)
65 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 303 (13.10.1955); La Nation Republicaine et Sociale, 240 (1.10.1955)
66 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 304 (20.10.1955) & 320 (9.2.1956); Chevrillon, pp. 266-73
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presented, in this context, as an example for the metropole to follow, as he had,
according to the RS, prevented crisis there by embarking upon a programme of
regeneration.67 The familiar theme of France's salvation coming from North Africa,
present in Gaullist thinking since 1943 and particularly influential in 1956-58,
therefore reappeared, with the RS attempting to present Soustelle's Algeria as an
example for the whole nation. That Soustelle had not convinced the entire nation that
his Algerian policy was likely to end the rebellion undermined the Gaullists' chances
ofwinning over public opinion with this argument in 1955.
The 1956 elections, held against a background of general disillusionment with
parliamentary politics, provided further opportunities to issue warnings of the fate to
which the regime was leading the nation. The RS had already made clear, in
December 1955, that the essential issues of the campaign were Algeria and European
/-o
integration, with the constitutional question bound up with both of these. Foccart
claimed to see the multitude of problems that the new government would have to
face as a sign that the final crisis had arrived:
Le regime, de degradation en degradation, conduira la France a Faventure. II se
pourrait bien que ce temps soit arrive. II se pourrait bien que les echeances
qu'il va falloir affronter - sociales, financieres, monetaires - et les problemes
nord-africains ... precipitent le pays vers une suite de crises de portee
historique.69
In addition to the overwhelming problems, the popular sense of crisis - as
70
demonstrated by the strength of the right-wing populist Poujadist movement -
risked bringing about the return to government of the communists. Thus, another
familiar Gaullist theme - the ever-present communist danger - also reappeared
around the time of the 1956 elections. The evocation of communism also had the
67 La Nation Republicaine et Sociale, 240 (1.10.1955)
68 Lettre al'Union Frangaise, 314 (29.12.1955)
69 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 317 (19.1.1956)
70 The Gaullists' share of the vote fell from 21.7% in 1951 to 4.4% in 1956; their number of deputies
declined from 106 to 17. The Poujadists won 11.6% of votes and 51 seats in 1956.
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advantage of allowing Gaullists to remind the nation that de Gaulle had twice
incarnated the resistance to communism at a time of crisis: in 1944, and with the
71
creation of the RPF in 1947. The association ofweak government with communist
threat and crisis, and the portrayal of de Gaulle as saviour, thus re-entered Gaullist
strategy from January 1956, and remained prominent until May 1958. The Gaullists
had still, however, to convince the nation that the situation in Algeria did indeed
constitute the regime's final crisis.
While the final evidence for crisis would not become clear until 1958, the RS did
seek to exploit the phenomenon of Poujadism to this end. They were, to some extent,
encouraged by the Poujadist success, seeing in it a manifestation of popular
discontent:
Nos electeurs etaient pour la plupart contre le regime. Le plus grand nombre est
passe chez Poujade. Je crois que le Mouvement Poujade sera un feu de paille.
Nous pouvons recuperer les electeurs poujadistes si nous savons rester dans
72
l'opposition un groupe uni et coherent.
The RS considered, therefore, that a resolute policy of remaining in opposition and
constantly attacking the regime would allow them to reap the benefits of growing
popular discontent. They believed that the fact that they had a wider-ranging
programme than Poujade - and, presumably, a more convincing figurehead - would
leave them in a position to become a credible alternative. Discrediting Poujadism
without alienating its supporters therefore became a Gaullist priority. Foccart
attempted to use the situation in Algeria for this purpose by claiming that the
Poujadists there were associated with pied-noir counter-terrorism, which clearly
made them committed not to reform, like the Gaullists, but to further unrest.73 The
foundations of the Gaullists' policy for 1956-58, of constant opposition to the system
71 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 318 (26.1.1956)
72 RS archives, Dronne to Frey, 4.2.1956, quoted in Tiimmers, p. 186
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while proposing a series of possible solutions to the Algerian crisis and convincing
public opinion of its crucial importance for the future direction of France, were thus
laid around the time of the 1956 elections.
The largest single obstacle to the Gaullists' efforts to win support for their views on
Algeria and the regime might be said to have been their apparent inability, at times,
to present a united front. The key problem, in this respect, was that of participation in
government; by the time of the 1956 elections, the extent of discontent among
members with the leadership's interest in accepting ministerial posts was becoming
clear. The first signs of Gaullist division over North Africa, however, can be found in
the public statements of certain deputies. Raymond Dronne, who had already found
fault with Fouchet's Moroccan and Tunisian policies, responded to the Algerian
problem in a similar manner, criticising Fouchet for not having the creation of a true
'union franco-musulmane' at heart.74 That Fouchet was not directly responsible for
Algeria did not make him immune to such criticism, as the more conservative
Gaullists like Dronne were convinced that a major cause of the rebellion in Algeria
was the government's willingness to contemplate reduction of French authority in
Morocco and Tunisia. Throughout the early stages of the war in Algeria, the Gaullist
movement suffered from a failure to assert sufficient authority to unite moderates
like Fouchet and conservatives like Dronne. Deputies expressed confusion as to how
much freedom they had within the group to divulge their own opinions on the
situation in Algeria; the subject was raised in June 1955 at a meeting ofGaullist
deputies and senators by the deputy Michel Habib-Deloncle, who wanted the
leadership to explain: 'dans quelle mesure nous sommes libres d'avoir une opinion
7S
personnelle'. No answer appears to have been forthcoming, other than a vague
reassertion that the policies of the 1944 Brazzaville conference remained a guide as
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far as the Union frangaise in general was concerned,76 and Foccart's assertion that,
on Algerian affairs, 'notre position, c'est celle de Soustelle'.77 Such responses to a
question that preoccupied many Gaullists did not ensure complete unity; the situation
in this respect was exacerbated by the fact that the RS were unable to replicate the
RPF's comprehensive network of local organisations all linked to the central
leadership.
With many local Gaullist federations preferring to remain outside the RS structure
after the demise of the parliamentary RPF, it is questionable to what extent the RS
leaders' statement can be said to fully represent the diversity of views within
Gaullism. In the 1956 elections, some federations went as far as to present candidates
without using the RS name, for fear that ex-RPF members would not support them.
With the RPF to all intents and purposes defunct, however, it is equally difficult to
speak of a coherent body of alternative Gaullist opinion.78 The question of leadership
was as problematic as that of unity; Chaban-Delmas is generally acknowledged to
have been the RS leader, but it has been suggested that this owed less to universal
approval - he was the strongest advocate of participation in government - than to the
7Q •
absence ofDebre and Soustelle from Gaullist activities during 1955. Even in their
absence, however, Soustelle and Debre laid claim to the intellectual leadership of the
movement, acquired popularity among the ordinary members, and underlined the
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That the leadership ofGaullism in 1955 seemed to be divided between Chaban-
Delmas, the advocate of participation in government, Soustelle, the 'semi-detached'
Gaullist, and Debre, the system's fiercest opponent, highlights the importance that
the question of co-operation with Fourth Republic governments held within the RS.
Soustelle's appointment as Governor-General raised some doubts among Gaullists,
who were concerned that one of their leading figures might be compromised by
being put in an important position, with responsibility for the development of Algeria
81
and the restoration of order, without any clear instructions from the government. It
was feared that Soustelle might find himself handicapped by a lack of commitment in
Paris, and that any resulting problems would reflect badly on the Gaullists' claims to
offer a solution to the problems in North Africa. Soustelle, however, seized upon the
lack of clear instructions to implement his own policies, presenting successive
governments with afait accompli and redefining Gaullist policy in the process. The
RS did share some of this scepticism about the value of participation in government,
though one member's ministerial activities met with almost universal approval: those
ofGaston Palewski in the development of atomic energy, described at the June
leaders' conference as Tinstrument futur de notre puissance industrielle et aussi de
notre defense militaire'.82 Gaullist activity in government in the name of key Gaullist
notions such as French puissance and national security was clearly to be welcomed,
even if doubts persisted over co-operation with the government's North African
policies.
The overall outcome ofGaullists' work in government, by January 1956, had not
totally convinced the majority ofmembers of the merits of this policy. After the
elections, with the RS once again considering entering into government - this time to
retain some influence on Algerian and defence policy by moving the socialist-led
coalition away from the left - envoys had to be sent out from headquarters in Paris to
81 Gaullists in Algeria were particularly concerned about this. Journal d'Alger, 27.1.1955
82 Les Idees ... Les Faits, numero special (June 1955)
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reassure the local federations that Gaullism was not being diluted or compromised by
this policy of participation. The question of participation was to remain a thorn in the
side of the Gaullists throughout the last two years of the Fourth Republic, not least
because of the strident opposition it suffered from such luminaries as Debre and
Soustelle. In the period from November 1954 to February 1956, however, leaders
such as Chaban-Delmas were able to prevent any further splits over this issue,
largely by ensuring that most Gaullists in government displayed their underlying
opposition to the system by being willing to criticise it from within and to stage high-
profile resignations such as those over Morocco in October 1955. Nonetheless, the
idea that the Gaullists would be better employed campaigning for a government of
salutpublic was gaining ground, and some candidates did make this their top priority
in the 1956 elections.83
The Algerian Crisis in International Context
As has been seen in the case ofMorocco and Tunisia, the divisions and doubts that
existed within Gaullism in response to the crises in North Africa and the question of
electoral strategy were often hidden by a show of unity over the international
implications of the colonial problems. The one aspect of Gaullist doctrine most likely
to unite Gaullists was the issue of France's claim to great power status. Initial
reactions to the beginning of the rebellion focused closely on this: Paris-Jeunes, for
example, insisted that only the overseas territories could allow France to remain a
04
world power and that that status was consequently now threatened. Debre saw the
problem in more concrete terms: North Africa was the guarantee of French security,
and France's right to defend its security in North Africa was equally valid as the
rights, acknowledged since 1945, of the USA and the USSR to maintain a network of
supportive territories in the name of their own national security. North Africa was,
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territories for France. More emotively, Fouchet warned that to lose North Africa
would lead France to decadence - the very opposite of great power status. General
de Monsabert contributed another dimension to the Gaullist view ofAlgeria's
importance: 'La France est en train de jouer en Afrique la derniere carte de sa valeur,
non pas seulement mondiale, mais meme europeenne'. The argument that France
could seek compensation in Europe for the loss ofNorth Africa was thus refuted as it
had been during the EDC debate, de Monsabert insisting that without French Algeria
87there could be no meaningful European security.
The crisis in Algeria, for the Gaullists, clearly called into question France's very
existence as an actor on the world stage. Jacques Soustelle developed the idea that,
with Algeria, France had a voice in the world, but without North Africa it was
insignificant:
Le monde ou nous vivons en ce milieu du XXe siecle, et dont l'Algerie, malgre
son importance, n'est qu'une petite partie, ce monde est dur et dangereux. Des
forces puissantes s'y deploient et s'y affrontent, tantot ouvertement, tantot sous
des masques diverses. II faut choisir; ou bien l'ensemble de la France et de
l'Algerie sera un des sujets de la politique mondiale ou bien il sera un de ses
objets.88
Such apocalyptic statements received official endorsement at the RS congress in
November 1955, with a resolution calling for France to overcome the current
OQ
immobilisme and return to a 'politique de grande puissance mondiale'. The
importance of retaining power in Algeria, according to Chaban-Delmas, went beyond
the immediate geopolitical situation: it was above all a question of preserving
France's mission historique to bring progress to the rest of the world.90 While
speeches on occasions such as party conferences must be seen as rather exaggerated
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and fulfilling a function ofmotivation as much as policy development, this reference
to the traditional mission civilisatrice does demonstrate that concern for the
international implications of any reduction of authority in Algeria tempered
somewhat the RS' interest in reform.
If the chief purpose of retaining French Algeria was clear - to preserve great power
status - then the nature of the threat seemed equally obvious to the Gaullists. Foreign
interference was quickly identified as the source of the nationalist violence. Both
Foccart and Debre immediately identified Egypt as the principal culprit, and called
for action against the La Voix des Arabes radio broadcasts from Cairo to Algeria.91
Fouques-Duparc concurred, though he added that the poverty and hardship in Algeria
made the foreign propagandists' job easy.92 Following on from Gaullist criticism of
the United Nations' role in the protectorates, the Gaullist press also launched fierce
attacks on the individual countries that were supporting the Algerian nationalists in
New York, with a particularly strong denunciation of Saudi Arabia's human rights
record contrasted with France's influence in Algeria.93 Once the initial anger at the
outbreak of violence had subsided, however, the Gaullists interrupted their attacks on
foreign governments - though they returned to this theme with great vehemence in
1957-8 - and concentrated instead on emphasising the importance ofAlgeria to
France's western allies.
The most effective way to underline Algeria's importance in a cold war context was
to demonstrate the links between nationalism and communism. Debre introduced a
theme that he was to develop almost incessantly over the following three years,
claiming that the survival of the free world and ofwestern civilisation depended on
the French presence in Algeria, while de Monsabert, appealing to American interests,
insisted that communism risked undermining French security not only in Algeria but
91 Lettre a I 'Union Frangaise, 256 (4.11.1954); Debre, CR, 24.11.1954, JORF
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also in metropolitan France.94 These two Gaullists continued to develop themes of
Algeria's importance to the West for strategic reasons throughout 1955. They failed,
however, to provide clear evidence for the communist role in the uprising, beyond
the links that had existed in the past between Algerian nationalist and communist
parties, and Soviet aid to Egypt. The United States did express some concern about
the possibility of communism reaching Algeria via Egypt, and Soviet rhetoric praised
the communists' role in the uprising even though in reality they had been sidelined
by the nationalists.95 In general, though, the Gaullists' opinions about the imminent
communist threat were not shared by international opinion. They therefore turned
their attention to arguing that France's so-called allies were themselves contributing
to the reduction ofWestern influence in Algeria through their own misinterpretation
of the situation.
The June 1955 RS leaders' conference provided Debre with the opportunity to
launch an attack on the member states of the Atlantic Alliance for their lack of
solidarity over, first, Indochina and, now, Algeria. For Debre, this fact alone was a
convincing argument against any closer alliances, whether in Europe or beyond.96
Indeed, in the light of the Gaullist involvement in the French nuclear programme, the
idea that a military nuclear capacity could go some way towards strengthening
France's position and freedom of action within the Alliance first appeared in policy
07
debates at the 1955 Congress. Debre continued his attack on France's allies,
accusing them of'lachete intellectuelle' in failing to accept French assessments of the
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conflict as a communist-inspired one. Likewise, international moves towards
detente with the USSR were condemned as undermining the conflict in which France
was engaged in Algeria." The solution to international problems, he argued, lay not
in dialogue with Moscow, but rather in the extension ofNATO to include areas in
Africa and Asia that were under threat from communism via anticolonialism. Thus,
Debre argued, France would make its own contribution to East-West detente, on a
global scale. This contrasted sharply with the existing situation, in which NATO
could even be said to be undermining French efforts in Algeria because of the
enforced distinction between classical conventional strategy in Europe and a new
form of guerrilla and psychological warfare in North Africa.100 Behind these
observations on the inadequacy of the international security system lay growing
resentment towards other western powers for their refusal to display unconditional
support for France. This resentment, frequently in the form of anti-Americanism,
became a dominant feature of Gaullist rhetoric after the RS' formal adoption of
motions condemning the lack of international support, and featured strongly both in
Gaullist strategy in domestic politics and in their international policy until 1958 and
beyond.
The Gaullists' interest in linking their foreign and defence policies with events in
Algeria demonstrated that Algeria was fast becoming their absolute priority, to which
reflection on any other issue was subordinated. As early as November 1954, with
European affairs still uppermost in foreign policy debates in France, Debre was
already arguing that from this point on, French foreign policy must never lose sight
ofNorth Africa. European policy, in particular, was now to be judged according to
whether it risked weakening links with Algeria.101 Defence policy was to be





101 Les Idees ... Les Faits, 6 (November 1954)
184
distinguishing between Europe and France's overseas interests and instead treat
France, Algeria and the Union franqaise as a whole.102 The trends evident in the
Gaullists' anti-EDC campaign were certainly reinforced by the problems in North
Africa after the defeat of the EDC. The question of adequate national defence had not
been resolved in 1954 and would not be resolved as long as North Africa was left in
a state of vulnerability.
Overall, the guiding principle of RS foreign policy from November 1955 was to be
• 10T
the defence of the French position in North Africa. Along with a united and
coherent foreign policy went the need to treat the whole ofNorth Africa as one, just
as the Egyptian instigators of pan-Arabism had been doing for years. The case for
this point of view was strengthened during 1955 by increasing evidence of links
between nationalists in Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria - as shown by the
simultaneous massacres of Europeans in Morocco and Algeria on August 20 - and
by fears that, once independent, the protectorates would strongly support Algerian
nationalism. While the Gaullists recognised that France could exert only limited
influence on the foreign policies of independent Moroccan and Tunisian states, they
argued that a single military command for the whole Maghreb and efforts to ensure
that Morocco and Tunisia remained pro-French would limit the extent of foreign
'interference' in Algeria.104 The same thinking was applied to the question of
nationalism in a religious rather than political context, with calls for France to
develop a coherent 'Muslim policy' throughout the Islamic parts of the Union
franqaise.105 Like many Gaullist ideas, this one was never developed in detail,
though there was, in 1956-58, much consideration of the question of how best to
incorporate a growing Muslim population in the secular French State. As will be
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seen, Gaullist attitudes to this question ranged from serious attempts to understand
Islam, to apocalyptic warnings about an imminent conflict between civilisations.
Jacques Soustelle in Algeria, 1955-56: Gaullism in Action?
Jacques Soustelle's appointment as Governor-General of Algeria, in January 1955,
might be said to represent the most important official position held by a Gaullist
between 1947 and 1958. That Soustelle should thus become the most prominent
Gaullist was not surprising; he had, in 1952, been the only Gaullist during the Fourth
Republic to seriously consider forming a government. The legacy of the friction that
that episode had created within the RPF led Soustelle to emphasise, immediately
upon accepting the post, that he did not intend to be seen as the representative of the
Republicans Sociaux in Algeria.106 The policies that Soustelle pursued and the
contacts he made in Algeria must therefore be seen not principally as a manifestation
ofmetropolitan Gaullism in Algeria, but rather as an important contribution to the
body of Gaullist views on the subject and a source of considerable influence for
Gaullist policy on Algeria in the final years of the Fourth Republic. Soustelle's
relations with metropolitan Gaullism were ambiguous during his time in Algeria, and
his later exile from Gaullism has obscured the issue of whether any regular contacts
between the Governor-General and the RS in Paris, or de Gaulle, took place in 1955-
56. Soustelle claimed, after his split with de Gaulle, that he had regularly been in
contact with the General while in Algeria, while Bernard Ullmann, Soustelle's
biographer, claims that no contact at all took place between the two during the
year.107 Both de Gaulle's published correspondence and the available archival
sources from Soustelle's governorship tend to suggest that the latter interpretation is
108
more accurate. Soustelle certainly adopted his own policies in Algeria, notably
those relating to integration, pacification and mise en valeur, thus exploiting a
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vacuum at the centre of the rather vague Gaullist polices on Algeria, as outlined
above, and defining a set of principles that influenced metropolitan Gaullist policy in
the years between Soustelle's return to Paris and May 1958.
If Soustelle cannot be said to accurately represent metropolitan Gaullism in Algeria,
he also attempted to distance himself from widespread colonial ideas about the
Algerian question. In April 1955, he instructed the generally conservative staff of the
administration in Algiers to abandon their old colonial mindset.109 This amounted to
making serious efforts to treat the Muslims with respect and avoid adopting racist or
dismissive attitudes. Reform-minded Gaullists in France, such as Foccart, welcomed
Soustelle's attempts to move away from traditional colonialism, even going as far as
to describe him as an anti-colonialist.110 The application of this term to Soustelle in
1956, however, reveals how much change in the colonial status quo Gaullists
considered possible. Soustelle was clearly no anticolonialist in the modern sense of
the term, even though his reforms were seen by many Gaullists as anticolonialist in
spirit.
Soustelle's attempts to distance himself from the colonial attitudes of the
administration were intended to prepare the ground for a vigorous programme of
reforms. He set out the general aims of his reforms in March 1955: 'percevoir les
aspirations du peuple de ce pays et ... determiner les taches les plus urgentes'. More
specifically, Soustelle argued that Algeria needed 'progres materiel et culturef, to be
achieved in partnership with France and drawing on the wealth of the metropole.111
Public works projects such as road building, education and irrigation were specific
concerns of Soustelle, but his chief interest was in creating a sense of community
between the French and the Muslims, and providing a clear display of French
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commitment. Soustelle's principal concern was, therefore, with creating the
structures that would allow economic development and political reconciliation,
leaving the more technical aspects of reform to his staff. The framework in which all
Soustelle's reforms were to be implemented was integration.
Integration was, in May 1958, the philosophy that inspired the decisive revolt against
the Fourth Republic. It was the dominant strain of opinion among Gaullists in 1956-
8, and quickly won much support among army officers in Algeria. Soustelle's role in
creating this doctrine, which was assumed at different times to be government policy,
military policy and the pieds-noirs'' ideology of choice, merits close consideration.
Soustelle's advocacy of integration in 1955 has been described as purely 'political',
as opposed to the mystical quality that it had assumed for the pieds-noirs and the
• 112*
military by 1958. This distinction is an important one, as it allows for some study
of the features and aims of Soustelle's integration policies in 1955 while keeping the
issue separate from the way in which integration was subsequently interpreted. For
Soustelle, integration was above all a realistic policy compared to traditional
colonialism or independence; its chief asset was that it respected the 'originality' or
1 1 T
'personnalite' ofAlgeria. Integration developed in stages during Soustelle's time
in Algeria. This fact itself has led to some confusion about Soustelle's intentions in
February 1955. Historians' attempts to explain and define integration have frequently
taken the comprehensive social, political and economic programme outlined by
Soustelle in his 1956 essay, Aimee et souffrante Algerie, as a true representation of
what integration meant to him upon his appointment in 1955.114 Such interpretations
have, as a result, tended to see integration as a coherent doctrine that Soustelle
always intended to apply in Algeria, rather than as a gradual evolution of responses
112 Y. Firestone, 'The Doctrine of Integration with France among the Europeans ofAlgeria, 1955-
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to an ever-worsening crisis. In the context ofGaullist policy on Algeria, integration
might more usefully be seen as a set of principles and objectives that developed
during 1955, in response to specific events, setbacks and opportunities. This
illustrates the way in which Soustelle's close contact with Algeria allowed him to
develop a clearer policy than most other Gaullists, yet distanced him somewhat from
the mainstream of the Gaullist movement in France.
Soustelle went to Algeria determined to apply the Statute of 1947, in line with the
views being expressed by many other Gaullists.115 There is no indication, however,
that Soustelle shared his colleagues' confidence that the application of the Statute
would be sufficient to resolve the problems in Algeria. Soustelle, at the very least,
envisaged combining the political reforms of the Statute with economic reforms.
Valette argues, however, that at the beginning of his mandate, Soustelle was content
to adopt the existing economic reform plans outlined by Minister of the Interior
Franfois Mitterrand in November 1954; he certainly only asked for a relatively
modest sum for economic reform at the time of his appointment, which does not
suggest an initial commitment to the kind of bold and vigorous social and economic
reform that had come to be associated with integration.116 Indeed, many of
Soustelle's initial measures, such as public works programmes to reduce
unemployment, had already been proposed by Mitterrand. Soustelle gradually set
out, through 1955, to define integration as a departure from the outdated assimilation.
Political reforms involved, notably, the creation of a single college electoral system
and the important innovation that political equality now no longer depended upon the
Muslims achieving full French statut civil through education, religion or other former
indications of'loyalty'.117 These measures constituted the first stage of Soustelle's
integration, in February 1955. By May 1955, he had taken integration further, with
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the Plan Soustelle for 'grande integration'. The 'petite integration' with which
Soustelle had begun his career in Algeria had proved to be both too limited to
political equality and too easily frustrated by the pieds-noirs.
The second phase of integration involved the suppression of the Algerian Assembly
and the complete integration of the Algerians' representatives into the National
Assembly in Paris. This plan, much bolder than most people had considered possible,
contained the seeds of future Gaullist discontent with the commitment that
i i o
integration implied. The first steps towards the implementation of this new plan
were to be an intensive effort to involve Muslims in the administration ofAlgeria;
they were expected to finally make up half of the body offonctionnaires. After
submitting this plan to the government in June 1955, Soustelle declared his intention
ofmaking Algeria 'une veritable province franijaise'. It was this conception of
integration, supported by the government, who extended Soustelle's mandate for a
further six months, that contributed greatly to the perception of integration as
symbolic of the development of a large and inclusive Franco-Algerian nation which
was prominent in the demonstrations of 1958.
Soustelle's changing conceptions of integration owed little to his Gaullism or to the
debate taking place during 1955 in metropolitan Gaullist circles; his evolution from a
policy based on the 1947 Statute and existing economic measures to a much deeper
commitment took place before the metropolitan RS had met formally to discuss
policy for the 1956 elections. Soustelle was clearly operating in Algeria according to
the contacts he made and events he experienced. In this context, any analysis of the
118 In the early years of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle expressed his views on the impossibility of
integration: 'Si nous faisions l'integration, si tous les Arabes et Berberes d'Algerie etaient consideres
comme Franfais, comment les empecherait-on de venir s'installer en metropole, alors que le niveau de
vie y est tellement plus eleve? Mon village ne s'appellerait plus Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, mais
Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquees!'. A. Peyrefitte, C'etait de Gaulle: La France redevient la France
(Paris: Fayard, 1994), p. 52. Concerns like these were, by 1959, widespread among Gaullists, although
many do not appear to have appreciated, in 1955, the extent of integration to which Soustelle was
committing them.
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extent to which he represented Gaullism during this period might most usefully focus
on the aims that lay behind Soustelle's integration rather than the specific
circumstances that influenced the development of the policy. By November 1955,
Soustelle's supporters were claiming that, given sufficient support, integration might
be achievable, though the coming six months would be crucial if the pied-noir
opposition was to be overcome.119 The theme of calls for a show of determined
support for measures to keep Algeria French was a familiar one in Fourth Republic
Gaullism. It must be noted, however, that in this case those calling for support for
Soustelle were not by any means all Gaullists; liberal intellectuals were probably
more prominent than Soustelle's fellow Gaullists in the first half of 1955.
Given Soustelle's relative distance from Gaullists during his period in Algeria, the
influence of his chosen collaborators in 1955-56 is an important factor in explaining
the development of Soustelle's views, which influenced those of the Gaullists in
France. Soon after his appointment, in line with his desire to distance himself from
the colonial administration, Soustelle appointed a team of close associates, chosen
for their expertise in Algeria and their opinions on the kind of reform that was
needed. His chief advisers were Commander Vincent Monteil, a veteran of the
Affaires Indigenes bureau of the army in Morocco, and the ethnologist Germaine
Tillion. Both of these appointments reveal that, in February 1955, Soustelle's chief
concern was to understand and identify not with the problems of the pieds-noirs, but
of the Muslims. If integration was to succeed, it would have to be based on a clear
appreciation of the state of the Algerian people. Tillion was especially valuable to
Soustelle in this respect. She had been conducting ethnographic research in the Aures
mountains ofAlgeria since 1938, and had contributed to French studies ofAlgerian
society, just as Soustelle had furthered the study of pre-colonial Mexico in his own
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one of demography and under-development contributed to the development of
Soustelle's view that France could maintain its position in Algeria by making
sufficient investment in social and economic progress. Tillion became a central part
of Soustelle's team in Algiers, with the specific responsibility for creating 'centres
socio-educatifs' to ensure the education of the Muslims, based on a similar scheme
for education of the native population that Soustelle had witnessed in Mexico. In
choosing Tillion as one of his closest collaborators, therefore, Soustelle sent out clear
signals about the programme of social development that he intended, in February
1955, to implement in Algeria.
Vincent Monteil's appointment also revealed much about Soustelle's approach to the
Algerian problem. Monteil was considered a supporter of the left, and had begun his
career in Lyautey's 'indigenous affairs' section in Morocco, devoted to applying the
theory of protectorate through close contacts with the population. He had
subsequently served in Korea and Indochina, and had been among Fouchet's
collaborators in Morocco and Tunisia. He therefore represented the ideal
combination for Soustelle's work in Algeria: an expert in North Africa, Arabic-
speaking and well informed about Muslim culture and politics, and at the same time
aware through first-hand experience of the nature of subversive, anticolonial,
guerrilla warfare that had been practised in East Asia for some years. The military
tactics of the FLN were generally reckoned to be influenced by the success of the
Viet Minh and inspired ideologically by both pan-Arabists and communists. Monteil
was therefore, in Soustelle's eyes, ideally equipped to deal with France's opponents
in Algeria. The Indochinese connection in Soustelle's team also extended to his
appointment ofColonel Jean Constans, an Indochina veteran and director of
Soustelle's cabinet militaire in 1944 while Soustelle was head of security and
intelligence for the Provisional Government in Algiers.121 Constans had kept
1942. Her experience of Algeria had already led Mitterrand, as Minister of the Interior, to recognise




Soustelle informed of the nature of the revolutionary war in Indochina, insisting on
the international nature of the war and the determining role played by China. His
influence on Soustelle's views ofEgyptian interference in Algeria was great,
especially as Monteil and Tillion tended to portray an Algerian population that could
be won over by peaceful means; any failure to do so could be interpreted by
Soustelle as a manifestation of the same kind of outside influence that Constans had
found in Indochina. Soustelle's closest collaborators in Algeria, therefore, were not
chosen for their political closeness to him or to Gaullism, but for their experience of
the social, political and military situation that faced him in February 1955. In this
context, the influence of Soustelle's actions in Algeria on metropolitan politics might
be seen in terms of giving an important voice to those who had been frustrated with
government for apparently ignoring the expertise and first-hand experience that they
had to offer. This is particularly true of the militaires from Indochina; their feelings
of discontent at government colonial policy could now be channelled into an
opportunity to influence policy in Algeria and prevent further mistakes being made.
Soustelle's changing relationships with his chosen collaborators, as much as his
relationship with Gaullism and with government, reveal much about the evolution of
his views on the Algerian problem. A turning-point can be seen around June 1955,
when some of the more liberal and progressive measures that had been proposed
seemed to lose their appeal to Soustelle. The case ofMonteil is instructive in this
respect. His initial contacts with nationalist leaders suggested that the number of
actual armed 'rebels' was small; he therefore recommended to Soustelle a political
solution as in Tunisia, assuming that political reform could prevent any further
recruits to the nationalist forces. Soustelle, however, convinced, like most Gaullists,
that the limit ofpolitical concession had been reached in Morocco and Tunisia,
responded simply that Algerie n'egale pas Tunisie'.122 Some contradiction might be
seen here between the intensive political effort that integration implied and
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Soustelle's reluctance to contemplate a political solution to the problem of nationalist
violence. Even at this early stage, the Governor-General appears not to have
entertained the idea that the nationalists could play a part in the political settlement.
Soustelle's own travels in Algeria had convinced him that the small nationalist forces
had managed to instil such fear in the population that they would have to be defeated
rather than appeased if his ambitious social reform programme was to have any
chance of success.
In March 1955, Monteil arranged meetings between Soustelle and the nationalist
leaders Ferhat Abbas and Ahmed Francis. Soustelle displayed some liberalism by
assuring Francis that the state of emergency legislation he was urging the National
Assembly to pass did not mean that nationalists would be arrested for non-violent
political expression, and he indeed proceeded to release two thousand nationalists
imprisoned for non-violent protest. The pied-noir reaction to leaked reports of this
meeting was so hostile, however, that Soustelle began to distance himself from
Monteil's mission to develop contacts and engage in secret negotiations with
nationalists. The local administrative and judicial officials demonstrated their
discontent and their capacity for obstructiveness, and Soustelle's liberal measures
were already vulnerable to pied-noir machinations.123 Monteil's reports of torture
met with the same response; Soustelle's initial attempts to ensure that measures were
taken to prevent it were undermined by officials who released and then quickly re¬
arrested nationalists. Soustelle eventually had to admit that, despite his efforts, he
could not guarantee the good treatment of prisoners. Soustelle's liberal policy of
contact with nationalists was being undermined by the pieds-noirs, to the dismay of
Monteil, who, in June 1955, resigned in frustration at Soustelle's reluctance to
modify his goal of integration. Monteil argued that a programme of political reform
and liberalisation, leading to a federal Algeria, would prove more acceptable to his
123 Ullmann, p. 198; G. Fleury, Tuez de Gaulle: Histoire de I'attentat du Petit-Clamart (Paris: Grasset,
1996), pp. 33-4
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nationalist contacts, but Soustelle remained determined to pursue integration, despite
the encouragement it offered the pieds-noirs and the greater nationalist opposition it
inspired, which in turn obliged the Governor-General to order more vigorous military
operations.124
Germaine Tillion's project of educational centres suffered the same fate, with
Soustelle's evolution, as Monteil's contacts with the nationalists. The centres lost
their importance in Soustelle's programme and Tillion became isolated from the
1 ?S
Governor-General's cabinet from June 1955. Soustelle instead concentrated on a
more military application of his vision of social inclusion, creating the Sections
Administrates Specialises (SAS) in 1955. These were modelled on the Affaires
Indigenes branch of the army in Morocco, and Soustelle appointed another officer
with considerable Moroccan experience, General Parlange, to oversee their creation.
The SAS were conceived not as part of a social reform programme - though they
performed important social functions - but rather, in the context of the intensification
of the military 'pacification' effort. They were to place Arabic-speaking officers
among the local population, with the aim of implementing French administration on
a local level - under-administration had been identified as one of the reasons for the
outbreak of the rebellion - and establishing contact with the population. While part
of the SAS' mission was to improve economic and social conditions, their chief role
was to gather intelligence and spread counter-intelligence, while also attempting to
bring Europeans and Muslims together. Thus, from the purely social and civilian
function ofTillion's educational centres, Soustelle shifted his attention to a military
means of integrating the Algerian population.126 The state of emergency legislation
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passed in Paris in April 1955 had allowed Soustelle to give the army greater powers
to intervene in civilian life; with the SAS, he attempted to enforce French control of
Algeria by devolving administrative functions to the army, thereby creating a
politicised officer corps that had been put to the service of integration. The effects of
Soustelle's decision to enlist military support for his programme can be seen in the
deep attachment ofmany officers to integration by the end of Soustelle's time in
Algeria, which contrasted with the continuing indifference ofmost of the Algerians.
Along with Soustelle's closer reliance on his military collaborators, he also
appointed, in April 1955, a new police chief, Gaston Pontal. Pontal had previously
been head of the intelligence services (Division de la Surveillance du Territoire) in
North Africa; this may be seen as a case of Soustelle seeking to reactivate the
intelligence networks from his own spell as Head of Intelligence in Algiers in 1943-
44. By the summer of 1955, Soustelle's emphasis in Algeria was clearly on military
and police operations, in the name of pacification and integration, with the
programme of civilian social and political reform somewhat sidelined.
While Soustelle was making his mark on Algeria, he also sought to exert as much
influence as possible on the government in Paris, stressing the absolute priority that
should be given to the Algerian situation. Once Soustelle's initiatives were in place
in Algeria, metropolitan governments were obliged to support him in the absence of
any alternative policy. Thus, in June 1955, reappointing Soustelle for a further six
months, Prime Minister Faure publicly praised his economic reforms and progress
towards integration. Faure was at the time moving in a completely different direction
over Morocco and Tunisia, but the fact that Soustelle presented him with specific
1 "J *7
projects under way in Algeria left him little room for manoeuvre. Soustelle's
influence on government became stronger throughout 1955. Echoing a familiar
Gaullist theme, he repeatedly complained to Faure about insufficient military means




thus becoming a strong voice of opposition in the months preceding the 1956
1 98
elections. In December 1955, he decided that the situation in Algeria prevented the
elections taking place in the Algerian departements, thereby strengthening the ability
of the Governor-General, the administration and the army to operate in Algeria
without close scrutiny from parliament in Paris. After the elections, Soustelle's
influence on domestic policy-making was seen in a leaked memo to Prime Minister
Guy Mollet, which revealed a full integration project, involving total political, legal
1 9Q
and economic integration, to be realised within six months. This radical plan - the
closest integration yet proposed - ensured that integration remained on the domestic
political agenda throughout the Mollet government even after Soustelle's departure
from office. It was the first clear statement of what integration meant for
metropolitan France - one hundred Algerian deputies in the National Assembly, for
example - and it emphasised the extent to which Algerian and domestic politics were
now interrelated. The Gaullist theme of the absolute importance ofAlgeria for the
metropole was thus brought clearly into the national consciousness in one of
Soustelle's last acts as Governor-General. He followed this by urging Mollet to
outline a clear Algerian policy and implement a loi-cadre, two demands that were to
set the tone of political debate on Algeria in Paris for the remaining years of the
Fourth Republic. Soustelle's influence, exerted on Paris from a distance, extended far
beyond Gaullist circles, but many of the ideas he imposed on the minds of politicians
and on public opinion were recognisably Gaullist, though altered to suit the situation
in Algeria.
While most of Soustelle's contacts in Algeria were with his own collaborators and
with Paris, he did not entirely disregard the attempts made by Monteil to engage in
meaningful relations with the Muslims. Indeed, he was convinced that the 'fait






in 1955, Soustelle emphasised that recent events in Egypt, notably the emergence of
Muslim Brotherhood organisations as a political entity, meant that the study of
Muslim religious and political institutions was essential to the understanding of
1 TO
Algeria. Seeing the Algerian rebellion in the context of a pan-Arab movement,
Soustelle was convinced of the need to devote considerable time to study of the
emerging Islamic movements. Frequently, however, he found himself unable to
convince even the moderate nationalists of the benefits of his integration plans. As
has been seen, early attempts at dialogue were frustrated by nationalist suspicion of
the powers available to the French authorities under the state of emergency
legislation, and many of Soustelle's apparently genuine early attempts to develop
partnership with Muslim leaders came to nothing.
By June 1955, Soustelle had begun to lose patience with the nationalists' violence;
this shift in his opinion was largely caused by the assassination ofMaurice Dupuy, a
government official who worked among Muslims on programmes of improvement in
living conditions in line with Soustelle's reform plans. The August 20 massacres at
Philippeville definitively turned Soustelle firmly against the idea of compromise with
moderate nationalists and pushed him closer to the pieds-noirs, but the origins of this
shift can be seen as early as June 1955. Further confirmation that the nationalists
were not receptive to integration or reform came in November 1955, when the
Muslim deputies in the Algerian Assembly rejected his latest measures to those
ni
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ends. Soustelle came to see the nationalists as a force that was not interested in
reform but only in revolution, a fact that he generally attributed to the influence of
foreign extremists. The distance between Soustelle's reforms and the nationalists'
aspirations became clearer in January 1956, after the leaked integration plan won the
support of the pieds-noirs and conservatives. The Algerian 'moderates', such as
130
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Ferhat Abbas, now lost hope in Soustelle's ability to bring about change,132 and his
spell in Algeria ended with only the Europeans satisfied. Gaullism in metropolitan
France, by its association with Soustelle, increasingly came to be identified with the
defence of settler interests in Algeria.
Soustelle's opponents were not only found among the Muslim community, although
it was there that opposition to his plans was most frequently expressed. In February
1955, he might be said to have faced greater opposition from thepieds-noirs.
Arriving with a reputation as a liberal, which his academic career did little to deny,
and already tarnished in pied-noir eyes by his association with de Gaulle, Soustelle
was attacked as a Jew and a supporter of the Muslims. That he had been appointed by
Mendes-France did little to reassure the settlers. His initial plans for reform were
obstructed in the Algerian Assembly, particularly as he sought to use the so-called
petits blancs - working class settlers - who were in regular contact with the Muslims
1 TT
as the vehicles for the spread of integration. In the early stages of Soustelle's
governorship, Muslim opposition was not very prominent, with the exception of the
most extreme nationalists who sought to polarise the two communities in Algeria.
From the summer of 1955, however, Soustelle's enemies were increasingly to be
found among the moderate Muslim community and French liberals.
After the events ofAugust and September 1955, which witnessed the escalation of
violence on both sides of the conflict, Soustelle effectively became the champion of
the pieds-noirs. Integration became their ideology, and the Governor-General
remained the embodiment of their hopes until May 1958 and beyond. The massacres
ofAugust 20 were largely responsible for creating this situation. The FLN's violence
was initially blamed on Soustelle's excessively tolerant policy, and the social aspects
lj2
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of his reforms were the first casualties. In France, Koenig echoed the view, held by
many pieds-noirs, that measure such as the 'arabisation' of education in Algeria were
in fact encouraging nationalism. Soustelle concluded that only military victory would
allow for the restoration of calm that his integration project required. The Governor-
General underwent what Gai'ti has described as 'la conversion brutale, apres un sejour
en Algerie, d'hommes reputes de gauche ou liberaux a la solution de force'.lj4 The
experience ofAugust 1955 was instructive for the pieds-noirs in that it confirmed
their views that negotiation could not end the rebellion. In France, it created the idea,
later demonstrated by Guy Mollet's volte-face over Catroux's appointment when
faced with settler protests on February 6, 1956, that metropolitan politicians could be
profoundly affected by the crisis in Algeria.
The principal effect of the violence ofAugust 1955 on Soustelle's policies in Algeria
was to convince him of the need to intensify the military effort. In February 1955, he
135
had ordered a policy of only limited military reprisals against nationalist forces.
Military discontent with these instructions was clear; officers warned Soustelle not to
be optimistic about the possibility of successfully dealing with the rebellion under
1
the present circumstances. The Governor-General's attempt to persuade the
Algerians of the beneficence of France, however, called for the avoidance of
excessive military force. Measures to control nationalist activity were limited to
those allowed under the state of emergency legislation voted in April 1955, such as
restrictions on movement and limits on the press and political activity. Many of the
excesses of repression carried out by sections of the army under cover of the special
1 T7
powers granted in Paris appear to have escaped Soustelle's knowledge initially.
After the events ofAugust, however, Soustelle immediately joined those in the
metropole - his fellow-Gaullists among them - in calling for the intensification of
134 Gai'ti, pp. 188-90. General Salan and Robert Lacoste also underwent this phenomenon of
'conversion' in Algeria.






the pacification process. Thus, in one of the areas in which Soustelle had in February
1955 differed from many of his colleagues - the use ofmilitary force - his
experience of Algeria contributed to a greater sense of the urgency and importance of
eradicating the rebellion.
A second important turning-point in this respect was the so-called 'Motion des 61',
adopted in the Algerian assembly against integration and the French military effort,
in September 1955. This represented the first open rejection by the generally
Francophile and moderate Algerian deputies of continuing close association between
Algeria and France. Soustelle's vision of the overwhelmingly pro-French and anti-
nationalist state ofAlgerian opinion suffered a public setback. Soustelle, along with
most Gaullists, interpreted this, however, as a sign that the Algerian people had
fallen victim to a form of extremism imported from other countries, and responded
with calls for intensification of the military effort. In contrast, the Muslim deputies'
rejection of integration hastened its acceptance by the pieds-noirs and its
identification with the Algerie frangaise cause. The deputies' protest against French
military methods fell on deaf ears; torture continued and intensified, and pied-noir
self-defence groups continued to receive tacit approval from the authorities.
Soustelle's attempt at positioning himself between the nationalists and the settlers
had clearly failed by the summer of 1955. As the community became polarised, just
as the perpetrators of violence such as the August 20 massacres had intended, liberal
pieds-noirs also turned against Soustelle, and from around December 1955 the
Radical mayor ofAlgiers, Jacques Chevallier, was beginning to attract the
progressive support that Soustelle had hoped to win over to the cause of integration
1 T8
and regeneration.
Negotiation and reform alone seemed to have failed by the summer of 1955; the




great to defeat those who sought to obstruct his integration project. His earlier calls
for military reinforcements - including conscripts - intensified, and accusations of
torture were no longer treated as sympathetically as they had been earlier in the year.
The basis was laid for subsequent Gaullist attacks on all those who questioned
military methods, including torture, to be condemned as anti-French defeatists. The
Gaullists' belief in the vigorous pursuit of the war in Algeria, in order to make
reform possible, can be seen as another consequence of the 'conversion' of Soustelle
in the summer of 1955. Algeria's influence on French politics grew after August 20,
1955; Soustelle's shift from liberalism to repression was mirrored by the increasing
urgency that characterised metropolitan debate over Algeria between then and May
1958. For the Gaullists, Soustelle now emerged as having a plan that could save
Algeria but could not be implemented under current circumstances. The need for a
government to end the rebellion, reassure the pieds-noirs and show sufficient
commitment to serious investment in Algeria was now made abundantly clear.
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CHAPTER 8
TOWARDS THE END: FEBRUARY 1956 - APRIL 1958
After Soustelle's return to France, Gaullists rarely held official positions before de
Gaulle's return to power in May 1958. The period addressed in this chapter,
therefore, is one in which Gaullists' views on the Algerian situation were developed
primarily from a position of permanent opposition to the regime, to government, to
any attempts to withdraw from Algeria, and to international involvement in the crisis.
It is this two-year spell of consistent opposition - only occasionally supporting
government, when it was deemed necessary to prevent any further erosion of French
authority — that has earned the Gaullist movement its reputation for being little more
than a force of constant opposition to the regime. While it is true that the chief
characteristics of Gaullist activities in 1956-8 are a loss of hope that the Fourth
Republic was capable of solving the Algerian crisis, and the emergence of a coherent
doctrine arguing that only the overthrow of the regime could save French Algeria, it
would be wrong to see the Gaullists of this period as merely a voice of opposition to
the government. Their lack of official responsibilities - only Chaban-Delmas held
high office in this period - allowed them to develop a number of reform plans for
Algeria, along with a clearly defined argument against the Fourth Republic, which
allowed Gaullism, in the summer of 1958, to re-emerge as a political force with a
programme to implement. Among the reform plans discussed in 1956-8, the most
important are constitutional and electoral reform, reflection on the nature of relations
between France and Algeria, and a strong belief in the value of economic
development of Algeria and, especially, the Sahara. The plans outlined in this
chapter, therefore, are of importance not only for analysis of the evolution ofGaullist
thought, but also for an understanding of Gaullism's platform in 1958 and ofmany of
the aims and assumptions that lay behind the policies attempted in the early stages of
the Fifth Republic. All these potential reforms, however, must be seen in the context
of absolute determination to keep Algeria French; even as public opinion and the
views of other political movements began to contemplate a negotiated settlement, the
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Gaullists remained strong defenders ofAlgerie franqaise throughout the final two
years of the Fourth Republic.1
Reform Plans for Algeria and the Sahara
One of the Gaullists' first areas of focus was the question of representation and
constitutional relations between France and Algeria. With the introduction of the
Mollet government's loi-cadre for Sub-Saharan Africa in 1956 giving rise to calls for
a similar reform for Algeria, constitutional reform was also one of the most-debated
issues relating to Algeria in parliament. While the issue came to prominence in 1957
with the Bourges-Manoury government's loi-cadre for Algeria - which would have
created several self-governing territories in Algeria, eventually to be united - the
Gaullists were already focusing on the question of administrative or constitutional
reforms throughout 1956. For Soustelle, the most important aspect of the subject was
the electoral colleges: a single electoral college composed of all Muslims and
Europeans was seen as the clearest symbol of French commitment to Algeria, though
it was deemed unacceptable by pieds-noirs and, as a result, opposed by metropolitan
conservatives and many Gaullists. Soustelle, however, insisted that the single college
was the only way for France to demonstrate the degree of commitment implied by
integration.3
1 The RS, at their Conseil national of June 1957, resolved to remain 'unanimes dans leur resolution
inflexible de maintenir l'Algerie fran9aise ... partie integrante de la Republique fran9aise', though they
did also speak of Algeria being composed of autonomous regions with local decision-making powers,
acknowledging the evolution of Gaullist views that had take place through the discussions on
federalism. This resolution provides a useful guide to the margin ofmanoeuvre likely to be available to
any Gaullist proposing reform of the relations between France and Algeria. S. Berstein, Histoire du
gaullisme (Paris: Perrin, 2001), p. 199
2 The proposed loi-cadre was to divide Algeria into five territories with representative assemblies and
limited legislative powers, co-ordinated by a federal Assembly and Council for the whole of Algeria.
The assemblies were to be elected by a single electoral college comprising all residents. Algerians
would continue to be represented in the French parliament, and the Minister for Algeria would have
overall authority. The chief issues of contention in France were this single college and the question of
internal federalism within Algeria, which many felt risked creating the foundations of a future
Algerian state. T. Oppermann, Le probleme algerien: donnees historiques, juridiques, politiques,
trans, by J. Lecerf (Paris: Maspero, 1961), pp. 176-87
3
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Soustelle, by now the pieds-noirs' chief ally in Paris, was certainly aware of their
fears of becoming an oppressed minority if a single college were introduced, but he
considered the single college sufficiently important to merit a report outlining ways
in which they could be reassured. He pointed out, for example, that the fact that final
decision making power was to remain in Paris ought to provide sufficient guarantee
that their interests would not be neglected. Furthermore, Soustelle suggested, any
administrative reform in Algeria could be carried out in such a way that constituency
boundaries would be redrawn to ensure that virtually all Europeans lived in
European-majority areas and would therefore be government by a local assembly of
Europeans.4 The extent to which this apparent separation of the pieds-noirs from the
Muslims whose rule they would not accept actually corresponded to the ideal of
integration that Soustelle had set out in 1955 is questionable. Indeed, given the later
proposals by his associates in the Algerie franqaise camp, in 1961-2, to create a
South African-style system of separation in Algeria, it is possible to see, as early as
1956, the evolution of Soustelle's ideas on relations between the two communities in
Algeria towards this position that would later be adopted once the Algerie franqaise
cause seemed lost. Gaston Palewski appeared to echo Soustelle's views on the
intractable problem of representation of the two communities within one body when
he argued that:
La bonne solution semblerait done non pas de rapprocher Fran9ais et
Musulmans au sein des memes institutions; mais au contraire de les separer.
Ce n'est pas une communaute franco-musulmane qu'il faudrait creer, mais
deux communautes, l'une ffanfaise, l'autre arabe.5
While Palewski may simply have been reiterating publicly the ideas expressed
privately by Soustelle, the fact that, at a time when debate in France centred around
the question of finding ways to unite the Muslim and European communities, a
4 RPF archives, BR.UF45, Dossier Soustelle sur 1'Algerie, 'Avant-Rapport sur les problemes relatifs
au futur statut de 1'Algerie', 1956.
3 G. Palewski, 'Une politique pour l'Afrique du Nord', Revue politique et parlementaire, 660 (July
1956), pp. 7-17
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senior Gaullist published such remarks might be seen as further evidence that the
Gaullists were already turning away from integration towards a clearer position as
defenders of the pieds-noirs' rights.
In January 1958, after the defeat of the first loi-cadre in parliament in November
1957, due largely to Soustelle's fierce opposition, the Gaullists reiterated their strong
support for the continued separation of European and Algerian electoral colleges.
Michel Debre claimed, in response to the government's argument that to remove the
single college from the loi-cadre would frustrate the Muslims' aspirations and thus
play into the hands of the nationalists, that the dual college system might actually
prove the best way to ensure accurate representation of each community.6 Another
Gaullist senator, Dubois, went further than Debre, questioning the assumption that
the Muslims were in favour of a single college, claiming that Muslim opinion could
not be reliably measured because of nationalist propaganda. Dubois' opposition to
the dual college was, however, motivated chiefly by a desire to defend pied-noir
interests; the single college went further than equality and was an assault on their
position, which could have serious consequences: 'Si vous les deceviez [the pieds-
noirs] definitivement, la France ne perdrait pas seulement son regime, elle se perdrait
aussi'.7 What was at stake in the loi-cadre, therefore, was much more important than
the effective government of Algeria; to alienate or annoy the pieds-noirs could
undermine the entire French mission in Algeria.
Throughout the loi-cadre debates of 1957, it is hard to identify a coherent Gaullist
position, with Gaullist responses varying from Soustelle's conviction of the need for
some kind of reform to others' outright rejection of any change at all. The issue
might, in addition, be seen as one which demonstrated Gaullist attitudes to the
government and the regime itself; to accept the need for a loi-cadre might have been
6
Debre, CR, 16.1.1958, JORF
1
Debre, CR, 16.1.1958, JORF
206
seen as acceptance of the regime's ability to solve the Algerian problem, a position
that few Gaullists were keen to be associated with. For Soustelle, however, reform
was needed simply because military success had been achieved by mid-1957 and the
o
promised French commitment must therefore follow. If it were accompanied by the
election ofAlgerian representatives to the National Assembly that had been
postponed in January 1956, it would achieve the Gaullists' aim of strengthening the
links between Algeria and France.9 Indeed, despite evidence that integration was
losing some support among Gaullists, the strongest argument advanced in favour of
some kind of reform was that a loi-cadre would inevitably be 'integrationniste' in
spirit, a step in the right direction away from autonomy.10
Soustelle's argument that reform was needed - even though he opposed the Bourges-
Manoury government's attempts in 1957 - was challenged by some Gaullists, who
felt that the government's plans were only being introduced in response to
international pressure. This view was prevalent among less senior Gaullists, who
might be assumed to represent mainstream Gaullist opinion; deputy Rene Malbrant,
for example, announced that the only purpose of announcing an interest in reform
could be to satisfy the United Nations.11 Even the normally moderate Lettre a
I 'Union Frangaise declared that the reform plans for Algeria were only intended to
19
appease international opinion. In response, Soustelle pointed out that the fact that a
certain reform plan had been introduced to appease international opinion did not
mean that it should not be taken seriously in France.13 Soustelle found little support,
however; his fierce attacks on the government's proposals also cast some doubt on
the sincerity of his appeals to Gaullists to at least consider the possibility of reform.
With the Gaullists' acknowledged intellectual leader on Algerian affairs prepared to
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bring down a government because of the wrong kind of reform, those opposed to any
reform at all were certainly not alienated from Soustelle in 1957. It might be argued
that the Gaullists opposed to the loi-cadre of 1957 were not in fact against any
reform; they merely suspected that international pressure was behind this particular
proposal and therefore rejected it, fearing that it would be hastily implemented and
would further weaken France's position. However, the absence of any alternative
proposals other than defence of the pieds-noirs' position tends to undermine this
interpretation. The senator Abel-Durand, for example, opposed the loi-cadre because
the Europeans, who constituted the principal economic and social force in Algeria,
would be weakened by it.14 By 1958, the Gaullists claimed to be vindicated in their
opposition to reform when it was reported that the loi-cadre was working badly in
the rest ofAfrica, where nationalists had been encouraged and French authority
weakened.15
Away from the pressure to adopt a position on the loi-cadre in response to
government proposals, the Gaullists engaged in more general debate about relations
between Algeria and France. Foccart acknowledged that the Algerian crisis was
essentially the result of under-administration, and welcomed plans to divide Algeria
into twelve departments, though such a scheme implied considerably less devolution
of power than the loi-cadre and was designed to allow Algeria to be administered
like metropolitan France.16 Debre shared this position, accepting the need for
decentralisation - to create, he suggested, metropolitan-style 'Conseils Generaux' -
but without any kind of institution that could rival the State or develop into an
Algerian state mechanism.17 The constitutional option that Gaullists addressed most
willingly in 1956-8, however, was that of federalism, in line with the federal
character of an effective Union frangaise outlined in de Gaulle's Bordeaux speech of
14
Abel-Durand, CR, 17.1.1958, JORF
15 R. Frey, Les Idees ... Les Faits, 30 (17.2.1958)
16 Lettre a I 'Union Frangaise, 335 (24.5.1956)
17
Debre, CR, 4.12.1956, JORF
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1947 (see p. 24). Strangely, given de Gaulle's view that the Union franqaise could
only function effectively with a federal constitution, Soustelle argued that federalism
would in fact lead to secession because of the international influence that a semi-
18
autonomous Algeria would be subjected to. He explained that the situation in North
Africa had changed since the time when federalism was seen as a viable option: now
Algeria would have to seek financial assistance from other states if it were not fully
supported by France, and both the Soviet Union and the Arab League would fill the
gap left by France's loosening of ties.19 Pierre Billotte agreed, claiming that federal
assemblies would be dominated by nationalists, federalism implied partition along
the lines of Vietnam or Korea, which could not be achieved in Algeria because of the
demographic and economic situation - the French community would have make up a
sufficiently large part of each unit for these to be viable - and the end result of
federalism would be the 'ecrasement politique' of the pieds-noirs. International
opinion might be satisfied by the partition ofAlgeria into smaller units but, Billotte
argued, the only division that might seriously be envisaged would be the creation of
European and Algerian assemblies with a co-ordinating body to oversee the
90
scheme. Thus, federalism was rejected by Gaullists during 1956-7, being replaced
either by the status quo - commitment to integration - or by the complete separation
of French and Muslim communities in Algeria. Federalism could only be acceptable
91
if it were implemented as part of a reform of the entire constitution - a project that
implied both a return to the 'pure' Gaullism of 1947 and the replacement of the
Fourth Republic with a new system.
18
Soustelle, speech, 'La verite sur l'Algerie', 2.3.1956
19 RPF archives, Dossier Soustelle
20
Billotte, 'Le subterfuge du federalisme interne', Le Monde, 21.9.1957
21
Soustelle, AN, 30.9.1957, JORF. The Gaullists argued that if the entire constitution were reformed,
then a federal Union franqaise - perhaps also including Morocco and Tunisia - could be envisaged.
Otherwise, federalism in Algeria alone would only weaken French rule.
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The Sahara: France's New Frontier
An important new aspect of the Gaullists' search for a means of ensuring the
permanence of the French presence in Algeria, from 1956 onwards, was the potential
seen in the Sahara desert. Though the Sahara's mineral wealth and economic
potential had been the subject of attempted exploitation for many years - the trans-
Saharan railway, for example, had been first conceived in 1860 and had reached the
far south ofAlgeria by 1948 - it was not until 1956 that confirmation was received
of the desert's vast oil and gas reserves, with the discovery of large oil deposits in the
Algerian Sahara. The Sahara's resources seemed to guarantee that France would
always have access to oil reserves regardless of any interruption in the flow of
Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe, a situation considered possible given the
West's fears about Nasser's intentions in Egypt. Indeed, France would be able to
become an exporter of oil. Such excitement about the Sahara was by no means
limited to the Gaullists, and it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a detailed
22
account of the various plans for exploitation of the Sahara. However, the news that
the Sahara desert could make a substantial economic contribution to the nation as a
whole was music to the ears of those Gaullists who believed that a great national
project to modernise and industrialise Algeria would prove fruitful in both economic
and political terms. The Sahara's energy reserves were evidence in support of the
Gaullist argument that sufficient investment by France in North Africa would be
richly rewarded.
The immediate problem facing the Gaullists in relation to the Sahara was to outline
exactly how its mise en valeur should take place. Soustelle proposed, firstly, that the
Sahara be considered an integral part of the new Algeria that he envisaged.
Comparing the task facing France in Algeria and the Sahara to that undertaken by
22 On the development of the Sahara, see D. Strasser, Realties et promesses sahariennes (Paris:
Encyclopedie d'Outre-Mer, 1956); N. Bodington, The Awakening Sahara (London: Andre Deutsch,
1961); P.R. Baduel (ed.), Enjeux sahariens (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1984); H. Elsenhans, La Guerre
d'Algerie 1954-1962. La transition d'une France a une autre. Le passage de la IVe a la Ve
Republique., trans, by V. Goupy (Paris: Publisud, 1999), pp. 221-344.
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Italy in developing Sicily and the South, he called for special government funds to be
created and set aside for developing new agricultural and industrial resources,
i • • • • 23
beginning with large-scale irrigation projects. Thus, the desert could be exploited
not only for its oil reserves, but also as a new frontier territory to be made available
to Algeria's fast-growing population, providing crops, industrial goods and
employment. In less concrete terms, the development of the Sahara would rejuvenate
France: the desert would be France's 'Far-South' just as the United States' prosperity
and greatness had relied heavily on the development of the American 'far-west'.24
That the Sahara's importance was political as much as economic was seen in the new
vigour that the plans to develop the desert gave the Gaullists' existing interest in
modernising and industrialising the whole of Algeria. In 1957, Soustelle, on behalfof
his cross-party Union Pour le Salut et le Renouveau de I'Algerie Franqaise
(USRAF), proposed the creation of a 'pilot zone' in Algeria, in which an intensive
programme of industrialisation, agricultural improvement, land reform, education
and training would take place. This zone would then serve as an example both to the
rest ofAlgeria and Africa, and to the international community, of France's capability
and willingness to exploit Algeria's new-found wealth in a symbol of its
commitment to incorporating Algeria into a renewed national community.23 Soustelle
was keen to stress the development aspect of the subject to international opinion. He
argued, in the American journal Foreign Affairs, that thanks to the industrial
potential of the Algerian Sahara, traditional agricultural practices were being
replaced by modern ones and dependence on the land reduced, a process that was
• 96
possible only through Algeria's association with France. In addition, it was hoped,
such clear evidence of investment and modernisation would have the further benefit
of identifying the nationalists as opponents of progress.
2j
Soustelle, 'Que faire en Algerie', speech, 21.3.1956.
24 Soustelle, Le drame algerien et la decadencefranqaise: reponse a RaymondAron (Paris: Plon,
1957), pp. 31-4. The term 'far-south' was always used in English by the Gaullists, emphasising the
comparison with the United States.
25 Soustelle, 'En Algerie: demontrer le mouvement en marchant', Journal du Parlement, 16.5.1957
26 Soustelle, 'France Looks at her Alliances', Foreign Affairs, 35 (1956), pp. 116-30
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The Sahara's new potential also allowed the Gaullists to develop more fully the
argument that the future of France itselfwas at stake in the struggle to retain
authority in Algeria. Jacques Dauer, calling for 'economic revolution' to increase
French productivity and create new wealth, employment and opportunities, argued
that none of this would be possible without the development and modernisation of
the whole of the Union franqaise along the lines being envisaged for the Sahara. A
vast internal market could be created, while North Africa's potential in terms of
resources, manpower and new areas for industrialisation could be exploited to make
97
France an international economic power. Soustelle, meanwhile, provided detailed
statistical analysis of the progress so far and the great potential in industry,
agriculture and social improvement since development had begun in the rural and
9R
desert regions of Algeria. The Gaullists, already determined to convince the
metropole to make sufficient investment in Algeria, therefore welcomed the
discovery of the Sahara's potential as a way to channel funds and commitment into
the whole ofAlgeria.
While the discovery of energy reserves in the Sahara seems to have been exploited
by Gaullists chiefly as a means of persuading government and industry to make the
required commitment to Algeria, they did not ignore the possibilities that the oil
itself represented. Soustelle called upon the government to immediately extend the
remit of the national electricity and gas suppliers to cover Algeria, where much of the
early exploration had been undertaken by private French interests or foreign oil
90
companies. A year later, he argued for the first time that, rather than being a
financial burden, as advocates of withdrawal insisted (see p. 158), Algeria was in a
27 J. Dauer & M. Rodet, 'La France et Plus de Justice', Cahiers du Telegramme de Paris (March 1956)
28
Soustelle, La verite sur FAlgerie, 7 (1-15.1.1957)
29
Soustelle, AN, 9.3.1956, JORF. The French government did already have a stake in the exploration
under way in the Sahara, thanks to the Bureau des Recherches du Petrole, established in 1945.
Soustelle, however, saw the involvement of Electricite de France and Gaz de France as potent
symbols of the national project in Algeria.
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position to benefit France economically, and would eventually provide two thirds of
-3A
national energy needs by 1969. With the cost of energy thus driven down by a
domestic abundance, France would be relieved of the financial burden that was
currently preventing it from achieving great power status because of the extent of
borrowing undertaken since 1945. Even the debt incurred in the Algerian War would,
by this logic, be justified by the economic potential of the Sahara. Financial
independence would clearly bring political independence from the United States and
would allow France the Gaullists' cherished international freedom of action. The
development of the Sahara also came into contact with the Gaullists' international
political concerns in terms of the seemingly simple matter of how to get the oil and
gas from the desert to the coast. The spectre of international 'interference' -
presumably from the Arab League countries - troubled Foccart to the extent that he
considered that, by 1958, the Sahara had become essentially a political rather than an
economic question.31
That the Sahara had become a political matter for the Gaullists rather than a purely
economic one was hardly surprising; hardly any subject, in 1956-8, failed to provide
an opportunity to demonstrate the benefits that could be gained from a more coherent
and committed political approach to the nation's problems. The Sahara mirrored the
rest ofAlgeria in that its effective development called for the creation of an efficient
system of political administration. The government created, in January 1957, the
Organisation Commune des Regions Sahariennes (OCRS), a body that de Gaulle
retained under the Fifth Republic. During the discussion on the political status of the
Sahara - a subject that was to feature prominently in the Algerian independence
negotiations of 1961 -2 — the Gaullists showed some of the same concerns as had
been evident over the loi-cadre and the earlier case of the protectorates. Soustelle
was particularly concerned that the OCRS proposal would separate the southern
30 Soustelle, T/V, 21.3.1957, JORF
31 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 410 (10.1.1958)
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territories ofAlgeria from the rest of the country, attaching them to the new Sahara
territory that would also include the northern parts of the Black African colonies.
TO
Given the FLN's belated interest in the Sahara as a front in the war, and the
extensive political and military powers to be held by each region's Delegue General,
it was feared that both administration and military operations in Algeria might be
complicated by this geographical division. Soustelle's preferred plan was to retain
the geographical unity of Algeria, but to create departments in the Sahara, as had
initially been proposed in 1947.34 Palewski agreed, saying that unification of the
Sahara would benefit Algeria and it should therefore be given its own statute and
35administered by France as a part of the metropole or the Union frangaise. Thus the
Sahara was to be treated as a geographical whole, just as the Gaullists had called for
a single military command for the whole of the Maghreb before the independence of
Morocco and Tunisia. Division ofNorth Africa into smaller units tended, according
36
to Gaullists, to lead to under-administration and to encourage the nationalists. In
particular, the danger of political internationalisation was to be avoided; agreements
must be reached with Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania regarding the precise
frontiers and rights of those states, while other countries' interests were to be
37restricted to rights of passage and trade.
The Sahara contributed an added dimension to the Gaullists' defence ofAlgeria in
the name of France's future and greatness. Foccart saw the desert as France's great
32 Lettre a VUnion Frangaise, 360 (20.12.1956)
33 On the extension of the war to the Sahara, S. Chikh, 'L'enjeu saharien dans la guerre d'Algerie', in
Baduel (ed.), Enjeux sahariens, pp. 95-7
34 Soustelle, AN, 13.12.1956, JORF
35 G. Palewski, 'Perspectives sahariennes', Revue politique etparlementaire, 663 (December 1956),
pp. 345-60
36 Michel Debre later complained that to divide the Sahara into different territories would create a
situation like that in the Middle East. Debre, 'Mauvais depart au Sahara', Courrier de la Colere, 1
(4.1.1958)
37 G. Palewski, 'Perspectives sahariennes', pp. 355-8. In March 1958, the Gaillard government's
proposal to co-operate with Morocco and Tunisia in exploitation of the Sahara was rejected by the
Gaullists, not least because the former protectorates could sell their share of the energy concerns to
foreign interests, most likely the United States. Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 419 (13.3.1958)
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new chance and described those working on its development as pioneers, issuing a
challenge to the nation to seize this opportunity:
La France est-elle a la hauteur des destinees nouvelles que le Sahara lui offre?
La reponse de l'histoire a cette question depend du peuple fran9ais lui-meme
- selon qu'il aura ou non laisse le regime gaspiller la chance evoquee par le
T O
general de Gaulle.
In addition to the economic prospects offered by the Sahara, the Gaullists also
stressed its strategic importance, further contributing to the image of a strong and
independent France emerging from correct exploitation of the Sahara. Palewski
envisaged a mobile rapid intervention force for the whole of Africa, based in the
Sahara, to ensure the security of French interests, an idea that was implemented
under the Fifth Republic. The other obvious beneficiary of the Sahara's resources
would be the nuclear energy programme; the required mineral resources were to be
found in the Sahara and sub-Saharan Africa, and the desert would provide an ideal
test site.39 In terms of the Sahara's strategic value, the Gaullists' views coincided
with those ofmany in the military, who had been interested in its potential for heavy
industry, communications and as a military base since the early 1950s. General
Catroux was a frequent contributor to debates on the subject in the military press,
along with the Sahara's chief advocate in military circles, Admiral Raoul Castex,
who shared the Gaullists' conviction about the crucial importance played by Africa
in France's war effort and the lessons to be learned in terms ofFrance's vital military
and geopolitical interests.40 Catroux, however, added a note of caution to the
enthusiasm about the Sahara's potential, warning as early as June 1952 that France
38 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 374 (28.3.1957)
39 Palewski, 'Perspectives sahariennes', pp. 359-60
40 Castex first outlined his views on the potential usefulness of the Sahara in the Revue de Defense
Nationale in May 1952, with Catroux becoming involved in the discussion shortly afterwards,
displaying once again the cross-fertilisation ofmilitary and Gaullist ideas. Though Castex was never
officially associated with the Gaullist movement, his interest in the Sahara is only one aspect of his
career that makes him typical of the kind of officers that Gaullist ideas appealed to. Removed from his
post by Darlan during the Second World War, he was one of the first military advocates of the nuclear
force, an associate of Juin and strong advocate of the so-called Tachons l'Asie, gardons l'Afrique'
school of thought around the time of the Indochina War.
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might come into conflict with Moroccan ambitions in the region, in which the
frontiers were still disputed, having never been clearly identified at the time of the
French conquest ofMorocco.41 The increasing antagonism between France and
Morocco in 1956-8, as will be seen below, corresponded to Catroux's warning of the
potential problems facing French ambitions.
The Military Situation in Algeria
The Gaullists' interest in reform and development between 1956 and 1958 did not in
any way imply a reduction of their interest in the military operations. Indeed, given
that the revolt ofMay 1958 would have been inconceivable without military support,
it is particularly important to analyse the Gaullists' views on matters affecting the
conduct of the military effort during the period preceding 1958. Moreover, the
Gaullists had declared their support for the Mollet government's policy of insisting
upon a cease-fire before elections or negotiations could take place in Algeria. The
only acceptable outcome of the war, therefore, was complete military victory that
would allow France to implement reforms from a position of authority. As will be
seen later in this chapter, international events frequently hampered the French
military's efforts to achieve control of the situation in Algeria. In terms of operations
and strategy, however, the Gaullists were not alone in believing that the war could
easily be won provided the necessary effort were shown by civilian authorities.
Debates on the military effort in 1956 were dominated by the questions of the use of
conscripts and the deployment of specialist troops and equipment. While these may
appear to be two different responses to the problem - the use of large numbers of
additional if relatively unprepared troops, compared to a more focused tactical
approach - they were seen as largely complementary. Greater troop numbers were
required, it was argued, in order to maintain order throughout Algeria and implement
41 Gen. J. Charbonneau, 'Existe-t-il vraiment une querelle du Sahara?', Revue de Defense Nationale, 8
(1952), pp. 693-714.
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the 'pacification' programme, while a decisive advantage could be gained by the
involvement of troops with knowledge of guerrilla tactics — generally Indochina
veterans - or the ability to use new equipment such as helicopters. The Gaullist
deputy Frederic-Dupont, a member of the National Assembly's Defence
Commission, returned from an official visit to Algeria in March 1956 recommending
a more focused use ofmanpower, suggesting, for example, that certain officers
should receive specialised anti-guerrilla and psychological warfare training while
others should be deployed solely in operations among the population.42 His views
certainly mirrored those of the military hierarchy; training manuals for so-called
psychological warfare were produced in great numbers in the years following the
defeat in Indochina. Koenig, indeed, warned of a 'second Indochina' if specialist
troops suited to guerrilla warfare were not immediately deployed in Algeria.43 Many
of the young officers involved in the events ofMay 1958 and the army's later
rebellions against de Gaulle's Algerian policy were instrumental in the development
of the new psychological action. The relationship between 'psychological', or
'revolutionary', warfare and Gaullism, however, is not as close as this might suggest.
Few, if any, of the officers in Algeria were Gaullists, and psychological warfare had
its disciples among all political movements in France, as well as being opposed by
figures on all sides who preferred to overwhelm the FLN with more traditional
military methods rather than attempting to match their guerrilla tactics.
42
Frederic-Dupont, AN, 31.3.1956, JORF. Psychological warfare, inspired by the theory of
'revolutionary warfare' that officers had been exposed to in Indochina, held that the soldier must
move freely among the people to spread propaganda and achieve total control of not only the territory
but also its civilian population. In Algeria, it aimed to create a parallel organisation to the FLN's cells
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propaganda. On the doctrine of psychological or revolutionary warfare, see P. Paret, French
Revolutionary Warfarefrom Indochina to Algeria: The analysis ofapolitical andmilitary doctrine
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nation (Paris: Fayard, 1961); R. Girardet, La crise militaire franqaise (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964); G.
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The army's Service d'Action Psychologique et d'lnformation was created in May
1956 and the cinquieme bureau - the division charged with organising large-scale
psychological warfare once the doctrines had been established - in November 1957.
Gaullists were therefore not directly responsible for this new direction, but Chaban-
Delmas, as Defence Minister in 1958, certainly encouraged the advocates of
revolutionary warfare, finding these younger officers more encouraging than the
ageing command.44 If actual Gaullist participation in the creation of psychological
warfare is hard to identify, it is more clear that many of the ideas behind the army's
adoption of psychological warfare had much in common with the Gaullist world-
view in the late 1950s. Psychological warfare contended that a communist offensive
would be launched via anticolonial movements rather than on the East-West divide
in Europe, and that the real defence of the West was best undertaken by undermining
nationalist movements like the FLN. The Gaullists' growing conviction that NATO
and France's western allies were proving to be of little help in Algeria was therefore
reinforced by the military's assessment of the geopolitical significance of the
Algerian War.45 Moreover, in need of a doctrine with which to oppose independence,
the psychological warfare officers embraced integration, preparing propaganda
material to demonstrate to the Algerians the benefits of full integration into a greater
France. Even the means used to implement the policy in Algeria owed much to
Gaullism, or at least to Jacques Soustelle - the SAS were increasingly transformed
into propaganda units working among the Muslims who had been rounded up into
newly constructed camps and villages as part of the 'scorched earth' policy being
used against nationalist forces.
44 J. Chaban-Delmas, Memoires pour demain (Paris: Flammarion, 1997). Chaban became frustrated by
the high command's apparent reluctance to embrace new ideas, and supported the young officers who,
through their creation of a new ideology and strategy, seemed to offer a solution to the army's
problems of immobilisme, low morale and detachment from the nation. Thus, despite the Gaullists'
future conflict with the advocates of revolutionary warfare, their Minister of Defence showed no signs
of concern about these officers' activities before May 1958.
45 The military's conviction that what was under way in Algeria was essentially a Soviet attempt to
encircle the West was most clearly expressed by General Jacques Allard in a speech at Supreme
Headquarters of Allied Planning Europe (SHAPE) in 1957, published in the Revue de Defense
Nationale and adopted enthusiastically by the advocates of psychological warfare. J. Allard, 'L'OTAN
et l'Afrique du Nord', Revue de Defense Nationale, 14 (1958), pp. 907-11
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Along with psychological warfare, the second major change in military operations in
1956-8 was the extension of police powers to the army, and the placing of the
military command in civilian control ofAlgiers. The Battle of Algiers, in 1957, gave
rise to many allegations of torture arising from the new military responsibilities.46
While the issue of torture divided Gaullists later in 1957, initial responses to the new,
more vigorous military operations were positive, with Jacques Foccart, for example,
praising the army's new found efficiency in February 195 7.47 The Gaullists' support
for new military methods was matched by their calls for an increase in troop numbers
in Algeria. This was to be achieved not only by diverting troops from Europe -
which had been begun by Koenig while Defence Minister in 1955 - but also by
recalling reservists, deploying conscripts and extending the length of national
service. All of these measures, which met with opposition in parliament and in public
opinion, became a test of the government's resolve, as it was by now widely believed
that the defeat in Indochina had been the result of a lack of political will, notably a
4R
refusal to use conscripts in a colonial war. Frederic-Dupont called for the
government to extend the length of service to two years,49 while Foccart welcomed
what he perceived as growing public support for those recalled to serve in Algeria in
1956, thus involving the nation as a whole in the effort.50
46 The relationship between revolutionary warfare and torture is close; it was argued that torture
represented a legitimate means of retaliating against terrorism, while the element of psychological
conditioning already present in the revolutionary warfare tactics learned in Indochina was easily
adapted to an institutionalised form of torture. On torture, see Maran, Rita, Torture: the role of
ideology in the French-Algerian War (New York & London: Praeger, 1989); R. Branche, La torture et
I'armeependant la guerre d'Algerie 1954-1962 (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), and General Massu's
defence of the methods used during the Battle of Algiers: J. Massu, La vraie battaille d'Alger (Paris:
Plon, 1971), in addition to many recently published memoirs by both victims of and participants in
torture.
47 Lettre a I 'Union Frangaise, 370 (28.2.1957)
48 On the importance of Indochina as a precedent and test of government resolve, see M. Alexander,
'Duty, Discipline and Authority: The French Officer Elites Between Professionalism and Polities', in
The Right in France: 1789-1996, ed. by N. Atkin & F. Tallett (London: Taurus, 1997), pp. 129-59
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50 Lettre a I 'Union Frangaise, 340 (28.6.1956)
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Likewise, Gaullists condemned subsequent moves, caused by financial problems, to
reduce the length of service,51 though on this matter some difference can be seen, in
1958, between the activists' views and those of Defence Minister Chaban-Delmas.
Chaban insisted that troop numbers were sufficient and what was needed was not
more costly reinforcements but rather efforts to improve the morale of those already
in Algeria. There was agreement, however, on the need for a greater effort and
greater support for military operations. Soustelle berated the government for failing
to make clear that the war in Algeria was not, as the official language maintained, an
C"2
'operation de police', or just 'une quelconque guerre coloniale'. In this respect,
Soustelle appears to have recognised the need to describe the problem as a war,
something successive governments had refused to do. His views also closely
resemble those of the military; General Paul Ely, for example, an officer with closer
Gaullist connections than many of his colleagues, insisted on the need to develop the
concept of 'L'armee dans la nation',34 identifying the population as a whole with the
war effort.
Practical measures to ensure that the army had sufficient troops and the correct
doctrine and tactics were accompanied by efforts to raise its morale. Echoing
Koenig's earlier concern for the army's morale in Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia
(see p. 120), Soustelle warned the government to be attentive to the morale of the
troops in Algeria, while Michelet pointed out that the army had been badly treated by
government for some time and success in Algeria would depend on sufficient civil-
military co-operation, warning that the army was likely to revolt if it did not receive
sufficient support.53 Demonstrating support for the army against the government, the
Gaullists enthusiastically took up the case of Captain Moureau, who had been
51 Lettre a 1'Union Frangaise, 414 (6.2.1958)
52 Lettre al'Union Frangaise, 423 (10.4.1958)
53
Soustelle, AN, 9.3.1956, JORF
54 M. Faivre, Le General Paul Ely et la politique de defense. Ely was Chief of the General Staff, and
resigned temporarily in May 1958 to avoid being compromised by his Gaullist connections. De Gaulle
subsequently restored him to his former post.
55
Soustelle, AN, 5.6.1956, JORF-, E. Michelet, Contre la guerre civile (Paris: Plon, 1957), pp. 46-53
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captured by Moroccan guerrillas in June 1956, tortured and assassinated. Foccart
called for veterans in France to stage a protest in solidarity with Captain Moureau, in
frustration at the government's perceived failure to react vigorously enough.56 The
metropolitan campaign against the alleged torture taking place in Algeria also
received little support from most Gaullists: Soustelle's attack on those in parliament
and the press condemning French torture but not Algerian 'terrorism' was typical of
Gaullist responses to the question of torture. '7 In general, the issue of torture itself
was not debated in great detail by Gaullists, but rather incorporated into their attacks
on the Left, intellectuals and the 'defeatist' press, whose willingness to support
campaigns in favour of those tortured in Algeria amounted to betrayal of the army.
Some Gaullists did openly condemn torture - notably those who had suffered
deportation during the Second World War such as Edmond Michelet, or colonial
moderates such as Georges Catroux - and this fact may explain why the issue was
• • c o
never debated formally within the Gaullist movement.
By early 1958, with Chaban-Delmas at the Defence Ministry, the Gaullists believed
that, though there was no chance ofmilitary defeat, the army must be reassured that
its role was valuable and its methods correct. The political nature of the conflict
meant that those who had become involved in psychological warfare in the name of
integration needed to be sure of the support of the civilian authorities. Gaullist hopes
were invested in Chaban-Delmas, who would ensure that the French military
superiority would not be wasted:
56 Lettre a/'Union Frangaise, 372 (14.3.1957). Debre added, in 1958, that Moureau's 'martyrdom',
given the government's apparent indifference, was that of the whole nation, demonstrating the way in
which isolated incidents were increasingly being seen by Gaullists, in 1957-8, as symbols of a bigger
picture of decline and defeatism.
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Soustelle, 'La porte etroite', in Void Pourquoi, 1 (19.12.1957)
58 J. Charbonnel, Edmond Michelet (Paris: Beauchesne, 1987), pp. 106-7. Most Gaullists' memoirs
and biographies do not include any mention of torture; Debre does acknowledge that it occurred but
only, he argues, because of the disappearance of state authority, thus relating the subject to the
question of the state and the regime that was uppermost in most Gaullists' minds in 1957-58.
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La presence de Jacques Chaban-Delmas a la tete de notre defense nationale
est pour nous le meilleur garant de notre determination. Alors pourra
intervenir la solution politique indispensable si nous voulons affirmer une fois
pour toutes le principe de la presence fran9aise en Algerie.59
By the beginning of 1958, therefore, the Gaullists' views on the military effort in
Algeria were generally positive. The campaigns of 1954-7 in favour of greater
commitment, increased troop numbers and more effective methods of eradicating
guerrillas and winning over the population appeared to have succeeded.
The New Enemy: Internationalisation
That the war was being won in Algeria was in little doubt; one factor remained,
however, that risked undermining the French army's operations: the increasing
support offered by Morocco and Tunisia to the ALN. Tunisia was considered more
troublesome than Morocco in this respect. President Habib Bourguiba was keen to
take the Algerian case to the United Nations at every opportunity and publicly
criticised France's military operations. In March 1957, he proposed that a solution
might be found in the form of a Maghreb federation, a proposal that was rejected by
both the French and the Algerians. Throughout 1957, he attempted to instigate
negotiations, but, in the face of continued French refusals, became increasingly
sympathetic to the Algerian nationalists. Mohammed V ofMorocco was less directly
associated with the Algerian nationalist cause, though he too became frustrated at
continuing French refusals of any attempt to negotiate or find a solution embracing
the whole region.
This element of the war carried the additional problem of internationalisation. In
attempting to deal with the behaviour of two independent states, France risked
opening up the Algerian problem - which it felt was coming under control - to
international involvement that, the Gaullists believed, could only weaken France's
59 Les Idees ... Les Faits, 28 (Jan. 1958)
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position and undermine the efforts already made. They repeatedly called upon the
government to ensure that Morocco and Tunisia were not able to pose a threat to
French interests. The protectorates were suspected of providing bases and training
facilities for Algerian nationalist forces, or at least of turning a blind eye to cross-
border contacts, and of allowing arms from Egypt and the Soviet bloc destined for
Algeria to be delivered to their territory and transported across the border. In 1957,
the French army began to construct the Morice line - a Maginot Line-style barrier -
on the Algerian-Tunisian border. In January 1958, however, the situation began to
deteriorate rapidly when a French border patrol was ambushed and a plane shot
down, in both cases by Algerian troops operating from the Tunisian side of the
border. In February, the French retaliation led to the bombing of the Tunisian village
of Sakiet, with the civilian loss of life ensuring international condemnation and
Bourguiba's final decision to condemn France at the UN and invite American and
British moderation. The internationalisation and humiliation that followed for France
can be seen as the first of the series of events that brought down the Fourth Republic.
The Gaullists had some involvement in these events through the presence of Chaban-
Delmas as Minister of Defence; their response will be examined in more detail in this
section. Their frustration with Morocco and, especially, Tunisia, however, dated back
almost to the protectorates' independence in March 1956.
The Gaullists consistently urged the government to prevent military incursions from
the former protectorates into Algeria and to exert diplomatic pressure to stop
Moroccan and Tunisian support for the ALN. Raymond Triboulet, perhaps
overestimating France's capacity for action two months after Moroccan and Tunisian
independence, stressed that: 'II faut retablir la situation au Maroc. C'est un element
essentiel du salut de l'Afrique du Nord, done du salut de la France'.60 The only
grounds for believing that France could still exert sufficient influence in Morocco
were the independence treaties, which had spoken of interdependence and granted
60
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France certain military rights, notably the important naval base at Bizerta in Tunisia.
IfMorocco and Tunisia would not co-operate with France, Debre suggested, the
French government should put more pressure on their governments; French financial
aid should be made conditional on the protectorates' supporting France at the UN in
discussion of the Algerian question.61 In addition, the army's request for a 'droit de
poursuite' to follow ALN troops into Tunisia should be granted, and Franco-Tunisian
• • • fO
relations should be made subject to the demands ofAlgerian policy. In response to
the Bourges-Manoury government's position that relations with Morocco and
Tunisia could not be 'normalised' until the end of the war in Algeria, Gaullists
protested that only Moroccan and Tunisian interference were keeping the war going,
and better relations with the former protectorates would bring an end to the Algerian
/■ o
rebellion. Furthermore, Morocco and Tunisia's supposed neutrality should
somehow be enforced, though Debre did not expand upon how he envisaged this
might be achieved; military operations against the former protectorates were never
suggested.64
The ongoing discord between the Gaullists and the former protectorates was
heightened by the moments of crisis in relations between the Maghreb states and
France - the Ben Bella affair and the bombardment of Sakiet - as well as by
Moroccan and Tunisian claims to the Sahara. The Ben Bella affair of October 1956
involved the French air force's intercepting of a plane carrying Algerian nationalist
leader Ben Bella, at the time based in Morocco, and several associates, to a meeting
in Tunis with representatives from Tunisia and Algeria. The plane was forced to land
in Algeria and Ben Bella arrested. The French government appears not to have been
informed in advance but approved the action retrospectively; Gaullists and other
defenders of French Algeria greatly welcomed the air force's decisive action, while
61 Debu-Bridel & Debre, CR, 18.12.1956, JORF. A resolution to this effect was voted in the National
Assembly in December 1957.
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Bourguiba and Mohammed V became more determined to support the Algerians.
Foccart immediately praised the operation, which was all the more welcome because
the government had had nothing to do with it. The Gaullists could therefore continue
to accuse the government ofweakness and indecision while approving of an official
operation.6s Later, however, they found cause for complaint in the way in which the
affair was investigated and in the lenient treatment ofBen Bella, who had been
imprisoned in France and accorded the status of a political prisoner. The opening of a
government commission of enquiry in May 1957 was thus criticised as a sign of
weakness towards Morocco.66
The Sakiet incident of February 1958 occurred against a background ofGaullist calls
for Moroccan and Tunisian 'co-belligerence' to be treated more firmly by the French
government. Arms deliveries to Morocco from Egypt and Eastern Europe discovered
in October 1956 and January 1958, intended for the ALN, were seen as further proof
of collaboration in the Algerian rebellion. The attacks on French forces in January
1958 led Foccart to question how much authority Bourguiba actually had over the
Tunisian and Algerian forces involved. This in turn meant that the French
government would be wrong to place too much confidence in maintaining good
relations with Bourguiba in the search for a solution. Soustelle concluded that
Tunisia's role in the Algerian war was now comparable to that of China in Indochina
- or rather, to that presumed by the Gaullists to have been played by China (see p.
/r o
107) - and regretted that France had not retaliated immediately after the attacks.
Given their dissatisfaction with Tunisian behaviour, Gaullists initially welcomed the
attack on Sakiet, though Foccart expressed doubts by insisting that a definitive
explanation of the incident be provided, notably relating to the non-military
casualties.69 With Chaban-Delmas as Minister of Defence, the Gaullists could not
65 Lettre a I'Union Frangaise, 352 (25.10.1956)
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publicly disapprove of the operation, though they did regret that the French troops
and citizens in Tunisia were now vulnerable to reprisals.70 The international
condemnation of France did not figure prominently in Gaullist reactions; the
Gaullists were, by February 1958, inclined to be hostile to any international opinion
on the Algerian situation. Sakiet's real importance for the Gaullists might be said to
have been as a conclusive demonstration of the government's inability to act
decisively - having left the military to decide upon how to use its 'droit de suite' -
and of how the divisions and lack of communication in the cabinet, in response to the
event, undermined France's international standing.
The International Context: France Against the World?
The Sakiet affair, and the Gaullists' subsequent fury at the government's acceptance
of British and American 'good offices', provided the immediate context for the fall
of the Fourth Republic and ensured that the Gaullist regime that followed it would
seek to assert French freedom of action in international affairs. It was no surprise that
the Gaullists should react so angrily to this eventual internationalisation of the
Algerian conflict. Between 1956 and 1958 their attitudes to international relations
focused on the need to keep foreign 'interference' - even from France's western
allies - away from North Africa, and to convince the world that France was in
Algeria not to defend an outdated colonialism but to uphold the interests of the free
world against communism and Islamic nationalism. The message, therefore,
remained broadly the same through this period, though the Gaullists' tone could vary
from the conciliatory to the aggressively hostile according to the immediate context -
70 Debre did attempt to distinguish between Chaban-Delmas and the rest of the government, claiming
that only the Defence Minister and the Algerian Governor-General, Lacoste, could really be praised
for their roles in the incident, as only they had unequivocally approved of it, albeit retrospectively.
Courrier de la Colere, 14 (21.2.1958). Chaban-Delmas claimed later that General Salan, Commander-
in-Chief in Algeria, had acted unilaterally at Sakiet, thereby forcing his hand - which appears to be
accurate - and that Chaban had thus unwittingly been forced into an unequivocal Algerie frangaise
position, a judgement that may have more to do with Salan's subsequent fall from grace as one of the
figures behind the OAS. J. Chaban-Delmas, Memoires pour demain (Paris: Flammarion, 1997), pp.
303-4
226
for example the Suez crisis - and to the slightly different perspectives of individual
Gaullists.
Soustelle, perhaps surprisingly, demonstrated that the Gaullists were not necessarily
hostile to all foreign opinion, insisting that the government must strive to retain the
support of'friendly' countries.71 Jean Bertaud, meanwhile, suggested that France
might even be able to find common ground with the Soviet Union by convincing it
that the enemy in Algeria was 'les emprises du fascisme egypto-arabe, dont
commencent a profiter certaines individuality allemandes', appealing certainly to
Russian fears ofGerman revival and Islamic nationalism but somewhat contradicting
his colleagues' rhetoric about the communist inspiration behind anticolonial
movements.72 Overall, however, the Gaullists focused on the harm being done to
France by its alliances and by the United Nations. 1956 saw the FLN intensify its
campaign at the UN for recognition of the Algerian rebellion as a war of liberation —
though the US and other western nations continued to support France at this stage
because of the Mollet government's reform plans. French delegations to New York
struggled, throughout 1957, to prevent the UN General Assembly from expressing
support for Algerian self-determination, in the face of an increasingly widespread
international view that support for anticolonialism was the only way to avoid Soviet
expansion into Africa. According to Soustelle, the UN would actually be in
violation of its charter if it were to be claim the right to investigate the Algerian
situation, which was a purely domestic affair.74 Foccart continued this line of thought
by claiming that even the UN vote, in February 1957, against a motion calling for
Algerian self-determination represented a defeat for France, as the very fact that the
debate had taken place meant the UN was now recognised as competent to deal with
the Algerian affair. The French delegation could therefore only have succeeded in
71
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defending French interests by preventing a debate on Algeria from taking place,
though it must be noted that France had gained little advantage from its boycott of
the UN from September to November 1955 on precisely those grounds.75 Michelet
voiced clearly the Gaullist contempt for the UN, dismissing it as: 'une institution dont
la principale raison d'etre est la collecte du plus grand nombre possible de drapeaux,
etendards et pavilions censes representer des Etats dits "souverains" et
"independants'", though he also envisaged that, given the right form of government,
France could play a leading role in the UN to match those of the United States and
Soviet Union.76
The Western alliance continued to decline in Gaullists' estimation as the United
States and other nations made their support for negotiations in Algeria increasingly
clear. Soustelle warned American opinion in 1956, before the Suez affair, that in
Gaullist eyes France was deriving no benefit from its alliances in either colonial
affairs or Europe,77 while Roger Frey introduced a key Gaullist theme of the Fifth
Republic in calling for France to withdraw from the Atlantic Pact if American
70
support for a negotiated settlement continued. Algeria determined the Gaullists'
approach to every other international question. European or Atlantic integration was
to be rejected if it prevented the independent development of the French nuclear
energy programme - in civilian as well as military terms - as this would prevent the
realisation of the potential ofAlgeria and the Sahara.79 Likewise, arms reduction
treaties, proposed in the name of cold war detente, posed a threat to French North
Africa by limiting France's freedom of action in military affairs and subjugating
OA
French defence policy to the needs of the Western Alliance as a whole.
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Rather than contributing to detente, the Gauliists were increasingly convinced that
France was in fact fighting the cold war alone. Debre argued that a thaw in relations
between East and West actually depended upon French success in Algeria, as this
O 1
would remove the real threat: Islamic nationalism. Most Gaullists, however,
continued to insist that international communism was the real enemy, particularly
when their opinions were likely to be heard by the United States. Thus Soustelle
focused on the 'encirclement' theory of Soviet aid to North African nationalism in
his article in Foreign Affairs, claiming that Trance has been the vanguard of the
Western world since 1945', and threatening a communist take-over in France in the
event of defeat in Algeria: 'If the tricolor is lowered in Algeria the red flag will soon
R9
fly in Paris'. Soustelle clearly played on American fears of communism in an
attempt to win support for the war in Algeria, yet his words correspond to what other
Gaullists had been saying in parliament and in the Gaullist press and party
conferences for some time. Even though some, like Debre, seemed to be moving
towards considering Islam and not communism as the real threat, the anticommunism
that had always been present in Gaullism rose to the surface easily in response to the
internationalisation of the Algerian conflict.
Internationalisation of the conflict, as has been seen, was considered the chief danger
in 1956. Yet Gaullists offered no suggestions as to how it could be prevented, other
than by refusing to acknowledge the UN's competence, which had failed by 1957.
Therefore, this seemingly intractable problem became a means of criticising the
government, with frequent speeches in parliament insisting that the government stand
up to the United States, particularly concerning its aid to Morocco and Tunisia. By
1958, the offer ofAmerican 'good offices' after the Sakiet bombing, which was only
OT
accepted reluctantly by the Gaillard government, heightened Gaullist fears of
81 Debre, CR, 26.5.1956, JORF
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American designs on North Africa, particularly the Sahara, where they feared
American involvement in the ongoing border disputes to the advantage ofMorocco
84
and Tunisia. Debre, typically, objected to the 'good offices' on more legalistic
grounds, claiming another infringement of sovereignty following an earlier proposal,
85in January 1958, to invite international observers to supervise elections in Algeria. *
Thus, not only was the United States guilty of seeking to impinge on French
sovereignty, but the French government itselfwas ceding some of its sovereignty,
further undermining its credibility in Gaullist eyes. The good offices were opposed
on grounds of precedent too, with the Dutch experience of American mediation in
Indonesia cited as proof that no good could come of the American mission to North
Africa.86
Fiercely opposed to internationalisation of the Algerian conflict, the Gaullists sought
to undermine those considered responsible: the Arab League. Campaigns against
Egypt's influence and ambitions began some time before the Suez crisis, Soustelle
warning of a choice to be made between French presence in North Africa and an
87
'empire arabe'. Debre argued that the mass exodus ofAlgerian Jews to Israel
demonstrated that the emerging Arab states were a danger to the principles of liberal,
tolerant society, not to mention his use of the Second World War analogy that
88
recalled previous Gaullist descriptions of Bourguiba and Nasser as the new Hitler.
The Suez crisis of October 1956, therefore, was seen by Gaullists chiefly as a means
to prevent the further expansion of pan-Arabism and to stop Nasser's arms deliveries
to the ALN. In this respect, the Gaullists found themselves in closer agreement with
the government than at any time since the RS ministers' resignation over Morocco in
October 1955. Foccart praised the government for finally acting in the national
Murphy, dispelled any goodwill that this concession might have elicited from Gaullists; Murphy had
been sympathetic to Vichy during his mission to North Africa during the Second World War.
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interest, though, in the spirit of Gaullist opposition, he also regretted that it had taken
an Israeli pretext and British support for the government to commit to an action that
should have been undertaken independently. The immediate Gaullist judgement on
the Suez action displayed a degree of optimism not seen since Mendes-France's
reforms of 1954:
Comme il ne faut se faire aucune illusion sur les dispositions presentes de
l'lslam a notre egard, le maintien et le renforcement d'lsrael au coeur du
monde arabe est, dans notre jeu, un atout maitre... Assisterions-nous a une
OQ
renaissance de l'independance frangaise?
After such optimism, the Franco-British withdrawal in the face of American and
Soviet intervention confirmed many of the Gaullists' convictions about American
hostility to French interests. While the government immediately devoted its energy to
European integration after the humiliation of Suez, the Gaullists instead found proof
that the government's existing foreign policy, based on alliances, was failing France.
Soustelle, beginning his long identification of Israel and Algerie franqaise, now
claimed that Algeria and Israel were victims of the same dangers: pan-Arabism,
Soviet ambitions and American indifference, calling for a formal Franco-Israeli
alliance.90 By 1957, the relationship between pan-Arabism and communism was
clear to leading Gaullists: faced with these two threats, Algeria and Israel had
become pillars of the West, and the United States and United Nations could therefore
no longer be relied upon to defend the Mediterranean and, by extension, to defend
French interests.91
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Just as Suez proved the inadequacy of alliance with the United States, so the
government's response - renewed focus on Europe - was, for Gaullists, evidence of
its limited vision and failure to represent French interests. Many of the themes seen
in the anti-EDC campaign thus resurfaced after Suez. The European idea had already
suffered attacks from Gaullists earlier in 1956, over the threat that the EURATOM
project seemed to pose to France's nuclear force and all that that represented.92 The
British failure at Suez, along with only lukewarm support from Britain, Germany and
Italy over Algeria, persuaded Debre that France could not expect help from the
European nations the proposed EEC would bring it into partnership with. Europe, he
argued, was becoming incompatible with vital French economic and strategic
interests, which were situated in the Mediterranean and Africa:
Dans quelle mesure le fait pour la France de disparaitre au sein d'une petite
Europe pourra-t-il aider a la defense des interets frangais en Mediterranee, au
Proche-Orient et en Afrique?... L'integration de la France dans la petite
Europe telle qu'elle est prevue aura pour nos interets et, par consequent, pour
nos concitoyens dans l'ensemble du monde africain des consequences si
graves ...93
Any European Assembly and community that were created must, Gaullists argued,
include Algeria and the Union frangaise94 The idea of Eurafrica, somewhat sidelined
by the North African crises since the EDC debate, reappeared early in 1958 as the
logical outcome of the creation of an EEC including members' overseas territories:
'Sur le plan international l'annee 1957 peut etre le point de depart d'une Eurafrique
qui, entre les deux blocs, americain et sovietique, constituerait un element de stabilite
dans le monde'.95 Indeed, evoking the spirit of the Second World War again as the
Fourth Republic appeared to be entering into terminal decline, Dauer's Salut Public
92 The threat that European integration posed to the French independent nuclear programme was
described by Debre, in March 1958, as the reason why the nuclear programme should be started as a
matter of urgency before international treaties prevented it. It might be argued that this was therefore a
contributing factor in the Gaullists' conviction that the Fourth Republic could not be allowed to
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stressed that the idea of Franco-African community as opposed to focus entirely on
European unity was the heritage of Free France; to abandon this heritage by
embracing the 'small Europe' would therefore amount to a betrayal of the wartime
founding principles ofGaullism.96
By 1958, therefore, inspired by long-standing Gaullist views on international affairs
and the catalysts of Suez and Sakiet, the Gaullists had not necessarily reached any
new conclusions about the international context of the Algerian crisis, but they had
certainly been strengthened in their convictions about the inadequacy of the Allied -
particularly American - protection, the twin communist and pan-Arab threat in North
Africa, the uselessness of the United Nations, the dangers of European integration for
France's African role, and the government and regime's weakness faced with
international pressure.
The Gauliist Assault on the Republic
The origins of the Gaullists' determination to bring down the Fourth Republic in
May 1958 can be found in the areas discussed earlier in this chapter: frustration that
military success in Algeria did not lead to a successful resolution of the conflict,
concern at the pace and direction of reform plans that seemed to weaken the link
between France and Algeria, and increasing annoyance at governments' inability to
resist international pressure. Yet, as was the case with Gaullist frustration at the way
in which Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia had been Tost', the crisis of authority in
the colonies was not seen as solely to blame for France's problems: the system of
government that had already been attacked for ten years before 1956 continued to
prove its incompetence to Gaullists. By 1956, the malaise ofAlgeria appeared to
have spread to metropolitan France in general and not only to its politicians. In
addition to devoting considerable energy to discrediting the system and planning its
96 Salut Public, 19 (February 1958)
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downfall, the Gaullists also attacked defeatism, Algerian nationalism in France,
• 07
communism and a general sense of division and apathy about the Algerian crisis.
Much defeatism, the Gaullists claimed, was generated purely by the press both in
Algeria and France. Any exceptions were praised, particularly the Echo d'Alger,
which was the principal newspaper in Algiers and edited by the Petainist Alain de
no
Serigny. In May 1958, de Serigny's late conversion to support for de Gaulle was
hugely influential in the Gaullists' being able to take control of the pied-noir
protests; the Gaullists were clearly moving towards rapprochement with the pied-
noir community from 1956." Ofmore serious concern was the increase in Algerian
nationalist activity in Paris, a subject that had exercised Gaullists intermittently since
the early 1950s. By 1956, however, their earlier suggestions that this might be
prevented by improvements in the living conditions and prospects of immigrants (see
pp. 76-7) had given way to calls for strict action. The senator Tharradin called on the
government to put a stop to all 'anti-French' meetings taking place in France and to
put pressure on foreign governments to stop Arab League activity in Paris.100 Jean
Legendre contrasted the seemingly successful measures to deal with nationalists in
Algeria - at the height of the battle of Algiers - with the freedom ofmovement and
expression allowed to nationalists in Paris, while Soustelle issued a darker warning
that the war might spread to Paris in the face of apparent indifference to violence and
terrorism among the Muslim community.101 For Foccart, however, the real problem
was not the Algerians in Paris but rather the record numbers of immigrants returning
to Algeria - seen as proof that the immigrant community was in the grip ofALN
97 Studies of public opinion throughout 1956 reveal a higher percentage of the population willing to
accept negotiations, leading possibly to independence, than those in favour of pursuing complete
military victory, while the numbers in favour ofAlgeriefrangaise and believing that Algeria would
remain French declined from mid-1956. C.R. Ageron, 'L'opinion franfaise a travers les sondages', in
La Guerre d'Algerie et les Frangais, ed. by J.P. Rioux (Paris: Fayard, 1990), pp. 25-44
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recruiters and taken as further evidence of the need for greater commitment and
sense of purpose.102
Lack of commitment on the part of the nation as a whole might be said to be the
Gaullists' main concern in the domestic situation. As early as March 1956, Dronne
saw this lack of government commitment manifested in the recall of Soustelle from
Algeria, though it was rare for a Governor-General to serve for more than two
i r\n
years. For Debre, what was needed were symbols of national effort, unity and
purpose in the fight to keep Algeria French; he called for twinning of French and
Algerian towns, public works projects to employ young people, and shorter
holidays.104 This somewhat interventionist or authoritarian approach was clearly
popular with other Gaullists. Rene Dubois first called for a government ofpublic
safety - an emotive term with allusions to 1789, and one that would become common
currency in 1958 — in December 1956.103 Raymond Triboulet later set the tone for the
Gaullists' final assault on the 'system' by attacking the Church (for its conciliatory
stance on Algeria), the schools (for neglecting their duty to create citizens and
promote loyalty to the nation), the unions (for having too limited aims), the
intellectuals (for failing to propose any solutions), and the familiar targets of
politicians, parties, the press and governments.106 Around the same time, Debre, as
will be seen in a later section, began his fierce assault on the regime, even
questioning the relevance of notions of democracy when faced with a crisis of
legitimacy. This was reflected in Gaullist calls for the Communist Party to be
banned: Dubois felt that to allow the communists to speak in parliament undermined
the effort in Algeria, while Debre saw the PCF as another threat to national
independence, being essentially the agents of a foreign country.'07 The Gaullists'
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attacks on their regular enemies began, between 1956 and 1958, to take on an air of
purpose and stridency that had previously been less evident. Events like Sakiet, in
this climate, served to confirm their impression of government division and
incompetence, and the ensuing parliamentary debates gave them a means of
developing their attacks on the regime to an increasingly receptive audience.
The assault on the regime, at the same time as castigating those responsible for
France's predicament, was careful to identify those worthy of praise. These were
principally the army and the police, charged with defending France in Algeria and
maintaining order in the absence of an effective state. The Gaullists called upon the
government to defend the army against press attacks, though these attacks tended to
focus on the delicate question of torture during the Battle of Algiers. For the
Gaullists, however, the government was neglecting its duty to defend the nation if it
did not take action to stop criticism of the army's activities; Dubois attempted,
unsuccessfully, to introduce a law making it an offence to criticise the police or army
1 OR
or treat 'terrorists' as legitimate combatants. It is likely that in proposing such
measures, the Gaullists were well aware that their chances of success were slim; the
importance of such tactics was to demonstrate support for the military effort and,
perhaps more importantly, to appeal to the as yet untapped body of support for a
more vigorous approach to the Algerian problem and the state of the nation that they
assumed to exist, in accordance with the view that every Frenchman was a potential
Gaullist. The value of appearing as the defenders of the police and army against the
unpopular government was not underestimated either, as the Gaullists had been
aware since the abortive plot to seize power in 1954 (see pp. 118-22) of the potential
that existed for similar action to overthrow the Republic. The resurgence of activism
in the army in Algeria, including the bazooka affair of 1956 in which Debre was
implicated,109 meant the possibility of capitalising on military activism was returning
108
Dubois, CR, 14.11.1957, JORF
109 The so-called bazooka afffair was a plot by pied-noir extremists to assassinate General Salan, who
was thought to be 'soft' on colonial affairs. He was to be replaced by General Cogny, who had links to
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to Gaullist minds towards 1958. Early in 1958, the Gaullists sought to associate
themselves with protests on the part of the police, whose morale was low as a result
ofAlgerian terrorist attacks and a perceived lack of government commitment.110 By
early 1958, therefore, the Gaullists' mission to discredit the regime was well
advanced; there remained the task of persuading the nation of the legitimacy of revolt
and overcoming the divisions and differences of opinion that had arisen since the
1956 elections.
The Gaullists' arguments for the urgent need to replace the regime developed
familiar themes: Algeria would be lost, and this would lead to communist
dictatorship in France:
L'opinion franqaise n'acceptera pas la perte de l'Afrique du Nord et le regime
ne survivra pas a la perte de l'Afrique du Nord. II sera emporte par la colere
populaire. Ce serait la grande aventure avec au bout probablement la dictature
de ceux-ci [the extreme left].1 1
The Gaullists' task from 1956 onwards, therefore, would be to channel the
anticipated wave of popular protest - already evoked by de Gaulle following the
defeat in Indochina - in a Gaullist rather than a communist direction. Their
Gaullists including Debre. Debre was named, at the trial of those involved, as one of the plot's
directors in Paris, an accusation he has always denied. There is, however, considerable evidence of
Debre's knowledge of other attempts to impose a military regime in Algiers. On the bazooka affair
and alleged Gaullist-military conspiracies before 1958, see C. Nick, Resurrection. Naissance de la
Verne Republique: un coup d'Etat democratique (Paris: Fayard, 1998), pp. 237-67; J. Ferniot, De
Gaulle et le 13 mai (Paris: Plon, 1965), pp. 97-110; R. Salan, Memoires: fin d'un empire, vol. 3:
Algeriefranqaise (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1972), pp. 91-144. Gaullist memoirs are understandably
silent on the subject; P. Samuel, Michel Debre: I'architecte du General (Paris: Arnaud Franel, 1999),
pp. 127-41 rejects the theory of Debre's involvement in any plots. In the absence of any sources other
than accounts of the trial and some memoirs, these early plots, like the events of 1958, must remain
within the realm of speculation. It might be said, however, that the fact that Debre was so readily
associated with clandestine military and pied-noir activities reveals much about the Gaullists' success
in presenting themselves as a legitimate and credible alternative to the Fourth Republic and as capable
of preserving French Algeria.
110 A demonstration by the Paris police in March 1958, supported by Gaullists and attended by many
who were to be involved in the events ofMay, was seen as an indication of the potential that clearly
existed for a mass movement involving Gaullists and army or police against the Fourth Republic. On
the succession of demonstrations and the heated climate of early 1958, see D. Tartakowsky, Les




arguments to this end focused on their vision of a France with no future to look
forward to after the loss ofAlgeria, condemned, like in 1939, to decadence and
decline. In this respect, they turned their attention away from questions ofAlgeria's
future and concentrated instead on France, distinguishing themselves from the most
fervent A Igerie franqaise campaigners, who never addressed the question of the
• 112 •future of the nation as a whole. Soustelle adopted the familiar Algerie franqaise
refrain that no issue affecting France was unrelated to the Algerian situation, though
he focused on the consequences ofwithdrawal for France rather than Algeria.
Algerian independence, he argued, would lead first to the 'loss' of the rest ofAfrica,
then to economic weakness, a symbol of decline. Raising the spectre of decadence
through comparisons with 1939, Soustelle argued that Algeria held the key to the
regeneration of France, not only in economic or political terms, but also in the more
mystical concept of greatness associated with 'pure' Gaullism:
Tout le monde comprend bien ... qu'en realite le drame n'est meme pas celui
de 1'Algerie, c'est celui de la decadence. C'est la question ... qui nous est
posee, a tous et a chacun: 'Acceptez-vous la decadence de la France?' ... Oui,
c'est s'incliner ... en invoquant les mythes obscurs et commodes de l'esprit
du temps et de la fatalite historique. Non, c'est resister. C'est croire que la
volonte et le sacrifice des humains pesent dans la balance. C'est se dire que si
la France a abandonne Pondichery, le Portugal est demeure a Goa. C'est se
rappeler que YAfrika Korps fonqait sur l'Egypte mais qu'il y eu El-Alamein,
que la Wehrmacht a foule les rives de la Volga mais qu'il y a eu Stalingrad.
C'est savoir que toute vague historique connait son flux et son reflux, que le
temps arrive toujours ou la cavalerie d'invasion tourne bride, qu'on a vu cent
fois des assieges obstines briser l'elan des conquerants qui battaient les
murailles, et qu'enfin on a toujours une chance de gagner une battaille, a
113condition de la livrer.
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Soustelle, after 1959, became increasingly identified with this tendency, though he continued to
advance arguments based on Algeria's geopolitical significance. The Algeriefranqaise campaign's
close focus on Algeria above all else is generally recognised as the factor that set it apart from
Gaullism after 1958.
113
Soustelle, Le drame algerien et la decadencefranqaise, pp. 66-7. Soustelle's argument might be
seen as a return to many of the concepts of 'pure' Gaullism: refuting historical inevitability with
examples from the Second World War, and believing in the human capacity to make the effort
required to triumph over adversity. Soustelle's reference to Portugal's defence of its Indian colonial
outpost after French and British withdrawal also reveals something of the direction of Soustelle's
thought: as his path diverged from that of de Gaulle from 1959, Soustelle and other Algerie franqaise
militants frequently expressed admiration for Salazar's Portugal, as much for its internal politics as its
238
Historical comparisons with previous regimes' decline were a favoured tactic of the
Gaullists' attempts to generate a sense of impending crisis, particularly in the work
ofMichel Debre, as will be seen in the next section. Roger Frey demonstrated that
such comparison was not the exclusive domain of the intellectual leaders of
Gaullism, comparing France to ancient Rome, where, in moments of greatest danger,
power was conferred upon the figure most capable of saving the Republic.114
That the nation's decline would lead to eventual public awakening and calls for de
Gaulle was the Gaullists' plan. However, any revolt in Algeria was likely to come
from the political sections of the army or from the pieds-noirs, neither ofwhich was
a pro-Gaullist section of the population. In France, meanwhile, any revolt against the
government would surely benefit either the communists or the re-emerging extreme
right. Thus, the Gaullists sought to strengthen contacts with potential allies in revolt
in Algeria, while discrediting their rivals on the right and their enemies on the left in
France. The link between Gaullism and the Algerie franqaise campaigners in both
Algeria and France was provided by the USRAF; departmental RS federations
helped in the creation of local USRAF committees, one such example being in the
Nord where Leon Delbecque, Chaban-Delmas' envoy to Algiers and the most
important figure in turning the May 13 1958 demonstration to the Gaullists'
advantage, was head of the RS federation that encouraged the USRAF's local
branch.113 The national Comite Directeur of the USRAF included the Gaullists Debre
and de Monsabert alongside Soustelle and former Algerian governors Violette,
Naegelen and Leonard. Anciens Combattants also figured prominently in the
developing Gaullist-USRAF networks, an important means of achieving support in
Algeria where the role of veterans in politics was considerable. Among the veterans'
determination to hold onto its colonies. Indeed, Portuguese support for the 1961 putsch was widely
claimed at the time and many OAS members sought refuge in Portugal after condemnation in France.
114 Les Idees ... Les Fails, 31 (25.2.1958)
115 M.F. Chevrillon, 'Les Republicans Sociaux ou la Traversee du desert', (unpublished memoire de
maitrise, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1965), p. 364
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groups associated with the USRAF were several pied-noir and Indochina veterans
movements, but also the Association des Frangais Libres and the Confederation
Nationale des Combattants Volontaires de la Resistance, both of which might be
assumed to be pro-Gaullist, rather than Petainist like the Algerian veterans'
associations.116 It must be noted that high-level Gaullist involvement in the USRAF
declined somewhat in early 1958, with Debre concentrating instead on his Courrier
de la Colere and on developing contacts in metropolitan France; Soustelle, however,
remained very much at the head of the movement alongside pieds-noirs and less
senior Gaullists such as Delbecque and Pierre Picard. His description of the USRAF
as neither a groupement - de Gaulle's dismissive term for political parties - nor a
party seems to identify the USRAF closely with the kind of national, cross-party
117
movement that the Gaullists were calling for in 1958.
Gaullist links with the higher reaches ofpied-noir society, as opposed to the petits
blancs who made up the bulk of the activist organisations at the centre of the various
plots and on the fringes of the USRAF, were less strong. The so-called grands-colons
had, after all, been condemned by Soustelle for obstructing integration and for
maintaining an outdated colonial attitude. Yet there is evidence that, by April 1958,
landowners in Algeria had joined the urban political classes in supporting Gaullism
in the form of Soustelle; fundraising campaigns took place among the landowners
• •••118and farmers of the Oran region to finance Soustelle's activities. In Morocco and
Tunisia, meanwhile, the Gaullists were instrumental in aiding the landowners forced
to leave their land after independence. Foccart organised the relocation to New
Caledonia of a number of farmers, in the name of developing agriculture and
116 La verite sur t'Algerie, 3 (25.10.1956) & 14 (7.7.1957). In June 1957, an entire issue of this
USRAF newspaper was devoted to extensive coverage of an anciens combattants' gathering in
Algiers, showing that the supposed antigaullism ofmany of the participating groups did not prevent
Soustelle's publication from highlighting their importance and taking up their cause.





exploiting the islands' potential - a kind ofmise en valeur - and of increasing the
French settlement of the territory.119
With contacts established in the military, veteran and settler communities by 1958,
the Gaullists also focused on metropolitan France. In addition to developing contacts
with Algerie frangaise supporters, they attempted to discredit the left. They focused
on the socialists' and communists' claims to be acting in the spirit of the wartime
resistance and against right-wing extremism in supporting a negotiated settlement in
Algeria, thus avoiding further conflict and denying success to the pieds-noirs, seen
by the left as colonialist exploiters and unreformed Petainists. The Gaullists did not
limit their criticism to the left-wing political parties: intellectuals were also
frequently attacked. Soustelle, for example, published Le Drame algerien et la
decadence frangaise in response to Raymond Aron's call for withdrawal from
1 90
Algeria. L 'Express, the journal that had strongly supported Mendes-France in
1954-55, was fiercely criticised for publishing allegations of torture in Algeria, while
the undercurrent of anti-intellectual feeling always present in Gaullism lent itself to
denunciations of individuals like Jean-Paul Sartre who sided with the PCF against
the war effort.
The left's comparison between opposition to the war in Algeria and Resistance to
Nazism in the Second World War effort enraged Gaullists. Soustelle argued that the
left had confused the two sides in Algeria:
Dans le monde d'aujourd'hui, le fascisme c'est Nasser, le totalitarisme c'est
le fanatisme pan-arabe qui a plonge 1'Algerie dans un bain de sang. Les
pretendus 'antifascistes' qui font aujourd'hui le jeu de l'entreprise pan-arabe
remplissent objectivement, meme s'ils ne se rendent pas compte, le role qui
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fut celui des Doriot, des Deat.
119 RTF archives, Maroc, 51/6.3, Foccart correspondence, October 1956
120 R. Aron, La Tragedie algerienne (Paris: Plon, 1957)
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Given Soustelle's leading role in the Comite de vigilance des intellectuels
antifascistes in the 1930s, his attack on those attempting to develop a similar
initiative twenty years later reveals the extent to which the Algerian experience had
altered the views of the former socialist and antifascist activist. Edmond Michelet
joined the Gaullist attacks on the left's tactics. Drawing upon his wartime experience
of deportation and imprisonment, he accused the FLN and their supporters of
'sacrilege' in claiming to be inspired by the Resistance, especially when Algerians
loyal to France were denounced as collaborators. The Resistance analogy, Michelet
argued, could only be applied to resistance to tyranny, as in Hungary in 1956, or to
opposition to defeatism and belief in national independence, thus reclaiming the
resistance legacy for Gaullism.122 The analogy established, Michelet and other
Gaullists began, from 1957, frequently to evoke the 'spirit of June 18, 1940'.
Soustelle's attack on the left intensified in 1958, when he accused the communist
party of betraying the working class ofNorth Africa, supporting the successors to the
dictators of the 1930s, and replacing its anticlericalism with support for religious
fanatics.123
The Algerian situation had, in Gaullists' opinion, caused the left to become the
champion of the practices and values of the far-right. The extreme-right itself had to
be discredited in turn, to allow the Gaullists to take advantage of the
antiparliamentarianism and anticommunism it represented without appearing
antirepublican or extremist. Since the 1956 elections, as has been seen, the
immediate priority in this respect was to regain Gaullist supporters who had become
Poujadists. The Gaullist deputy Pesquet was expelled from the RS in October 1956
after forming a sub-group in parliament with some Poujadists who wished to support
government policy on Suez.124 The Gaullist attack on the 'nouvelle droite' continued,
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Soustelle, 'Lettre a un ami de gauche', Void Pourquoi, 10 (24.4.1958)
124 Lettre a I 'Union Frangaise, 354 (8.11.1956)
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with Michelet condemning the Right for abandoning French responsibilities in Africa
in favour of a retreat into Europe because of the economic burden that the colonies
1 9S
represented. As for the nationalist far-right, which had been gathering strength
since 1954, Gaullists condemned its readiness to accept American protection against
communism at the expense of control ofNorth Africa. The Gaullists' fervent
anticommunism would not extend to devoting all their energies to fighting the Cold
19 f\
War in Europe. The Gaullists' quest for republican respectability after years of
attacking the 'system' led them to vigorously deny allegations of involvement in
right-wing plots against the government in both Algiers and Paris, claiming that these
were being invented by the authorities to discredit the likes of Debre and
Soustelle.12'
The Gaullists appeared united in attacking their enemies in domestic politics. Their
opinions on how to hasten the Republic's downfall, however, demonstrated that the
divisions of 1955 had not disappeared in the growing sense of anticipation and
urgency. The question of participation in and co-operation with government still
divided Gaullists. Support for government was generally considered acceptable in
certain circumstances where Algerian interests were at stake, such as in
demonstrating foreign interference in the conflict to the United Nations, or limited
support for the Mollet government to move it away from the left and avoid its early
defeat, which would surely have led to a general call for negotiations and withdrawal
19R
from Algeria. The RS vote on the fall of the Mollet government in May 1957 was
divided, only Dronne and Brusset actually voting against the government while four
1 9Q
others abstained and twelve RS deputies supported Mollet. The Bourges-Manoury
government, too, was not condemned completely by the Gaullists, though they did,
after some debate, decide not to participate in it because they considered it too pro-
125 Michelet, Contre la guerre civile, pp. 23-6
126 Soustelle, 'Lettre a un homme de droite', Void Pourquoi, 9 (10.4.1958)
127 Soustelle, 'Les provocateurs a l'ceuvre', La verite sur I'Algerie, 11 (1.3.1957)
128 Chevrillon, pp. 337-8
129 Le Monde, 23.5.1957
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European.130 Soustelle's fierce assault on it over the loi-cadre in November 1957 is
generally credited with bringing about its downfall, though even on this issue
Soustelle protested that his intention was limited to securing an acceptable project for
Algeria and his primary intention had not necessarily been to create further
instability.131
In general, however, the Gaullists were sceptical of the benefits of continued
association with the regime. At the 1957 RS congress, disagreement arose between
the majority of party activists and some leaders, such as Roger Frey, who insisted
that Gaullists like Chaban-Delmas had a role to play in government as long as the
Algerian situation remained precarious. For Frey, the Gaullists were too weak a
political force to sustain opposition without using the methods of the 'system':
II nous faut bien vivre dans le siecle, il nous faut bien vivre dans le regime ...
Tout ce que nous pouvons faire, c'est essayer de limiter les desastres que le
regime porte en lui comme la nuee porte forage, c'est empecher les perils de
monter autour de nous, c'est essayer d'eviter que le recours au general de
Gaulle n'intervienne au lendemain de la catastrophe et sur la terre brulee ... II
nous faut employer les moyens meme du systeme, nous y inclure, y travailler
... Etant admis que nous preferions que le relevement national fut rapide,
spectaculaire, glorieux, mais qu'il ne depend pas de nous qu'il soit tel, nous
devons, beaucoup plus modestement, travailler a le rendre possible.132
Even in 1958, Chaban-Delmas' position as Defence Minister in the Gaillard
government enjoyed more support from Gaullists than might be expected. The fact
that he occupied a post central to the military effort in Algeria and the nuclear
130 H.J. Tiimmers, 'Das "Centre National des Republicans Sociaux": Eine Gaullistische Partei unter
der IV. Republik', (unpublished doctoral thesis, Universitat Augsburg, 1980), p. 225
131
Responding to Prime Minister Gaillard's accusation, in April 1958, that his role in bringing down
Bourges-Manoury over the loi-cadre had been entirely destructive, Soustelle insisted that his
reputation as the wrecker of that administration was the fault of the Fourth Republic system: in
opposing one piece of legislation he had ultimately brought about the fall of the government because
of the regime's inherent weakness. The link between acceptance of or opposition to any government's
reform proposals for Algeria and the downfall of the regime was clearly very obvious to Gaullists by
1958. Soustelle, AN, 15.4.1958,JORF
132 Debre archives (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques), 1DE24, 4.1, R. Frey,
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programme surely explains this indulgence, in addition to the fact that the 'Antenne'
of the ministry he established in Algiers was designed to ensure that any revolt there
would be turned to the Gaullists' advantage. Chaban-Delmas' position, however,
became increasingly unpopular with the ordinary party militants: the Meurthe-et-
Moselle RS federation, for example, condemned his behaviour as 'incompatible avec
la doctrine du parti'.133 Chaban-Delmas was replaced by Michelet as RS President, to
avoid further discord of this type, and militant Gaullists like Dronne and Debre
became distanced from and frustrated with their colleague.
Debre, in contrast, claimed to see no benefit at all in Gaullist involvement in
government. He argued that the RS participation in government had not led to the
adoption of policies acceptable to the Gaullists, other than preventing further
concessions over Algeria, which was clearly not seen as an unqualified success given
the Gaullists' constant attacks on the government's Algerian policy:
Que le benefice de la participation ait ete reel en ce qui concerne la politique
algerienne, je le confjois, je le reconnais, mais regardons aussi le cote negatif
... qu'avons-nous pu faire en ce qui concerne le Maroc, la Tunisie?
Qu'avons-nous pu faire pour la redaction de ces traites soi-disant europeens
qui risquent d'etre signes dans quelques jours? Rien! ... Enfin, il y a une
constatation determinante: la participation hate-t-elle la reforme ou la survie
du regime?134
That influence on Algerian affairs was not deemed sufficient to justify participation
in government demonstrates that Debre was already beginning to see the Algerian
crisis in terms of is importance for the State and the Nation as a whole, as will be
seen in more detail in the following section. By March 1958's Conseil national, calls
for Chaban to resign from government were widespread and Triboulet now found no
support for an attempted defence of participation.133 The Hautes-Pyrenees federation
Tummers, p. 232




called for Chaban-Delmas to leave either the government or the Gaullist movement,
and the RS Commission politique permanente decided, in April 1958, that Chaban's
i -jr
presence could no longer prevent them from condemning the government outright.
The Gaullists' association with the 'system' was deemed to have failed, with a
concerted effort to bring down the Republic now apparently their only
preoccupation.
The crisis following the fall of the Mollet government in May 1957 had given rise to
hopes that Soustelle would be called to form a coalition government that Gaullists
i -sn
saw as the first step to the desired government of public safety. However, the
choice of Bourges-Manoury as Prime Minister instead of Soustelle, and the five
week period without a government that followed his resignation in October 1957,
caused some disillusion in Gaullist circles. It was against this background of
frustration that the attacks on participation discussed above began to intensify. At
this time, several activists including Leon Delbecque began to demand that RS
members be authorised to adopt alternative tactics to the official policy of waiting for
an opportunity to arise to either enter government or bring down the regime in
1 TO
parliament. The final phase ofGaullist opposition to the Fourth Republic might
therefore be dated from around November 1957, which also saw the appearance of
Debre's Courrier de la Colere. The Gaullists shifted the focus of their campaigning
away from solely attacking the government's record on Algeria, developing the idea
of de Gaulle as saviour, and the typically Gaullist concept of legitimate revolt. By
April 1958, Salut Public described revolt as a right and a duty, to be exercised in the
• 11Q
present situation. The fall of the Gaillard government in the same month
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situation facing the nation was routinely presented as a choice between de Gaulle and
the Communists.
Michel Debre 1957-58: Algerie frangaise and the Nation's Last Chance
The pace of developments within Gaullism from November 1957's somewhat
disorganised state to May 1958's return to power owed much to the concerted
campaign that took place during those six months. While the Algerian affair was
never neglected during this period, the Gaullists did not greatly contribute to the
debate about reform or Algeria's future, concentrating instead on how to interpret the
crisis and convince the nation of its seriousness. Michel Debre was instrumental in
this final stage in the evolution of Fourth Republic Gaullism from a movement of
opposition to one of revolt, and his contribution to both Gaullist thinking and tactics
is crucial to an understanding of the intellectual and political context in which the
Gaullists' return to power in May 1958 took place. This section will therefore focus
on the arguments used by Debre against the regime, after a brief summary of his
views on the Algerian situation.
Debre's views on the Algerian problem and what it meant for France did not differ
greatly from those of other leading Gaullists. He did, however, see the rebellion as a
question of sovereignty, legitimacy and the role of the State first and foremost, and
this informed his response to any proposed reforms. Thus, the loi-cadre was judged
according to its effect on French sovereignty and its potential to strengthen the
nationalists' cause. Debre concluded that the proposal was unacceptable because it
could create a separate political power in Algeria and thus undermine French
sovereignty. The nationalists' insistence on elections risked legitimising the rebellion
if the government agreed to hold elections in Algeria.140 In a statement reminiscent
ofDebre's earlier doubts about extending the franchise throughout the Union
140 Michel Debre archives, 1DE24.7, 'Lettre aux Algeriens fideles', s.d. (1957), also published in
revised form as 'Loi-cadre et double jeu', Le Courrier de la Colere, 5 (20.12.1957.)
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frangaise (see pp. 46-7), he thus refused to support the government's formula of
'cease-fire, elections, negotiations':
On nous parle d'un statut negocie, apres des elections dites libres, trois mois
apres la fin de la pacification, au college unique, et pouvant aboutir a un
executifet a un legislatifalgerien. Si vous faites le lien entre toutes ces
formules, qu'est-ce qui reste de l'Algerie fran9aise? ... Trois mois apres la
pacification, des elections libres? II n'y a pas un Europeen, un Musulman qui
ne vous dise qu'il sera impossible, avant plusieurs annees de faire une
honnete consultation electorate. Si on veut la faire immediatement apres un
'cessez-le-feu', dans quelles conditions psychologiques, dans quelles
conditions morales va-t-on Torganiser? D'autre-part, est-ce avec les
personnes elues dans ces conditions qu'on discute un statut? ... C'est une
contradiction, c'est contraire meme au concept de l'Algerie liee a la France
d'une maniere definitive et partie integrante de la communaute frant^aise. 41
A second consequence of Debre's emphasis on the nature and role of the State and
the Nation led him to question the very notion of independence for Algeria. He saw
the cases of Tunisia and Morocco as proof that independent states could not exist in
North Africa: Tunisia had fallen prey to Egyptian domination, while Morocco had
become in effect an American protectorate.142 The Tunisian example, he told fellow
Gaullists, demonstrated that in combating Algerian nationalism, they should present
independence as a regression compared to the progress associated with French rule:
II faut avoir le courage de dire que lorsque l'independance aboutit a donner
pleins pouvoirs a un systeme feodal, totalitaire ou raciste, l'independance
n'est pas un progres; il faut avoir le courage de dire que quand la democratie
aboutit a organiser des elections avec un parti unique et un chef unique, c'est
une regression terrible.143
Only association with France could, therefore, guarantee to North Africa the rights
and freedoms that the independence movements claimed to deliver, for the simple
reason, according to Debre, that the Nation, in France, represented the principles of
141 Debre archives, 1DE22,4.1, speech, RS Congres National, Bordeaux, February 1957
142 Debre archives, 1DE23,2.2, correspondence, Debre to M. Mousseau (mayor of Chaille), 24.7.1956
143 Debre archives, 1DE22,4.1, speech, RS Congres National, 1957
liberty and equality. In contrast, he argued, 'II est peu de societes qui, sur le continent
africain, meritent le nom de nation', because few African societies could claim the
principles that France represented.144 Algeria, in particular, could not be independent,
quite simply because it could not be described as a Nation capable of constituting a
State based on common values. Thus the Nation, to be defended in Europe against
entangling alliances, was a concept wholly unsuited to African development: 'La
nation, en Afrique, est un mot qui sonne faux. La negation de la Nation, en Europe,
est un songe creux.'145 Debre's sense of the primacy of the nation in France and
Europe therefore set him firmly against any recognition of an Algerian nation,
strengthening his resolve to defend the French nation against what he saw as a threat
in the form of both Algerian independence and compromise with the wishes of
European and American allies in this respect.
Debre's attack on the Fourth Republic began from the premise outlined above - that
devolution, let alone independence, for Algeria was incompatible with French
interests - and continued by developing arguments based on what Algeria meant for
France. In this respect, too, his views echoed those of other Gaullists. Algeria was of
value as a symbol both of French hope for the future and of continued security;
Debre envisaged future emigration from France to Algeria as the vision of a
prosperous southern extension to the nation became reality.146 Like Soustelle, Debre
held that the Algerian problem was too important to be addressed in terms of
economics, and should instead be seen as a question of French security and
grandeur. 'Qui tient l'Algerie peut tenir la Mediterranee occidentale, qui tient
l'Algerie peut tenir le Sahara, qui tient Alger peut tenir l'Europe.'147 Debre's
typically Gaullist concerns on this issue were matched by his fears for France's
future without Algeria: only the communists would benefit from France's 'retreat' to
144 M. Debre, Ces princes qui nous gouvernent (Paris: Plon, 1957, 146)
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Europe, whether through exploiting economic hardship caused by immigration and
the return ofpieds-noirs, or by taking up the nationalist mantle abandoned by the
other political forces and claiming to represent the Nation against an integrated
Europe.148 Internal security would, therefore, be threatened by the communists, and
external security by the familiar process of anticolonialism opening up France's
southern hinterland to communist influence. Debre thus embarked upon his crusade
to discredit the regime and persuade public opinion of the crisis of security
confidence and hope that the Nation was facing, a campaign that began in November
1957 with the launch of Le Courrier de la Colere and the publication of the pamphlet
Ces princes qui nous gouvernent.
Debre's publications in the six months preceding the events ofMay 1958 have
earned him a reputation as the Gaullist who led the assault on the Republic. The tone
of his denunciations of the regime and his depictions of desperate crisis facing the
nation has, in this respect, been described more frequently than the content of
Debre's work has been analysed.149 His intention in launching both publications was
to 'profiter des circonstances', though he defends himself against charges of being
interested only in bringing down the regime, claiming that Ces princes qui nous
gouvernent was written in the hope that it would inspire those in government - the
princes — to instigate reform themselves.That both the Courrier and Cesprinces
were intended as rallying calls to Gaullists is clear, especially in the case of the
newspaper, in which Debre was assisted by, among others, Raymond Dronne,
Jacques Foccart, the RS deputy Jean-Baptiste Biaggi, future Gaullist minister
Alexandre Sanguinetti, and veteran, anciens resistants and young Gaullist
148 Debre archives, 1DE22,4.2, notes, December 1956; 1DE23, 2.2, correspondence, Debre to
Mousseau, 24.7.1956
149 Debre's provocative headlines such as 'Jusqu'a la guillotine' (Courrier de la colere, 1
(23.11.1957)), 'Cederons-nous Toulon a l'OTAN?' (Courrier de la colere, 14 (21.2.1958)), or chapter
headings like 'La logique du regime mene a la catastrophe' (Ces princes, p. 69) explain why he is
generally seen as the Gaullist most strongly devoted to bringing down the regime, in addition to the
conspiratorial reputation that alleged plots like the Bazooka affair had already earned him.
150 Debre, Trois republiquespour une France: memoires, vol. 2: agir (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988), pp.
275-6
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movements.151 The Courrier dealt less with Algeria in its own right than with the
weakness of the regime that it revealed: only two editorials focused directly on the
Algerian situation, but every issue affirmed the need to keep Algeria French and the
regime's inability to do so. De Gaulle, too, remained in the background until around
April 1958, possibly for fear of alienating the numerous pieds-noirs and former
communists and socialists who corresponded with the journal, though the notions
expressed by Debre in his attacks on the regime were unmistakably Gaullist.
Cesprinces qui nous gouvernent, drawing its title from Machiavelli's writings on
raison d'etat, also dealt more with the potential consequences of the regime's failure
to reassert authority in Algeria than with the Algerian problem in its own right.
Echoing attacks in the 1930s on the small elite ruining France, Debre estimated at
around 800 the number of 'princes' betraying Algeria and France through limited
ambitions and lack of commitment: these princes were to be found in government,
the civil service, political parties, trade unions, business, the press, the universities,
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the Church and freemasonry. Revolt, by the people against this self-serving and
incompetent elite, was presented as a legitimate right and duty, in the interests of the
Nation and in line with the heritage established by de Gaulle in 1940.133
Debre's attack on the regime relied on demonstrating the threat to the French nation,
through comparisons with other moments of crisis or revolution in French history,
and promotion of a Gaullist alternative, against the background of the crisis in
Algeria and its effect on the State. By 1958, he argued, what was at stake in Algeria
was not only French grandeur, but the Nation itself, which Debre, like Soustelle, saw
151
Debre, Memoires, vol. 2, pp. 282-4. Biaggi and Sanguinetti played key roles in the preparation of
the May 13 events in Algiers, winning overpieds-noirs and veterans to the Gaullist cause. Biaggi also
founded a political movement known first as the Volontaires de I 'Unionfrangaise and later as the
Partipatriote revolutionnaire, devoted to bringing about de Gaulle's return, which recruited among
war veterans, Petainists and former RPF security forces, and was implicated in violent attacks on left-
wing parties' meetings and offices. C. Nick, Resurrection, pp. 191-4
152
Debre, Ces princes qui nous gouvernent, pp. 2-12
153
Debre, Ces princes qui nous gouvernent, pp. 197-200
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as being in a serious state of decline and decadence.134 French decline was contrasted
with Portuguese grandeur under Salazar - the type of comparison that led many on
the left to accuse the Gaullists of advocating something approaching fascism - on the
grounds that Portugal had not only resisted any pressure to relax authority in its
colonies, but had the fortune to be governed by a strong leader who assumed his
responsibilities as defender of the West and opponent of any attempts to undermine
the role of the Nation.133 France's decline had gone on for so long, according to
Debre, that the nation had now reached its last chance to restore its grandeur. This
last chance was to be found in Algeria: 'Nos derniers atouts: FAlgerie et le Sahara,
sans lesquels il n'y a plus de chances fran9aises dans le monde.'136 Thus, if the
regime could not save Algeria, it could not save France from decline. That the
regime was not up to the task, even if it had good intentions, had already been made
clear on several occasions by Debre:
Nous ne doutons pas de la bonne volonte et de la bonne foi des dirigeants
actuels. Le probleme est plus grave et il est pose en ces termes: est-ce que le
regime est capable a la longue de garder FAlgerie? ... II faut depasser les
critiques a l'adresse des hommes et des Gouvernements et poser le vrai
probleme ... La verite est connue de tous: le regime n'est pas capable de
garder FAlgerie, il ne sortira de l'immobilisme que pour sombrer dans
F abdication.137
In May 1958, Debre saw his prediction come true with the investiture of Pierre
Pflimlin as Prime Minister, which, he claimed, represented the regime's choice of
1 CO
shameful defeat over salvation.
154 It must be noted that Debre did not attribute this decline exclusively to the Algerian crisis; his
fervent opposition to European integration also informs much of his writing on the subject. However,
after the Suez affair, European integration was seen as a policy pursued by governments resigned to a
loss of influence in the rest of the world, and therefore as an unsatisfactory alternative to the French
role in Africa.
155 'Declin de la France et grandeur du Portugal', Courrier de la Colere, 21 (11.4.1958)
156 Courrier de la Colere, 2 (29.11.1957)
157 Debre archives, 1DE22, 4.1, speech, RS Congres National, Feb. 1957
158 Courrier de la Colere, 26 (15.5.1958)
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Given the regime's failure to defend France against decline, and the fact that it was
deemed incapable of reforming itself, any revolt against it was to be encouraged.
Thus the issue of sovereignty in Algeria raised by the loi-cadre became a test of the
regime's ability to uphold the interests of the Nation, and any departure from the
principle of sovereignty would therefore create a state of legitimate revolt: 'La
desobeissance ne serait pas seulement justifiee. La desobeissance serait alors un
devoir.'139 Thus, the question oiAlgerie franqaise came to represent a test of the
regime's ability to defend not only Algeria but also the principle - sovereignty - at
the heart of Debre's conception of the nation. This principle went beyond Algeria to
encompass all the other key themes of Gaullism in the Fourth Republic: national
independence without hindrance from international alliances, a resolve to defend
France and French interests, and a strong State capable of representing the interests
of the nation as a whole.
Debre's conviction that revolt against the regime was necessary resulted in sustained
efforts to convince the nation of the link between the crisis in Algeria, the Fourth
Republic's terminal decline, and the need for a new regime. FTis principal method of
persuasion was historical comparison, embracing the Toss' of French North America
in 1763, the 1789 Revolution, and the Second World War. In each case, an analogy
was found to relate the Algerian crisis to these decisive moments in the history of
French aspirations to grandeur. Thus the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which followed the
defeat at Quebec in 1759, was likened to the treaties of the 1940s and 50s ceding the
French Indian territories to India and the Fezzan province to Libya, and to the
independence treaties signed with Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia. Furthermore, the
two French defeats had a common cause: government indifference in the face of
potential military success:
159 Debre archives, IDE24.7, 'Lettre aux algeriens fideles', s.d. (Feb. 1958)
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Montcalm au Canada tenait la victoire. A plusieurs reprises il s'adressa a la
Cour de Versailles, la suppliant de comprendre. Versailles ne comprit jamais.
Les Fran9ais du Canada connurent un affreux martyre et le Canada frangais
fut perdu. Paris comprendra-t-il ce que Versailles n'a jamais compris?160
The consequence of the loss of Canada, Debre argued, was the people's final
realisation of the regime's decadence, thus creating the climate in which the 1789
Revolution occurred.161 Likewise, the Court in 1789 had behaved like the present
regime, one refusing to call the Estates General while the other rejected all calls for
constitutional reform: Prime Ministers Pinay, Faure, Pflimlin and Gaillard were
• 1 fO
described as the Necker and Calonne of their era.
That the 1789 Revolution was principally caused by the fall of Quebec is debatable,
and surely appeared so even to Debre's readers. The connection, nevertheless, was
made between colonial disaster, government incompetence and dramatic change of
i z-i
regime. A more familiar comparison, and one with more direct relevance to North
Africa, was the defeat in 1940. In 1957, Debre still hoped a recurrence of the
wartime defeat might be avoided in Algeria: 'II faut esperer que nous n'irons pas
jusqu'au mois de juin 1940', but by 1958 he felt the Gaullists' only option was to
wait for a similar crisis to arise.164
160 Courrier de la Colere, 16 (6.3.1958) & 17 (13.3.1958)
161 Courrier de la Colere, 1 (23.11.1957). The Gaullists' subsequent interest in encouraging
Quebecois nationalism is beyond the scope of this study, but it has been suggested that the Toss' of
Algeria led de Gaulle to seek to reactivate France's former role in North America through promotion
of the so-called fait nationalfrangais in Quebec.
162 Courrier de la Colere, 16 (6.3.1958) & 20 (3.4.1958). It might also be noted that, in May 1958,
Debre again sought inspiration in pre-revolution history, comparing de Gaulle to Henri IV because of
his ability to unite a divided nation. Debre archives, 1DE24.7, 'Henri IV', 8.5.1958, also published in
Courrier de la Colere, 26 (15.5.1958)
163 Debre seemed to acknowledge the limitations of his comparison in practical terms, conceding, in
November 1957, that revolt appeared unlikely because there was, as yet, no popular movement like in
1789. By May 1958, however, he had become confident that a popular movement could indeed be
relied upon. Courrier de la Colere, 1 (23.11.1957) & 23 (24.4.1958)
164 Debre archives, IDE23, 3.2, correspondence, Debre to M. Halna du Fretay, 11.1.1957; Courrier de
la Colere, 24 (1.5.1958)
254
IfDebre saw his principal contribution to the defence of French Algeria and all that it
represented in 1957-8 as to persuade as many people as possible of the dangers
facing the nation,163 he also developed a number of valuable contacts that would be
influential in May 1958. Among Gaullists, his activities consisted of a series of
'banquets' - whose very name recalls the prelude to the 1848 revolution - which
were attended by all leading Gaullists except Chaban-Delmas and de Gaulle himself.
The chief purpose of these meetings has been seen as the preparation of clandestine
activities designed to turn the expected revolt in Algiers to the Gaullists'
advantage.166 While this is surely an accurate judgement, the existing accounts of
these banquets reveal that the dominant themes discussed were firstly North Africa,
i en
closely followed by the State, the Constitution, and Europe. Debre was not active
among the pieds-noirs in Algiers in the manner of Soustelle or Delbecque, but his
arguments in the Courrier clearly attracted pied-noir support, as is seen by a number
of letters of support received from pieds-noirs, even those who continued to assert
1 f\9k
their hostility to de Gaulle. Other groups praised and cultivated by Debre in print
were the military and the police: an article in praise of the Algiers' police's activities
during the Second World War - admittedly not written by Debre himself— appeared
in the Courrier, while the newspaper, in more general terms, devoted an increasing
165 Debre archives, 1DE23, 3.2, correspondence, Debre to P. Debougnee, 14.1.1957
166 These meetings of senior Gaullists are described by J. Ferniot, De Gaulle et le 13 mai (Paris: Plon,
1965), p. 117; S. Berstein & P. Milza, Histoire de la France auXXe siecle, 1945-1958 (Brussels:
Complexe, 1991), p. 298; P. Gaillard, Foccart parle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard (Paris:
Fayard/Jeune Afrique, 1995), pp. 133-4. All these accounts convey a sense of expectation among the
Gaullists, and of preparation for an inevitable revolt in Algiers, though there is no evidence of their
actual organisation of such an event. P. Bourdrel, La derniere chance de FAlgerie franqaise: du
gouvernement socialiste au retour de de Gaulle (Paris: Albin Michel, 1996), p. 213, makes reference
to the meeting, in Nice in March 1958, of the senior Gaullists and Alain de Serigny, editor of I'Echo
d'Alger, widely credited with bringing about the pieds-noirs' temporary conversion to the Gaullist
cause in May 1958.
167 Debre archives, 1DE22,4.2. The programme cited here is that for the banquet held in Nice on
March 16, 1958, attended by Debre, Soustelle, Michelet, Triboulet and Leon Teisseire (Vice-president
of the RS group in the Senate). Triboulet claims that the Gaullists' meeting with de Serigny (note 176)
took place on the same day, though no mention is made of the Echo d'Alger editor in Debre's papers.
168 Courrier de la Colere, 5 (20.12.1957) contains an illuminating example of Debre's campaign's
appeal in Algeria; a certain Abbe V. Serralda of Algiers writes: 'M. de Gaulle est coupable d'avoir
combattu dans la Province algerienne les bons sujets et les respectables agents de la souverainete
franqaise. M. de Gaulle est responsable du Tripartisme qui liquefie la belle Nation franqaise.' Serralda
goes on, however, to praise Debre's efforts for the Nation and request a subscription to the Courrier.
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amount of space to the concerns of the army in Algeria - supporting its complaints
about budgets and equipment, for example - from February 1958, shortly after
warmly praising the air force's actions at Sakiet.169
Given Debre's role in creating an atmosphere of salutpublic before May 1958, his
views on what exactly Gaullism meant merit some attention, in order to determine
how representative he was ofmainstream Gaullist thought at this time. Two themes
emerge in Debre's relations with Gaullism: firstly, attempts to distance himself from
parliamentary Gaullism, and secondly, efforts to reinforce to the public the
identification of Gaullism and the Nation that is apparent in much of his own
thought. In June 1956, Debre anticipated the future discontent among most Gaullists
with the idea of participation in government and resigned from the RS Comite
executifand Comite directeur in protest at the Gaullists' relations with the regime.170
A month later, he envisaged the creation of a parliamentary 'intergroupe' - which
could extend beyond Gaullist members - for the sake of putting pressure on the
government over Algeria.171 Gaullism, for Debre, now had to assert its claim to
represent the Nation, in order to present a credible alternative and offer hope of a
solution to the Algerian crisis. In 1957, Debre had explained that 'Nous ne sommes
pas gaullistes simplement par fidelite sentimentale a une personne ... Nous sommes,
i nj
nous devons etre gaullistes par raison d'Etat', identifying firmly with the so-called
gaullistes de raison rather than the gaullistes de foi (see pp. 29-30).173 He also thus
clarified an important difference, in terms of response to the Algerian crisis, between
himself and the other intellectual leader ofGaullism, Jacques Soustelle. While
Soustelle forged alliances among pieds-noirs and metropolitan activists in the name
169 P. Combes, 'Verites sur la police algerienne', Courrier de la Colere, 3 (6.12.1957.)
170 Debre archives, 1DE23, 3.1, correspondence, Debre to Dronne, 23.6.1956
171 Debre archives, 1DE23, 3.1, correspondence, Debre to Labonne, 24.7.1956
172 Debre archives, 1DE22, 4.1, speech, RS Congres National, 1957
17j These categories of Gaullists were mirrored in an article by Debre in April 1958, which claimed
that a combination of the sentiment inspired by faith in de Gaulle, and rational political action was
required in the interests of the Nation. Debre, 'Gaullismes, antigaullismes, pseudogaullismes',
Courrier de la Colere, 20 (3.4.1958)
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ofAlgerie frangaise, Debre instead conducted a campaign based on arguments about
the effect of the crisis on the State, lending verbal rather than practical support to
non-Gaullist forces because of his conviction that only the creation of a new regime
based on Gaullist principles could resolve the Algerian problem in a satisfactory
manner.
If Gaullism represented the salvation of the Nation in its time of crisis, those
representing the regime had to be strongly condemned as both antigaullists and
opposed to the interests of France. Therefore, in a piece of typically sensationalist
Debre rhetoric, the members of the 'system' were described as 'professionnels de
l'anti-gaullisme' and denounced in uncompromising terms: 'Les germanomanes avec
leur Europe dirigee par l'Allemagne. De Clovis a Rene Coty, il y a toujours eu les
partisans de l'etranger.'174 Debre's interest in discrediting even president Coty -
generally seen as an ally in despair at the regime's weakness, and who played a
crucial role in de Gaulle's return by threatening to resign in May 1958 if de Gaulle
were not invested - lay in the fact that, in order to present a government of public
safety as the only solution to the nation's problems, Gaullism had to appear as the
only political force truly acting in the national interest. By April, the notion of a
government of public safety was defined for Debre's readers as holding complete
authority, free of party politics, and representing a 'sens national' and, above all, 'le
prestige', qualities that even the Presidency could not claim under the Fourth
Republic, in Debre's view.175
Debre, as has been seen, did more than any other Gaullist to establish the link
between crisis in Algeria, crisis for the Nation, and a credible Gaullist alternative.
Yet it must be remembered that Gaullist support in France appeared relatively low,
and that even if a revolt did take place in Algiers, the Gaullists would be far from the
174 'Les professionnels de l'anti-gaullisme', Courrier de la Colere, 1 (23.11.1957)
175
'Qu'appele-t-on gouvernement de salut public?', Courrier de la Colere, 23 (24.4.1958)
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most likely beneficiaries. To deal with this problem, Debre gradually introduced the
name of de Gaulle into his assault on the regime, despite the risk of alienating some
potential supporters. De Gaulle's name was first mentioned in the Courrier in
December 1957, but it was not until the spring of 1958 that the idea that the General
represented a credible alternative to the Fourth Republic was fully developed. De
Gaulle was identified initially with the salvation ofAlgerie frangaise, through
articles such as 'De Gaulle, c'est la sauvegarde de l'Algerie', which argued that only
de Gaulle could provide the authority needed to defend the Nation and its interests in
North Africa.176 The link between de Gaulle as saviour ofAlgeria and a change of
regime was first made in an opinion poll published in the Courrier in March 1958,
showing large numbers of respondents in favour both ofAlgerie frangaise and de
Gaulle.177 By May 1958, the change of regime had replaced Algeria as the dominant
feature of Debre's promotion of de Gaulle. The emphasis, by this time, was firmly on
the General's historic mission to restore the State and rescue France. The Algerie
frangaise argument, after May 13, was clearly considered to have been won and the
remaining task for the Gaullists was to ensure that it now merged with their
campaign for de Gaulle's return.
176 'De Gaulle, c'est la sauvegarde de l'Algerie', Courrier de la Colere, 13 (14.2.1958). De Gaulle's
speeches and memoirs were also quoted extensively to demonstrate his Algerie frangaise credentials,
such as 'La France, quoi qu'il arrive, n'abandonnera pas 1'Algerie' (from speech of 18.8.1947),
quoted in Courrier de la Colere, 18 (20.3.1958)
177 Courrier de la Colere, 19 (27.3.1958). No source or details were given for this opinion poll, nor for




MAY 1958: GAULLISM'S RETURN TO POWER
Debre's attacks on the regime, accompanied by the efforts of other Gaullists in
parliament and in the country as a whole,1 ensured that when the Gaillard
government fell, in April 1958, the name of de Gaulle was raised as a possible
solution to the crisis of authority in Paris. However, the Gaullists who have been
discussed in the preceding chapters were operating almost exclusively in
metropolitan France - only Soustelle had first-hand experience of the situation in
Algeria - and the European population in Algeria, from which any revolt against the
regime would most likely arise, had, since 1951, shown few signs of becoming
Gaullist. Thus, the connection between Gaullism and a solution to the Algerian
problem, which the Gaullists had been attempting to demonstrate since 1954,
remained unclear in Algeria. This chapter will therefore look at the events leading to
de Gaulle's investiture as Prime Minister on June 1, 1958, in the context ofwhat
these events reveal about the success of the Gaullists' attempts to develop a coherent
policy on Algeria and to present Gaullism as the solution to the crisis in both Algeria
and France.
In February 1958, Jacques Chaban-Delmas created an 'antenne' of the Defence
Ministry in Algiers, ostensibly to oversee the implementation of psychological
warfare tactics, but widely seen as an attempt to develop contacts between the
Gaullists, the army and local political movements, in order to take advantage of any
1
Alongside Debre's efforts in favour of de Gaulle, former RPF organiser Andre Astoux had initiated a
campaign of letters from Gaullists throughout France to President Coty calling for the General's
return, and Jacques Dauer had arranged for the young Gaullists' associations in most towns to
simultaneously put up posters, on April 26, with the appeal: 'Appelons de Gaulle et la France sera la
France.' These campaigns certainly helped raise awareness of the possibility that de Gaulle might
return to power to resolve the crisis, but said nothing about the situation in Algeria or how de Gaulle
was to solve the problems there. Around the same time, Gaullists began to make reference in public to
the idea that de Gaulle might return. All these measures, however, as Rene Remond has observed,
were: 'temoignages de fidelite plus qu'initiatives politiques'. R. Remond, 1958: Le retour de de
Gaulle, (Brussels: Complexe, 1983), p 57; A. Astoux, L 'oubli: de Gaulle 1946-1958 (Paris: J.C.
Lattes, 1974); J. Dauer & M. Rodet, Le 13 mai sans complots, (Paris: La Pensee Moderne), 1959, pp.
100-1
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protest movement arising in Algiers. Leon Delbecque, head of the RS in the Nord
department, was appointed to this post. Delbecque, who held no significant position
in the Gaullist movement before or after 1958, thus became the most important
figure in the events that led to de Gaulle's return. He developed contacts in Algiers
and formed a 'Comite de Vigilance' composed ofpied-noir activists including
veterans, militaires and students, which alarmed the government and the army
command sufficiently for Resident-General Lacoste and Commander-in-Chief Salan
to request that Delbecque be removed from Algeria. In April 1958, the Gaillard
government fell and no successor was found for five weeks, giving rise to a sense
that the Fourth Republic's final crisis was approaching. Around this time, calls from
the public and individual politicians from different parties for de Gaulle's return
became common, though the General himself apparently still discounted any
prospect of returning to power. What was clear, in any case, was that de Gaulle
would not return within the Fourth Republic 'system'; the calls for the General's
return, therefore, effectively became calls for the end of the regime, thereby echoing
the sentiments not only of the Gaullists but also of the pieds-noirs and much of the
army in Algeria.
In Algeria, the fall of the government exacerbated the power vacuum that had existed
since the 1956 elections had been cancelled, leaving no authority other than Lacoste
and Salan, a situation that worsened on May 10 when Lacoste returned to Paris. On
May 13, a crowd, led by student activist Pierre Lagaillarde, with the military doing
nothing to prevent it, seized control of the Governor-General's building. In the
ensuing chaos a Committee ofPublic Safety was formed under the auspices of
General Massu, including Delbecque and his supporters alongside non-Gaullist pied-
noir activists. For Delbecque and the Gaullists in Paris, the next step was to launch a
call for de Gaulle to return to power to restore order, but the National Assembly
instead finally invested Pierre Pflimlin as Prime Minister. The Gaullists, therefore,
had to find a way of turning what was essentially a pied-noir and military revolt to
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their advantage. On May 15, Delbecque persuaded Salan to issue an appeal to de
Gaulle, while the arrival of Soustelle in Algiers, two days later, inspired hopes that
the crisis would lead to the General's return. Soustelle's presence in Algiers was
crucial: as defender ofAlger ie frangaise and hero of the pieds-noirs, he was able to
temporarily unite the settlers and the army in the belief that only de Gaulle could
guarantee the future of French Algeria.
In Paris, meanwhile, de Gaulle announced that he was prepared to form a
government according to official procedures, attempting to reassure those who saw
him as a dictator-in-waiting acting on behalf of a rebellious army. However, a
majority could not be found in parliament in favour of de Gaulle's investiture, and
General Massu put in place a plan, named Operation Resurrection, for a military
operation in Paris, directed from bases in Algeria and south-west France, in order to
force the government and the President to accept de Gaulle. With no progress being
made towards de Gaulle's investiture, on May 24 a military force from Algeria took
control of Corsica, with the co-operation of the local Gaullist deputy Pascal Arrighi.
This produced a greater sense of urgency in Paris, culminating in the crucial
acceptance, on the part of Pflimlin and Socialist leader Mollet, of de Gaulle's return
to power, and finally President Coty's threat to resign if the National Assembly did
not elect de Gaulle as Prime Minister with full powers for six months.
The events ofMay 1958 are problematic in two respects for the study of Gaullist
views on Algeria. Firstly, the unorthodox nature of the events in Algiers and Paris
means that reliable evidence is hard to find.2 The second problem facing the historian
2 The vast majority of source material on May 1958 consists of memoirs of those involved which,
though of some historical interest, often present contrasting views of the subject, notably concerning
the relative importance ofGaullists, pieds-noirs and the army. Some of the most reliable and well-
informed studies of the May 1958 events, indeed, remain those written by observers at the time,
because of the range of participants interviewed and the accuracy of recollection, though such
accounts do lack the historical perspective needed to set the events in wider context. The most useful
examples of works of this kind are: M&S. Bromberger, Les 13 complots du 13 mai (Paris: Artheme
Fayard, 1959); J. Ferniot, De Gaulle et le 13 mai (Paris: Plon, 1965); J.R. Tournoux Secrets d'Etat,
(Paris: Plon, 1960; repr. Paris: 10/18, 1962). P.M. Williams, 'The Fourth Republic: murder or
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of Gaullism in respect ofMay 1958 is that of determining the precise extent and
nature of Gaullist involvement. The Gaullists in Algiers were only able to operate in
co-operation with the pieds-noirs and the army. It must therefore be determined how
important their role in influencing events was, and at which stages of the three-week
long crisis of authority the Gaullists played an important part. The most difficult
issue to resolve, in this respect, is that ofGaullist approval ofOperation
Resurrection. De Gaulle was constantly kept informed of developments, and is
widely reported to have authorised the operation in the event that parliament refused
to elect him as Prime Minister. However, it is also acknowledged that de Gaulle had
no interest in returning to power as the champion of a military rebellion, and that the
only role he was prepared to accept was that of national arbiter, recalled to power by
constitutional means in a time of crisis.
If de Gaulle's behaviour in May 1958 appears typically ambiguous, that of the
Gaullists is easier to describe, though no more conclusive. Gaullist contacts with
pieds-noirs, the military and other political forces can be ascertained from a number
of sources, and these can at least reveal something about the state ofGaullist views
on Algeria and the regime, by demonstrating which positions they were willing to be
associated with. Gaullist declarations of opinion on the Algerian problem are
virtually absent, however, from accounts ofMay 1958. In seeking alliances and
winning support, the Gaullists relied on arguments they had already developed in the
suicide', in P.M. Williams, Wars, Plots and Scandals in Post-war France (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970), pp. 129-66 illustrates the problems created by the abundance of sources based
on first-hand accounts and recollections. Among more recently published secondary accounts, the
most useful are those that rely on primary source material made available to the authors. However,
even in this case the story ofMay 1958 remains incomplete, as too many official primary sources are
lacking for a complete picture of the revolt in Algiers and the proposed military operations in
mainland France to be drawn. See, for example, O. Rudelle, Mai 58: De Gaulle et la Republique
(Paris: Plon, 1988); C. Nick, Resurrection. Naissance de la Veme Republique: un coup d'Etat
democratique (Paris: Fayard, 1998). Nick relies on military documents in his possession relating to
the 'Resurrection' operation, while Rudelle's account is based on private interviews with several
participants in May 1958. These interviews, however, have not been made available to researchers,
despite their being conducted under the auspices of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques.
Rudelle's work has therefore acquired the status of the 'definitive' account ofMay 1958, while the
general lack of primary sources contributes to the proliferation of rumours and conspiracy theories.
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previous years of debate, the argument in favour ofAlgerie franqaise being assumed
to have already been won.
It is clear that a number of plots and conspiracies existed in Gaullist,pied-noir,
military and extreme-right circles in May 1958. The immediate historical interest for
this study, however, is not to provide a detailed account of the actions of the various
participants, but rather to determine how the Gaullists succeeded in persuading
traditionally antigaullist military and pied-noir communities to support their cause.
The revolt ofMay 13 in Algiers, commonly seen as the beginning of the process that
led to the founding of the Fifth Republic, cannot be accurately described as Gaullism
in action. Very few of those involved in the seizure of the Governor-General's
building in Algiers were Gaullists. Indeed, Leon Delbecque, the Gaullist with most
responsibility for the events, has accused other Gaullists of failing to fulfil their
promises of support. Thus, not only were the events ofMay 13 conducted by a
majority that was not Gaullist - hardly a surprise in Algiers - but the Gaullists' role
in the events may even have been overestimated in the light of subsequent events.3
The Gaullists sought, in 1958, to reactivate old contacts in Algeria. The RS
federation in Algiers gradually became active, having been virtually silent since its
foundation in September 1955; meetings began to be held again from February
1958.4 Delbecque's arrival in Algiers was the catalyst for this, as he received
instructions from Chaban-Delmas not only to develop military and pied-noir
contacts, but also to rebuild the local RS.5 The Gaullists therefore clearly anticipated
a movement in which a local body of support might be useful. According to a report
J L. Delbecque, 'Mon 13 mai\ in G. Guilleminault et. al., De Bardot a de Gaulle: le roman vrai de la
IVe Republique (Paris: Denoel, 1972), pp. 321-66. Delbecque's account, like all others ofMay 13, is
not entirely reliable, with its emphasis on the unique and decisive contribution of Delbecque himself.
It is, however, revealing that he seeks to demonstrate that, far from being a Gaullist revolt, the events
were notable for the absence ofmass Gaullist support.
4 RS archives (Paris: Fondation Charles de Gaulle), H.J. Tummers, 'Das "Centre National des
Republicans Sociaux": Eine Gaullistische Partei unter der IV. Republik' (unpublished doctoral thesis,




of June 1958, the reorganisation of the RS had been conducted 'en vue notamment
d'une action plus intense et d'une collaboration a un eventuel mouvement de defense
de la France dans ce pays.'6 However, it would be wrong to conclude that this
constitutes definitive evidence of careful Gaullist planning for a seizure of power in
May 1958. The Gaullists were by no means the only politicians anticipating some
kind ofmass movement or revolt in Algiers in 1958, and their numbers remained
small compared to the numbers ofpieds-noirs involved in the various Algerie
franqaise organisations. Old Gaullist-pzW-«oz> contacts made at the time of the RPF
were renewed in 1958, chiefly in the form of the local branch of the USRAF.7 In
Paris, however, the USRAF was somewhat distanced from the Gaullists, some of
whom considered it a possible threat. Delbecque's 'Comite de Vigilance', indeed,
was based on the small group of Gaullists who had been active in Algiers before the
Allied landings in 1942 and had been involved, alongside Soustelle, in the intrigues
surrounding the assassination of Darlan and the agreement between de Gaulle and
Giraud.9 However, the majority of Gaullist contacts in Algiers were made with
veterans, pied-noir political groups, and the army. In Paris, too, the Gaullists were by
no means only working in co-operation with colleagues, though the exact role played
by Gaullists in France does shed some light on their role in channelling the revolt of
Algiers into a Gaullist political triumph.
All the leading figures of Fourth Republic Gaullism were involved in developing
contacts and turning events to de Gaulle's advantage in May 1958. Among senior
Gaullists, Debre, Soustelle and Foccart were most prominent, while much of the
organising and co-ordinating of the Gaullists' various allies was done by more minor
6
Tiimmers, p. 250
7 F. Barthelemy, 'Le Gaullism et l'Algerie au temps du RPF, 1947-1955' (unpublished memoire de
maitrise, Institut d'Etudes Politiques, Paris, 1997), p. 112; Lettre a I'Union Franqaise, 428 (14.5.1958)
8 P. Gaillard, Foccartparle: entretiens avec Philippe Gaillard (Paris: Fayard/Jeune Afirique, 1995), p.
134; J. Dauer & M. Rodet, Le 13 mai sans complots, p. 168
9
Rudelle, p. 138. A typical example of the small group ofpied-noir Gaullists is Rene Vinciguerra,
who had been active in the Algerian RPF during the early years of the Fourth Republic (see p. 36).
Delbecque, however, insists that the number of actual Gaullists in Algiers was always too small to be
of any importance alone. Delbecque, p. 327
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figures such as Pascal Arrighi, Guy Ribeaud, Lucien Neuwirth, Jacques Dauer, Pierre
Lefranc and Olivier Guichard.10 Thus the leaders of the Gaullists' efforts were
Soustelle, the staunchest Algerie frangaise supporter, Debre, the developer of the
idea that Algerie frangaise could save the Nation, and Foccart, the Gaullists' chief
expert on colonial questions. The leadership of the Gaullists' activities was certainly
composed of those with a strong attachment to Algerie frangaise. Soustelle and
Foccart, indeed, had shown much more interest in colonial affairs than the question
of the change of regime, while Debre had certainly established his credentials as
defender ofAlgeria. The argument advanced by most supporters of conspiracy
theories to explain the Gaullists' behaviour in May 1958 — that they merely took
advantage of the Algerie frangaise campaign to bring down the Fourth Republic and
return de Gaulle to power - does not appear to be supported by analysis of the
leading participants' views on Algeria as seen in preceding chapters.11 Furthermore,
among the Gaullists who were prominent during the Fourth Republic, but who
played little part in May 1958, were figures like Fouchet, Terrenoire, Georges
Catroux and Michelet, all of whom had shown less attachment to Algeria. Even
Jacques Chaban-Delmas, having played an important role in sending Delbecque to
Algiers, does not feature prominently in accounts ofGaullist behaviour in May
10
According to Lefranc, a precise division of responsibilities among Gaullists existed, with Guichard
responsible for liaison with politicians, Foccart for contacts with the military, and Lefranc for
information and organisation. P. Leffanc, Avec qui vous savez: vingt-cinq ans avec de Gaulle (Paris:
Plon, 1979), p. 121 In addition, Foccart asserts that Dauer and his collaborators played essentially a
secondary, supporting role, and were not part of the Gaullist leaders in May 1958. Gaillard, pp. 130-1.
There seems, therefore, to have been a division between Gaullist leaders and activists in the May
events, with the possible exception of Foccart, who maintained the widest range of contacts. For
details of the Gaullists' exact involvement in May 1958, see Rudelle, pp. 136-41, along with the
memoirs ofmost Gaullists: P. Arrighi, La Corse - atout decisive (Paris: Plon, 1958); A. Astoux,
L 'oubli; Dauer & Rodet, Le 13 mai sans complots; M. Debre, Trois republiques pour une France:
memoires, vol. 2: 1946-1958: Agir (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988); R. Dronne, La revolution d'Alger
(Paris: France-Empire, 1958); Gaillard, Foccart parley O. Guichard, Mon general (Paris: Grasset,
1980); Leffanc, Avec qui vous savez; J. Soustelle, L 'esperance trahie, 1958-1961 (Paris: Editions de
l'Alma, 1962); R. Triboulet, Un gaulliste de lalVeme, (Paris: Plon, 1985). Many military memoirs
also relate the 1958 events, but they tend to be less reliable, frequently being written after Algerian
independence by officers who felt betrayed by de Gaulle.
" The argument that May 1958 was simply a pretext for the Gaullists, or that a military revolt was
taken over for their own ends, has been advanced by disillusioned military figures who were
committed to Algeriefranqaise, as well as by some on the left like Mitterrand and Mendes-France,
who accused the Gaullists of simply manufacturing a crisis in Algiers to mount a coup d'Etat.
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1958.12 Chaban-Delmas, too, was not one of the Gaullists' most vocal spokesmen on
Algeria, and has claimed, indeed, not to have taken much interest in colonial
1T i
questions during the Fourth Republic. The Gaullist ringleaders in May 1958,
therefore, were clearly drawn from among those most strongly committed to Algerie
frangaise.
The less senior Gaullists involved in May 1958 often played crucial roles. Guichard,
for example, was responsible for liaison with de Gaulle, while Ribeaud and Neuwirth
maintained links between Delbecque in Algiers and the leaders in Paris. Arrighi,
meanwhile, was instrumental in the rallying of Corsica to the revolt, while Dauer was
chiefly responsible for ensuring that any nationalist movements on the far right were
sidelined in favour of appeals to de Gaulle. Much of the work carried out by these
Gaullists was achieved in conjunction with departmental federations or young
Gaullist associations composed of party activists motivated, in most cases, by
attachment to de Gaulle himself. Likewise, Guichard, Ribeaud and Neuwirth were
typical of the so-called gaullistes de foi, attracted to Gaullism by admiration for de
Gaulle, especially the Resistance legacy and the unrelenting opposition to the Fourth
Republic. The Gaullist leaders in May 1958, therefore, were those with a strongly
held and coherently developed argument for the importance ofAlgerie frangaise;
they were assisted, in most cases, by the kind of Gaullists motivated principally by
de Gaulle himself, though their support for French Algeria is also not in doubt. Thus
the Gaullists, in May 1958 as in the preceding years, combined rational defence of
the French presence in Algeria with the more emotional belief in de Gaulle's rightful
place at the head of the nation.
12 Foccart claims that Chaban-Delmas was deliberately not involved by the Gaullists in their activities
ofMay 1958, because of his position in the government. Gaillard, p. 134
13 O. Wieviorka, Nous entrerons dans la carriere: de la resistance a I'exercice dupouvoir (Paris:
Seuil, 1994), p. 304
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The role of de Gaulle himself in the Gaullists' attempts to combine Algerie frangaise
and Gaullism in May 1958 is ambiguous. His attitude to the 'Resurrection' operation
is probably the most studied aspect of the whole episode, and will be examined
below in relation to Gaullist-military relations. Even after May 13, the General
showed little sign of directly supporting the Gaullists' activism, though the effect it
generated in the political world undoubtedly benefited him. He warned both Foccart
and Lefranc, however, not to involve themselves in any further plots or conspiracies
after his statement that he was prepared to form a government.14 In general, de
Gaulle appears to have shown more enthusiasm for plans presented to him by more
minor Gaullists such as Neuwirth, who can be considered to show less personal
ambition or ideological commitment to any position on Algeria, than to the likes of
Soustelle. De Gaulle is reported to have assured Neuwirth that he would respond to
any appeal that Delbecque might make in Algiers, but he refused to issue any
endorsement of Soustelle's plans to go to Algiers and attempt to gain control of the
pied-noir and military revolt.15
The Gaullists in Paris and Algiers could not have achieved control of the revolt
without the co-operation ofpieds-noirs, veterans groups in Algeria and France, and
the military. In addition, they needed the acquiescence, if not the active co-operation,
of rival political movements in France, in order to impose de Gaulle as the solution
to the crisis. Veterans in Algeria were rallied to the Gaullist cause by Delbecque, via
the 'Comite de vigilance'. Once integrated into Delbecque's networks, the veterans
could then be relied upon to spread the message that de Gaulle would guarantee both
14
Gaillard, p. 141; Lefranc, p. 116
15
Rudelle, pp. 140-1, 163. Soustelle did go to Algiers, on May 17, with de Gaulle's failure to support
him apparently not delaying him, though Debre reports that Soustelle decided to remain in Paris for a
short time, while Foccart insists that Soustelle was merely prevented from going to Algiers
immediately by a lack of transport. Debre, p. 305; Gaillard, pp. 137-8. De Gaulle's apparent
reluctance to support Soustelle might be seen as evidence of the General's continuing suspicion of
Soustelle's ambitions, which had first been aroused in 1952 with Soustelle's interest in becoming
Prime Minister, in addition to the frequently offered interpretation that de Gaulle did not share
Soustelle's commitment to Algeria. It is also important to note that Soustelle's subsequent split with
Gaullism and discrediting in the eyes ofGaullists may have led some Gaullists to portray Soustelle's
relations with de Gaulle in May 1958 in a less favourable light.
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the maintenance ofAlgerie franqaise and an end to the political crisis in Paris. This
committee, seen as a forerunner of a future Committee ofPublic Safety, was created
with the intention of bringing together as many different groups in Algiers as
possible, at the end of Delbecque's process of establishing contacts in pied-noir
circles.16 Thus, the Gaullists actively sought co-operation from groups such as
veterans, students and even Poujadists from early 1958, rather than merely finding
common cause with them at the time of the May events. In France, also, veterans'
support was sought for a possible popular movement in favour of de Gaulle. In
particular, the Anciens Combattants de I'Union Franqaise (ACUF), successors to the
Anciens d'Indochine, who had already been linked with Gaullist plans to overthrow
the Republic in May 1954, were closely connected with Gaullist activists. ACUF
president Yves Gignac - also involved in the May 1954 events - was a member of a
group of nationalist figures organised by Debre and Dauer into a potential source of
support for de Gaulle.17 Many veterans were more Petainist than Gaullist, and it
would be wrong to imply that groups like the ACUF became Gaullist in 1958.
Rather, the combination of arguments in favour ofAlgerie franqaise and the end of
the Fourth Republic struck a chord with veterans, particularly Indochina veterans,
and by May 1958 the Gaullists' efforts to link the two causes in the name of de
1 8
Gaulle had evidently succeeded.
While the veterans' associations provided an important body of potential activists in
the event of any concerted action in favour of de Gaulle being deemed necessary, the
Gaullists, reduced to only 4% of electoral support in 1956, also needed to win





18 The appeal of Gaullism to veterans was also enhanced by the presence among Gaullist activists of
some figures who seemed to have more in common with the nationalist right than mainstream
Gaullism, such as Alexandre Sanguinetti, a pied-noir charged with liaison with veterans and described
by Debre's collaborator, Melnik, as 'fascisant' and by Dauer as 'retrograde'. Nick, p. 519, Dauer &
Rodet, p. 51. Despite this, however, Sanguinetti was in close contact with Foccart, who was
responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the various veterans groups rallying to the Gaullist
cause. Gaillard, pp. 134-5
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as well as its state of tension and history of protest - that Algiers was considered the
most likely location for a Gaullist-led movement. The Gaullists had a number of
reasons to be optimistic about their chances ofmaking inroads into the traditionally
antigaullist settler community more successfully than the RPF's attempts to find an
electoral breakthrough before 1951. After the cancellation of the 1956 elections, the
pieds-noirs' form ofpolitical expression had been local committees and pressure
groups, which were in any case well-suited to the settlers' mistrust ofmetropolitan-
style party politics. Thus, the Gaullists were faced with a situation in which, if one of
the pied-noir groupings could be influenced, others could be expected to follow suit,
and they could hope to derive some benefit from their opposition to the system in
France among the antiparliamentarian pieds-noirs.'9 Delbecque succeeded in
winning over many pied-noir organisations to his 'antenne', though he is reticent as
to the means he employed or the arguments with which he lowered the settlers'
90
traditional defences towards de Gaulle. Alain de Serigny, editor of the Echo
d'Alger, issued a public appeal to de Gaulle on May 10, which can be seen as a
consequence of the assurances he had received from senior Gaullists including Debre
and Soustelle in March 1958 regarding de Gaulle's commitment to Algeria (see p.
234). Along with de Serigny, one of the most important individual in attracting
pieds-noirs to Gaullism was Colonel Thomazo, a war veteran and commander of the
Unites Territoriales - the pied-noir civilian defence organisations that had appeared
in Algiers from 1956 - and a member of Delbecque's 'Comite de Vigilance'.
Thomazo's 'conversion' to the Gaullist cause can be seen as the crucial link between
19 After May 13, an official report on the political situation in Algeria concluded that the absence of
formal political structures in Algiers had indeed been an important contributory factor in the
channelling of the settlers' concerns in a revolutionary direction, as the small groups that existed were
easily controlled by activists. Archives de l'Armee de Terre, Delegation Generale du Gouvernement
en Algerie: Bureau d'Etudes, 'Evolution politique des milieux europeens d'Algerie 1954-1959', s.d.
20
According to Delbecque, the purpose of re-establishing an RS group in Algiers was not principally
to advance the Gaullist cause, but rather to inspire other political movements to make themselves
known and operate in a more concerted and organised way. Delbecque, p. 327
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Delbecque's 'Antenne' and the parallel pied-noir and military 'Groupe des sept' that
21
was also planning a popular revolt in the name ofAlgerie franqaise.
The events ofMay 1958 have often been portrayed as becoming essentially a joint
Gaullist-military operation, once the pieds-noirs' initial activism had been used to
instigate the revolt ofMay 13. While it is true that the military quickly took control
of events in Algiers and the Gaullists came to the political foreground in Paris after
that date, it is less certain that a great deal of contact existed between Gaullists and
the military in Algiers during this period. In Paris, Gaullists were in close contact
with senior military figures over two issues: the army's response to the prospect of
de Gaulle's return, and the means of ensuring that the 'Resurrection' operation could
be put into practice should de Gaulle not be able to assume power. In Algiers,
however, most of the Gaullist-military contacts took place before May 13,
Commander-in-Chief Salan's call to Paris for a 'national arbiter' being followed, on
May 15, by his 'Vive de Gaulle', which effectively handed the initiative back to
Paris and marked the triumph of the Gaullists' work to persuade the army that its
interests in Algeria coincided with those ofGaullism.22 Salan appears to have been
somewhat reluctant to call upon de Gaulle, though Delbecque had already, on May 9,
convinced him to address a telegram to President Coty - France had been without a
government since April 15 - calling for 'un gouvernement fermement decide a
maintenir notre drapeau en Algerie'.23 However, by the time of Soustelle's arrival in
Algiers on May 17, Salan and Massu were distinctly hostile to his presence, fearing
21 Rudelle, p. 159. The common ground between Thomazo and Delbecque must not, however, be
interpreted as evidence that the entire 'groupe des sept' was sympathetic to the Gaullist cause; other
members of this group, such as Pierre Lagaillarde, never rallied to Gaullism, however briefly.
22 The Gaullists quickly realised that the decisive decisions would now be made in Paris. Debre, who
had considered going to Algiers, was told by de Gaulle at this stage to remain in the capital. Debre, p.
305
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Rudelle, pp. 156-7. Salan's memoirs, written after his engagement in the OAS, make no reference
to the Gaullist origins of this message, though several other sources confirm Delbecque's
involvement. Delbecque, moreover, claims that the text of the message had been cleared with
Guichard and Foccart in Paris, via General Ely, who played an important role in liaison between the
army, the Gaullists and President Coty after May 13. Salan, Memoires: fin d'un empire, vol. 3: Algerie
franqaise (Paris: Presses de la Cite, 1972), pp. 284-6; Delbecque, p. 332
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that to politicise the situation would damage the army's unity and undermine the
control that they had achieved since May 13.24 Once in Algiers, Soustelle was in
contact not with other Gaullists, but rather with the pieds-noirs of the local
USRAF.25 However, Salan and Massu were by now convinced that, as they sought to
restore order, neither pied-noir political movements nor more rebellious generals
were welcome. Likewise, the apparent complicity of sections of the army in Algiers
on May 13 - notably the parachute regiment - has been interpreted as evidence that it
too had rallied temporarily to the Gaullist cause, though any contacts that had taken
place to this end appear to have occurred via the pied-noir and veterans' associations
that Delbecque had infiltrated, in which many young, politically active officers were
involved.26
The contacts between the military and the Gaullists in Paris might be seen as more
important in determining the course of events leading to de Gaulle's return, and in
establishing how much compromise took place between the views of each group,
once Salan's call for de Gaulle had brought the army and Gaullism together. Before
May 13, Debre had reassured General Paul Ely, increasingly concerned about the
real danger of a split in the army between the young officers committed to
psychological warfare and Algerie franqaise and the high command, that de Gaulle
now intended to return to power to redress the situation.27 Thus, at a senior level,
Gaullist-military contact in the name of the change of regime had already taken place
before May 13. Ely, however, was not entirely representative of the highly politicised
army in Algeria, as he was already sympathetic to Gaullism, opposed to any
overthrow of civilian power, and concerned with the wider question ofFrance's
24 J. Chariot, Le gaullisme d'opposition 1946-1958 (Paris: Fayard, 1983), pp. 347-8; Salan, pp. 315-8
25 B. Ullmann, Jacques Soustelle: le mal aime (Paris: Plon, 1995), p. 254
26 The paras did nothing to prevent the 13 May seizing of the Government buildings, but no
conclusive evidence exists that they had actually been won over to the Gaullist cause. Colonel Roger
Trinquier, commander of the paras on May 13, makes no reference to any Gaullist contacts in his
memoirs, but he, like Salan, had become fiercely antigaullist by the time ofwriting. R. Trinquier, Le




international alliances as much as with Algerie franqaise alone. He also agreed with
the Gaullists' view that the essential problem in Algeria was Soviet aid to the ALN,
via Egypt.28 On May 17, the first meeting took place between General Beaufort,
charged with co-ordinating the Operation Resurrection in Paris, and Michel Debre.
While this demonstrates that from this date, senior Gaullists were well aware of the
military plans - Beaufort told Debre that the Gaullists would have the final decision
as to when to launch 'Resurrection' - the fact that Debre and Beaufort had not met
sooner suggests that this particular Gaullist-military conspiracy was a new
development in May 1958.
Most Gaullist-military contacts in Paris took place towards the end ofMay 1958,
during the preparation of the 'Resurrection' operation. In metropolitan France, the
operation's success depended upon the co-operation of General Roger Miquel, who
commanded the Cinquieme Region Militaire in south-west France. Miquel, as has
already been seen, had previously worked closely with Pierre Koenig to undermine
liberal policies in Morocco (see pp. 144-5), though he cannot be described as a
Gaullist. He was, however, involved in the local Association Nationale des Franqais
d'Afrique du Nord, which was, by April 1958, threatening to stage demonstrations in
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Paris in support ofAlgerie franqaise. Direct Gaullist-military contacts are
ambiguous. Accounts range from that of Commander Vitasse, sent from Algiers to
prepare the ground in Paris for 'Resurrection', and who claims that Foccart and
Pierre Lefranc gave complete approval to the plan, to Foccart's report of the same
meeting, which insists that the Gaullists only ever approved the principle ofmilitary
30
pressure in the background to ensure that parliament would give way to de Gaulle.
28 P. Ely, Memoires, Vol. 2: Suez ... le 13 mai (Paris: Plon, 1969), pp. 264-5; Debre, pp. 297-8
29 The south-west region had a high concentration of former North African settlers by the late 1950s,
following immigration from the protectorates and Algeria. J.P. Buffelan, Le complot du 13 mai dans
le sud-ouest, (Paris: LGDJ, 1966), pp. 34-54
30
Nick, pp. 591-3 & 757-809; Gaillard, p. 142. Nick reprints Vitasse's original report on the
'Resurrection' operation, which does include the phrase 'accord complet' to describe Foccart and
Lefranc's reaction to his proposals.
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De Gaulle is generally acknowledged to have been reluctant to approve
'Resurrection'. For de Gaulle to come to power as head of a military insurrection
would deprive him of his status as national arbiter, lose him international support,
and possibly lead to internal conflict in France resulting from resistance by the Left.
The relationship between de Gaulle and the Gaullists in relation to 'Resurrection',
however, is less clear, with some Gaullists apparently as keen as the army for the
operation to take place. De Gaulle hoped that the threat ofmilitary action would
suffice to persuade parliament to accept him as Prime Minister, and insisted that the
decision-making authority for 'Resurrection' should rest not, as seemed to be the
case, with Michel Debre, but with Salan - the Gaullists would thus be free of blame
31if 'Resurrection' were to fail. To this end, de Gaulle requested that Salan send his
representative, General Dulac, to explain the plan to him. This gave rise to the report
that de Gaulle instructed Dulac to 'faites le necessaire' in the eventuality that de
Gaulle failed to win over the National Assembly.32
Some Gaullists took a more active part in the preparation of'Resurrection'. After
persuading Arrighi of the benefits of a Gaullist-military seizure of power in
-jo t .....
Corsica, Soustelle envisaged participating in the military operations in Paris.
Nonetheless, he too acknowledged that this could only be seen as a last resort if de
Gaulle were not invested in parliament. Soustelle and Salan were to be in the second
wave of forces entering Paris, behind Massu, while the full extent of the plan's
unrealistic expectations is seen in Soustelle's proposal that Massu and President Coty
should go to Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises by helicopter and bring de Gaulle to
Paris.34 Soustelle may have been encouraged by Dulac's report that de Gaulle had
promised that his policy towards Algeria would be integration,33 though it seems
unlikely that de Gaulle actually made such a promise. Trinquier's earlier request for
31
Femiot, pp. 508-9; Gaillard, p. 142
32 Ferniot, pp. 509-10; Tournoux, p. 293
33 Ullmann, p. 255
34 Ferniot, pp. 451-2; Ullmann, p. 255
35 Ferniot, pp. 509-10
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clarification of de Gaulle's views on Algeria had met with silence and it was left to
Massu to assure Trinquier that the General was committed to integration,
demonstrating how the views of Soustelle had come to represent Gaullism in
Algeria. Like Soustelle, Jacques Dauer also expected that the proposed Gaullist-
military alliance would come to fruition. He organised a number of volunteers from
youth and student Gaullist movements to support the airborne troops upon landing in
France, while Gaullists were instrumental in the creation ofCommittees of Public
Safety in eighty towns, ready to reveal themselves at the time of 'Resurrection'.37
Despite all the preparations and contacts outlined above, the joint Gaullist-military
planning was never put into operation. It would be wrong, though, to see
'Resurrection' as merely an empty threat, devised by the Gaullists to secure de
Gaulle's return and manipulating the army's activism. In order to return to power as
Prime Minister, de Gaulle had to persuade the National Assembly, the Presidents of
the two houses of parliament, and President Coty, of his ability to form a legitimate
republican government. The approval of the socialist group, in particular, was crucial
to ensure that de Gaulle won a majority in parliament for his investiture. On May 28,
de Gaulle's path to government seemed to be blocked by the refusal of the socialist
President of the National Assembly, Andre Le Troquer, to allow the General to
govern with full powers. With de Gaulle's return seeming uncertain, the army in
Algiers decided to proceed with 'Resurrection', which had been put on hold during
de Gaulle's talks with politicians in Paris. If the military operation was seen as a last
resort, in the event of de Gaulle's failure, then the state of disillusion among de
Gaulle's entourage on May 29 must explain this change of policy in Algiers.
However, the only evidence of any Gaullist involvement in this process is the fact
that Dauer was prepared to implement his part of 'Resurrection' on May 30.
President Coty's appeal to de Gaulle on May 29 prevented 'Resurrection' from
36 Ferniot, pp. 456-7
37 Williams, p. 155; Ferniot, pp. 453-4
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taking place. It would be inaccurate to describe the Gaullists as disappointed that the
military operation had not been necessary, but the enthusiasm shown by some
Gaullists, such as Dauer, demonstrates that this last resort had not been entirely
unpalatable to all Gaullists. Among the army, many were frustrated that their
moment of glory had been denied them, possibly preparing the way for the officers'
rapid disillusionment with de Gaulle's Algerian policy and their feelings of being
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used and betrayed by the Gaullists.
It must be noted that not all Gaullists were working according to the assumption that
'Resurrection' would be necessary. Edmond Michelet, for example, took part in talks
with Algerie frangaise activists, members of other political parties and Pflimlin,
aimed at finding a form of presidential appeal to de Gaulle that would be acceptable
to the activists in Algiers and the parliament in Paris, to prevent the military
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operation from taking place. Foccart, too, despite his conspiratorial reputation,
acted as intermediary between the Gaullist camp and the President of the Senate,
Monnerville, in preparation of the meeting between de Gaulle, le Troquer and
Monnerville on the night ofMay 28. The Gaullists, therefore, did show some
commitment to the principle of de Gaulle's return being accomplished according to
regular constitutional procedures. Indeed, those Gaullists who showed most interest
in 'Resurrection' were Dauer, at the head of an assortment of youth and student
activist groups, and Soustelle, increasingly immersed in the political life of Algiers
rather than Paris. De Gaulle might even be said to have achieved a kind of
reconciliation with the 'system' that the Gaullists had been denouncing for years, by
insisting on reaching agreement with former enemies like Mollet and Auriol in order
to return to power as the representative of the Nation rather than as a representative
of a particular group.
38 Foccart describes the hostility he encountered, in June 1958, from sections of the army that had




The splits within Gaullism that were to emerge over Algeria might, therefore, be seen
as emanating from the events surrounding de Gaulle's return, especially as far as
relations between de Gaulle and Soustelle are concerned; outlining his plans for
government to Auriol on May 30, de Gaulle announced that he intended to appoint a
minister for Algeria, and that: 'II ne sera en aucun cas Jacques Soustelle'.40 Algeria
was the issue that undermined Gaullist unity in the early years of the Fifth Republic,
though the question of Algerian policy was generally absent from de Gaulle's return;
very few original statements on the subject emerged in May 1958. Integration was
generally adopted as the doctrine in whose name the revolt in Algiers would take
place. Despite the doubts expressed by some Gaullists in 1956-8, as seen in chapter
8, it was the preferred option of the pieds-noirs and the army, and of Soustelle, who
was the Gaullists' chief asset in Algiers, and therefore was never contradicted by
Gaullists during the three weeks of crisis. Indeed, shortly before the revolt in Algiers,
Soustelle wrote that there was no need for Gaullists to further clarify their ideas or to
further explain the situation in Algiers; everything was sufficiently clear and all that
was required was a show of determination, presumably from the government though
this is not explicitly stated.41 By the end ofMay 1958, Foccart was able to conclude
that the events had shown both the pieds-noirs' and the Muslims' approval for
integration, as seen by the welcome received by Soustelle in Algeria, and there could
now be no question of implementing any other policy in Algeria.42
In addition to their public support for integration in May 1958, the Gaullists also
focused on the theme already developed by Debre since 1957, presenting de Gaulle
as a national arbiter and the only possible solution to the Algerian crisis. Frey thus
defended de Gaulle's silence during the government crisis and the calls for his return,
arguing that the General could only return to public life as a force above politics,
answering the call of the Nation as a whole:
40 V. Auriol, quoted in Ferniot, p. 530
41
Soustelle, 'Pour sauver l'Algerie, il faut d'abord le vouloir', Void Pourquoi, 1 1 (8.5.1958)
42 Lettre a I'Union Franqaise, 430 (29.5.1958)
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Le General de Gaulle ne saurait se departir d'un silence qui constitute sa
principale force parce qu'il est la condition meme de sa liberte. Des lors qu'il
exposerait son point de vue sur les grands problemes nationaux une coalition
d'interets se haterait d'exploiter ses paroles, de les deformer, de les traduire a
son profit en actes partiels. II est certain que la pensee du General de Gaulle,
tant qu'il ne pourra lui-meme la faire passer dans les faits, court le risque de
servir d'alibi aux uns ou aux autres et de couvrir des calculs contradictoires.43
Debre added that de Gaulle had to remain above politics and the various plots and
revolts because the General represented legitimacy, national independence and the
revival of the State.44 Given the complete absence of civil authority in Algiers and
the collapse of government in Paris, the appeal of the State's restoration in May 1958
was clear. National independence implied, above all, resisting American pressure to
withdraw from Algeria: the American cultural centre had been one of the casualties
of the revolt in Algiers, and in Paris rumours were circulating that the United States
were hostile to de Gaulle's return.45 The question of legitimacy is more ambiguous,
given that much of the army in Algeria considered itself to be in a state of legitimate
revolt along with the Gaullists, while de Gaulle had to be presented to the Nation as
the beneficiary of a legitimate process of transfer of power, not as the figurehead of a
military revolt. Debre, however, remained focused throughout May 1958 on the
situation in Paris, where for the sake of national unity it was vital that de Gaulle's
return to power appeared legitimate and republican.
In May 1958, the Gaullists avoided making any specific commitments on Algeria -
other than Algeriefrangaise or integration - and kept the issue of de Gaulle's actual
intentions out of public debate. Reference to the General took the form of appeals to
43 Les Idees ... Les Faits, 32 (9.5.1958)
44 Courrier de la Colere, 27 (22.5.1958) & 28 (30.5.1958)
43 The United States, in fact, welcomed de Gaulle's return as it ensured stability in France and
prevented civil war or a communist take-over. I.M. Wall, France, the United States and the Algerian
War (Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 151-6, 'The United States,
Algeria, and the Fall of the Fourth French Republic', Diplomatic History, 8 (1994), pp. 498-511 &
'Les relations franco-americaines et la Guerre d'Algerie 1956-1960', Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique,
110 (1996), pp. 63-89; M. Connelly, 'The French-American Conflict over North Africa and the Fall of
the Fourth Republic', Revue Franqaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, 84 (1997), pp. 9-27
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a national arbiter above the parties, or a historic saviour who could prevent military
coup, communist take-over or civil war. This strategy can be explained by the fact
that the Gaullists, by May 1958, saw de Gaulle's return as a means to achieving
certain goals, rather than as an end in itself. Many of those whose support they
enlisted - such as those in the army who rallied to Gaullism in May 1958 - appear to
have focused purely on securing the General's return, believing that his presence at
the head of the government would allow the army greater freedom of action in
Algeria. The pieds-noirs, too, traditionally sceptical of politics, appear to have
accepted the assurances they received from Gaullists like Delbecque and Soustelle,
that de Gaulle meant order, stability and Algerie frangaise. As has been seen,
however, the Gaullism that triumphed in May 1958 was already in a state of
uncertainty, reflection and change regarding Algerian policy, and it already
contained the origins of the splits that occurred between May 1958 and Algerian
independence in July 1962.
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CONCLUSION
Although studies of Gaullism tend to focus on the personal contribution of de Gaulle
himself, the subject of the present study does not lend itself easily to such an
approach. De Gaulle remained silent on North African questions between 1955 and
May 1958, and even then he gave no clear indication of his North African policies
upon his return to power. Yet the events ofMay 1958 would have been unimaginable
without the Algerian crisis, and the Gaullists' success in turning them to their
advantage could not have happened if a coherent 'Gaullist' position on the crisis in
North Africa had not existed. In conclusion, therefore, it is possible to identify the
dominant features of Gaullist thinking on North Africa and its relationship to France
at the time of de Gaulle's return to power. That de Gaulle, during the first four years
of his presidency, did not always adhere strictly to the positions already defended by
Gaullists does not undermine the conviction with which those views were held; the
General antagonised and disappointed many of his own supporters by moving
gradually towards Algerian independence. Thus, the present study of the Gaullists
and North Africa during the second half of the Fourth Republic can be seen as a
contribution to the study of the internal debate and divisions within Gaullism, by
demonstrating that the Gaullist movement did far more than simply echo de Gaulle's
pronouncements and that, when left to their own devices by a long period of exile
from power and by the silence of de Gaulle, Gaullist politicians, thinkers and
activists were more than capable of sustaining debate on the most pressing question
facing France: the crisis in North Africa.
A number of themes emerge from this study ofGaullist attitudes to French North
Africa. Upon the outbreak of widespread nationalist protest in the late 1940s and
early 1950s, the Gaullists remained convinced that nationalism was only a minority
movement, generated by foreign interference in French affairs. Their first reaction
was therefore to regard nationalism as a problem that could be addressed through
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French foreign policy, by demonstrating the degree of foreign 'interference' in North
Africa and denouncing the foreign agents involved, notably Egypt, the Soviet Union
and the United States. In this response to this perceived foreign-led nationalism, the
Gaullists adopted the concept of the Union frangaise as a symbol of commitment to
its colonial mission in North Africa, even though this constitutional framework had
excluded Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia when it was devised at the end of the Second
World War. To adopt a different course - for example, loosening the ties between
France and North Africa - was now seen as a betrayal of loyal populations. In
Morocco and Tunisia, therefore, the only constitutional changes that could be
accepted were those that devolved some power to the Moroccans - in accordance
with the spirit of protectorate - but left it in the hands of a reliable, pro-French elite,
preferably the protectorates' sovereigns rather than their politicians. In Algeria, an
integral part of France, no change in status was envisaged at all. Only measures to
secure the Algerians' 'evolution' were deemed acceptable. Algeria was therefore
somewhat sidelined by the Gaullists between the 1951 elections and the outbreak of
the rebellion in November 1954. Consequently, they saw the rebellion not as a local
phenomenon but rather as the culmination of a crisis that had been developing
through Indochinese independence and devolution of power to Morocco and Tunisia,
and became all the more determined to prevent any further French concessions.
By 1954, most of the factors that were to dominate Gaullist policy on North Africa
had become apparent through the Gaullists' reactions to the problems in Morocco
and Tunisia: resistance to internationalisation, refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy
of the principle of self-determination, attacks on government for both immobilisme
and inconsistency, warnings of the consequences of losing North Africa, and
reminders of the continuing importance of the French civilising mission. These same
themes merged with the Gaullists' more general views on France's international
status and priorities in the debate over the European Defence Community between
1952 and 1954. The Gaullists, from the end of this debate until 1958, focused on a
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perceived choice between closer relations with Europe and safeguarding French
North Africa. Moreover, the defence ofNorth Africa, after the EDC debate,
increasingly came to be presented as fulfilling the same function as European
defence co-operation: defending the Western World as a whole against communism.
In response to their new prioritisation of defence ofNorth Africa, the Gaullists won
support in military circles as many officers, after the loss of Indochina, began to see
Arab nationalism as a Trojan horse for Soviet communism. By the end of 1954 the
Gaullists were committed to spending the final four years of the Fourth Republic
arguing that France's very survival, and the welfare of the Western world, depended
upon there being no further distractions from the effort to restore France's world role
through prioritising its campaign in North Africa.
Given the priority accorded to North Africa, the Gaullists' existing policy of
opposition to any government of the Fourth Republic 'system' became closely linked
with governments' policies on Algeria and the protectorates. Only the Mendes-
France government of 1954-55 won any Gaullist approval in this respect, and once
this administration fell in February 1955, leaving unresolved problems in Morocco
and Tunisia and war in Algeria, the Gaullists became convinced that only a change of
regime could deal adequately with the crisis in North Africa. A theme of impending
crisis emerged at this stage and dominated the final years of the Fourth Republic. As
Gaullists became more intransigent in their defence ofNorth Africa and opposition
to the 'system', divisions in Gaullist ranks appeared, with any Gaullist supporting
liberal policies in North Africa or advocating participation in government generally
becoming isolated from the mainstream Gaullist movement.
As the Gaullist movement lost some of its unity following the demise of the RPF,
individuals became more influential. Jacques Soustelle and Michel Debre, in
particular, shaped Gaullist attitudes to the Algerian War and to the Fourth Republic,
between 1955 and 1958. Soustelle developed the concept of integration during his
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spell as Governor-General in Algeria, thereby creating the ideology in whose name
the Algerian settlers and the army were to be rallied to the Gaullist cause in 1958.
Integration also sowed the seeds of future discord, as Soustelle had offered the
settlers, the army and many Gaullists hope that Algeria would never be 'abandoned'
by France. The Gaullist splits and civil-military conflicts of the early Fifth Republic
can thus be seen to have their origins in Soustelle's rise to prominence as the
intellectual leader of the Gaullists on Algeria affairs from 1955, a rise that itself
owed much to the silence of other Gaullists and de Gaulle himself on specific
questions of policy towards North Africa. Soustelle committed the Gaullists to a
defence and intensification of the military effort in Algeria and thus contributed to
the coming-together of the Gaullist and military causes before 1958. He also
developed the idea of intensive economic and political commitment to Algeria,
further enhancing Algeria's status in Gaullist thinking as an issue that must become
the Nation's primary priority as the consequences of its loss would be catastrophic.
This, in turn, meant that the Fourth Republic and its governments came to be judged
by the Gaullists on the basis of their commitment to Algeria. Any signs that this
commitment was in doubt were interpreted as evidence that a change of regime was
needed to restore the Nation's sense of purpose and commitment, as symbolised by
the grand scheme of integration and development that Soustelle outlined for Algeria.
Following on from Soustelle's argument about the paramount importance of French
Algeria, Michel Debre linked Gaullism with the growing sense of crisis associated
with the war in Algeria. Debre thus allowed the Gaullists to take advantage of the
damage that the war caused to public confidence in Fourth Republic governments,
through his denunciation of their lack of commitment and submission to foreign
pressure. His activities in 1957-8 also contributed greatly to Gaullism's reputation, at
the beginning of the Fifth Republic, as a force in favour of the status quo in Algeria
and hostile to proposals for international co-operation in matters that were perceived
as being essential to the French national interest. Unlike Soustelle, Debre's
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worldview as expressed towards the end of the Fourth Republic found its way into
much of Fifth Republic Gaullism, in areas such as de Gaulle's mistrust of the
Atlantic Alliance and in the Fifth Republic's system of strong central government.
Debre, however, had in common with Soustelle the fact that de Gaulle's concern for
national redressement in general required him ultimately to choose between
distancing himself from Gaullism or abandoning his very real commitment to Algerie
frangaise. The divisions that already existed in Fourth Republic Gaullism but were
masked somewhat by the crisis in North Africa in 1957-58 are evidenced by the fact
that Soustelle's commitment to Algeria led him into open rebellion against de Gaulle,
while Debre's fidelity to de Gaulle revealed his defence ofNorth Africa during the
1950s to have been essentially a central part of a greater concern for national
greatness and freedom of action.
Many of the themes of Fifth Republic Gaullism can be seen to emerge in the Gaullist
movement's debates on colonial problems in North Africa during the Fourth
Republic. These include suspicion of the Atlantic Alliance, a desire for national unity
under a strong State, and an interest in developing and maintaining a network of
'friendly' states in the former French Empire, designed to ensure France's continued
prominence and influence in international affairs to counteract the power of the
superpowers. More generally, the study of Gaullism, also, is advanced by a study of
the Gaullists' response to North African problems. Many of the somewhat vague and
general notions ofwhat constituted Gaullism, dating from the Second World War
and the liberation era, were more closely defined in response to a crisis that raised
issues ofgrandeur, independence and unity, all ofwhich had previously featured
prominently in Gaullist discourse as general principles without having been the
subject of detailed debate in a specific context. In addition, de Gaulle's absence from
many of the debates of the 1950s on North Africa meant that the debates that took
place among leading Gaullists, in the General's absence, contributed greatly to the
development of Gaullism as a force that was able to organise and present a series of
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positions and principles in the manner of regular political forces in the Fifth
Republic, in contrast to the Fourth Republic attempt to create an organisation - the
RPF - that was chiefly concerned with avoiding conventional forms ofpolitical and
parliamentary expression. Having created a new parliamentary system and developed
a set of positions on French and international affairs, the Gaullists' debates of 1951-
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